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ABSTRACT 
Eight years.after Transkei has been granted independence, the 
independent states have become an important component of the South 
African political landscape, and their existence cannot be ignored 
despite the fact that no other country but South Africa has recognised 
their independence. 
This thesis is concerned with the evaluation of the choice of 
independence. The reasons are examined which led the South African 
government to grant independence to the homelands, and those which 
induced some of the homeland leaders to accept it. An evaluation is 
made of the political and economic benefits and lack thereof this choice 
has brought to those who made it and to their communities, with a view 
to the role the independent states may play in future developments in 
South Africa. 
A descriptive-analytical approach has been adopted and the main 
subjects have been presented in their chronological unfolding, in order 
to stress the basic continuity in the aims pursued both on the part of 
the South African government and on the part of the homeland leaders, 
despite numerous tactical adaptations to the circumstances on both sides. 
Most of the information has been gathered from.the Hansard of the 
House and from reports of various commissions and government White Papers. 
Official documents from the independent states and the economic 
corporations working therein have also been extensively used. Other 
information and data have been gathered during a period of fieldwork in 
Ciskei and Transkei and through a number of interviews. 
The time passed since the granting of independence to the homelands 
which opted for it is still too short for an exhaustive evaluation of the 
effects this choice had for their population. It is however possible to 
draw a few preliminary conclusions regarding the effects the independent 
states will have in the evolution of the political situation in South 
Africa. The most important is that they are here to stay, bar a total 
defeat of the white government in an all-out war, and that they may be 
a factor in a still possible peaceful solution of the South African 
prob 1 ems. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The society and political system of South Africa are certainly 
unusual in the present world. Granted, South Africa is not the only 
country in the world where a minority of the population possesses the 
political power, controls the economy and enjoys far higher standards 
of living than the destitute and powerless majority, nor is South Africa 
' 
the only country where such a minority can so clearly be circumscribed 
to an ethnic or racial group, to the point of identifying itself with 
such a group. The uniqueness of South Africa is given by its political 
and legislative system, in which race is~ ope legis, the discriminatory 
criterion by which every person is given his place in the society. 
This blatant infringement of the rules of non-discrimination which 
are accepted (in theory) in the whole world, and the wide gap in the 
economic, educational and social conditions between the white ruling 
minority and the huge non~white majority, make South Africa a potentially 
highly explosive society. The impossibility of maintaining a situation 
of sheer racial domination has long been appreciated by many white 
leaders, although the diffusion of this awareness to all sectors of the 
white group has been somewhat slow and incomplete. There can be no doubt 
about the long term instability of the present South African situation; 
thus there are no doubts about the necessity of changing the socio-
political system of South Africa. The necessity to 'adapt or die' has 
been pointed out forcefully to the white group even by the leaders of 
the present government. 
One of the most important aspects of the South African reality is given 
by the ethnic and cultural differences existing amongst the various groups 
which form the population of the country. These differences not only 
separate the four racial groups which by law constitute the population 
of this country, but are also present within the groups themselves, 
making the situation in South Africa and the solution to its problems 
even more complicated than it appears at first sight. 
Ethnic differences have a high potential for being the source of many 
troubles if they are not handled with care, and even more so if they are 
ignored. Therefore, ethnicity is a powerful force which has.to be taken 
into consideration and given effective practical recognition if one wants 
to keep peaceful a country where different ethnic groups live together. 
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In a country with so many ethnic groups, where racial separation and 
discrimination have such a long history, and where the government is the 
expression of the interests and fears of one of those groups, it was 
inevitable that ethnicity - and race - would become the inspiring 
principle of any political move. Even when in the light of the changing 
international situation the most perceptive amongst the leaders of the 
Afrikaner group saw the inevitability of the demise of 'baasskap' as the 
principle of South Africa's internal policy, the solution they could 
devise - the homelands - was almost obligatorily based on ethnicity. 
The most important aims any South African government - being the 
Afrikanerdom-in-politics - may conceivably have are the maintenance of 
Afrikaner power over South Africa or over as great a part of South Africa 
as possible as a means to guarantee Afrikaner economic well-being, and, 
most important, the preservation of Afrikaner identity. In view of the 
strong belief that South Africa was given to the Afrikaner by the Will 
of God - a belief amazingly (at least for a foreigner) held by a large 
number of Afrikaners - it is possible that economic well-being would 
have a lower priority than the preservation of Afrikaner power over 
South Africa. (Of course, since the National Party is - or was - the 
expression of Afrikanerdom and, as such, is the best guarantee for the 
Afrikaner to obtain the above-quoted aims, for the present government 
the number one priority becomes to keep the National Party in power; 
but this is another story.) 
In these conditions, th~ racial aspect is certainly important, but 
it is my opinion that 'white supremacy• as opposed to 'Afrikaner supremacy' 
is not per se high on this list of priorities: unless there is an 
Afrikaner supremacy (at least politically) in the white group, white 
supremacy is not that important. Certainly, it is not possible to say 
that we have an 1 Afrikaner-ruled 1 South Africa with the same meaning as 
we.give to 'white-ruled' South Africa. Nevertheless, it is undeniable 
that at least in the political field South Africa is Afrikaner-dominated. 
The other Whites (English speakers and immigrants) are part of the ruling 
group for many reasons, not least of them because they are Whites. The 
main reason, however, is that they constituted an easily co-optable 
reserve for the garrison of th_e_ l aager,. once it was assured that they 
could not try to take control of it. 
When the pressure against the laager increases, when the Afrikaners 
feel that their control of South Africa may be threatened, there are two 
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reactions. On the one hand, they offer an alternative target and try 
to channel the forces in movement against them towards it - as in the 
case of the homelands. On the other hand, they try to enlarge the 1aager 
and to co-opt fresh forces for this garrison - as happened in the early 
1960s with the encouragement given to white immigration, and as it is 
happening now with the new constitutional proposals. This co-option to 
the ruling group, however, can be taken into consideration only provided 
that the new comers accept a somewhat minor role and, mos't important, 
provided that they will not be able to challenge the dominant position 
of the Afrikaners or their security. 
The first and foremost principle that inspires the actions of the 
government is the safeguarding and the furtherance of the Afrikaner volk. 
It is therefore improbable that the co-option to the halls of power of 
the Republic of South Africa might be extended to the Blacks: if Blacks 
are accepted as political equals, they will be able to take control of 
South Africa, merely because they are more numerous than everybody else 
put together. Neither the government nor the white community at large 
are prepared to accept this. 
How, then, will it be possible to find a. solution to the South 
African problems which will defuse the explosion that many people foresee 
as looming in the future of South Africa? When the government began to 
realise that the situation was changing_ and that it had become necessary 
for the long term defence of the Afrikaner people to find a constructive 
answer to the question of how the Blacks could fulfil their political 
aspirations, it was most likely that ethnicity would become the insp1r1ng 
principle behind this aspect of the government policy too. The relatively 
great number of different black peoples living in South Africa, their 
significant differences, the historical rivalries amongst them made it 
easy for the government to decide that the solution lay in recognising 
the ethnic identity of each people and in encouraging them to assert their 
political aspirations within their nation. In the light of Afrikaner 
experience, and of the experience of many African countries, it was a 
sensible solution. It was even more sensible from the government's point 
of view, since it allowed a handbook-case application of the old divide 
et impera policy. 
The homelands have been created with one main aim: to establish 
territories where the Blac.ks could live apart from the Whites and where 
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they would find an outlet for their political aspirations, so that they 
could not.advance any claim for a participation in the political life 
of the 'white homeland', thus not endangering white rule over it. But 
although the homelands policy has been formulated by the Afrikaners in 
the paramount interest of the Afrikaners (in this context Afrikaner and 
White may be considered interchangeable - provided, of course, that 
Afrikaner control of the white group is assured), it may also have some benefits 
for its largely passive subject, the Blacks; and it is possible to say 
that it has already obtained some beneficial results for some of them. 
In the last decade, a number of black interest groups has appeared 
in the South African society, most of them as a result of the homelands 
policy. Even more important from the political point of view, the room 
of manoeuvre and the freedom to criticise gained by the homeland leaders 
has slowly extended to other black groups and has contributed to the 
limited but real improvement of the general conditions of the Blacks. 
Tlie·homelands and the independent states are very weak and almost 
helpless in comparison with South Africa, and are incapable of surviving 
without Pretoria's commitment to their survival. But they are strong 
enough to play an important role in the lives of many Blacks. Moreover, 
they constitute a basis of power, albeit limited, from which the Blacks 
can start bargaining with the Whites to improve their conditions, and 
also possibly to increase their political weight. They are one of the 
few legal instruments for representing the Blacks and this can be used 
by them to expound their grievances and their requests. They are the 
only institution which is recognized by the government as entitled to 
speak for the Blacks and with which the government is prepared to 
negotiate as between equals. 
The homelands wield a tangible power, and have at their disposal 
resources which are not inconsiderable even though they are limited. 
With independence the TBVC countries have increased the scope of their 
power and have become autonomous actors on the political scene of 
Greater South Africa. The effects their decision to opt for independence 
had on their population and the way in which they will be able to benefit 
from it will have an important part in the future of South Africa. 
Whether or not this future wi 11 be peaceful wi 11 be0 determined al so by 
the degree of success of these independent states. 
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This thesis is concerned with the evaluation of the choice of 
independence - the reasons which led the South African government to 
grant independence to the homelands and those which induced some of the 
homeland leaders to accept it, and the political and economic advantages 
and disadvantages this choice brought them - with a view to the role the 
independent states may play in future developments in South Africa. 
The first part examines the historical background to the present 
circumstances, taking into consideration how and why the policy of 
separate development took shape and was implemented. This examination 
will identify the existence of a continuous thread in the government's 
attitude towards the presence of Blacks in the midst of what it liked 
to call a 'white man's country', and towards the threat such a presence 
poses to white control over South Africa. It will also point out that 
although the homelands as they exist now were not even in the imagination· 
of the people leading South Africa in the years before the second World 
War, nor probably in that of the drafters of the Bantu Authorities Act 
of 1951, they are the result of an unbroken sequence of logical steps. 
It will also underline that this policy has been essentially a pragmatic 
policy, and that its implementation has been adapted to the other exigencies 
of South African politics, particularly in response to the changing 
international situation and in support of South African foreign policy. 
In the second part I shall investigate the reasons which led the 
government to offer independence to the homelands and the reasons which 
induced some of the homeland leaders to accept it. I shall again 
emphasize that this policy, although firmly based on ideological convictions, 
was - and is - a pragmatic policy. This is one of its most important 
aspects, because it allowed the government to modify it in conformity 
to changing requirements imposed by changing circumstances (or at least 
in conformity to changing requirements as seen from its point of view); 
and because it is quite possible that changing circumstances will lead 
to future modifications, of which the constellation of states and the 
search for a new role for the urban Blacks are examples. I shall also 
try to show that although separate development, in its broad limits, was a 
logical outcome of the dominant ideology applied to this aspect of the 
South African reality, the influence exerted by single individuals on 
the elaboration and implementation of this policy has sometimes been 
considerable. Dr. H. Ve~oerd was certainly a determining factor in 
the evolution of separate development as it is now. But if Verwoerd 
can without doubt be regarded as the most important individual in the 
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history of separate development, others too have played an important 
role. M.C.Botha, as Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, 
exerted a strong curbing influence; while P. Koornhof, first as deputy 
minister under M.C. Botha and then as Minister of Co-operation and 
Development, was the main representative of the verligte wing of the 
National Party operating in this field to revitalize and give impetus 
to the homelands policy. I shall also point out that the personal 
choices of the black leaders were the most important factors in the 
decision of some homelands to become independent. These leaders, 
however, were not aiming only at their personal interests (not all of 
them at any rate). They made a definite choice, evaluating the conditions 
in which they were operating,and the short and medium term perspectives, 
in the conviction that the effects of their choice would bring some 
benefits also to their peoples. The attitude of the homelands' 
population towards independence, however, has not been that hoped for 
by the leaders of the independent states and the South African govern-
ment. The main reaction to independence has been one of apathy, with 
a sizeable minority of the Blacks concerned rejecting it outright, and 
a smaller minority accepting it with limited enthusiasm. 
In Part III, I shall investigate the results the choice of independence 
had for the TBVC countries. I shall examine the agreements entered into 
between South Africa and the independent states, paying special attention 
to the most important of them, such as those regarding security matters 
and economic relations. It will be pointed out that, despite all their 
efforts, the black leaders did not succeed in changing South Africa's 
basic conditions for independence. The most vital field for the success 
of the whole policy, the economic field, will then be taken into 
consideration. The different instruments South Africa uses to give 
economic support to the independent states will be examined, and it will 
be pointed out that the homelands which chose independence had, as a 
result of their choice, a bigger share of South Africa's aid, although 
not as big as one might imagine and for a limited period only. A very 
short outline of the economic conditions of two of the independent states 
will follow, to show in brief what effects South African aid had for 
these countries and how far this effort still is from having a successful 
outcome. I shall then examine how independence affected two issues which 
are among the most sensitive both for the South African government and 
for the homeland leaders: land and citizenship. The homeland leaders 
who chose independence were not able to induce the South African government 
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to make substantial concessions regarding either of them. As far as 
citizenship is concerned, the South African government remained firm 
in its unbending stance; and it could not be otherwise because this 
is the basic objective of separate development. On the land issue, 
however, it was more malleable. The concessions it made before indepen-
dence were not large, but they were not inconsiderable either. After 
the victory of the verligte wing in the power struggle within the National 
Party, the government accepted that the 1975 'final' consolidation 
proposals were inadequate, and since then the Commission for Co-operation 
and Development has worked to devise a new programme for further consoli-
dation and enlargement of the homelands. Again, we shall not see any 
radical change in this regard: land is too emotive an issue to be treated 
lightly and lightly given away. Every acre of land given to the homelands 
will cost the government support and votes from amongst the Afrikaners. 
- The granting of every acre of land thus will be painfully discussed and 
fought over. It is possible that those homelands which have chosen 
independence will be favoured in the sharing out of the limited amount 
of land that will be released at the end of this process. Since this 
land will be transferred a little at a time, because of the costs involved, 
it is possible that the independent states will have precedence also in 
the transfer. This might be one of the ways in which the choice of 
independence will start paying positive returns in a not too distant future. 
In Chapter 10 I shall draw some conclusions from what I have examined. 
I shall try to detennine if and within what limits the policy of separate 
development has up to now been successful from the government point of 
view; and if and within what limits the decision taken by some homeland 
leaders to opt for independence has had any positive consequences for 
the peoples concerned. This will allow a first evaluation of the role 
the independent states have had and wil.l have in preventing the 
acceleration of the worsening of the present situation and an outcome 
'too ghastly to contemplate'. 
PART I 
THE EVOLUTION OF SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT 
. CHAPTER 1 
POLITICAL AND OTHER RIGHTS OF THE BLACKS 
BEFORE THE NATIONAL PARTY GOVERNMENT 
The Blacks have always occupied the lowest place in South African 
society and discriminatory legislation against them has certainly not 
been a National Party invention. Even before Union their condition was 
the same, not only in the Boer republics, where they had no political 
rights at all, but also in the British colonies. Even in the 'progressive' 
Cape Colony various measures were in force with the aim of controlling 
the movements of the Blacks. These measures had not, however, a deep 
political meaning. Although they had been enacted to assure a steady 
and controlled supply of black labour, they were not part of a larger 
political design aimed at excluding the Blacks from the political life 
of the country. Indeed, in the Cape Colony the qualified franchise of 
the time was open to everybody who met the qualifications. 
After the establishment of the Union Afrikaner nationalism could 
exert its influence over the whole of South Africa. However, the control 
of the government was only for a short time in the complete power of the 
nationalists. For the greatest part of the period up to 1948 the 
government was in the hands of the Smuts party, consisting of moderate 
Afrikaners and English-speakers, or of the Hertzog-Smuts coalition. 
The various changes of government in this period exclude the 
possibility that the Native policy could have been directed by clear 
and unchanging ideological premises. However, the results of this 
policy look as if a clear objective were pursued, viz., the separation 
of the Blacks and their exclusion from the political life of South Africa. 
In the early years of the century the Blacks had a limited franchise 
and were hoping to extend it; they had a relative freedom of movement; 
and they were beginning to acquire land in increasing quantity. When 
Malan's National Party came to power, the Blacks had an almost meaningless 
franchise on a separate voters' roll, their movements were strictly 
controlled and their right to. live in the urban areas increasingly 
curbed, and the areas where they could live enjoying property rights 
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were rigidly demarcated. The National Party's policy brought about a 
change in the intensity and ideological rigidity of the application of 
the principle of separation rather than a totally new principle in 
complete contrast with the previous policy. 
1.1 The 'Native Franchise' 
1.1.1 Pre-Union political rights 
The question of political rights for the Blacks is one of the oldest 
causes of dissension in South African politics. Before the formation of 
the Union of South Africa, the British colonies and the Boer republics 
followed a different path on this subject: the latter clearly stating 
in their constitutions that 1 the people will not allow equality between 
Whites and Natives neither in the state nor in the Church', and the 
former excluding race as a discriminatory criterion for voting rights. 
Also between the two British colonies there were differences in the 
attitude towards Black franchise, the rules in Natal being far tighter 
than those in the Cape. 
In Natal the possibility of Black franchise was regulated by Law 11 
of 1865 which had the practical effect of debarring all the Blacks from 
the franchise, excluding those who were exempted from Native Law. In 
order to be admitted to the franchise a Black had to be: male; over 21 
years old; resident in Natal for at least twelve years; exempted from 
Native Law for at least seven years; and in possession of the general 
Natal qualifications (literacy, property valued at at least .£50, or 
rental of .£10 p.a., or income of .£96 p.a.). (l) How stringent these 
conditions were is proved by the fact that in 1904 only two Blacks had 
the right to vote in the whole of Natal. 
In the Cape Colony the situation was very different. The 1 Native 
Franchise' was introduced there by the Cape of Good Hope Constitution 
Ordinance of 1852 (which established representative government in the 
Colony), not explicity, but by implication, since among the 
disqualifications for the franchise race and colour were not mentioned. 
,The qualifications for voters were the occupation for one year of property 
to the value of at least .£25, or salary and wages of at least .£50 p.a., 
or £25 p.a. with board and lodging. 
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By 1884 the number of Black voters in the Cape was large enough 
for them to hold the balance in some constituencies of the Eastern 
Cape. This caused a tightening of the qualifications, which by the 
Franchise and Ballot Act (No. 9 of 1892) became: the occupation of 
property valued at not less then £75, or the receipt of salary and wages 
of at least £50 p.a.; in addition every person applying for registration 
had to pass a literacy test. Two years later, by the Glen Grey Act 
(No. 25 of 1894), the tribal .lands and land held under quitrent tenure 
·in terms of the Act were not allowed to count as qualifications for 
the franchise. Notwithstanding this tightening of the qualifications, 
by 1903 there were 8 117 black voters (out of 135 168), who held the 
balance in seven constituencies out of forty-six. (2) 
By the first decade of this century small grou.ps of politically 
conscious Blacks had appeared in the· four South African colonies. Within 
the Cape they enjoyed a limited political influence, which was nevertheless 
particularly strong in the Eastern part of the Colony. In the three other 
colonies they had to rely on moral assertions, petitions and in the last 
instance on appeals to the Crown. They considered the Cape system, with 
its common voters' roll symbolising non-racial ideals, as the prototype 
for a just Native policy. When, after the Treaty of Vereeniging and 
during the negoti ati ans for the es tab 1 i shment of the Uni on, it became 
clear that the discriminatory policy of the Boer republics was by no 
means ended, and, to the contrary, that it was likely to remain in 
force and even to be extended to the Cape, black political consciousness 
reached new heights. Local and regional political organisations emerged 
and coalesced, and the foundations were·laid for the emergence of a 
South Africa-wide black political organisation. 
1.1.2 The Union of South Africa and the birth of the African 
· National Congress 
One of the most hotly debated points in the negotiations for the 
constitution of the Union was what kind of franchise there would be for 
the Blacks, and whether there should be any franchise at all. The 
positions were well de 1 i neated. On the one hand there was the Cape 
Colony with its Native Franchise, standard-bearer of the enlightened 
imperial traditions and ideals of 'equal rights for every civilized man'; 
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on the other hand there were the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies, 
the former Boer republics, which had recently received self-government 
and were determined to uphold - and possibly extend to the whole Union -
their policy of depriving the Blacks of any political influence. 
Although the Natal Colony was the most British of the four, it was more 
interested in keeping the Zulus under tight control than in supporting 
imperial ideals of equality. 
Because of the evolution of the political structure of the British 
Empire, by 1907 the British government had come to accept an equality of 
status for the self-governing communities overseas. Such a recognition 
precluded British intervention in their domestic affairs. This evolution, 
designed mainly for Australia, New Zealand and Canada, had the effect of 
freeing the South African colonies from imperial interference in Native 
affairs. Since the union was thus to be negotiated and decided from 
within the country's own power structure, it proved impossible to 
convince the ex-Boer republics and Natal to accept a more enlightened 
attitude in Native policy. 
In the end, it was agreed - and the South Africa Act was accordingly 
drafted - that each province was to maintain its own system, therefore 
confining the non-European vote to the Cape, and that membership of 
Parliament was to be limited to persons of European descent. On the 
other hand, the Cape Franchise was entrenched, since the clause 
recognizing it required a qualified majority to be modified. For giving 
some voice (in theory .at least) to the Blacks of the o.ther provinces, 
four of the eight nominated senators were to be selected on the ground 
of their knowledge of "the reasonable wants and wishes of the coloured 
races in South Africa". (3) 
This solution did not satisfy the Afrikaner nationalists, who had 
tried to eliminate completely any black participation to Parliamentary 
elections in any province, and immediately considered the abrogation of 
the entrenched clause protecting the Native Franchise in the Cape as a 
particularly important political objective. Nor did this solution satisfy 
the Blacks, or at least it did not satisfy that small part of the black 
population which at the time was interested in such things. 
In reality, since the Treaty of Vereeniging was published, the 
politically active Blacks started worrying abou.t the future, and working 
towards the establishment of organisations which could articulate their 
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political aspirations. The fact that the former Boer republics were 
promised and a few years later granted self-government was rightly 
interpreted as the renunciation by Britain to extend to the north the 
Cape system. After the publication of the draft South Africa Act, in 
all four colonies Native Congresses were held to express black opinions 
about how the proposed union shou 1 d grant them representation. These 
regional conventions elected delegates for a South African Native 
Convention which met at Bloemfontein towards the end of March 1909. 
This convention pleaded in its resolutions for the retention and 
extension of the Cape system. It rejected the colour bar clauses and 
asked that the clause entrenching the Cape Franchise be made unalterable. 
In practice an alternative approach to black representation was required, 
an approach providing full and equal rights for all without distinction 
of class, colour or creed. 
Since the Convention's requests were not accepted, a delegation 
nominated by it was sent to England to put its case to the "Mother of 
Parliaments". The delegation had however to adopt more limited goals, 
since the extension of the Cape system to the other provinces was out of 
the question. The goals were now the elimination of the clause reserving 
membership of the Senate and House of Assembly to persons of European 
descent, the strengthening of the safeguards for the Cape Franchise, and 
imperial rule for the Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland Protectorates. 
Notwithstanding some success in winning over pub1ic opinion, the 
delegation failed to attain its main goal of the removal of the colour 
bar from the South Africa Act. The Protectorates, however, were to be 
kept out of the Union - although the delegation's influence on this 
decision was irrelevant - until such time as South Africa's Native policy 
conformed with imperial ideals. 
With the memory of the war still very much alive, the elections of 
1910 were bitterly fought, and polarised white society. In such a 
situation, Botha's government had to tread a very careful path and had 
to pay particular attention to the rural Afrikaners who had an extreme 
attitude as far as racial issues were concerned. (This was to become a 
constant factor in South African politics and still conditions every move 
of the South African government.) Although no systematic Native policy 
was attempted in the years immediately following the formation of the 
Union, several discriminatory laws were passed( 4) which gave a foretaste 
of how the government intended to settle its Native affairs. 
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Although "apathy, indifference and tribal sentiment continued to 
characterise the African masses",(S) the small groups which had debated 
the issues in the period preceding the Union were still active, albeit 
on a local and unco-ordinated basis. The first two years of Union gave 
those leaders of the black community sufficient causes for alann: 
major issues of Native policy had been rasied and were being detennined 
by the Afrikaners. 
These deve 1 opments 1 ed to a growing pol i ti cal awareness of the s·1 acks. 
·In their reaction to discrimination they also became aware of the 
necessity of checking tribal antipathies and hostilities, and of 
establishing an organisation through which the development of a common 
black nation could be encouraged. Such an organisation was established 
in January 1912, when many prominent chiefs and leaders of local black 
organisations gathered in Bloemfontein to found the South African Native 
National Congress which became the S.A.A.N.C. in 1919. The essentially 
moderate nature of the Congress is well evinced by the statements made 
by some of its most important leaders in which they pointed out that 
the Congress had been formed 11 to provide a representative and responsible 
outlet for African opinion, and to so avoid the exploitation of Native 
fears and suspicions by irresponsible agitators". (6) Although the. 
Congress was at this time respectful towards the chiefs (many of them 
were amongst its founding members), and envisaged establishing them in an 
upper house, it identified tribalism as one of the main obstacles to its 
aim of a united black people. The Congress was to be a supra-tribal 
organisation which in the end would root out tribal prejudices; and the· 
pre-existent small and scattered organisations were to become a single 
body recognised as the real voice of the black people. Since the founding 
members were traditional leaders or the products of missionary education, 
the political aims of the Congress could hardly have been revolutionary. 
They wanted equality of opportunity in the economic life and political 
institutions of a society which was to be based on non-racial principles. 
Such a society was to be based also on the generally recognised Western 
principles of the time which admitted equality only amongst 'civilised' 
persons. How far from radical the founders of the Congreee were is 
demonstrated by the fact that they accepted the Cape qualified franchise 
as their ideal, and by their decision to use only the most legal and 
respectful means to air their grievances and to further their aims. 
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1.1.3 Introduction of the Sepa~ate Voters• Roll 
That the Afrikaner nationalists considered the provisions of the 
South Africa Act only as a temporary solution to the Native policy 
problems is shown by the Natives Land Act of 1913 (See below 1.3.1) 
which enforced territorial separation, scheduling the areas reserved 
to black property. This territorial separation was seen as a prelude 
to a complete separation of the Blacks in the political field, and not 
. only by the most extreme Afrikaner nationalists. (7) 
The issue of black representation at central level, however, qid 
not come to the fore of Uni on policy for many years, a 1 so because the 
World War, and the economic and social crisis which followed it, required 
the full attention of the government. Nevertheless this issue was never 
far from the mind of the Afrikaner nationalists. When, in 1924, Hertzog's 
National Party came into power with its programme of racial segregation, 
it began almost immediately to seek a way for eliminating the black 
presence on the voters• roll. The so-called Hertzog bills of 1926(8) 
were the first attempt of an organ.ic Native policy for the whole Union 
and they left no doubts that this government envisaged no place at all 
in the central political arena for the Blacks. 
Notwithstanding that the Congress in the preceding few years had 
shown a marked reluctance to confront the authorities openly and had 
even shown a certain willingness to compromise with the government on 
some aspects of its proposed policy of segregation, the reaction of the 
politically active Blacks to those bills and to the policy they pre-
supposed was irrmediate and unmistakeable: the bills were unacceptable, 
particularly those which tampered with the Cape Franchise. 
However, b 1 ack opinion had little influence and the effects of its 
opposition were irrelevant. Nevertheless, the bills failed to go beyond 
the first reading when they were introduced into the House in March 1927. 
Since more urgent problems needed a solution, and since the Hertzog 
coalition did not have enough votes to overcome the entrenched clauses 
of the South Africa Act, for some years this question was kept quiet. 
When, in 1933, a coalition government was formed between Hertzog and 
Smuts, and in the following year their two parties merged to form the 
United Party, the way for a general review of the political situation of 
the Blacks was open. After some bargain to gain the votes of some M.P.s 
for the Eastern Cape, in 1935 two bills were introduced into Parliament 
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which consolidated and ~ightly modified the previous four Hertzog bills. 
The year 1936 saw the enactment of those two bills in the form of two 
comprehensive laws that in the view of the government should have 
settled the 1 Native 1 problem forever. These acts were: the Native 
Trust and Land Act (No. 18 of 1936) which dealt mainly with the territorial 
and residential aspects of the question, and the Representation of 
Natives Act (No. 12 of 1936) which solved (for the moment) the issue of 
black representation. 
The Representation of Natives Act modified the South Africa Act and 
removed the entrenched clause protecting the Cape Franchise, eliminating 
any effective black influence at central level. Some kind of black 
franchise remained in the Cape Province, but now the Blacks were on a 
separate voters 1 roll, and they could elect only three M.P.s (for the 
Transkeian Territories, Eastern Cape, and the rest of the Cape Province).( 9) 
In the Senate, four Senators remained as representative of the Blacks 
of the whole Union, this time indirectly elected by an electoral council 
composed of the Chiefs of the tribes, the local councils, the Native 
Advisory Boards and the el ectora 1 committees. ( 10 ) The four senators 
were to represent the Province of Natal, the Provinces of Transvaal and 
Orange Free State, the Transkeian Territories, and the Cape Province 
excluding the Transkeian Territories. (ll) This Act established also a 
Native Representative Council whose functions were to consider and report 
upon "proposed legislation affecting the black people; any matter 
referred to it by the Minister; any matter specifically affecting the 
interests of the Natives"; and to recommend, to Parliament or to any 
provincial council, legislation which it considered necessary in the 
interest of the Blacks. (l2) It was a meagre exchange for the elimination 
of direct black participation in the elections. The Native Representative 
Council was only an advisory board and, although ~epresenting all the 
Blacks of South Africa, it had no real power, and its opinions and 
suggestions could be easily ignored. 
Amongst the Blacks, discussion of the proposed legislation had 
continued since the publication of the four original Hertzog bills but 
a renewed wave of opposition developed when the two modified bills were 
published in 1935. By the mid~thirties, however, the Congress had lost 
its pre-eminence in black politics and lacked both the organisation and 
the leadership to co-ordinate the opposition to the proposed legislation.(l3) 
The peak of the black opposition came with the formation of the All-
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African Convention in which many members of the A.N.C. played an 
important part. The Convention met in Bloemfontein at the end of 
1935 and restated the strong opposition of the Blacks to the bills. 
In its resolution the Convention affirmed its opinion that the only 
policy which could protect the interests of all was a policy of 
political identity, directed to the creation of a united South African 
nation where the different groups wou 1 d be bound together by the 
pursuit of common political objectives, although free to develop on 
their own lines. 
There was no point of contact between the position of the All-
African Convention and that of the government, and the two bills -
again modified - were enacted with the opposition of the Blacks. 
Once these two laws were on the statute book, however, the A.A.C. and 
the A.N.C. were forced to come to terms with their existence and to 
elaborate a policy towards the new fonns of representation. Since a 
wholehearted acceptance of the acts was not possible, two choices 
-· - - ....... . 
remained: a complete boycott or a participation 6bt6rt6 tollo in the 
institutions at their disposal, in the hope of using the Native 
Representative Council in the defence of black interests and as a 
platform for continuing.the struggle against racial discrimination. 
This latter choice prevailed, although not before the frustration felt 
by the Blacks introduced a new element of radi ca 1 ism into the thinking : 
of many of them. 
In this atmosphere of diffident readiness to collaborate, the 
following years saw the implementation of the Representation of Natives 
Act, and with some hope the Native Representative Council started its 
collaboration with the government. The deteriorating international 
situation and the war which followed took the atten~ion of the govern-
ment away from the black question, and the hoped-for collaboration 
between that semi-representative body of black opinion and the 
authorities failed for the most part to materialise. 
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1.2 Utbanisation and infl~x tontrol 
1.2.1 Pre-1936 utbanisati6h ahd ~arly t6httol ~~as~tes 
The influx of black people into the 'white', and particularly, 
into the urban areas of South Africa is a reality of South African 
society since the second half of the last century. At first it was 
a limited occurrence: not many Blacks moved from their tribal areas, 
and when they did so, it was mainly to earn enough money to pay the 
taxes and not to settle in those areas. In this period the movement · 
of Blacks to the areas of white economic activity (mainly farms) was 
encouraged by the white authorities: the farmers needed labour and a 
source of it was at hand. It was only a matter of· convincing the 
Blacks to work on the white farms, and the authorities obliged. 
The trickle of black seasonal workers to the white farms began to 
swell after the discovery of diamonds in the Kimberley area and became 
an unstoppable flood of labourers after the start of the mining 
activity on the Reef. Again, these first waves of the black influx 
were the result of a definite policy on the part of the Whites rather 
than the result of a desire to go to the mines or to the towns on the 
part of the Blacks. Mining required a great deal of manpower and the 
rapidly growing population of the mining districts required to be fed 
and supplied. The need for black labourers grew and the authorities 
resorted to many means, fair or unfair, to assure the white farmers and 
the fledgling mining industry of the steady flow of labour they wanted. 
Up to this time the laws and regulations which regulated the move-
ment of Blacks to the 'white' areas and their residence therein were 
simply provisions for the maintenance of public order, as in the case 
of the measures taken against 'vagrancy', or provisions taken.to defend 
the white territories, some of which had been established less than a 
generation earlier, from a still dangerous enemy. The growing number 
of Blacks moving into the white areas and towns as a result of the 
expansion of mining activities caused the authorities to exert stricter 
control on their movements. These first examples ef pass-1 aws, however, 
were sti 11 an instrument for contra 11 i ng the movements of the Blacks in 
order to guarantee a constant supply of labour to the mines,{l4) rather 
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than measures for the control of a part of the population which might 
pose a political threat. 
At the beginning of this century, an already substantial number of 
Blacks was living in the urban areas. Although this number was far 
from being politically dangerous, the implications of this demographic 
trend began to become apparent to the authorities. The census of 1904 
in the Cape Colony showed that within the borders of 1875 plus 
Griqualand West (i.e., the Colony less the Transkeian Territories and 
. British Bechuanaland) there were 431 175 1 Kafirs and Bechuanas' and 
118 398 'Fingoes 1 constituting about 29% and about 8% of the total 
' population respectively. (See Table 1.) The number of urban Blacks 
within the same borders was 91 812, with an increase of 46 686 from 
1891. (l5) The fact the census figures underlined, i.e., that the 
natural demographic trends in the various areas of the Colony were 
being modified by the migratory movements of Blacks towards the white 
areas, was pointed out by the writer of the census report~ who noted: 
... another feature of the growth of the population, viz., the 
fact that the increase in the Native Territories between 1891 
and 1904 has been by no means so great as was to be expected 
from the analogy of the years 1879 to 1891, whereas in the Eastern 
Districts of the 'Old Cape' and in 1 Kaffraria 1 it had been much 
more rapid than was anticipated. 
and concluded 
The primary inference .•• to be drawn ... (is) .•. that the 
natives had been leaving th~ Territories to settle or to find 
work in these Districts.(16; 
The official concern about the growing number of Blacks living in 
the white areas may be dated to the beginning of the century, but 
during this period the negotiations for Union drew almost all the 
attention, and the movement of Blacks to the white areas was still 
encouraged because it was still an influx of temporary migrants and 
was necessary to the economic growth. 
From the beginning the Native policy of the Union tended to 
segregation. Yet the first field to be taken into consideration by 
the legislative activity was that of territorial segregation in the 
rura 1 areas, with the demarcation of the land reserved for the Blacks 
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(Natives' Land Act, 1913) and the establishment in those territories 
of some form of local government (Natives Affairs Act. 1920). The 
regulation of the influx of Blacks into the urban areas and their 
status therein was left to measures primarily concerned with labour 
regulation or the maintenance of public order. By 1921 the urban 
Blacks were 587 000, representing 12,5% of the total Black population 
of the Union. Even more significant was the fact that those 587 000 
urban Blacks constituted 34% of South Africa's urban population.( 17 ) 
In this period the attitude of the government towards the presence 
of Blacks in the urban areas ceased to be one of indifference 
tempered by the need of assuring a constant flow of labour to the mines 
and the nascent industries. This was the period in which the 'poor 
Whites' phenomenon reached the explosion point. The urban Blacks were 
in direct competition with those 'poor Whites', most of whom were 
Afrikaners leaving their impoverished farms, and the government could 
not afford to overlook the problem any longer. The main reaction was 
again in the field of labour relations with the reinforcement of the 
colour bar, which became even more deeply entrenched. through the 
application of the Apprenticeship Act of 1922, the Industrial 
Conciliation Act of 1924 and the Wages Act of 1925. Also in the field 
of influx control, measures were taken. The Native (Urban Areas) Act 
of 1923 (No. 21 of 1923) regulated the subject. Every urban authority 
of the Union had to reserve areas for black occupation, in which 
reserved areas property transacti ans were limited to the Blacks. To 
help in the daily administration of these black urban areas, Native 
Advisory Boards were established. (l8) In fact this law established a 
residential segregation in the urban areas, and provided also for a 
sort of influx control, requiring the registration of the Blacks-as 
workers or work-seekers, as a condition for their residence in the 
urban areas. For those who did not comply with the regulations, the 
consequence was deportation to their reserves. (l9) This Act was 
amended slightly in 1930( 20) and the amendments were simply a 
restriction of some of the existing rules. 
These first attempts at controlling the movement of the Blacks 
into the white areas and in particular towards the towns. were not very 
successful. As Table 3 shows, in 1936 already more than half of the 
total Black population was living in the white areas, outnumbering all 
the three other groups put together. This alone was a cause for 
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TABLE 1: POPULATION OF THE COLONY OF THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE. CENSUS OF 1904 
SECTION I 1) SECTION II SECTION I II TOTAL 
European or White 553 452 15 808 10 481 579 741 
Malay 15 615 36 31 15 682 
Hottentot 85 669 2 130 3 461 91 260 
Fin go 118 398 177 990 14 332 310 720 
Kafir and Bechuana 431 175 431 246 251 646 1 114 067 
Mixed and Other 285 382 5 674 7 278 298 334 
l) NOTE: Section I comprised the 'Colony Proper• (borders of 1875) 
and Griqualand West. 
Section II comprised Walvis Bay, Tembuland, Transkei and 
Griqualand East. 
Section III comprised Pondoland and British Bechuanaland. 
SOURCE: Colony of Cape of Good Hope, Census of the Cape of Good 
Hope, 1904, Final Report G 19-1905 
TABLE 2: POPULATION OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA. YEARS 1911, 1921, 
1936' 1946. BY RACE GROUPS. 
1911 1921 1936 1946 
Total 5 973 394 6 928 580 9 589 898 11 418 349 
White 1 276 242 1 519 488 2 003 857 2 372 690 
Asiatic 152 203 165 731 219 691 285 260 
Coloured 525 943 545 548 769 661 928 484 
Black 4 019 006 4 697 813 6 596 689 7 831 915 
SOURCES: Union of South Africa, Reports of the Censuses of 1911, 1921, 
1936, 1946. 
U.G. 32-1912; U.G. 15- 1 23; U.G. 37-24; U.G. 21- 1 38; 
U.G. 12/42; U.G. 51-1949. 
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TABLE 3: BLACK POPULATION. YEARS 1936, 1946, 1951. 'NATIVE RESERVES' 
AND 1 WHITE AREAS 1 •. NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION. 
1936 1946 1951 
Total 6 596 000 100 7 831 000 100 8 560 000 100 
Native Reserves 2 976 000 45,1 3 261 000 41,7 3 316 000 38,8 
White Areas 3 622 000 54,9 4 570 000 58,3 5 244 000 61,2 
SOURCE: Benso, Black Development in South Africa, Pretoria 1976, Ch. 4. 
TABLE: 4: BLACK URBAN POPULATION. YEARS 1911, 1921, 1936, 1946. 
BY PROVINCES, AND PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL URBAN POPULATION. 
-1911 1921 1936 1946 
Cape 113 143 124 572 219 229 333 812 
Natal 35 967 54 548 127 920 209 568 
Transvaal 35 686 347 645 690 505 ...... , 1 006 082 
OFS 42 346 60 235 103 988 139 591 
TOTAL 508 142 34,0 587 000 33,8 1 141 642 37,9 1 689 053 
SOURCE: As for Table 2. 
TABLE 5: BLACK URBAN POPULATION. YEARS 1911, 1921, 1936, 1946. 
BY SEX, NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE. 
1911 1921 1936 1946 
Male 410 161 80,7 439 707 74,9 784 769 68 ,7 1 097 486 
Female 97 981 19,3 147 293 25,1 356 874 31,3 591 567 
TOTAL 508" 142 100 587 000 100 1 141 643 100 1 689 053 
SOURCE: As for Tab l e 2 . 
N.B.: It is likely that in all the censuses the Black population, 






preoccupation for the government, but the fact that almost one third 
of those Blacks were living in the urban areas indicated the failure 
of the policy of segregation that just in 1936 had been so vigorously 
reconfirmed. This was not all, because it was clear that the urban 
black population had increased at a far faster pace than the black 
population as a whole (Tab.le 4). From the government's point of view, 
the worst aspect of all this was the fact that the greatest increase 
was that of black women living in the urban areas. In 1921 they were 
· a quarter of the total urban black population. By 1936 they were almost 
one third, having more than doubled their absolute number (Table 5). 
The urban Blacks were no longer migrants with no links in the towns and 
no desire to stay there longer than necessary. They were becoming a 
community with permanent roots in the places where they lived. 
1.2.2 The dynamics of influx control 1936 to 1948 
For the Afrikaners the situation was alarming. But the Hertzog-
Smuts government could not adopt a comprehensive.policy in this regard 
because of the different opinions of its components on this subject as 
well as on many others. The main 'innovation' of this period was the 
introduction of the principle of the removal of 'redundant' Blacks from 
the urban areas by the Native Laws Amendment Act (No. 43 of 1937). 
However big and potentially threatening the increase of the urban Blacks 
might have appeared to some, after 1936 the attention of the government 
was increasingly drawn to the worsening international situation, and to 
the internal implications of this. The war and the rapid industrializa-
tion of this period made the question of black influx an issue of. 
relatively limited importance, and this is reflected by the scarcity 
of legislative activity directed at regulating it. (2l) 
Towards the end of the war, the government took the question again 
into consideration, and in 1945 was enacted the Native (Urban Areas) 
Consolidation Act (No. 25 of 1945), which restated the most important 
principles established by previous legislation. It reaffirmed the 
prohibition to the Blacks of transactions for the acquisition of land, 
or the lease of land, outside the urban areas set aside for their occupa-
tion, for the non-Blacks the same applied inside those areas. It re-
affirmed the residential segregation of the Blacks in the urban areas, 
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extending this segregation to schools and entertainment premises( 22 ) 
which, if they were mainly used by Blacks, had to be moved within the 
areas delimited for black occupation. The right of Blacks to enter an 
urban area was again restricted, and the possibility of removal of 
'redundant' or 'idle' Blacks, or simply of Blacks without passes, was 
increased. (23 ) To give the Blacks some kind of say in the management 
of the reserved areas, the Native Advisory Boards were confirmed. 
Despite the tightening of the rules which allowed the Blacks to 
enter into the urban areas, the increased segregation within these 
areas, and the growing possibility of forced removals therefrom, the 
Blacks continued to migrate to the towns. The census of 1946 showed 
that while the population of the 'Native reserves' since 1936 had increased 
by less than 300 000 souls, the Blacks living in the 'white areas' had 
increased by almost one million (Table 3). More than 58% of the Blacks 
were living in. the 'white areas' , and more than one and a ha 1 f mi 11 ion 
of them were in the urban areas. They constituted just a little more 
than 40% of the total urban population of the Union; and the proportion 
of women amongst them had again increased, indicating that the trend 
towards permanent residence was continuing. 
This was the demographic background to the political battle that was 
being fought in the immediate post-war years. Among the nationalist 
Afrikaners the clamour about the 'swart gevaar' became louder and louder, 
and to defeat this danger the doctrine of apartheid was being elaborated. 
The Smuts government, however, tended. to reach different conclusions. 
It realised that the movement of the Blacks to the cities was unarrestable, 
and stopping the flow, had it been possible, would have meant curtailing 
the booming industrial development of the country, given the reliance 
of the whole South African industrial system on black labour. 
In this period signs appeared indicating that the government was 
thinking of changing its attitude towards the urban Blacks. (24 ) A new 
commission was appointed, headed by H. Fagan, to study the implications 
of the presence of Blacks in urban areas, and to propose modifications 
in the relevant legislation. (25 ) The conclusions arrived at by the Fagan 
Commission were almost revolutionary: it recognised that the process of 
urbanisation of the Blacks had assumed such a proportion as to become 
irreversible (almost 60% of the Blacks were then in the 'white areas'), 
and expressed its opinion that legislation should be provided to recognise 
17 
this change, thus steering the Native policy 180 degrees from the 
course followed till then. The proposals of the Fagan Commission 
were under examination when the elections of 1948 totally changed 
the political landscape of South Africa. 
1.3 Land Ownership and the Reserves 
,"nt aspects of the South African Native 
e division of the territory into 'white' and 
One of the most impo 
policy has always been 
'black' areas. Inde 
racial groups has 
the territorial separation of the two main 
ays been the basis of this policy. Since the 
earliest years of the Union, legislative measures were taken to delimit 
the areas reserved for black occupation and ownership. These areas 
were intended as the place where the Blacks would live in their 
traditional ways, where they would return after their working spells 
in the mines or in the 'white' towns, and where the traditional Bantu 
'extended family' would take care of the needy, freeing the white local 
authorities from the burden of providing extensive social services for 
them. 
It soon appeared that the land initially reserved for the Blacks was 
insufficient,and a lengthy process began, directed at increasing the 
extension of the reserves. When this enlargement was finally approved 
it was regarded by the government a 1 so as a compensation for the 
deprivation of voting rights for the Blacks and for the transfer of those 
Blacks enjoying the franchise on a separate voters' roll. The trend to 
consider the reserves as the only place where the Blacks could take an 
interest in political life was already evident in this period. Indeed, 
provisions had already been taken for establishing and extending some form 
of local government in the reserves. Although this form of local govern-
ment was to be changed by the Nationalist government, the legislation of 
this period was designed to constitute the territorial basis on which 
that government would build its policy of separate development. 
18 
1.3.1 The Natives' Land Act of 1913 
During the last decades of the nineteenth century the conquest of 
South Africa by the Whites and their appropriation of the land were 
completed. The only areas where the land was in black hands were the 
locations: generally small and scattered pieces of land (the Transkei 
being the most important exception), demarcated in the course of the 
years in the best interest of white farmers. (26 ) However, for some 
time the black peasants were able to withstand the pressure exerted on 
them to compel them to work for the Whites, and in some cases were able 
even to thrive, thanks to a modernised agriculture (in comparison with 
the traditional Bantu farming technique). (27 ) The beginning of the new 
century saw a rather unexpected development: well-off black peasants 
or tribes, helped sometimes by sympathetic Whites, began purchasing 
land put up for sale by Whites. This was soon perceived as injurious 
to the white position, and in a short while a remedy was found. 
An inter-Colonial Commission (the South African Native Affairs 
Commission of 1903-1905) was established to study and to propose 
solutions for the various problems regardi.ng the black people. Amongst 
its recommendations the Commission said that "the purchase (of land) by 
Natives should in future be limited to certain areas to be defined by 
legislative enactment11 ( 28 ) and that "the time has arrived when the lands 
dedicated and set apart •.. as locations, reserves or otherwise, should 
be defined, delimited and reserved for the Natives by legislative 
enactment". (29 ) 
The work of this Commission yielded its fruits after the formation 
of the Union in the form of the Natives' Land Act of 1913 (No. 27 of 
1913). The main objects of this Act were to lay down definitely, for 
the whole of South Africa, the principle of separate ownership of land, 
to check the relatively new trend towards the acquisition of land by 
Blacks, and to solve the 'squatter problem'~ The protection of the 
remaining black areas from encroachment by the economically stronger 
white group was also among its objectives. (30) This Act scheduled the 
areas in which the Blacks, and the Blacks only, could purchase or sell 
ownership rights over the land, and prohibited them from having any 
ownership rights outside those scheduled areas. In this way about 
8 928 000 hectares were reserved for the Blacks, in addition to 
1 207 000 hectares which already legally belonged to them. (3l) 
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This Act, however, was intended as a temporary measure - its 
section 2 provided for the establishment of a commission to enquire 
into the land issue and to report within two years. This commission, 
the Natives' Land Commission - known also as the Beaumont Commission 
from the name of its chai'rman - submitted its report in 1916, after 
various interruptions due in part to the war. The Beaumont Commission 
recommended, among other things, the extension of the land reserved for 
the Blacks, asking for an additional 7 166 000 hectares, more than half 
of them in the Transvaal. (32 ) These proposals were presented to 
Parliament in 1917, in the fonn of a Native Affairs Administration Bill, 
that went as far as the second reading before being referred to the 
Select Committee on Native Affairs, which suggested that the enlargment 
of the area of the Blacks' land should be reconsidered by local or 
provincial committees. 
The evidence taken by these committees showed how much hostility the 
ideas of extending the black areas aroused in the Whites. In reality, 
the 1913 legislation and the subsequent work of the Beaumont Commission 
aroused not only the hostility of the white farmers, but also that of 
the Blacks. The Land Act was the first important measure of Native 
policy to be taken by the government of the Union and it set the guide-
lines of this policy. The Blacks were opposed to this measure and their 
only political movement, the newly born Congress, voiced their opposition. 
The Congress' reaction to this Act contributed to the consolidation of 
its image amongst the Blacks, and favoured the extension of the support 
for the movement both amongst the chiefs and the new ~lite and amongst 
the less educated multitude. 
After the Act was passed, however, the Congress' attitude changed. 
It decided to make the most out of the existing circumstances and started 
pleading for more land to be assigned to the Blacks. Some of its most 
prominent members even accepted in theory territorial segregation in the 
rural areas, but only if carried out on 'just' lines, i.e., if at least 
about 50% of the territory of the Union was assigned to the Blacks. 
After the publication of the Beaumont Commission report which suggested 
increasing the land reserved to the Blacks from about 7,5% to about 
12% of the territory of the Uni on, fa 11 i ng thus short of the expectati ans 
of the Blacks, the Congress reassumed its original stance of rejection 
of any policy of segregation, asking for the repeal of the Land Act and 
for the extension of the Cape Franchise to the 0ther provinces. 
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In relation to Congress' attitude, it is interesting to remark 
the fact that the Congress, although established with the aim of 
defending the Cape traditions of black integration in the political 
process, had been drawn into a temponary revision of its policy by an 
act its members disliked but the political reality of which they could 
not escape, and that many of its members were prepared - admittedly out 
of desperation - to accept rural land segregation and even to think in 
terms of a wider segregation.( 33 ) This underlines the presence since 
the earliest times amongst the black nationalists of a pragmatic 
tendency which in different times had.led many of them to collaborate 
with the government and partially to accept its policy, in the conviction 
that in the face of the existing unsatisfactory circumstances, some 
limited gains were better than no gain at all. 
1.3.2 The Natives' Trust and Land Act of'l936 
The proposed enlargement of the black areas was duly considered by 
the local committees and their reports were published in 1918; they 
recommended an amount of 6 442 000 hectares (two thirds of which were 
in the Transvaal and none in the Or~nge Free State) to be added to the 
areas reserved for the Blacks. 
These recommendations were accepted in principle by the government, 
but for a long time very little was done,( 34 ) besides establishing a 
Natives' Economic Commission and a Select Committee investigating the 
'Native Land Question'. Commissions and committees appointed to 
investigate the Natives' Affairs were all agreed that separate land-
ownership was essential, and that more land was needed for the Blacks 
because the 'scheduled areas' (the land reserved for the Blacks in 1913) 
were becoming overcrowded. These recommendations were accepted by the 
government which presented them to Parliament in 1935 in the form of a 
Bill. The year 1936 saw the enactment of what was at the time 
considered the last word on Native affairs: the Representation of 
Natives Act (No. 12 of 1936) (See 1.1.3), and the Natives' Trust and 
Land Act (No. 18 of 1936). 
In terms of the latter Act an additional 6 211 000 hectares - the 
so-called 'released areas' - were added to the black territories 
(955 000 hectares fewer than what was proposed by the Beaumont Commission). 
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Black reaction to this Act was mainly determined by its twin on the 
Representation of Natives. Amongst the educated urban elite and some 
of the most politically conscious chiefs the opposition to the 1936 
legislation was total. Once again this opposition proved to be vain, 
and a number of chiefs and rural people were induced to think that more 
land was more useful to them than the voting rights of the educated 
filite in the Cape. 
As these 'released areas' were considered in part as a compensation 
for the exclusion of the Cape Blacks from the common voters' roll, the 
government pledged itself to acquire for the Blacks all the land 
released for their occupation in terms of this law. The South Africa 
Native Trust (S.A.N.T., later S.A.B.T., later S.A.D.T.), an 
incorporated body, was established to keep all the Crown land comprised 
within the 'scheduled' and 'released' areas in trust for the Blacks. 
According to the delimitation scheduled in this Act, when all the 
scheduled land had been transferred,the Blacks would own 16 346 000 
hectares or 13,3% of the total territory of South Africa. The cost 
of the purchase of the land was estimated at between .£10 million and 
.£15 mi 11 ion. 
The land purchases should have been settled as quickly as possible, 
but spending a perceptible quota of the budget for buying land for the 
Natives was at the time an unpopular action. (35 ) After the war broke 
out, the purchase of land for the Blacks sunk to an even lower level of 
priority. The tempo of acquisition of land remained slow for many 
years afterwards, and the result of this was that at the end of 1979 
only 4 225 047 hectares had been purchased.( 36 ) The slowness in 
implementing the 1936 Land Act resulted in a constant increase in the 
amount of money required for buying the remaining land, to the point that 
it had been claimed that with the rate of provision for this aim pre-
vailing in the 1970's and the growing cost of land, it would never be 
possible to acquire all the land demarcated in that law. Such slowness 
also made the Blacks feel sooner the inadequacy of the extension of the 
land demarcated for their use, and, as will be seen later, the land 
question became, and still is, one of the most problematic issues in the 
relations between Whites and Blacks and between South Africa and the 
homelands. 
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1.3.3 Local govetn~~ht in th~ te~~rVes 
Local government for the Blacks in South Africa has quite a long 
history, dating back at least to the Glen Grey Act of 1894 (No. 25 of 
1894). By this Act, and by the following Proclamation 352 of the same 
year, the so-called district council system was introduced in some 
districts of the Transkei.( 37 ) 
Every district council was to be composed of four elected (by all 
the black ratepayers) and two nominated {by the district magistrate) 
members and its task was to assist and advise the district magistrate 
in the implementation of his work in matters affecting the local black 
population. 
In 1895 a General Council was established for the four districts with 
district councils, composed of the district magistrates, two members 
appointed by each district council from among their number, and one 
member from each district council appointed by the Governor-General. 
The General Council had the power to allocate funds (revenue for which 
came from a general tax levied by the district councils, the rent for 
quit-rent land and from the payment of other duties and fines) for the 
expenses of the administration and for the construction and maintenance 
of roads and bridges, eradication of noxious weeds and establishment of 
agricultural and industrial schools, pounds and tolls. District councils 
_had no separate revenues, but the General Council tried to allocate funds 
to each district in proportion to revenues received from it. (38) 
In the following years, the system was extended to other districts 
and in 1903 it was in force in many districts of Transkei, Tembuland 
and East Griqualand.( 39 ) In the same year the General Council was re-
organised and became the Transkeian Territories General Council. The 
council system was extended to Pondoland too,( 40) but till 1931 Eastern 
and Western Pondoland had a separate Pondoland General Council. In that 
year the councils were merged into the United Transkeian Territories 
General Council, sitting in Umtata. {4l) 
The United Transkeian Territories General Council, or Bunga, consisted 
of the Chief Magistrate of the Transkei, acting as chairman, the twenty-six 
district magistrates, three members from each district council, and the 
three Paramount Chiefs (of Tembuland; Eastern Pondoland and Western 
Pondoland) who were members ex officio. The powers of the Bunga were 
limited, and in reality, notwithstanding the fact that it had a large 
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establishment of its own and a revenue of approximately £150 000 per 
year, (42 ) it was purely an ad~isory board because all the actual powers 
in connection with Council affairs were vested in the Chief Magistrate 
as the chief executive officer of the Council. 
This situation of impotency was resented by the Bunga, and the year 
after the unification of the two General Councils, a new Proclamation 
revised the constitution of the United Transkeian Territories General 
Council and extended the powers of the Bunga in a significant way. 
Proclamation No. 191 of 1932 recognised as falling within the 
functions and the powers of the Bunga: 
a) the initiation and consideration of any matter relating to the. 
economic, industrial or social condition of the Native 
population of the Union, or any part thereof in so far as it 
affects the Natives within the area of jurisdiction of the 
Council; 
b) the consideration of any proposed legislation or existing law 
which specifically affects the Natives within the area of 
jurisdiction of the Council; 
c) the consideration of any specific matter submitted to it by 
the Governor-General or by the Minister (of Native Affairs); 
d) the passing of resolutions on any such matter. (43 ) 
In such matters the Bunga still had only advisory powers, but it 
was now transfonned into a truly political body, which could express 
its opinion on the most important aspects of South Africa's policy 
affecting the black population. This was the first time the Blacks 
had the possibility of discussing political (as opposed to adminis-
trative) matters in a body empowered to do so by the law. To give 
the Bunga some real power, the Proclamation provided for the 
establishment of a standing Executive Committee( 44) which would be 
responsible for the administration and control of all Council affairs 
regarding its own personnel (a civil service in embryo), the award of 
scholarships, agricultural matters, public works and the institution 
of legal proceedings. (45 ) . 
In the meantime, the Native Affairs Act (No. 23 of 1920) provided for 
an extension of the district council system to other areas of the Union. 
The Native Affairs Commission, which was also established by the same 
Act with consultative and advisory functions in any matter relating to 
the conduct of Native affairs and to legislation affecting the black 
population,( 46 ) could recommend to the Governor-General the establishment 
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of local or General Native Councils whose composition and powers were 
also proposed by the Commission. (47) From 1927 onwards local councils 
began spreading in various areas of the Union. At the end of the war 
there were eight district councils in the Ciskei, four in the Northern 
Cape and Western Transvaal (parts of present-day Bophuthatswana), six 
in the Northern Transvaal and two in Natal. 
Councfl was established, for the Ciskei.( 48 ) 
However, only one General 
Some of those councils 
had reduced powers or were composed of a greater proportion of appointed 
members,( 49 ) but the area and population which enjoyed this type of 
local government was however almost doubled.(SO) 
The council system was not particularly popular(Sl) but it gave 
the Blacks the possibility of training in the administration of units 
larger than the tribe, and of influencing in some way the conducting of 
their affairs and their everyday life. 
1.4 Conclusion 
From the constitution of the Union to the elections of 1948, the 
control of the government was for long periods in the hands of people 
whom the extreme Afrikaner nationalists (those who came into power in 
1948) often regarded as traitors to the cause. This notwithstanding, 
the political conditions of the Blacks steadily worsened during this 
period, This was certainly not what they had hoped for when the Boer 
republics were defeated. Indeed, in the years preceding the Union, the 
Blacks hoped to become, with British help, one of the components of the 
South African political life. In fact, thanks to the British policy, 
they were already a junior component of Cape politics where they had a 
limited but growing influence. 
Although in the British colonies, but in practice only in the Cape, 
the political rights of the Blacks were recognised on the basis of the 
principle 'equal rights for every civilized man', such recognition was 
neither wholeheartedly given nor particularly cherished by the great 
majority of the Whites. Indeed, more than once, legislative measures 
were taken to tighten the qualifications for the franchise with the 
undeclared but practical effect of reducing the number of Blacks eligible 
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to vote and thus curtailing their political influence. Already, 
before the Union, in the 'progressive' Cape Colony, it is possible to 
see forces in action tending to control and limit the participation of 
the Blacks to the decision-making process. 
Despite this, in the Cape the Blacks were enjoying political rights 
and a degree of influence that very few 'Natives' had elsewhere in the 
British Empire or in any other colonial empire. After the British 
victory over the Boer republics in a war purportedly fought to 
eliminate inequalities in these territories, it was understandable that 
the Blacks expected to see the Cape Franchise extended to all the South 
African territories. Instead they were sorely disappointed and all they 
obtained was the preservation of the franchise in the 1Cape Province. 
In the political field, the British victory was in a sense a Pyrrhic 
victory. The Boer republics were reduced to colonies under British 
sovereignty, but to gain the indispensable collaboration of the Boer 
population the British had to make substantial political concessions. 
These concessions resulted in the reappearance of the Afrikaners as one 
of the most powerful interest groups in the political scene. The Union 
would be possible only if the interests of the Afrikaners were taken into 
consideration or not at all. It was thus inevitable that the aspirations 
of the Blacks were to be disappointed. 
After the establishment of the Union, the Afrikaner nationalists had 
two correlated targets: to take political control of the Union, which 
they could confidently expect. because of the growing numerical superiority 
of the Afrikaner group over the English, and to use this power to 
eliminate any black influence in South African affairs as a means to 
assure permanent Afrikaner control over South Africa. 
The elimination of any black influence in South African politics 
was a lengthy process and it was not to be accomplished until after the 
party representing the extreme Afrikaner nationalists, Malan 1 s National 
Party, gained an overwhelming majority in Parliament. However, if the 
process of elimination of black political influence and of total (legal) 
separation of the races was accomplished only after the Nationalist take-
over, this process was well under way long before that time. It is not 
possible to say that it was the implementation of a pre-planned design, 
nor that it always went smoothly, but it can be seen as a constant trend 
in the South African politics of the period, only momentarily halted a 
few times. 
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It is particularly worth noti_ng that if the impulse to every move 
in this direction came from the 'hard core' nationalists, the most 
important measures taken in this period to curb black aspirations, viz., 
the Natives' Land Act of 1913 and. the Natives'.Trust and Land Act of 
1936, were passed with the support of practically all the components of 
the white group. In fact, the Land Act of 1913 was ideated by Hertzog, 
but was passed after his break with Smuts in a period when the govern-
ment was supported by a coalition of moderate Afrikaners and the majority 
of the English-speakers. Likewise, the Trust and Land Act of 1936, 
which all but abrogated the entrenched rights of the Blacks in the Cape, 
was passed only after the constitution of the United Party with the 
indispensable support of the representatives of the English community. 
Only in the years immediately before and after the second world war 
were there signs that the United Party government was thinking of 
reversing its attitude towards the Blacks, and also in this case, in 
spite of the fact that the Fagan Commission recommended considering the 
urban Blacks as a permanent feature of South African society and taking 
provisions in consequence, the modifications were not intended to be 
substantial. Indeed, when Malan's National Party came to power in .South 
Africa, it could build its apartheid policy on the firm basis already 
laid down by its predecessors. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE.NATIONAL PARTY IN.POWER 
AND'THE SHAPING.OF SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Attempt to eliminate the Blacks as a factor in 
South African politics 
The access to power of the National Party in 1948 put an end to 
every trend seeking to change the political situation of the Blacks. 
In fact, it announced changes in their situation, but in the opposite 
direction to which they hoped. 
The National Party came to power having heavily played on the white 
fears of the 'swart gevaar'. Their programme was to keep the towns as 
a 'white man's thing', to obtain through apartheid complete separation 
between the various racial groups living in South Africa, and to 
entrench white domination on the country, eliminating any residual 
influence of the Blacks at the political level. It was clear that 
in the demographic situation of- South Africa, white political domination 
in the long tenn could only be assured by a manipulation of the 
demographic trends. The constantly growing number of Blacks leaving the 
rese~ves and settling in the cities or in other 'white' areas was the 
greatest threat to the aims of the government. 
It soon became apparent that in order to ward off this threat, it 
was not sufficient to set up a comprehensive and stricter control on the 
movements of the Blacks and on their influx to the urban areas. It was 
necessary al so to revert the trend and to move back to the reserves at 
least part of the Blacks already settled in the 'white' areas, both 
urban and rural. The relocation of p~ople was already the logical out-
come of apartheid, but the resettlement of the Blacks in the reserves 
was essential to the achievement of the objectives of the Afrikaner 
nationalism. 
Even the Afrikaner nationalists, however, realised.that some form of 
political power had to be devolved to the Blacks to avoid an explosive 
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reaction in the long tenn. This devolution of power was to be 
relatively limited in substance, confined to the reserves and framed 
into the traditional tribal system. The decision to utilise the 
traditional system was due both to the Afrikaner sensitivity to the 
ethnic problems, which led them to consider the evolution of modern 
nations from relatively loose association of tribes as a positive and 
conmendable by-product of their policy, and to the more pragmatic 
considerations that they might find in the tribal hierarchy a willing 
ally, and that as long as the Blacks were divided along ethnic lines 
they would find it more difficult to challenge Afrikaner supremacy. 
It is possible to say that the access to power of the National 
Party heralded a new era in race relations in South Africa. The first 
tasks the government undertook were to separate the various groups and 
to ensure that every challenge to its activity could be speedily dis-
posed of. In a very short time South Africa was flooded with a never-
ending flow of new discriminatory laws involving all aspects of life and 
a new security legislation which made it almost impossible to challenge 
this policy. 
The tightening of security legislation was_ considered necessary in 
the face of a renewed assertiveness of the black political organisations, 
in particular the A.N.C •• During the forties, the A.N.C. was 
revitalized and given a modern organisation. Thanks to this, it was able 
to develop mass support and to regain its primary position in black 
politics. The main themes of A.N.C. policy became full citizenship and 
equal opportunity; the ultimate outcome of this policy was recognized 
to be the emergence of the Blacks as the major political force in South 
Africa. Their _tactics also changed. The means used up to this point 
by the A.N.C., viz., delegations, resolutions and polite requests, had 
shown themselves inadequate and useless. Now that the A.N.C. was 
starting to build up a considerable mass support, it had the possibility 
of backing up moral claims with effective political pressure. In 1949 
it adopted the 'Program of Action' which emphasised the movement's goal 
of 'one man one vote' and accepted as methods of struggle passive 
resistance, non-collaboration and strike action. It was clear that the 
government could never accept modifying South Africa in the sense 
requested by the A.N.C. and that as soon as the movement started exerting 
effective pressure it would be checked with growing harshness. 
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2.1.1 Abolition of the 'Native Franchise' 
As far as political rights were concerned, the Blacks in practice 
were already totally powerless. Their only voices in Parliament were 
the three white Native Representatives elected by the few thousand 
Bantu voters in the Cape Province and the four senators elected by 
the black electoral colleges throughout the country. The Native 
Representative Council which was only an advisory body and in practice 
was constantly ignored, had ceased to function as a result of its 
adjournment sine die in 1946 in protest of the government handling of 
the mineworkers' strike. In reality the uselessness of the Council 
had a 1 ready been appraised by its members who considered it "nothing 
but a toy telephorie" because "Africans had been talking into it for a 
decade without a single word being heard at the other end". (52 ) 
Furthermore, the Nationalist government considered it not only 
useless but also in contrast with its philosophy of ethnic division of 
the black population. Indeed the N.R.C. was a partially representative 
body of all the Blacks of the Union and as such a potentially dangerous 
precedent. 
The government's first move against the political rights of the 
Blacks at central level was thus the abolition of the N.R.C. by the 
Bantu Authorities Act (No. 68 of 1951) which in exchange established 
the 'traditional' trtbal authorities system (See point 2.2.1). The end 
of the N.R.C. was unlamented, and in reality in this period the Blacks 
had to cope with more pressing and hurtful things to bother much about 
its fate. 
The elimination of the last voice of the Blacks at central level, 
that of the three Native Representatives, came with the Promotion of Bantu 
Self-Government Act (No. 46 of 1959). This Act provided for the 
establishment and political development of ethnic national units (See 
point 3.1.1), and, among other things, provided for linking all the 
Blacks living in the 'white' areas with the homeland with which they 
were ethnically rel~ted. This in the eyes of the government made the 
presence of Native Representatives in Parliament superfluous. The 
Native Representatives were thus abolished and with them went the last 
vestiges of the once cherished 'Cape Franchise'. 
The abrogation of the last voting rights of the Blacks at central 
level came at the end of a decade which saw the implementation of 
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apartheid and the curtailment of the rights of the Blacks in every 
field. It was a decade in which the A.N.C. tried vainly to protest 
and to exert pressure on the government to make it change its policy. 
This decade saw the practi ca 1 ·fa i1 ure of the 1 ega l means used by the 
A.N.C. to change the mind of the government and the spread of security 
legislation which reduced almost to nil the possibility of legally 
opposing government policy. The elimination of the 'Cape Franchise' 
did not arouse a great reaction from the Blacks, certainly nothing 
comparable with their reaction to the introduction of the separate 
voters' roll in 1936. Also this form of representation had shown its 
uselessness. Furthennore, it concerned only a few thousands of 
relatively wealthy Blacks in the Cape and was discriminatory on the basis 
of census. The black nationalist movement with its insistence on the 
'one man one vote' principle had no more use for such limited and 
elitist fonns of representation. 
2.1.2 Apartheid legislation and black reaction 
The elimination of the last vestigial remains of black participation 
to the decision-making process was a step in the government's policy to 
stifle any possibility of the Blacks in future gaining enough power or 
influence to pose a threat to 'white' South Africa. 
Having made the Blacks powerless did not mean really having created 
a 'white' South Africa. The presence of Blacks in the 'white' areas 
was an inescapable fact, and their increasing influx into the urban 
areas was the most evident threat to the government's aims. In 1951 
only 42% of the 8 500 000 Blacks lived in the reserves, 31,2% lived in 
the 'white' rural areas and 26,8%, corresponding to 2 290 000 people, in 
the urban areas~ 53 ) (See Tables 6 and 7 for population figures 1951-1960.) 
The government's answer to this threat was to extend the controls on the 
movements and on the very life of the Blacks, to limit their ability to 
settle in the urban areas and to start removing them to the reserves. 
This policy was obviously resented by the Blacks who tried to oppose 
to it with all the limited means at their disposal. Such opposition was 
led by the A.N.C., which,during the 1940's, had been reorganised and had 
re-established itself as the most influential black movement. The 
TABLE 6: Black population. Years 1951, 1960, 1970, 1980. Black homelands and 'white areas'. 





3 316 000 38,8 
5 244 000 61,2 
8 560 000 100 ,0 
. 1960 % .
4 133 000 37,8 
6 795 000 62,2 
10 928 000 100,0 
1970 
6 997 179 46 ,5 
8 060 773 53,5 
15 057 952 100,0 
SOURCE: BENSO, op.cit. 1976 and BENSO Survey of Black Development 1981. 
NOTE (1): Including de fact~ population of Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda. 
.1980 .% 
6 802 340 40,2 
10 121 420 59,8 
16 923 760 100,0 
. ... 1980(l). . .% 
10 830 770 51,7 
10 212 420 48,3 
20 952 190 100,0 
TABLE 7: Black urban population. Years 1951, 1060, 1970, 1980. By provinces and percentage of total 
urban popu 1 a tion. 
1951 % 1960 % 1970 % 1980 % 
Cape Province 430 809 623 043 756 688 982 300 
Natal 288 600 420 732 476 391 319 040 
Transvaal 1 399 228 2 016 067 2 647 855 3 501 360 
OFS 209 897 411 400 526 081 521 100 
TOTAL 2 328 534 43,1 3 471 233 46,4 4 407 015 45,5 5 324 300 44,l 
SOURCE: Union of South Africa: Population census 1951; Republic of South Africa, Bureau of Statistics, Population Census 1960, 
R.P. No 62/1963; Republic of South Africa, Department of Statistics, Population census 1970, Report No 02-05-10; RSA 
Central Statistical Services Population Census 1980, Report No 02~80-01. 
TABLE 8: Black urban population. Years 1951, 1960' 1970, 1980. By sex, number and percentage. 
1951 % 1960 % 1970 % 1980 % 
Male 1 424 336 61,1 2 023 082 58,3 2 533 151 57,5 2 932 020 55,0 
Female 904 198 38,9 1 448 151 41,7 1 873 864 42,5 2 392 280 45,0 
TOTAL 2 328 534 100,0 3 471 233 100,0 4 407 015 100,0 5 324 300 100,0 
SOURCE: As for Table 7. 




Congress assumed a more radical attitude also because of the prodding 
of its Youth League,( 54 ) and its aim now was not only to free the 
Blacks from all the discriminatory laws but also to obtain their full 
participation in the political life of South Africa on the basis of 
'one man one vote'. Amongst the various nationalist groups there were 
sharp ideological differences, mainly between communists and non-
communi s ts and between orthodox communists and Trotzkyi tes, ( 55 ) and 
also the Congress itself was divided between moderates and radicals, 
the latter, members of the Youth League, taking control of the move-
ment in 1949. (56 ) Notwithstanding these differences, the objective of 
'one man one vote' was accepted by all. Nothing could have been 
furthest from this position than the new government's policy, and it 
took a short time before the first legislative measures of the 
Nationalist government( 57 ) elicited a strong reaction from the·black 
mov)ements. 
These movements decided to revert to passive resistance, non-
collaboration and strike action. Sometimes the protest degenerated 
into riots causing loss of lives on both sides. (5B) The most important 
protest of this period, however, was completely peaceful. The 'Campaign 
of Defiance of unjust laws' was launched by the Congress in June 1952. 
It was decided that volunteers would break the pass laws or other 
discriminatory regulations and let themselves be arrested. By the end 
of the campaign, decided as a precautionary measure after the unrelated 
riots of October-November 1952, more than 8 500 passive resistance 
volunteers had been arrested. The campaign did not achieve its objective 
of inducing the government to repeal the discriminatory laws, but was a 
success for the Congress which saw its membership increase more than 
tenfold in a few months.~ 59 ) 
The government's reaction was to apply with more severity the 
existing laws, to amend them to make them stricter(60) and to introduce 
a number of new laws aimed explicitly at controlling the Blacks and at 
reducing their ability to protest against its policy. By the Natives 
(Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act of 1952 (No. 67 
of 1952), the network of checks on the movements and on the very life 
of the Blacks was completed, making it even more difficult for them to 
move into the urban areas and to stay therein when they were not wanted, 
and by the Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act of 1953 (No. 43 of 
1953) strikes by Blacks were definitely prohibited. (6l) Also in the 
economic field the heavy hand of apartheid was felt. The Native Building 
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Workers Act (No. 27 of 1951) effectively eliminated the presence of 
black skilled workers from the building industry in the urban areas 
(excluding the black townships), and a few years later the Industrial 
Conciliation Act (No. 28 of 1956) introduced the practice of job 
reservation. (62 ) 
The efficient repression of the protest movement, concentrated on 
the elimination through banning of the most important and active 
leaders of the black organisations and of the other extra-Parliamentary 
opposition, had a demoralising effect and caused a general dwindling 
of the open membership of these organisations; the A.N.C., for example, 
was never able to regain the level of membership it had towards the 
end of the Campaign of Defiance. These years saw a greater collabora-
tion of the A.N.C. with the political movements of the other racial 
groups, such as the South African Indian Congress, the South African 
Coloured People's Organisation and the white South African Congress of 
Democrats. The result of this collaboration was the Congress of the 
People, held in June 1955, which approved the 'Freedom Charter' as its 
political programme. This period saw also an increase in the frictions 
within the A.N.C., again mainly between the old moderate members and the 
new militant leadership and between communists or pro-communists and 
non-communists.( 63 ) Another cause of dissension within the A.N.C. was 
the growing influence and activism of the Africanist group which opposed 
the A.N.C. multi-racial approach and its collaboration wtth non-black 
movements, maintaining that the Blacks should aim at taking control of 
South Africa and that they did not need the collaboration of any non-
black group. (64 ) 
The difficulties in which the A.N.C. and other opposition organisations 
found themselves were compounded by the arrest of almost all their 
leaders on charges of high treason, in December 1956. Although they 
were shortly thereafter let out on bail, the conditions of the bail had 
the result of prohibiting them almost any political activity. The 
charges against more than one third of them were withdrawn a year later 
and those against~any others were withdrawn in the following years, the 
remaining defendanls being found not guilty. However, in an important 
period, the top level leadership of the A.N.C. was put out of action and 
this caused the internal dissension to come to the surface, further 
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undermining the effectiveness of its action. Such lack of effectiveness, 
a 1 ready shown by the failure of the one..!. day 'work boycott' ca 11 ed for 
the 26th June 1957, was enlightened by the utter lack of success of the 
'stay at home' demonstrations in April of the following year. At the 
end of 1958 the internal differences in the ranks of the A.N.C. came to 
a head and the Africanist group broke away to form the Pan-Africanist 
Congress (P.A.C~)· (65 ) 
The black nationalist movements were encouraged by the events in 
the rest of Africa and by the approaching independence of the West 
African states, but they did not find it any easier to act within South 
Africa. The government did not relent in its repressive action, the 
freedom of movement of the nationalist leaders was severely curtailed and 
the ability of the movements to organise mass action was checked by the 
increased severity of security legislation. The growing competition 
between A.N.C. and P.A.C. was also a factor of the limited mass response 
to the initiatives of these movements. 
The last· attempt of the black nationalist movements to organise 
peaceful mass protest against government policy,and the pass laws in 
particular, was in 1960. It was to be a repetition of the Campaign of 
Defiance, but on a bigger scale. This action, however, was not 
properly organised because the rivalry with the A.N.C. induced the 
P.A.C. leaders to anticipate the start of its action to show their 
militancy. Having launched its campaign after a hasty preparation and 
in contrast with the A.N.C., the P.A.C. was not able to mobilize a great 
support. (66 ) The day could have passed as another half defeat of the 
blacks movements, leading to further recrimination and disheartenment 
among the mass of Blacks, but the lack of nerve of the Sharpeville 
police transformed it into one of the worst days in the history of the 
Union and into the beginning of a period of unrest which for a time 
appeared to put in doubt the survival of white rule. 
The killing of 69 hannless Blacks in Sharpeville started a series 
of protests outside and within South Africa which shook the confidence 
of the Whites and was controlled only after the proclamation of the 
state of emergency and the full use of the repressive apparatus. The 
final result was the outlawing of the A.N.C. and the P.A.C. and of 
every organisation which shared their aims. The reaction of the black 
nationalists was to go underground and to resort to violent methods to 
further their aims. The decision to use violence was a complete break 
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from the previous attitude of the A.N.C. and the P.A.C., but, given 
the apparent ineffectiveness of non-violent methods, was almost 
inevitable.for all those Blacks who were not prepared to use the 
instruments put at their disposal_ by ~he government policy of separate 
development. However, both theA.N.C. and the P.A.C. were unprepared 
to lead an underground struggle, and although both organised their 
mi 1 itary wing, they met with 1 imited success and were rapidly defeated. 
The military wing of the A.N.C., Umkhonto weSizwe, during 1961-62 
staged a number of successful bombings, not directed against people, and 
then started to organise for a guerrilla insurrection, but in July 1963 
police raided its secret headquarters and arrested the core of its 
leadership.(67 ) The P.A.C. was in an even worse situation, since most 
of its leaders were already in jail, and only in late 1962 an offshot 
of the P.A.C., called Poqo, based in the Cap~was able to organise small 
groups of terrorists. Poqo also had strong links with the rural areas 
of Transkei. It managed with a minimum of formal leadership and 
organisation to create widespread fear among the Whites. The repression 
of Poqo activity was, however, efficient and by the end of 1963 it was 
to all effects stamped out.( 68 ) 
The first open confrontation of the black nationalists with the 
Nationalist government was thus concluded with the total defeat of the 
former which caused the disappearance of any organised black opposition 
to the government for almost a decade. 
2.1.3 Reshaping of influx control and resettlement policy 
The crushing of the black nationalist movements and the consequent 
paralysis of any organised opposition to the government policy on the 
part of the Blacks did not solve the main problem facing the South 
African government. The Blacks living in the white areas continued to 
increased in number and as proportion of the total black population. 
This continuous growth was the nightmare that troubled the government 
and most of the Whites. In the long term this growth could mean only 
one thing: that it would be impossible to keep this swelling mass of 
Blacks indefinitely under control, that sooner or later the Blacks would 
be able to challenge white rule even in the cities and on the simple force 
36 
of numbers, they would be able to win the challenge. 
Influx control was the traditional instrument for checking the 
movements of the Blacks, in particular towards the urban areas,and for 
limiting their number therein. But although influx control was more 
strictly enforced, extended to all the black men without exception and 
slowly extended also to black women,< 69 ) it was clearly insufficient to 
achieve the aim of reducing the presence of Blacks in the white areas. 
A different approach was necessary, without neglecting influx control, 
and this could only involve the removal of people. 
Remova 1 of peop 1 e was, by the mi d-fi fti es, a 1 ready an es tab 1 i shed 
practice in South Africa. The implementation of the Group Areas Act 
required the zoning of the urban areas into sectors reserved for the 
various racial groups and the consequent movement of people from one 
area to the other in order to obtain segregated residential areas. This 
provision regarded mainly Coloureds and Indians, but also the Blacks 
were involved, in particular because of the policy of 'slums clearance' 
and the establishment of new townships in the outskirts of the most 
important cities and towns. Another occasion for removals of black 
people was the bettennent schemes in the reserves. (lO) But in both 
these cases the movement of people was from one part to another of the 
same area. After the relocation, the people who lived in the reserves 
continued to live in the reserves and the people who lived in the white 
areas continued to live in the white areas. 
The idea of mass removals of Blacks from the white areas to the 
reserves was first entertained in relation to the proclamation of the 
Eiselen line. The decision to consider the Western Province as the 
preserve of the coloured people had the effect of making the enforcement 
of influx control in this region stricter. The flow of Blacks into the 
Western Province was to be carefully controlled and the arrival of 
families severely discouraged. The government's policy in this regard 
was taking shape and at the beginning of 1955 the Secretary for Native 
Affairs stated that it was government policy eventually to remove all 
the Blacks from the Western Province since it was the natural home of 
the Coloureds. (ll) This policy was to be implemented gradually and in 
various phases and initially the removal of people to the reserves co-
existed with the concentration of many of the black families removed from 
the small towns in the westernmost part of the region in the locations 
of the Cape Town area. 
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In this p~riod, another category of Blackswas found deserving of 
being removed. The Tomlinson Commission (See 2.2.2) recommended in its 
report the consolidation of the reserves into more compact blocks, but 
found that certain areas occupied by Blacks were so situated as to make 
impossible their consolidation. The Commission singled out 332 such 
'black spots' and suggested their elimination. (72 ) The government 
accepted this suggestion .and declared that black spots in white rural 
areas would be gradually 'cleared up', and compensatory land adjoining 
existing reserves would be given to the people concerned. (73 ) Also in 
this case the process of 'cleaning up' was relatively slow and initially 
involved a relatively limited number of people. (74 ) 
The government was still elaborating its policy and if, on the one 
hand, it had clear the reasons for wanting to remove the Blacks from 
the white areas, on the other hand it was less clear what to do with 
them once they were removed. Only after the whole policy regarding the 
Blacks was clarified and the decision. to establish ethnic homelands as 
the principal instrument of this policy was taken, was the criterion to 
be used in the destination of the removed people clear, and with it a 
more tenable theoretical justification of the relocation of people. 
Indeed, once the concept of ethnic homelands constituting the foci of 
a political and national development of the various black ethnic groups 
and destined to become, sometime in the future, independent as the 
political home of all the components of their ethnic group is accepted, 
relocation of the Blacks to their homeland becomes a logical answer to 
many problematic aspects of the population composition of South Africa. 
As the Bantu Authorities system was extended and the number of 
established regional and territorial authorities grew (See 3.1), the 
pace of removals of Blacks for 'black spots clearance' and from the 
Western Cape increased.( 75 ) Tighter application of influx control was 
another source of removals, but it had little effect on the total number 
of urban Blacks which continued to increase. 
The removals started to have an impact on population figures and to 
involve people on a really grand scale after the decision to abolish the 
labour tenant system and the presence of squatters in the white rural 
areas was taken. (76 ) The elimination of the labour tenant system and 
. the reduction of the number of Blacks living and employed in the white 
rural areas was noticeably facilitated by the evolution of farming methods 
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and the modernization and mechariization of agriculture. The white 
farmers who had always been lobbying for more labour on their farms, 
found that they did not need so many labourers any more. In fact, the 
reduction of the number of people employed in agr1iculture is a 
characteristic of the development process common to every country. 
Usually, however, this surplus population tends to move to the urban 
areas. In South Africa, the government po 1 icy made the mov·ement to 
the urban areas impossible in theory, and very difficu:lt in practice. 
Nevertheless, this trend played into the hands of the government which 
cou.ld start removing black people from the white rural areas without 
eliciting serious opposition from the politically powerful farming 
community. 
At the beginning of the 1970's the removals had already affected a 
great number of Blacks,( 77 ) and this policy started to show its effects, 
if not on the total number of Blacks living in the white areas, which 
continued to increase, at least on the proportion of the total black 
population living in those areas, which decreased from 62,5% in 1960 
to 53,5% in 1970. However, this decrease was not due only to resettle-
ments. The addition of newly bought quota land and the policy of 
industrial decentralization in the 'b0rderareas' helped to bring it 
about. The policy of removals continued to be implemented, and the 
proposals for the territorial consolidation of the homelands introduced 
a new and numerous category of people affected by it.( 78 ) 
It is almost impossible to detennine the number of people affected 
by removals since the Nationalist takeover in 1948. G. Mare identifies 
nine categories of relocations, (?9) but. does not give figures, except 
for two of them (about 1 400 OOOplus for removal of tenant labour and 
squatters and 250 OOOplus for clearance of black spots up to the mid-
seventies). The group working for the Surplus People Project, elaborating 
on Mare's categorization, identifies eleven categories of relocation and 
estimates, for the period 1960 to mid-1982, a round figure of about 
3 500 000 people affected. (80) This figure can only be indicative of 
the magnitude of the phenomenon and the exact number of the people 
affected in one way or the other by removals will never by known. 
However, these categorizations are perhaps too omnicomprehensive and 
indicate the tendency to blame the Nationalist government for everything, 
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including its positive actions. Nevertheless, the number of people 
removed, often forcibly, from the place where they were living and 
resettled or dumped .somewhere else is really staggering. Even if only 
the categories directly related to the implementation of separate 
development are taken .into consideration, viz., removals due to 
deproclamation of black townships, clearance of black spots and 
homeland consolidation, the number of people affected exceeds 1 300 000. 
Resettlement of people is an inescapable aspect of the policy of 
separate development, indeed, without it, separate development could 
not exist. However, it is difficult to say that the policy of 
resettlement had been overly successful. In fact, the proportion of 
Blacks living in the white areas decreased steadily from more than 60% 
in 1960 to less than 50% in 1980. In particular the Blacks living in 
the white rural areas fell from 31,4% in 1960 to 20,6% in 1980 (See 
Table 9). Conversely, the proportion of Blacks living in the homelands 
increased, and in 1980 was more than 50%, the highest since 1921. 
However, an important, if not determinant, contribution to this 
demographic change was given by the cession of land to the homelands 
in tenns of the 1936 legislation. From 1971 to 1980 about 1 000 000 ha. 
of land were transferred to the homelands. It is not possible to know 
with any degree of exactitude how many people, who in 1970 were living 
in the white areas, found themselves, in 1980, living in the homelands 
without having moved, just because of the redrawing of the homelands' 
boundaries. Nevertheless, their number must be conspicuous. 
TABLE 9: Black population in white areas and homelands. 
1960, 1970, 1980. %. 
WHITE WHITE 
URBAN RURAL HOMELANDS 
AREAS AREAS. 
1960 29,1 31,4 39,5 
1970 28,2 24,5 47,3 
1980 25,4 20,6 54,0 
SOURCE: Surplus People Project, Forced Removals in South Africa, 
Cape Town, 1983, Vol. 2, p. 6. 
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In reality, all this apparatus of controls, all the resources spent 
on the resettlements, all the hardship inflicted on the people have 
been in vain. The number of Blacks living in the white areas, instead 
of starting to decrease after 1978 as it was confidently announced by 
Verwoerd, continued to increase, growing from 6,8 million in 1960 to 
10,1 million in 1980. Their proportion in the total population of the 
white areas has been only slightly affected, decreasing from 57,2% in 
1960 to 56% in 1980. The 'whitening' of the white areas is as far as 
it ever was. 
It is of course true that without these removals the white areas 
would be ~ven less 'white' than they are now, and that without influx 
control a still greater number of Blacks would have come to the big 
metropolitan areas. But, notwithstanding this fact, and notwithstanding 
that the manipulation of demographic trends takes a long time to show 
results - unless very drastic methods are employed, it appears that the 
policy of 'whitening' the white areas is doomed to failure. 
It is possible that in the light of this evidence the whole policy 
regarding urban Blacks is undergoing a revision (See 2.1.4 and 8.1), but 
this does not mean that influx control and the resettlement policy are 
going to be scrapped. Indeed, in the case of a reappraisal of the 
political future of the Blacks in the white areas, influx control would 
probably be tightened and resettlements would continue and perhaps 
increase. The retention of these policies and their partial success 
would be a vital pre-condition of any such reappraisal. If a change in 
the political condition of the urban Blacks and their eventual 
participation in the policy-making process in the Republic of South 
Africa could ever by contemplated by this government, the basic 
condition would be that they would not have the possibility of taking 
control of the country. This might be achieved in the medium-long 
term only if the Blacks wou.ld not be the majority of the population in 
the area concerned, and this might only be attained by controlling their 
movements and removing a still substantial number of them to the homelands. 
Thus, the failure of influx control and resettlements to achieve their 
original aims might become, paradoxically, one of the causes of their 
retention and of their increased implementation. 
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2.1.4 R~t~~t trends i~ black urba~ lotal ~Overnment 
At the birth of the Republic, the situation of the Blacks in the 
white areas of South Africa was one of complete subservience. They 
did not have any representation, excluding the almost useless Native 
Advisory Boards in the townships and the faint and generally unwelcome 
links with the homelands; they could not move from one part of the 
country to the other without pennission; they could not own any land 
or fixed property; they did not have any security of tenure. They 
were, in short, at the mercy of the authorities, who could deprive 
them of any chance of getting a job, and then could deport them. The 
organisations which articulated their aspirations and aired their 
grievances had been outlawed and were resorting to futile violent 
actions. These violent actions were not supported by the majority of 
the Blacks and were swiftly and ruthlessly dealt with by the government. 
The only legal way open to politically active Blacks was that of the 
Bantu Authorities system, i.e., that of the collaboration with the 
government. For the rest of the 1960's it appeared that the government 
had won its battle for the preservation of white rule in South Africa: 
the influx of Blacks in the urban areas was apparently under control, 
the resettlement of Blacks from the white areas to the homelands was 
gaining momentum and the Blacks were unable to organise themselves and 
to act politically outside the framework of separate development. 
In the 1960's there was almost no change in urban black local govern-
ment. In reality some legislative measures were taken in this regard, 
but their effect was limited. The Urban Bantu Councils Act (No. 79 of 
1961) laid down the provisions for the establishment of Urban Bantu 
Councils. These could be established by an urban local authority for one 
or more black residential areas or parts thereof under its jurisdiction, 
or for Blacks in such areas belonging to a national unit in terms of the 
Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 (See 3.1.1). The 
establishment of such councils had to be approved by the native advisory 
boards of the areas if they existed, or by the local black community. 
A council was to be formed of elected and appointed members, the latter 
not to exceed the former. An urban Bantu council had all the powers, 
functions and duties of an advisory board, and additional powers might 
be granted to it in respect of residential management and population 
control. 
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In practice the urban Bantu cou_ncils were simply the old advisory 
boards with a different name. The most important difference of .the 
councils was the relevance given to the ethnic factor. A council cou.ld 
be established for the members of a national unit living in a 
residential area, and thus the same residential area might have eight 
different .councils, one for each national unit. Furthermore, if the 
council was established for the residential area as a whole. and not for 
a national unit, the nominated members were to be representatives of the· 
national units of which a relevant number of members was living in the 
area concerned. On members of the council might be conferred the same 
powers and jurisdiction as might be conferred on a chief or a headman. (8l) 
It was, in short, the attempt to introduce the principles of the Bantu 
Authorities system in the urban areas. 
The implementation of this act met with the hostility of the urban 
Blacks, and the establishment of urban Bantu councils went on slowly. (82 ) 
The black opposition or. indifference to the councils persisted through 
the years, and also the provision that all their members would be 
elected(B3) did not improve their popularity. (B4) The urban Blacks had 
been passive for a whole decade, but this did not mean that they were 
ready to accept a powerless and merely consultative body as the answer 
to their aspirations. 
The first stirring of a black political reawakening came at the end 
of the 1960' s with the formation of the South African Students 
Association (S.A.S.O.} and with the establishment of the Black 
. (85) Consciousness movement a few years later. But still some years were 
to pass before the Blacks were able to act in opposition to the 
government. Indeed, the black nationalist forces were so weak and dis-
organised that the first remarkable protest after years of passivity, 
the Durban strikes of 1973, broke out spontaneously and the nationalist 
movements profitted little from it. This period also saw the growth of 
Inkatha, the national Zulu cultural movement,( 86 ) which, under the 
leadership of Chief G. Buthelezi, became the dominant political force 
amongst the Zulus, a force to be reckoned with also in the urban areas 
with a strong Zulu presence. The growth of Inkatha was initially 
received with satisfaction by the government because the movement's 
insistence on an ethnic Zulu nationalism was considered as the 
vindication of the policy of separate development. For the first time 
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a genuinely popular black movement could be seen working within the 
framework of the government policy, albeit criticizing it. On the 
whole, by the mid-seventies everything appeared to be under control of 
the government, the policy of separate development was yielding its 
first fruits with the coming independence of Transkei, and the Whites 
were lulling themselves in the conviction that everything was going 
according to the government's plans. 
This confident illusion was shattered in 1976 by the outbreak of 
the riots in Soweto which in a few days extended to many other important 
townships in the whole of South Africa. The primer of this explosion 
was the issue of Afrikaans as a medium of teaching in the schools, but 
it shortly became a general protest against the government and its 
policy. (87 ) The widespread nature of the unrest and its persistence 
was a symptom of the dissatisfaction of the urban Blacks with their 
economic and political condition. The government had. to admit that 
its insistence in considering the urban Blacks only as temporary 
sojourners in the white areas with strong links with their homelands 
and desirous of returning there to enjoy their traditional life was 
clearly not based on reality. The reality is that a growing number 
of Blacks live with their families in the urban areas, are integrated 
into the urban life, have no link with the homelands and do not in the 
least dream of returning. there. 
The recognition and acceptance of these facts were, and are, a 
traumatic process for the Nationalist party and for its supporters. 
However, spurred on in this recognition by the widespread riots of 
1976-77, the government was compel.led to modify at least partially 
its traditional approach to the question of the urban Blacks, and slowly 
and cautiously to begin to change some aspects of the discriminatory 
legislation.( 88 ) 
One of the first provisions taken was the Community Councils Act 
(No. 125 of 1977), by which a slightly higher degree of autonomy was 
granted to the bodies administering the black urban areas. The urban 
black councils and the 1.advi sory boards were to be substituted by 
community councils composed of a various number of elected and 
designated members. These councils could, in respect of their area and 
"subject to the Minister's directions" exercise powers and perform 
duties "as may be vested in {them) and with which (they) may be charged 
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by the Minister, after consultation with the administration board 
concerned," over a number of matters. (B9) Amongst these matters there 
were: the control of residential questions (approval of sites and 
plans for buildings, allocation of accommodations and dwellings, prevention 
of unlawful occupation of land and so on), the administration of sporting 
and recreational facilities and some other matters of equally little 
consequence. In the area administered by such a community council there 
could be established a community guard for policing (in normal times) the 
area concerned. The sou-rces of revenue. for these councils were fees and 
duties on the services granted, fines and, mostly, ~mounts granted 
by the Department of Co-operation and Development. 
With this law a little power was given to the black counci~s in 
the urban areas, but since those councils did not have the control over 
their finances and the real administration of the townships was still 
not in their hands, their meaning for the majority of the Blacks was 
limited. That the powers and the importance of the community councils 
were insufficient to attract the interest and the participation of the 
urban Blacks is testified by the low poll in the elections of the members 
of such councils in the most important black townships. (90) 
In 1978, by the Bantu (Urban Areas) Amendment Act.(No. 97 of 1978) 
provisions were introduced for black home ownership in the urban areas, 
on a 99 year land leasehold basis. Following the work of the Wiehahn 
Commission,( 9l) also in the field of labour relations there was a 
progressive change, both in regard to job reservation and to the right 
to belong to, or to form trade unions which could be registered. (92 ) 
It is thus possible to say that a new feature of the government's 
policy appeared during these years. This was its concern to promote the 
creation of stable urban black communities. The 1976 riots made the 
government aware of the possible social and political instability which 
could be caused by the existing conditions in the black townships. This 
new concern for the urban Blacks was evidenced by the government 
acceptance of the main recommendations of the Riekert Commission( 93 ) which 
were designed to accord a better deal to the urban Blacks. This concern, 
however,did not extend to the political field, and the government 
restated that it was its policy that the Blacks shou.ld realise their 
political aspirations through the homelands. (94 ) 
The preoccupation of not letting the political activity of the 
urban Blacks get out of hand is evidenced by some aspects of the Labour 
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Relations Amendment Act (No. 57 of 1981). This Act allowed all the 
Blacks to join a trade union and allowed mixed trade unions. However, 
clamps on a union involvement in politics were tightened and both 
registered and unregistered trade unions were prohibited to give 
financial or other assistance to any party or candidate for election 
in a legislative body or to influence their members to do so. 
Although at the beginning of the 1980's the government has begun to 
acknowledge that the presence of Blacks in the cities and towns of 
white South Africa may not be simply dismissed as a temporary phenomenon, 
it has not accepted them as a permanent and equal component of 
South African society. The most evident example of this fact is the 
exclusion of the Blacks from the new constitutional dispensation. However, 
the situation is compelling the government to give attention to the urban 
Blacks. Although it is still government policy that at national level 
the Blacks should be linked politically with their homelands, they are 
receiving more meaningful powers at local level. 
An upgraded form of local government was introduced for the urban 
Blacks by means of the Black Local Authorities Act (No. 102 of 1982). 
This Act arose out of the Riekert Commission recommendation on local 
government. The main aim of this Act is the establishment of local 
government structures for the Blacks that resemble as closely as 
possible those for Whites. The main difference being that the black 
local authorities provided for in this Act do not fall under the 
jurisdiction of the provincial administrations but under that of the 
Department of Co-operation and Development. 
The Act provides for the establishme'nt of two tiers of local 
authorities, viz., town councils and village councils, the former with 
higher status, the main difference being in the degree of responsibility 
and powers entrusted to them. They can be established by the Minister 
of Co-operation and Development for one or more townships or parts 
thereof and will substitute the community councils of these areas. The 
members of a council are a 11 e 1 ected by the Blacks over the age of 18, 
either S6uth African citizens or citizens of an independent homeland, 
having Section 10 rights in the area. (95 ) A local authority is invested 
with all rights, powers and duties, with regard to all the matters set 
forth in a Schedule, which have been conferred to an administration 
( 96) board or any other local government body. Furthermore, a local 
authority may employ people, acquire and sell movable property and, 
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subject to prov1s1ons of any other law, also immovable property, and 
invest or borrow money. (97 ) A local authority may make bye-laws, with 
the approval of the Minister, on any matter.within its powers. 
The local authorities are certainly a big step forward from the 
community councils both in responsibility and autonomy. However, they 
have not been received with irrmoderate enthusiasm by the urban Blacks. 
The percentage poll of the elections to the local authorities held in 
the last months of 1983, on average a little more than 20%,( 98} 
demonstrates that although more interesting than the community councils, 
the local authorities have not been considered by the urban Blacks a 
sufficient answer to the1r aspirations. 
2.2 Black Local Government 
While, in as far as the rights and conditions of the Blacks in the 
white areas are concerned, the accession of the National Party to power ' 
in 1948 represented mostly a change in the intensity of the application 
of the policy of curbing their political aspirations, with regard to 
black local government in the reserves, it represented an important and 
decisive change of policy. In fact, from the beginning( 99 ) the 
apartheid policy was two-pronged: on the one hand depriving the Blacks 
of any chance of influencing the political life in the white areas, on 
the other hand providing for an autonomous and separate development in 
the political and social fields. The purpose of separating the political 
future of Blacks and Whites was to guarantee the 'self-determination' of 
the white group in its own territory; but it was felt that a political 
evolution of the Blacks would be inevitable, and it was thought this 
evolution should be channeled in the form of the development of separate 
structures of self-government for the other racial groups, granting 
them, in this way, their right to 'self-determination'. 
2.2.1 The Bant11 Authorities System 
Local government for the Blacks, in the form of the local council 
system, was more than half a century old, (See 1.3.3) and if on tne one 
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hand it gave some good results, on the.other hand the new government 
felt that it was not attractive enough to have the support of the 
Blacks. The government position was that the council system was not 
able to develop the reserves and to motivate the Blacks for the task 
of moving from a subsistence economy to a framework of modern developing , 
activities. The reasons for this.were (in the government view) that the 
council system was not related to the traditional Bantu hierarchy, and 
as such, it was unattractive to the Blacks; and that the council 
system was kept under strict guidance by the white authorities giving 
the Blacks few incentives to support or participate in an essentially 
powerless structure. To modify this situation it was felt necessary 
to give the Blacks a more direct sharing, financially and politically, 
in a more responsible structure.(lOO) This new structure was the Bantu 
Authorities System introduced in 1951 by the Bantu Authorities Act 
(No. 68 of 1951) at least in the Statute book, because to introduce it 
in practice took a little longer, as we will see later. 
This system was to be based as far as possible on the traditional 
Bantu tribal organisation,(lOl) and was to be structured as a three-
tiered hierarchical system. At the lower level there would be a tribal 
authority based on the existing tribes (those groups not forming a 
recognised tribe, and for which it was not possible to appoint a chief 
of 'royal' blood, would form a community under a headman acting as a 
chief); at the middle level there would be a regional authority, in 
order to co-ordinate, at a higher level, the affairs and the administra-
tion of two or more tribal authorities; and at the higher level two or 
more regional authorities could be unified under a territorial authority 
with wide administrative powers. (l02) 
The tribal authority was to consist of the chief or the headman of 
the tribe or cormiunity, and of a number of appointed councillors. It had 
the power to administer the affairs of the tribe or community for which 
it had been appointed; to "render assistance and guidance" to its chief 
or headman in connection with the performance of his functions; "to 
advise and assist" the government, or any regional or territorial 
authority having jurisdiction over it "in connection with the matters 
relating to the material, moral and social well-being" of the members 
of the tribe·. The revenues for the tribal authority were to come from 
fees, charges and fines payable to the chief or the authority under the 
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existing laws and customs, and from money assigned to it by the 
government. ( 103 ) 
The regional authority could be established in respect of any two 
or more areas for which tribal autho~tties had been established. It was 
to be composed of a number of members elected or selected from amongst 
the chiefs, headmen and councillors of the dependent tribal authorities. 
Its powers were "to advise and make representations to the Minister" 
(meaning the then Department of Native Affairs) in regard to all matters 
affecting the population of the area under its jurisdiction; to provide, 
under the direction of the Minister, for the establishment and manage-
ment of educational institutions, hospitals and clinics, the construction 
and maintenance of roads, bridges and other works of public utility, and 
for the improvement of farming methods and all the matters relating to 
agriculture. The regional authority had the power to levy a general 
tax on every black male in the area of its jurisdiction, and to make 
bye-1 aws in regard to any matter fa 11 i ng within its competence, including 
bye-laws prescribing fees or rates payable in respect of services it 
made available. Such bye-laws had to be approved by the Governor-General, 
and any amendment made by him was automatically entered in the text of 
the bye-law. To the regional authority were payable all the amounts 
collected in relation to the levies imposed by it, or to the bye-laws it 
made, or to contraventions to such bye-laws; and any amount which 
Parliament might appropriate for this purpose. (I04) 
The territorial authority could be established in respect of any 
two or more areas for which a regional authority had been established, 
and its members were to be elected or selected from amongst the members 
of the dependent regional authorities. It could exercise the same powers 
as the regional authority (in which case the regional authorities placed 
under it would lose those powers), and receive parts of the revenues of 
the regional authorities. (lOS) 
The Bantu Authorities Act, as we have seen, provided also for the 
abolition of the Native Representative Council. (l06) 
Notwithstanding that this Act extended the powers of the General 
Councils and made their substitutes, the regional and territorial 
authorities, completely black, it was not welcomed by the Blacks, even 
in the reserves. Since the government decided to apply the Bantu 
Authorities system only when the population concerned asked for it, it 
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had to wa1t for some years before its powers of persuasion convinced 
the first black group to accept it. The first victory for the Bantu 
Authorities system was scored in the Bunga, when it dissolved itself, 
accepting reconstruction as the Transkeian Territorial Authority 
(24th November 1955).(lO?) 
There could have been many reasons for this decision, but it is 
beyond any doubt that the system appealed to the traditional chiefs 
(who formed the majority of the Bunga) for the greatly increased 
res pons i bil i ty and financial autonomy it promised, and, above a 11 for 
the new powers it gave them. In fact the tribal authority, which is 
the basis of the whole system, had its own basis in the old chiefdoms, 
which after occupying an equivocal position for about sixty years 
became the backbone of the administrative system, and this was to have 
a great influence on the future appreciation of chi eftai n~hi p by 
tribesmen. ( 108) 
2.2.2 The Tomlinson commission 
Even before the presentation to Parliament of the Bantu Authorities 
Bill, the government decided to face the whole question of the black 
areas in a comprehensive way. In 1950 a new commission, the Commission 
for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of 
South Africa, chaired by Professor F.R. Tomlinson, was established, with 
the aim of enquiring into all the aspects of actual conditions in the 
black areas, and in particular into the possibility of, and conditions 
for the economic and social development of those areas. (l09) 
The Tomlinson Commission presented its final report in 1954. The 
Commission considered that the "so-called Native question (was), 
undoubtedly, the most formidable and urgent of South Africa's problems", 
and that the Whites faced a fundamental choice, decisive for their own 
future, "between two ultimate poles, namely that of complete 
integration and that of separate development of the two main racial 
groups".(llO) Since it was convinced that there was little hope of 
"evolutionary development" in the integration scenario, the Commission 
recommended that "the separate development of the European and Bantu 
communities should be striven for, as the only direction in which racial 
conflict may possibly be eliminated, and racial harmony possible be 
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maintained". (lll) To accomplish this aim, the most necessary condition 
was the "sustained development of the Bantu Areas on a large scale". 
The Commission pointed out that the black population of the Union was 
divided into various ethnic groups, with different languages and 
traditions, and recommended the consolidation of the black areas 
around the traditional "heartlands" of the most important black ethnic 
groups, which in the course of time would exercise an ever-increasing 
degree of self-government. ( 112 ) 
The Commission found that the black areas were appallingly poor, 
and even their agriculture was hopelessly inadequate because of the 
backward techniques and soil erosion (in Transkei, one of the most 
eroded of the black areas, only 26% of the land was free from erosion);(l13) 
and that the real income produced in the reserves "has remained almost 
unchanged since 1936, ••. while the per capita income has even fallen". (ll4) 
The Commission proposed a total modification of the economic and social 
life of the black areas. Abou:t one half of the population present 
there at the time should be removed from the land, leaving there only 
full-time farmers and their families, who only in this way could have 
enough space to grow sufficient food for themselves. But even in this 
case "until agricultural practices and methods have greatly improved, 
there will be .little or no surplus grain available for the use of their 
non-farming population". (ll5) The Blacks leaving the land would have 
to find their livelihood in commerce and industry. The Commission 
estimated that about 50 000 new jobs per year would have to be created 
in the black areas in the following twenty-five years,( 116 ) and, since 
"as far as industries are concerned, the Bantu areas are in fact a 
desert", (l17) and that "owning to lack of a sufficient number of 
entrepreneurs among the Bantu", 11 the desired tempo of development will 
probably not be attained", {llB) it proposed that the necessary stimulus 
to development be provided by white private enterprise, both inside the 
black areas and through the establishment of industries in "European 
Areas adjacent to Bantu Areas (Border Areas)". (l1 9) 
The government answered to the findings and proposals of the 
Commission with a Wh.ite Paper issued in May 1956,( 120 > in which - after 
commending the Commission for collecting "precious factual material", 
and for its stand in favour of the government policy of separate 
development - it decided to accept only part of the recommendations of 
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the Commission. In particular, it accepted that the establishment of 
industries in the black areas had to be undertaken, but, rejecting the 
recommendation of the majority of theConnnission about the establishment 
of white-owned industries inside those areas, it decided that "private 
European industrialists should not be permitted into these areas". (121 ) 
The government accepted as of the "utmost importance" the development 
of industries in border areas,(122 ) but did not "regard it desirable 
at this stage" to establish a development corporation for the black 
areas,( 123 ) nor to spend for this corporation the £25 million over a 
period of five years the Connnission considered necessary, because this 
decision was "presumably based upon the principle, which is not accepted, 
of the admission of large European privately owned industries into the 
Bantu Areas". (124 ) Also with regard to the territorial consolidation of 
the black areas the government rejected some of the recommendations of 
the Commission. In fact, it accepted 
the principle that Territorial Authorities, as envisaged in 
the Bantu Authorities Act, should be founded on an ethnic base 
and, furthermore, that by the exchange of 'black ownership 
spots' in the European areas .•• for land adjacent to Bantu 
areas, more geographic consolidation will be effected.(125) 
But since the process of acquisition of the released areas under the 
terms of the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 was far from being 
complete, it was 
however, unrealistic to indicate at present, 
on maps which involve further European land, 
of which cannot possibly now be considered. 
may have reason to return to such the9rie~. 




At the present 
In the following years the government continued to weigh the 
report and the decisions to be taken until, five years after the 
presentation of the report, it made up its mind and .presented a new 
legislation to Parliament. 
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2.3 Conclusion 
After caning to power the Nationalists tried to shape South Africa 
according to their ideology. To obtain their objectives they 
implemented a policy of increasingly rigid separation of all the 
racial groups which form the population of South Africa. Also the 
two other minority groups, Coloureds and Indians, were strongly hit by 
this discriminatory policy, notwithstanding the fact that the govern-
ment considered them as potential subordinate allies in the case of a 
confrontation with the majority racial group (it took some time, 
however, to consider the Indians as such, the original Nationalist plan 
for them being repatriation). Obviously, the most affected group was 
the black group. A simple look at the population figures explains why. 
It was clear that in the long run the government's aim of an Afrikaner-
dominated South Africa, or, looking at the other side of the coin, of a 
homeland for the Afrikaners in the land settled by their forefathers, 
was incompatible with the demographic reality. It was thus necessary 
to try and modify this demographic reality if the aim of the Afrikaner 
nationalism was to be safely achieved. 
Initially the measures taken were directed at checking the influx 
of Blacks into the urban areas and at controlling their activities 
therein. The Blacks were to live preferably in the reserves, or in 
demarcated locations in the white areas where they would be accepted 
only in their quality of sellers of labour. They were in the white 
areas on sufferance and almost no role was comtemplated for them in 
the political field. They were to obey the government or the 'baas' 
and eventually go back to the reserves to obey chiefs and headmen who 
in their turn obeyed the government. 
Government policy and actions were strongly opposed by the Blacks. 
Their opposition lead to a confrontation with the government which ended 
with the total defeat of the black movements. These movements, 
particularly the A.N.C., had been able to extend their influence in the 
black community and at times to mobilize mass support to fight political 
battles. The A.N.C. was mostly successful in mobilizing the Blacks in· 
the early 1950's when the introduction of apartheid legislation was 
harshly felt and the security legislation was not as comprehensive as it 
was to become later. The Campaign of Defiance was the high tide mark of 
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A.N.C. influence. In this period its official membership touched 
the record 1eve1 of more than 100 000, and its influence amongst the 
urban Blacks, and also in the rural areas, was generalized and without 
contra~t. This great effort of the A.N.C. and the Blacks to induce 
the government to change its policy was, however, totally unsuccessful. 
In the aftermath of the Campaign of. Defiance the A.N.C. entered a 
crisis, caused by various factors. The security legislation was made 
more stringent and the Congress was temporarily decapitated by the 
banning of most of its leaders. The new leaders who took their place 
had neither their experience nor their personal influence amongst the 
masses. The masses, although still recognizing the Congress as their 
standard-bearer, had been disheartened by the failure of the Congress 
to obtain even the minimal concession from the government and deterred 
from acting in the political field by the combination of tightened 
security legislation and expanded policy of removals from the urban 
areas at the smallest infraction. To compound these difficulties, 
ideological and tactical differences emerged stronger than ever in the 
leadership of the Congress, paralysing its actions, driving away from 
it the most moderate of its members and finally causing the split which 
led to the creation of the Pan Africanist Congress. 
Although there were sti 11 peri ads of mass activity, particularly 
after the old leadership returned on the political scene, the black 
nationalist movements were again unsuccessful and unable to induce the 
government to change its policy. To the contrary, their strongest 
challenge to the government, in 1960, which induced foreign observers 
to think that the 'wind of change' was blowing also in South Africa, 
led instead to their outlawing and to the crushing of any organised 
black opposition. After the outlawing of the A.N.C. and P.A.C., 
although the majority of urban Blacks still supported them, the black 
nationalist movements were for many years totally ineffective and 
constituted no more than a limited nuisance for the government. 
The crushing of any organised opposition amongst the Blacks, however, 
solved only an immediate problem. The Blacks in the white areas 
continued to increase, both in absolute numbers and as a proportion of 
the total black population, and already in 1951 they constituted more 
than half the population of these areas. The defeat of the black 
movement~ and their subsequent banning would ass~re th~ break up of 
effective black opposition for a period of time, which could be 
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lengthened by the use of an efficient apparatus of control and 
repression. But the absence or ineffectiveness of black opposition 
could not be taken for granted to last for long. The demographic 
reality was self-evident: also in the white areas the majority of 
the population was constituted by Blacks and their number was growing. 
It would not be possible to keep them in a subservient condition forever. 
For Afrikaner nationalism it was unimaginable to accept the 
inevitable outcome of such a situation: black majority rule over the 
whole of South Africa, The only chance to avoid this unpalatable 
f~ture lay, in government opinion, in the modification of the demographic 
trend towards the increase of Blacks in the white areas. Since influx 
control, aimed at controlling the movements of the Blacks from the 
reserves to the white areas, could only slow down the flow, it was 
thought necessary to start a movement in the opposite direction. 
The resettlement policy was the most immediate answer to the need of 
moving the Blacks out of the white areas. However, this policy taken 
alone was self-defeating. If it were implemented to its end the 
reserves would become an overcrowded and unstable focus of resentment 
and the white areas would grind to a standstill. Indeed, it was clear 
to everybody that 'white' South Africa could not survive without the 
Blacks. Therefore influx control and resettlements could not be the 
answer to the government's dilemma. The Blacks were needed to make the 
South African economy work, and they were needed in such a number that 
they would always constitute a political menace to Afrikaner nationalism. 
It was necessary to find a political dispensation in which the 
Blacks would fit without threatening Afrikaner control of South Africa. 
This dispensation was found in the political upgrading of the reserves, 
extending or establishing their powers of local government with a view 
to a future expansion of these powers. The Blacks would maintain their 
links with the reserves and their traditional hierarchy and would 
continue to be considered as temporary sojourners in the white areas. 
The Bantu Authorities System, however, was only reluctantly accepted 
by the Blacks living in the reserves and therefore slowly implemented. 
Furthermore, it was clear that impoverished reserves endowed with 
limited powers of local government were an insufficient political 
dispensation even for their inhabitants, let alone for the urban Blacks. 
The government accepted that in the long term the status of the reserves 
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would have to be changed and vastly improved, but it was Verwoerd's 
inspiration which expanded the still rudimentary policy in regard to 
the reserves into the vision of a separate development of the black 
territories leading to their eventual independence. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE HOMELANDS 
3.1 The Homelands come into being 
3.1.1 Verwoerd's homeland policy 
The decisions taken by the government in its limited acceptance of 
the recommendations of the Tomlinson Commission, as spelt out in the 
White Paper,( 127 ) were put into practice in 1959 by the Bantu Investment 
Corporation Act (No. 34 of 1959) and by the Promotion of Bantu Self-
Government Act (No. 46 of 1959). 
By the former act, a corporation (Bantu Investment Corporation of 
South Africa Limited) was constituted for the promotion of economic 
development in the black areas, and its operations were to be limited 
to "Bantu persons and Bantu undertakings in Bantu areas". The B.I.C. 
was to "promote and encourage the economic development of Bantu persons 
in the Bantu areas" by providing capital, technical assistance, and 
specialised advice to encourage the establishment by Blacks of new 
industrial and other undertakings, and therefore the formation of a 
self-reliant class of black entrepreneurs. 
By the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, on the one hand the 
process of depriving the Blacks of any political influence still 
exercised in the 'white area' was completed, by repealing the 
Representation of Natives Act of 1936, and by the abolition of the last 
vestiges of the Cape Franchise. (128 ) On the other hand it augmented 
slightly the powers of the territorial authorities, and for the first 
time gave legislative recognition to the different ethnic groups into 
which the black population of South Africa is divided. 
This Act recognised eight national units,( 129 ) each of them destined 
to have a territorial authority, whose powers were increased in so far as 
they had legislative powers (not, of course, enabling them to legislate 
in opposition to Parliament) in the area of their jurisdiction, in 
connection with matters regarding social welfare and education of the 
population of the area, the administration of justice, the licensing of 
trade, and in any matter in respect of which the Governor-General or the 
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Minister of Bantu Administration and Development might make regulations 
and which fell within the scope of territorial administration. (l30) The 
powers of the territorial authorities in this field were limited not 
only in scope and importance, but also because the Governor-General or 
the Minister could withdraw any of them at any time. Up to this time 
revenues payable to a territorial ·authority were those payable to a 
regional authority and shifted to it by proclamation. From now onwards, 
the territorial authority received an autonomous source of revenue, 
being empowered to impose a tax on the Blacks living in the area of its 
jurisdiction, and a tax on their income,( 131 ) initially only with the 
Governor-General's approval. The territorial authorities could 
nominate representatives in the urban areas, acting as 'ambassadors' 
or 'consuls' of the territorial authority in relation to the 
population of its national unit living in those areas. (132 ) The South 
African government, too, had its representatives to the national units, 
in the person of a commissioner-general,( 133 ) whose functions were to 
"furnish guidance and advice" to the nati ona 1 uni ts; to "promote the 
development of the administration of justice"; to "consult with the 
Bantu population", in particular with their recognised representatives, 
"in regard to all matters affecting the interests of the national unit 
concerned"; to "enlighten the population in regard to government policy 
and legislation"; and to "advise the Minister in regard to the needs 
and wishes of the population". 
During the debate for the introduction of this bill, there were the 
first reference;to a possible future development of the black areas into 
completely self-governing homelands, or even, in some far distant 
future, into independent states.( 134 ) It was still a vague prospect, 
and although Dr. Verwoerd could say that "indeed we regard the territorial 
authorities as independent bodies in the first stage of development 11 ,( 135 ) 
nobody tried to specify what form those independent bodies would have and 
when they would attain the further stages of their development. Under 
the pressure of the Opposition( 136 ) the government could only say that 
it did not envisage any future threat to the security or economic welfare 
of South Africa caused by the development of the national units, and it 
explained its programme by saying that "it is ideal to retain political 
independence with economic interdependence".( 137 ) 
The main reason for taking this way, a way which cou.ld bring about, 
and has indeed brought about, some kind of partition of the territory of 
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South Africa was that the government felt the growing pressure of a 
black nationalism. In this way it tried to channel it in the direction 
of an ethnic nationalism and away from a racial nationalism which could 
have been {and still can be) more dangerous for 'the mission' the 
government had {or which it thought it had), i.e., the preservation of 
the Afrikaner volk through its political domination over at least a part 
{the largest possible) of South Africa. {138 ) The channelling of the 
rising black nationalism in a less dangerous. direction would be accom-
plished by awakening the pride and the sense of 'selfness' of the Blacks 
using "a system which has developed over the centuries amongst the 
Bantu ••• taken as the starting point for development 11 { 139 ) in the 
political field, and organising the structures for power-management for 
the Blacks on an ethnic base, giving legislative recognition to the 
national units into which the black population can be divided. 
Although it enhanced the 'legislative' powers of the territorial 
authority, this law did not actually increase them in a meaningful way, 
nor did it increase the representative quality of the assembly, as the 
members were still appointed. But notwithstanding this, it was an 
important law, because, to use the words of the then Leader of the 
Opposition, Sir de Villiers-Graaff, "although in this Bill no rights of 
substance have been given to the future black dominions, nevertheless, 
the very act of establishing these national units as entities ... {was) 
setting them on ••• {the) ..• road .•• {to independence)". {l4o) 
Up to this time the diffusion of the Bantu Authorities system was not 
particularly fast: the only existing territorial authority was the 
Transkeian Territorial Authority, established, by Proclamatidn 180 of 
1956, on the 1st September 1956; under the jurisdiction of the T.T.A. 
there were seven regional authorities and 123 tribal or communal 
authorities. Outside Transkei there were 195 tribal authorities and 
nine regional authorities, most of them in Ciskei. (l4l) The government 
hoped to implement .the provisions of the Bantu Self-Government Act in a 
few years, but since the Bantu Authorities system was unpopular amongst 
the Blacks, the implementation took a considerable time: the first 
territorial authority {besides the T.T.A.) to be established was the 
Ciskei Territorial Authority on the 24th March 1961, followed on the 
21st April by the Tswana Territorial Authority, but both had to wait 
until 1968 to see the institution of their executive councils. In 1962 
three other territorial authorities were established (Lebowa, Machangane 
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and Thohoyandou), one of them (Thohoyandou) with the executive council. 
Only in the last years .of the decade were other territorial authorities 
and executive councils ~stablished.( 142 ) Particularly interesting, in 
the light of future developments, was the strong opposition to the Bantu 
Authorities system amongst the Zulus and in particular by the Buthelezi 
tribe. (I 43 ) 
In establishing the national units, the government hoped for a speedy 
establishment ofthehomelands, but did not have a clear idea of what to do 
afterwards, and the statements about future self-government, or even 
independence, were so vague as to leave the shape of this autonomy and 
the time of its attainment in the mist of an unspecified future. 
In the immediate years that followed the introduction of the home-
lands, the government, under internal and external pressure, made the 
choice of really giving the homelands independence in the future. It 
was not an easy decision, and the eventual partition of South Africa was 
not enthusiastically endorsed, but it was considered the only acceptable 
choice between the unpleasant fact of partition and the totally 
unacceptable alternative of black rule. (144 ) 
. Again, a year later, exigencies of international relations made the 
implementation of separate development leap forward. Wanting to extend 
that policy to South West Africa and hoping for a positive ruling of the 
International Court of Justice on its right to keep control of the 
territory, the South African government thought it was an apt time to 
show the world that it meant business with its policy of separate 
development. Again Transkei was the subject of this experiment which 
transformed it into a "self-governing territory within the Republic of 
South Africa"! 
3.1.2 Transkei becomes a self~governing territory 
The spark which ignited this new phase of separate development came 
however not from the government, but from the T.T.A •. On the 21st April 1961, 
a motion was moved in the Bunga requesting "that ... this Territorial 
Authority in session, respectfully requests the Government to declare 
the Transkei Territories as a whole a self-governing state under the 
control of the Bantu people". (I45 ) This motion took the white officials 
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ir. Umtata by surprise (or, at least, the motion having been tabled two 
days earlier, they did not realise its implications immediately), and 
they convinced the T.T.A. to keep the question in cold storage for a 
while. The government decided to seize the opportunity, and a few days 
later the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr. M.A.C. van 
de Wet Nel, let it be known that the government was ready to give the 
Blacks the possibility of ruling themselves in the homelands, and on the 
26th April, the T.T.A. decided to appoint a recess committee to inquire 
into the implications of self-government. This committee did not meet 
until the new year, but in the meanwhile some of its members met with 
Dr. Verwoerd who told them that the government was prepared to co-
operate with the T.T.A. in obtaining self-government for Transkei, and 
that, provided that they did not consider a multi-racial government 
elected by a multi-racial electorate, they would decide for themselves 
what kind of constitution they wanted.( 146 ) 
The decision to give self-government to Transkei, the limits of this 
self-government, and the reasons behind this decision were stated by the 
Prime Minister in Parliament at the beginning of 1962. (l47 ) He said that 
although he was 11 not prepared to permit a dramatic deve 1 opment 11 , the 
decision of giving self-government to Transkei was a very important 
development which showed that the government was "honest in its policy" 
and in "earnest". The decision was taken also because "of the demands 
being made by the Afro-Asian states in respect of S.W.A. in relation to 
the Republic of South Africa itself", and since those demands were 
unacceptable, it was necessary to show to the world that the policy of 
separate development was working, and working well. It was clear that 
in the end such a policy could produce the partition of South Africa, but 
the government felt that it was a reasonable.price to pay to maintain 
white rule over the 'white' South Africa. {l4S) In the light of this, the 
government could announce that self-government would be in operation in 
Transkei before the end of 1963. 
The drafting of the constitution for the new self-governing territory 
by the select committee of the T.T.A. took less than three months, and 
it was based on the suggestion of the chairman of the committee, Chief 
K.D. Matanzima. (l49 ) It is true that the constitution was drafted by 
Transkeian Blacks, and then submitted to the T.T.A. and to groups of 
Transkeians for approval, but the committee had not enough freedom of 
choice to be defined truly independent. Indeed, in the drafting of it, 
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Matanzima did not allow any discussion about a multi-racial constitution 
(which was clearly declared unacceptable by Verwoerd), and at the end of 
its work the committee expressed its "appreciation of the patient, 
valuable and friendly assistance" rendered to it by various officials of 
the Department of Bantu Administration and Development.( 150) Thus there 
can be no doubt that the draft constitution was considerably influenced 
by official direction, as it could be logically expected. 
The draft constitution was swiftly approved by the T.T.A. on the 
1st May and then the Department of Bantu Administration and Development 
provided the ~rafting of the Transkei Constitution on this basis. The 
proposed Constitution before being introduced into the white Parliament 
was submitted, on the 12th December 1962, for approval to the T.T.A. 
which approved it without changes, even if there was some opposition 
reflecting the cool reception with which it was received by many 
Transkeians. (151 ) At the beginning of 1963 the Bill was introduced into 
Parliament, and the Opposition decided to fight it at every stage. (152 ) 
To pass· this Bi 11 it was necessary to make a s 1 i ght amendment to the 
South Africa Constitution Act in regard to the entrenched clause protecting 
the two official languages (the amendment provided for the recognition of 
one or more Bantu languages as alternative official languages for Bantu 
areas declared self-governing).( 153) The Bill was in due course approved 
and became the Transkei Constitution Act of 1963 (No. 48 of 1963) and the 
Transkei became a "self-governing territory within the Re pub 1 i c of South 
Africa". 
Only the black areas were included.in the definition of the territory 
of Transkei, thus excluding the white enclaves of Umtata, twenty-five 
other towns, seats of magisterial administration, some white farming 
areas, and the town of Port St. John's; it was however provided for the 
'zoning' of these areas for black occupation and ownership by proclamation 
of the State President. (154 ) The citizenship of Transkei was for Blacks 
only, thus excluding Whites and Coloureds living permanently in the 
territory. Citizenship included Blacks born in the territory or 
domiciled there for at least five years, Blacks living outside the 
Transkei who spoke any dialect of Cape Nguni, even if they were not born 
in the Transkei, unless they owed allegiance to another Bantu homeland, 
and other Blacks living outside Transkei who derived from Sotho-speaking 
tribes living in the territory. (155 ) The territory was to have an 
executive council composed of a chief minister and other five ministers( 156 ) 
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(other ministers, up to a maximum of nine, could be added in future by 
the State President) elected by the Legislative Assembly amongst its 
number.( 157 ) The Legislative Assembly was to be composed of the four 
Paramount Chiefs, sixty chiefs (all members ex-officio) and forty-five 
members elected by all Transkeian citizens - men and women - over 
twenty-one years of age or over eighteen if taxpayers. (l5B) The 
Assembly had exclusive powers in certain matters (listed in a schedule 
of 24 paragraphs)( 159) to which, with the approval of Parliament, 
other matters could be added, excepting those expressly excluded from 
the Assembly's powers by this law( 160) (such as military matters, 
foreign policy, monetary and financial policy). The Legislative 
Assembly had the power to legislate in the matters under its 
jurisdiction even in contrast with the central Parliament, and to 
amend or repeal any law in so far as it related to such matters and 
applied to Transkei or to Transkeian citizens. The only check on this 
power was a kind of suspensive veto held by the State President who 
could refer back for further consideration the laws approved by the 
Assembly. Sources of revenue for the Assembly were: the taxes payable 
by any Transkeian citizen in terms of the existing legislation and of 
any further legislation approved by it; fees, fines, taxes deriving 
from the administration of those matters subject to its jurisdiction; 
an annual grant from the Republic approximately equal to the expenditure 
of the government on behalf of Transkei in the 1962-63 fiscal year, and 
any additional sum of money which might be appropriated for this 
purpose by Parliament.( 161 ) 
The Transkei Constitution Act placed Transkei in the same constitutional 
position enjoyed by many British and French colonies a decade earlier, 
and the cession of powers to the Transkeian Legislative Assembly was more 
significant than the contemporary situation in Basutoland. (162 ) It 
stirred up much protest amongst the Blacks, the opposition parties and 
abroad, but caused also some interest in quarters not favourable to 
apartheid. 
Besides the fact that the cession of powers was not so extensive as 
some hoped, two main faults were seen in this constitution. One of these 
was the decision to limit Transkeian citizenship only to the Blacks, 
whtch implied the exclusion of a multi-racial solution. The other was 
the large number of chiefs, members ex-officio of the Assembly. Since 
the chiefs were on the payroll of the government, which had the power to 
63 
remove them, it was feared, and with good reason, that they might not 
be independent enough from its pressures. The latter circumstance was 
not so grave in theory since it was thought of as a transitional phase, 
and in consideration of the fact that in all the pre-independence African 
parliaments the number of appointed members was larger than the number of 
those elected, if there were any elected members at all. But it was 
another step toward the entrenchment of the power of the chiefs (and 
this was an autonomous decision taken by the select committee of the 
T.T.A., because, at the beginning, the South African government wanted 
more, if not all, members to be elected to the Legislative Assembly),( 163 ) 
and this entrenchment wou 1 d cast many doubts on the credi bi 1 ity of the 
future developments. But the really crucial aspect of the constitution 
was the citizenship question. It had to be clear to all that the 
citizenship issue could not be solved in any way but in the one which was 
chosen: every Black with links, however tenuous, with the Transkei 
became a citizen of Transkei, and no White or Coloured, even if born 
there, could take Transkeian citizenship. This was the very core of 
separate development and any different solution would have meant failure 
by default for this policy. But of course this solution endangered the 
credibility of Transkei at this stage, and was going to damage it even 
more in the future: as we shall see later, it was the death-knell for 
any hope of international recognition of the independent homelands. 
3.1.3 Political stalemate and economic decentralization 
In the following years - while Transkei began its life as a self-
governing entity amid polemics and political struggles, and Kaizer 
Matanzima began his march toward almost absolute power in the territory -
the policy of separate development lost a great deal of the impetus it 
had in the period 1958-1963. There was less external pressure against 
the policy of the National government; the internal opposition was 
crushed, apparently for good (it would take until 1973 before any 
important signs of reawakening of organised opposition, and until 1976 
before that opposition could again shake the confidence of the ruling 
group); the question of South West Africa was solved at the International 
Court of Justice in a way favourable {for the moment at least) to South 
Africa; and, not least of all, in 1966 Dr. Verwoerd, the 'father' of 
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separate development was murdered, and with him was lost not only the 
mastennind of separate development, but also its main propulsory force. 
These years saw only the slow implementation of the Promotion of 
Bantu Self-Government Act, with the institution of three territorial 
authorities and five executive councils.( 164) In this period were also 
laid the basis of the hoped for economic development of the homelands, 
along the lines indicated by the White Paper of 1956. In this regard the 
first measure taken {after the establishment of the B.I.C.) was the Bantu 
Homelands Corporation Act of 1965 (No. 86 of 1965) by which the Minister 
of Bantu Administration and Development was empowered to establish by 
proclamation a development corporation in respect of a homeland or a 
national unit. The objects of such a corporation were 11 to plan and 
to promote in all spheres the economic development of the homeland in 
respect of which it (had) been established, and the general welfare of 
such Bantu homeland and its population".( 165 ) Such a corporation, 
whose only shareholder could be the S.A.B.T., was to co-operate with, 
and then replace the B.I.C. in its operations in the homeland concerned, 
and to work as the main instrument for the intervention of the state as 
the main propulsive force of the economic development of the territory. 
Following this act, the Xhosa Development Corporation was established, 
to operate in the areas occupied by the Xhosa national unit, i.e., 
Transkei and Ciskei. 
This law was repealed a few years later by the Promotion of the 
Economic Development of Bantu Homelands Act (No. 46 of 1968) which 
enlarged the powers of a development corporation and the scope for 
which such a corporation could be established, it being now possible to 
establish such a corporation not only in respect of a homeland or a 
national unit, but also in respect of "any industrial, commercial, financial, 
mining or other business undertaking in the Bantu homelands", or even in 
respect of some specified development projects.( 166 ) Moreover this new 
law put the stress on the necessity of employing black people and of 
encouraging their training and employment in all 11 the fields of industry, 
commerce, •.. and any other business 11 at every level of responsibility.(167) 
This law provided also for the establishment, after consultations with 
the local black authority, of an advisory board 11 consisting of Bantu 
persons" for each of those development corporations "to advise ... on 
any matter relating to the affairs of a development corporation referred 
to it by the board (of directors) ..• and •.. to exercise .•• such powers 
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of the board as the Trustee, after consultations with the board, may 
from time to time determine". (168 ) 
The reason for the institution of this board composed of Blacks 
only was that 
these types of corporation can ultimately pass to homelands 
governments and by making provision at this stage already for 
advisory boards consisting of Bantu persons, and for the 
advisory bodies to exercise the power of the normal boards, 
it is being ensured that the Bantu are trained in this sphere 
as well, so they can deal with their own affairs.(169) 
Although it stated that the operations of a corporation should be 
limited 11 to Bantu persons ••• in Bantu homelands", this Act made 
provision also that the Trustee (the State President) could, 11 if he 
considers it necessary for the attainment of the objects of, or the 
exercise of any power by the body concerned", grant exemption from 
this rule. (l70) Furthermore, among the powers of the investment 
corporations was the mandate 11 to act as a broker", and not only 11 to 
inaugurate, plan, finance, co-ordinate, promote or carry out •.• 
projects which are intended to benefit and develop the Bantu homelands", 
but also 11 to assist in the inauguration" etc., of such projects.(17l) 
In this way the government announced that it was changing its policy 
in regard to the intervention of white businessmen in the homelands, 
which up to this time was the one stated in the White Paper on the 
recommendations of the Tomlinson Conmission, i.e., that their presence 
in the homelands should not be permitted, and that any kind of economic 
development in these territories should arise from the Blacks themselves 
or from the activities of the state-owned corporationsJll2) Now the 
Minister of Bantu Administration and Development could explain to 
Parliament, much to the surprise of the honourable members "for the 
umpteenth time •.• that the old policy ..• of using white entrepreneurs, 
where it is justified, to act as contractors of the Trust" would "be 
continued". (l73 ) In reality it was a 180 degree turn from the old 
policy which had been demonstrated to be completely wrong, to the point 
that in the decade from 1959 to 1968 the economic development of the 
homelands was conspicuous for its absence.( 174 ) Some kind of economic 
development of the homelands was one of the bases of the theory of 
separate development by which the homelands should become developed 
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enough to attract back some of the Blacks who became urbanised during 
the years of the industrial development of South Africa (the time for 
the reversal of the tide was put around 1978). Therefore it was 
evident that if the government wanted to see at least some of the 
Blacks staying in the homelands, it had to change its approach to the 
economic development of these areas. Finally, drawing the conclusions 
from the realisation that the Blacks did not have the technical expertise 
and the managerial skill to activate the industrial development of their 
homelands, nor the capital to invest in this development, the government 
decided that the establishment of white industries, under certain 
conditions, could be the only way really to start the process of 
economic development in the black areas, as had been recommended by the 
Tomlinson Commission. 
The various conditions which would apply to white industrialists 
willing to move to the homelands were: 
1) the whit~ agent or contractor would be granted permission only to 
occupy land: he would not obtain property or entrenched rights; 
2) links with foreign interests would not be allowed; 
3) while the agent might benefit financially, he wou.ld not operate 
exclusively for his own financial gain; 
4) large concentrations of white workers and their dependants had to 
be avoided if it was feasible; 
5) agreements with the agents would be entered into for fixed periods 
only; 
6) the agents might be assisted in various ways by a corporation; 
7) agents had to pay rent, royalties, commissions or a share of profits 
to a corporation and/or to the Bantu Authority in the area 
concerned; 
8) as far as possible, Blacks had to be employed and they had to be 
trained to hold increasingly senior posts.( 175 ) 
So many conditions were unappealing to the businessmen, and only by 
elaborating on the possible assistance of the corporations and relaxing 
some of the conditions was it possible to introduce the so-called agency 
system, which would become a major component of whatever measure of 
economic development there has been in the homelands since then. 
But for the moment, and for a couple of years still, the development 
corporations were the only presence in the industrial development of 
these territories. Following the provisions of the Promotion of Economic 
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·Development of Bantu Homelands Act, the first public corporation to be 
established was the Bantu Mining Corporation (B.M.C. now M.C.), which 
took over the mining operations of the B.I.C. and undertook the task of 
a complete prospecting of the mineral resources of the homelands. 
In the meanwhile, by the Physical Planning and Utilization of 
Resources Act of 1967 (No. 88 of 1967) the other way to improve the 
economic conditions of the black people living in the homelands, viz., 
establishment of industries in border areas following the indications 
of the White Paper of 1956, was also implemented. This law provided 
for the proclamation of 'growth points' in which the state would grant 
facilitations to the industrialists willing to establish their under-
takings there; and to stimulate further the industrialists to do so, 
provided also for the proclamation of 'controlled areas' in which any 
extension of existing factories, or establishment of new ones, of a 
particular class or with a white/black employee ratio of more than 1:2,5 
depended on the approval of the Minister of Planning. In the following 
years many growth points and border areas were proclaimed, in the 
attempt to contrast the great centripetal force exerted in the industrial 
field by the P.W.V. area, and to bring about economic activities and 
economic development in areas closer to the homelands. 
In 1970 began a new phase of activity in the policy of separate 
development. Again the pressure from outside (regular condemnations 
of South Africa at the United Nations for its apartheid policy, the 
Security Council exercising jurisdiction, however vain it could appear, 
over South West Africa, re-named Namibia, from 1968) was one of the 
reasons which decided the Nationalist government to shift its attention 
again to the political development of the homelands. Furthermore, the 
implementation of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act was almost 
completed, and it was time to move another step on the road of separate 
deve 1 opment. 
But now the move was not mainly a defensive one, because the South 
African government decided to take the political offensive by means 
of its 'outward policy', .aimed primarily at winning friends in the 
moderate states of Africa. To quote J. Dug a rd, whi 1 e it was 11 the stick 
of the world opinion" which was "responsible for the initial move towards 
self-government for black nations, it was the carrot of African support 
and dialogue which led to an acceleration of that policy". (176 ) 
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The first move in this new period of activity was the introduction 
of the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970 (No. 26 of 1970). This 
Act provided that every 11 Bantu person in the Republic" who was not "a 
citizen of any self-governing Bantu territory in the Republic" (i.e., 
who was not a Transkeian citizen) was to become a citizen of the 
territorial authority area to which he was linked by birth, domicile 
or cultural affiliation. (l77 ) The eligibility for homeland citizenship 
was thus as wide as for the Transkeian one, and it was indeed wide 
enough to make every black South African a citizen of one or another 
territorial authority. It was, at least on paper, the first decisive 
step toward the elimination, in legal terms, of the black South African, 
and toward the 'whitening', again on paper, of the common area of South 
Africa. 
In the following year another important law was approved by 
Parliament. It was the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act (No. 21 of 
1971) which definitely opened the way for self-government in all the 
black areas of South Africa. 
3.2 From Self-Government to Independence 
3.2.1 The creation of self-governing territories 
At the beginning of the seventies, significant progress along the 
path of separate development was still conspicuous by its absence. 
Only Transkei had self-government, while the other black areas were 
only at the territorial authority level. Moreover, KwaZulu lacked an 
executive council and the Swazi territory did not have the territorial 
authority. The economic development of these areas too was almost non-
existent. But now the government made up its mind and decided that it 
was time to show 
the firm and irrevocable intention of the Government to lead each 
individual (Bantu) nation to self-government and independence ... 
by making further provision by law for the development of ~elf­
government for the said nations in their respective areas.\178) 
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Indeed, in the preamble of the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act 
there was the first declaration of the commitment to independence for 
the homelands ever to appear in the statute book. (ll 9) By this Act 
provision was made for giving the homelands the same status as Transkei, 
but there were some differences in the procedure by which it could be 
done. 
Firstly, the State President was empowered to establish legislative 
assemblies or to declare any homeland to be a self-governing territory_ by 
proclamation. Parliament passed an act 
in which matters which are common to all areas, such as finances 
and powers of legislation, (were) provided for in detail, while 
matters which are peculiar to a partjcyl~r area, such as the 
constitution of the legislative bodyll80J 
were left to the discretion of the State President after consultation 
with the people concerned. In this way Parliament, after having 
accepted 11 the principle that every one of the remaining homelands 
(might) become a self-governing territory in the Republic 11 ( 181 ) and 
having laid down in detail the limits of the powers of such possible 
self-governing entities, lost any further control on the implementation 
of this policy, leaving it to the government. 
The other major difference was that the progress toward self-
government was to be made in two steps. By Chapter 1 of this Act, 
provision was made for the institution of a legislative assembly in 
every homeland which requested it. The composition of those assemblies 
as well as the period of office of their members, and the ways in which 
they could be elected or appointed were amongst the matters left to the 
discretion of the State President. The legislative assembly might make 
laws, for the area of its jurisdiction, in respect of a series of matters 
listed in a schedule of 33 articles. The matters included in the 
schedule were almost the same as specified in the Transkei Constitution 
Act, with the addition of the control of many health services,( 182 ) the 
planning, establishment and management of industrial and other business 
undertakings, and all the matters relating to the traditional subdivision 
of the tribes and the appointment of chiefs and headmen. (183 ) In some 
of the fields in which the legislative assembly had the power to 
legislate, in particular: establishment of business undertakings, 
nomination or deposition of chiefs, and education, its enactments were 
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subject to the veto of the State President or the Minister of Bantu 
Administration and Development. (184 ) Again in conformity with the 
provisions of the Transkei Constitution Act, some matters such as 
foreign policy, defence and armaments, telecommunications, national 
roads and railways, monetary and financial policy, were expressly 
withheld from the legislative powers of the legislative assembly. (185 ) 
The capacity of the assembly to legislate, or to amend or repeal acts 
of Parliament, in so far as they affected the territory under its 
jurisdiction or its citizens, was limited by a power of veto vested in 
the State President. 
The executive powers were vested in an executive council constituted 
from amongst the members of the legislative assembly. Such an executive 
council could establish, with the approval of the State President, a 
number of departments for implementing the decisions of the legislative 
assembly in the matters reserved to it; and on it rested the duty to 
administer the territory within the limits of its capacity. The sources 
of revenue for the legislative assembly were to be: all the taxes, 
levies, etc., payable by its citizens, or by any private company with a 
black majority of interests, under the existing laws or any other law 
approved by it; all the income deriving from the administration of 
the matters over which the assembly had legislative powers; an annual 
grant of an amount approved by the Minister of Bantu Administration and 
Development, corresponding to the expenditure of the government on the 
matters left to homeland control during the financial year preceding the 
establishment of the legislative assembly; and any additional sum which 
could be appropriated by Parliament for this reason. (186 ) 
The second chapter of the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act dealt with 
the institution of self-government. Again the State President had the 
power to declare by proclamation, after receiving the consensus of the 
legislative assembly involved, that a homeland was a self-governing 
territory. Such a self-governing territory was to have its own flag 
and anthem, chosen by the legislative assembly. There were also some 
improvements in the powers of the legislative assembly of such a 
territory. The State President had only a suspensive veto on the laws 
passed by its legislative assembly, and those laws automatically applied 
to the citizens of the self-governing territory living in other areas of 
the Republic. (Under chapter 1 rights, the approval of the State 
President had to be obtained before the extension of the validity of any 
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law of a legislative assembly to its citizens outside the homeland.) 
Furthermore, any new law of Parliament affecting the matters reserved 
to the assembly could not apply to the area or to the citizens of a 
self-governing territory. The State President might, in regard to a 
self-governing territory, constitute a High Court replacing any local 
or provincial division of the Supreme Court of South Africa having 
jurisdiction over the area, so that a separate body could exercise 
jurisdictional power in the self-governing territory. At the end of 
the process a homeland which had become a self-governing territory 
would be in the same situation as Transkei • 
. The implementation of the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act began 
at a swift pace: before the end of 1971 six homelands (Tswana, Venda, 
Ciskei, Lebowa, Machangane and Basotho) had a legislative assembly with 
chapter 1 rights, (l87) and the remaining homeland, KwaZulu, attained 
this status in the following year. The Swazi territory still did not 
have a legislative assembly under the 1959 legislation. The passage 
to chapter 2 rights, i.e., to self-government, took a little longer, 
but excluding again KwaZulu - with its people solidly loyal toward their 
traditional leaders, and with a leader of such. great personality and 
political weight as Chief G. Buthelezi, the Zulu homeland has always 
been a troublesome place in the eyes of the government - was accomplished 
. f (188) 
in a ew years. 
After the decision was taken to proceed with the constitutional 
development of the homelands in the direction of an increasing autonomy 
toward self-government and eventually independence, two major problems 
presented themselves: the economic development of these areas and, 
partially linked to this, their territorial consolidation. 
3.2.2 The role of economic issues in the political evolution 
As regards the former, a major change of policy was made (as we 
have seen) in 1968, by allowing white industrialists to establish under-
takings in the homelands. The conditions which accompanied permission, 
however, were so stringent that the initial participation of white 
industrialists was almost non-existent. Therefore some of these 
conditions were altered and it was recognised that the enterprises would 
72 
be operated by the entrepreneurs only on a profit basis. Initially 
the entrepreneur who had moved into the homelands accepted that while 
he might receive financial benefits from his undertaking, he would not 
operate exclusively for his own financial gain: therefore it was under-
standable that very few, if any, entrepreneurs moved under this condition. 
For a government so committed, in words, to free enterprise as the South 
African one, this should have been clear from the beginning. Furthermore, 
the presence of foreign capital was first allowed and then encouraged; 
and although the entrepreneur still did not have ownership rights on the 
land and the buildings, and had to be willing to sell the enterprise to 
black interests after a fixed period, this period was fixed at twenty-
five years or more, guaranteeing him the use of the rented property for 
enough time to make the investment profitable. 
In 1970 the government appointed an inter-departmental committee to 
evaluate the programme of industrial decentralization. A White Paper 
on the report of the committee was published in 1971, and in this White 
Paper the government selected six growth points in the homelands,( 189 ) 
where a whole range of incentives would apply to the industrialists 
willing to move in. In 1974 the government decided that the homeland 
governments would in future determine the conditions under which white 
businessmen could establish enterprises within a homeland, although 
Pretoria retained the control over certain conditions of establishment 
as it was the South African government which was paying for the facilities. (l90) 
The incentives began to attract some industrialists and by 31st March 
1974 seventy-eight industries were established at the various homeland 
growth points (Babelegi 56, Butterworth 10, Isithebe 9, Umtata 3), and 
a score more in other places within the homelands. The investment was 
R28,7 million by white entrepreneurs and R19 million by the development 
corporations (for buildings, loans, share capital, etc.). This invest-
ment provided employment for 11 556 people, 11 194 of them Blacks,( 191 ) 
at an average cost of R4 130 per job. To this must be added the cost 
of providinu the chosen localities with the whole range of services 
necessary for starting an industrial settlement, from railway links to 
sewage and electricity. Of course it was only a drop in the ocean in 
relation to the enormous requirements of the homelands, but at least it 
was a beginning. 
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3.2.3 Territorial consolidation 
The other major problem, the territorial consolidation of the home-
lands, was tackled from 1972 onwards. In this year the consolidation 
of Ciskei was dealt with, and as a result the fifteen blocks and eleven 
'black spots' which constituted this homeland were reduced to four large 
blocks (two of them, namely the Herschel and Glen Grey districts were 
transferred to Transkei a few years later). The biggest part of the 
consolidation issue was tackled in 1973 when the Select Committe on Bantu 
Affairs presented its report on the land question. It proposed only a 
partial consolidation, since only two homelands - QwaQwa and Swazi - were 
to be properly consolidated in one single block. Notwithstanding this, 
it implied the removal of at least some hundreds of thousands of people 
from their land. The Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, 
Mr. M.C. Botha, said that the government would have liked to consolidate 
each homeland in a single block, but this was not possible for economic 
and political reasons. (192 ) So it had to settle for 11 a reasonable solu-
tion" which transformed the homelands from a patchwork of 112 blocks and 
168 'black spots' into a lesser patchwork of little more than 40 pieces. 
These proposals, excluding those regarding Bophuthatswana which could 
not be considered for lack of time, were approved by Parliament, and 
constituted the first official attempt to draw the boundaries of the 
homelands. The position of some areas was, however, left for further 
examination. To give the definitive opinion on these areas and to examine 
the whole situation in the light of the reactions to the 1973 plan, a 
Select Committee on Bantu Affairs was appointed in early 1975 to consider 
the matter and to report to Parliament.( 193 ) The major shortcomings of 
this committee was its decision to accept evidence only from the Depart-
ment of Bantu Administration and Development, a decision which cast many 
doubts on the objectivity of the conclusions arrived at in the reports. 
The committee presented three reports, of which only the first was 
important, the other two referring to relatively trivial matters. (l 94 ) 
These reports were tabled in Parliament in May 1975 and were adopted by 
it, becoming the 'final' consolidation programme for the black homelands. 
By this programme the territory of the black homelands, which before 
1973 extended over 15 661 800 ha. divided into 112 blocks and 168 'black 
spots', was to extend over 17 006 000 ha. divided into 24 blocks (the 
0 
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total number of blocks into which the homelands were divided was 35, but 
the black areas would consist of 24 blocks as some parts of one homeland 
are situated adjacent to some pieces of another homeland.( 195 ) 
These proposals were not welcomed by any black leader,( 196 ) and not 
surprisingly. Besides the fact that the proposals failed in most cases 
to consolidate the homelands - although reducing the blocks to almost a 
fifth of the existing number was certainly an improvement - their main 
fault lay in the fact that the government was not able to abandon the 1936 
legislation as regards the extension of land to be ceded to the black 
authorities, and that legislation was not supposed to form the basis of 
independent states, nor even of self-governing territories. Therefore 
the consolidation programme left completely unsolved the question of 
territorial consolidation of the homelands. The attitude of the govern-
ment towards this question in the following years was symptomatic of a 
lack of clarity regarding the future role of the homelands. On the one 
hand government officials began talking about co-operation regions, 
implying that there was no real need for a final and complete consolida-
tion of the homelands, on the other hand some high-ranking government 
officials (sometimes the same persons) began to say that the Natives' 
Land Act was "a step in the right direction", implying that the govern-
ment was thinking of a consolidation programme including cession of land 
in addition to the quota set apart in the 1936 legislation. (Further 
developments of the land issue will be examined in Chapter 8.2 .) 
The failure to solve the land issue definitely was due mainly to 
two facts: the economic cost involved in the transfer of a large extent 
of land, and the political sensitivity of large scale cession of white-
owned land to the Blacks. As far as the former was concerned, the decision 
of the government to purchase every white property in the areas to be 
transferred to the homelands - .~lthough understandable in view of the 
reluctance of the Whites to live under black rule, and of the political 
risk of white anger due to an unsatisfactory deal - meant that the conso-
lidation programme would incur very heavy economic costs. Considering 
that even in this unsatisfactory form the consolidationprogramme was 
estimated to cost (at current money values) about R807 million (l 97 ) it 
is understandable that the government was not overly anxious to double 
the amount of land to be purchased for a proper consolidation of the home-
lands. But even if the government were ready to spend what was necessary 
for the total consolidation, the political dangers of a bigger cession 
of land were too great to be acceptable. Every proposal of cession of 
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land aroused an outcry fran the community involved (of course it 
aroused outcries also fran the Blacks who were compelled to leave 
their land, and those were more justified outcries at that, but the 
Blacks could not threaten the standing of the National Party at the 
elections), and the government had to be very careful in order not 
to lose their support and the confidence and support of the farming 
communities at large, particularly in the Transvaal and the Northern 
Cape. 
The consolidation progranme could not satisfy any homeland leader 
and the land issue remained a sore point in the relations between 
South Africa and the homelands. But this did not reveal itself as 
such a stumbling block in the path of the separate development policy 
as one would imagine in the light of many statements on the topic 
made by almost all the homelands leaders. The first homeland to 
request independence, Transkei, had already taken this decision before 
the last consolidation proposals were revealed, and in the following 
years other homelands requested independence even if their consolidation 
was far fran being satisfactory. 
3.2.4 Transkei and Bophothat~~ana opt fOt ihd~p~hd~hce 
As we wll see more fully in Chapter 5, the decision of asking for 
I 
independence was an almost total reversal of his previous attitude for 
each homeland leader. Although some of those leaders, in particular 
Chief K. Matanzima of Transkei and Chief L. Mangope of Bophuthatswana, 
have always been considered supporters of separate development and had 
accepted in principle the idea of independence for their homelands as the 
logical conclusion of that policy, they were cautious in hastening this 
conclusion until their claims and their conditions regarding the economy 
of the homelands, their territorial consolidation, and the situation of 
their citizens in 1 white South Africa• were met. Indeed, in the early 
seventies it seemed that all the homeland leaders were becoming dis-
illusioned about the government's implementation of separate development, 
and were beginning to think of changing their attitude and of trying to 
modify partially :the outcome of that po 1 icy. 
The maximum level of unity amongst the homeland leaders in partial 
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opposition to the official policy was attained at the summit conference 
held in Umtata on the 8th November 1973. This summit was attended by 
the leaders, or by the representatives of the leaders, of six out of 
eight homelands.( 198 ) No official statement was issued at the end of 
the meeting, but it was reported( 199 ) that all the participants were 
agreed in principle that a future federation of the homelands was vital 
to the unity of the Blacks in South Africa, and that they would not 
open separate consultations with Pretoria about independence unless 
and until there was a.revision of the 1936 Land Act. (200) Since it 
was agreed that the home 1 ands would seek a federa 1 agreement after their 
independence, the federation issue did not directly concern the next 
stage Of separate development, although this was against one of the 
basic tenets of this policy. On the other hand, the very essence of 
the policy was independence for the homelands. There were no impelling 
preclusions to further and future.developments, provided they first 
became independent. But the decision of not opening independence 
negotiations until the 1936 Act was revised, could have been a paralysing 
obstacle to any further implementation of separate development, in view 
of the repeated statements of Prime Minister B.J. Vorster that he was not 
prepared to go beyond the 1936 Act. This unity and community of intent, 
however, were only superficial and were destined to break down within a 
short time. The idea of federation was not wholeheartedly accepted by 
all the homeland leaders (QwaQwa and Venda were. not represented at the 
summit, and Mangope was quite hostile towards a federation of black home-
lands, pref~rring an eventual federation of Bophuthatswana with Botswana), 
and the South African government had both carrots and sticks big enough 
to convince some of them of the attractiveness of independence. 
Again the icebreaker was Transkei. Matanzima had always accepted the 
idea of independence as a final aim, although careful not to hurry until 
he could see some advantages,( 20l) but he had always linked it to the 
acceptance by the South African government of his claims for a better 
deal. His early hopes were for a Greater Xhosaland extending from the 
Fish River to the Natal border, but he had soon to drop this scheme, at 
least as an immediate objective attainable in the given circumstances: 
his angry reaction to the announcement that Ciskei would become 
independent makes one think that the dream of a Greater Xhosaland still 
remains in his mind. Renouncing the Greater Xhosaland idea did not mean 
renouncing other territorial claims, which now concerned four or five 
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districts. A year and a half before the sunmit meeting in Umtata, the 
T.L.A. approved a motion requesting independence for Transkei and the 
territories claimed by it. (202) 
Matanzima's agreement with the resolution not to ask for indepen-
dence unless the homelands were given more land was thus not surprising. 
He maintained his position also at the first summit meeting between the 
leaders of the homelands and the South African Prime Minister on the 
6th March 1974. But six days later, after the annual conference of the 
Transkei National Independence Party (T.N.I.P.) which was, as it has 
always been, under his full control, he could declare to the press: 
"This is an historic day. We have decided to go for independence now". (203) 
Two weeks later, the T~L.A. approved a motion calling on the South 
African government to grant independence to Transkei within five years. 
Two conditions were attached to this, that the land promised to Transkei 
under the 1936 Land Act be ceded and that independence would not 
prejudice Transkeian claims tothe contested areas. Notwithstanding these 
two conditions, this decision was a complete about-face from the position 
held less than a month earlier. The opposition parties asked for the 
Transkei an population to be consulted by means of a referendum, but 
Matanzima refused, claiming that the Transkeian people had given him and 
his party a mandate to negotiate independence both in the 1968 and in 
the 1973 elections. In May and August 1974 discussions took place between 
South African and Transkeian leaders,. and on the 10th September the Prime 
Minister, Mr. B.J. Vorster, could declare to Parliament that the South 
African government was in favour of granting independence to Transkei 
within five years. (2D4) Some pieces of land were to be ceded to Transkei 
within this time, the most important of which was the white enclave of 
Port St. John's, the others being white-owned farms protruding into, or 
adjoining, the Transkeian territory. Further details were settled in 
negotiations held in the following year, and the date of independence 
was set at the 26th October 1976. In the same year (1975) the Ciskeian 
government accepted a new consolidation proposal by virtue of which 
Ciskei returned to South Africa the districts of Glen Grey and Herschel 
in exchange for land between the two other existing blocks of its 
territory that were to be consolidated in this way into a single stretch 
of land. The two districts transferred from Ciskei were ceded by Sou.th 
Africa to Transkei, giving Matanzima something he had not directly asked 
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for (although the Glen Grey district is inhabited mainly by Emigrant 
Tembu, whose Paramount Chief is Matanzima) in exchange for the districts 
he claimed. But this did not preclude the Transkeian claims on the 
other districts. 
South Africa was hopeful that the independence of Transkei would 
be recognised by a considerable part of the international community in 
a relatively short time, but as the date of independence approached, 
these hopes began to fade and it became clear that the chances of 
international recognition of an independent Transkei, or of any other 
homeland which became independent, were almost non-existent. The 
independence of Transkei was not only loudly condemned in every inter-
national forum, but it also drew considerable and strong criticism 
within South Africa, both from the white Opposition and from almost 
all the black leaders. The failure to gain international respectability 
for the p0licy of separate development and the failure of the newly 
independent state to receive international recognition did not deter 
South Africa from pushing ahead its policy, nor stop the would-be 
independent homelands to go along this path. Indeed, already in 
November 1975, the congress of the Bophuthatswana Democratic Party 
(B.D.P.), the ruling party in that homeland, gave the Chief Minister, 
Chief L. Mangope, a mandate to lead Bophuthatswana to independence, 
even without a satisfactory territorial consolidation of the country. 
The matter was then submitted to the B.L.A., and on the 19th November 
the Assembly agreed, by a majority vote (the B.D.P. in favour, the two 
opposition parties against), to start negotiations for independence. 
During 1976, it seemed for some time that independence for Bophuthatswana 
could be not so close after all, because the questions of land 
allocation and citizenship were again at the centre of stormy declarations 
by Mangope and othe·r Bophuthatswana officials. The dispute between the 
South African and Bophuthatswana governments went on for most of 1977, 
although early that year, the 6th December 1977 was chosen as the day 
of independence for Bophuthatswana. While some legal and financial 
questions were settled in the first half of the year, land and citizen-
ship remained points of bitter contention. Only on the 11th October 
were these issues settled, Bophuthatswana accepting whatever little it 
could extract. (205) 
In 1977 there were other moves in the implementation of separate 
development. In October, the Swazi homeland entered the f1rst stage 
of self-government with the establishment of the Kangwane Legislative 
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Assembly, and in the same month a territorial authority was established 
for the South Ndebele, who were thus recognised as the ninth national 
unit in terms of the Promo ti on of Bantu Self-Government Act 1959. 
3.2.5 The Bantu Homelands Constitution Amendment Bi.11 
A shortlived detour 
In the same year new legislation was introduced in Parliament with 
the Bantu Homelands Constitution Amendment Bill. The most important 
aspect of this bill was the provision of a third stage of self-government 
which might be attained before independence: should the government of 
a self-governing territory so request, this territory could be declared 
an internally autonomous country. 
In terms of this bill the legislative assembly of an internally 
autonomous country would be empowered to detennine the manner in which 
the head of the executive was to be designated and what his powers were,( 206) 
and to make laws in respect of all matters, in addition to those 
mentioned in Schedule 1 of the original Act (the Bantu Homelands 
Constitution Act of 1971), which might be deemed "necessary for regulating 
the internal peace, order and good government of its territory". (207) The 
limits of the competence of the assembly on foreign affairs, defence, 
telecommunications, etc., (20B) still remained in force. The impact of 
the State President's veto was partially diminished by the provision 
that vested in the head of the executive of an internally autonomous 
country the power to assent to a bill adopted by the legislative assembly. 
However, every bill passed by the legislative assembly, before being 
assented to by the head of the executive, had to be submitted to the 
Minister of Bantu Administration and Development who, within twenty-
one days, might decide "by reason of its implications for the Republic" 
to submit it to the State President for consideration and, if necessary, 
for suggestions by him to the legislative assembly. (209) The head of 
the executive could not assent to a bill if the State President made 
'suggestions' on it "before those suggestions have been given effect 
to". {2lO) In this way the State President's power of vetoing the 
legislation of a legislative assembly was first withdrawn and then 
given back to him. 
The executive council of such a territory was empowered to establish 
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all the departments it deemed necessary for the performance of its 
duties. The legislative assembly of an internally autonomous country 
had the power to amend or repeal almost all the Acts of Parliament, 
in so far as they affected the territory under its jurisdiction. It 
could also conclude or ratify conventions or treaties with the Republic 
of South Africa. This bill envisaged the extension of the powers of 
the legislative assembly also in some financial matters. (211 ) 
On the eve of its introduction this bill was described as one of 
the most far-reaching measures to be introduced in Parliament in a long 
time,( 212 ) and it was predicted that the homelands which accepted a 
·transfer of powers in terms of the bill would be able to enjoy almost 
all the advantages of full independence, while remaining under South 
African sovereignty. It was also suggested that this bill could open 
the way for a confederation of Southern African states,( 213 ) and it 
was one of the first official allusions to a new development of the 
official thinking, namely the prospect of a confederal framework within 
which to solve the South African, and, hopefully, Southern African 
problems; a line of thought which would evolve in the "constellation of 
states" concept outlined a few years later by P.W. Botha. The 
opposition parties in South Africa were opposed to the bill because, 
although it could provide, in the words of M.C. Botha, the then 
Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, for the highest 
level of constitutional development for the homelands "this side of 
external sovereign independence",( 214 ) the South African government 
still retained the power of vetoing the most important decisions of 
the legislative assembly of an internally autonomous country. The home-
land leaders took different positions on this topic. Professor 
H. Ntsanwisi of Gazankulu and Dr. C. Phatudi of Lebowa declared that 
they might be prepared to use the powers granted to an internally 
autonomous country in order to repeal apartheid legislation, while 
Chief G. Buthelezi and Mr. K. Mopheli of QwaQwa were totally opposed to 
the bill, considering it political bait aimed at inducing homeland 
leaders to take independence by offering them a measure of autonomy. (215 ) 
During the 1977 session of Parliament it was not possible to move 
this bill beyond the first reading stage, and further developments 
were postponed to the next (1978) parliamentary session. But although 
Mr. M.C. Botha, in his statement to the press after the first reading 
of the bill, declared that "this important further constitutional 
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development is the logical development of the Government's ethnic 
policy 11 ,( 216 ) the bill was dropped by the government. Explaining 
the decision to drop the bill, Dr. C.P. Mulder, Minister of Plural 
Relations (in those days the 'wind of change' swept Pretoria, and 
the Department of Bantu Administration and Development became the 
Department of Plural Relations and Development) said that the home-
lands "must be able to switch from self-governing states directly to 
full independence without the intermediate step of internal indepen-
dence". (217 ) Certainly this bill was dropped because it would have 
made independence still less attractive to the homeland leaders. 
After all, a country already internally autonomous could have decided 
all particulars of its own constitution, enjoyed an almost complete 
legislative autonomy and searched for foreign loans (with South African 
guarantees). Almost all the advantages a homeland leader could perceive 
in the choice of independence were at his disposal in an internally 
autonomous country, and without the many disadvantages thereof. Most 
probably the South African government felt that in this situation very 
few homeland leaders would be tempted by independence, and independence 
for the homelands was the goal of the South African government. In 
this light, the fate of the Bantu Homelands Constitution Amendment Bill 
was doomed from the beginning and the only surprising thing is that it 
was introduced in Parliament. 
3.2.6 The spreading of independence 
Independently of the fate of ·that bill, a third homeland decided to 
ask for independence. Early in 1977, following rumours regarding the 
possibility of a request of independence from Venda, the Chief Minister 
of that homeland, Chief P. Mphephu, said that Venda would not opt for 
independence until the homeland had been consolidated and a sound 
economy had been developed. But he said too that the matter would 
probably be discussed by the V.L.A. the following year.( 218 ) During the 
same year, discussions were held between Chief Mphephu and Mr. Vorster, 
centered around the implications of independence for Venda and the 
granting of extra land to it. During the next session of the V.L.A. in 
March 1978, a motion calling on the Venda government to ask for 
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independence was passed, and at the end of April Chief Mphephu made the 
formal request during a meeting with Mr. Vorster. The date of indepen-
dence was tentatively set for the latter half of 1979, and negotiations 
for more land for Venda continued. A month and a half later, the South 
African government announced that it was its intention to consolidate 
Venda in a single block( 219 ) although the 1975 consolidation programme 
had provided for the consolidation of Venda in two blocks. Chief Mphephu 
was less hard a bargainer than Matanzima and Mangope, or perhaps he had 
1 ess to ask for, and a 11 proceeded smoothly and on the 13th September 1979 
Venda became the third independent homeland. 
1978 also saw an unexpected development in the relations between 
South Africa and Transkei. The land issue was the spark that ignited 
the crisis. The object of the dispute was Griqualand East. This area, 
surrounded by Transkei, Lesotho and Natal, had been repeatedly claimed 
by Matanzima. It was part of the Cape Province, but since October 1976 
it was isolated from the rest of it by the independent Transkei. To 
facilitate the administration of this area, the government decided to 
incorporate it into Natal. Matanzima renewed his claims and warned that 
if the South African government went on with the incorporation it would 
have deleterious consequences on the relations between South Africa and 
Transkei. The South African government refused to accept the Transkeian 
claims and proceeded to incorporate Griqualand East into Natal. Matanzima 
reacted by breaking diplomatic relations with South Africa (10th April 1978). 
On the face of it, it seemed that the homelands policy had backfired. In 
reality, the dependence of Transkei on South Africa was so complete as to 
make Matanzima's action meaningless as a form of pressure on the South 
African government. Matanzima probably had a twofold objective when he 
took this action. On the one hand he tried to exert some pressure on the 
South African government in order to have his claim to Griqualand East 
accepted. On the other hand he tried to obtain acceptance from the 
international community by breaking off ties with South Africa and attacking 
it. His move failed on both accounts and by early 1980 Matanzima had 
realised that since outside support was not forthcoming, he had better 
go back on his decision before the South African government lost its 
patience. South Africa had almost ignored the break and had continued 
to give Transkei all the financial aid it was entitled by agreement, but 
had not increased it as it was planned before the break. After the break, 
Transkei had spent this aid more freely and it was on the.brink of 
bankruptcy. There was no alternative to a rapprochement with South Africa, 
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and therefore, in March 1980, diplomatic relations between South Africa 
and Transkei were officially resumed. 
During 1978 there were rumours that a fourth homeland might request 
independence, and all the homeland leaders said that they would not ask 
for independence: some under no conditions, others until their claims 
were met. Chief L. Sebe of Ciskei said that he would not ask for 
independence, nor would he rest until all the land which was rightfully 
Ciskeian "from Fish River to the Kei and from the Indian Ocean to the 
Stormberg11 had been regained. (220 ) In August, however, the Ciskeian 
government appointed a commission (the Quail Commission) to "enquire 
into and report and make recommendations to the government of the Ciskei 
on the practical feasibility, considering all political, economic and 
social aspects, of independence for the Ciskei 11 .( 221 ) The commission 
worked for the whole of 1979, and in February 1980 presented its report 
to the Ciskeian government. The commission recommended that the Ciskei 
should not opt for independence. (222 ) Only as a fourth alternative was 
independence taken into consideration, and also in this case only if 
certain conditions were satisfied, such as the support of the majority 
of the Ciskeians, the satisfactory solution of the citizenship and land 
issues, and financial support. (223 ) The Ciskeian government, having 
probably already decided to go for independence, accepted the commission's 
advice only as far as the conditions were concerned, and the usual process 
of bargaining started again. Chief Sebe spoke about a 'package deal' under 
negotiation with South Africa, containing many of the conditions recommended 
by the Quail Commission, and submitted the decision to go for independence 
to a referendum. The referendum was held on the 4th December 1980 and in 
a poll of 59,5% of the 503 000 registered voters, 295 891 (98,7%) voted 
in favour of independence. For almost the whole of 1981 the 'package 
deal' was at the centre of the discussions between South African and 
Ciskeian governments (the 'package deal' thus, on the eve of the referendum 
was not a deal but the Ciskeian opening for' the negotiations), but by 
December (on 4th December Ciskei became independent) Ciskeian hopes of a 
good deal had disappeared and in the end most of the conditions of inde-
pendence were similar to those accepted by the three homelands which had 
p~~ceded Ciskei on this route. 
In the following years the South African government put the stress 
on the concept of a 'constellation of states', or, alternatively, on a 
vaguely outlined confederation, insisting on the need for co~operation 
among Southern African states, and in particular among South Africa, the 
independent homelands, and the non-independent homelands, inducing a 
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number of observers to think that the independence of the homelands was 
not a first priority of the government any longer. On the other hand, 
in April 1979 the government appointed a commission of enquiry into the 
consolidation of the homelands. The Central Consolidation Commission, 
chaired by Mr. H. van der Walt, was to report by the 31st March 1980, 
but its recommendations are for the most part still not for public 
consumption. Only the proposals for a few homelands have been made 
public, but they have not yet been submitted to Parliament for approval. 
Further developments in late 1981 and early 1982 have demonstrated 
that those who interpreted the government's attitudes as a re-thinking 
of its policy were wrong. During 1981 the Kangwane Legislative Assembly 
asked that Kangwane be declared a self-governing territory enjoying 
Chapter 2 rights of the Homelands Constitution Act of 1971. The Chief 
Minister of Kangwane, Mr. E.J. Mabuza, repeatedly stated that it was 
not Kangwane's intention to move further along the path of separate 
development and that it would not ask for independence. Furthermore, 
Mr. Mabuza led his party (Inyandza National Movement) in that federation 
of black, coloured and Indian parties known as the South African Black 
Alliance, dominated by G. Buthelezi's Inkatha. The Black Alliance 
rejects apartheid, separate development and any idea of perpetual 
division of South Africa on ethnic lines, but it is, on the scale of 
black nationalism, still in a moderate position. Although the Black 
Alliance is viewed by many observers of South African politics as the 
only, and probably the last, black movement that does not put 'one man 
one vote in a unitary state' as a precondition of any talk with the govern-
ment, and at the same time still commands allegiance from a very consistent 
part of the black population, the South African government does not seem 
to show a great appreciation of this, at least not enough to feel 
compelled to take into consideration the opinion of its leaders. The 
government denied the request of the Kangwane Legislative Assembly, and 
in December 1981 made it known that the unity of the Swazi nation took 
precedence over the wish of Kangwane to become a self-governing territory. 
To this end negotiations were held between the South African and 
Swaziland governments and pending these negotiations; any further 
constitutional development of Kangwane was kept in cold storage. 
The first half of 1982 brought other developments which were 
unpredicted. In late April the KwaNdebele government announced that, 
provided that the promised land consolidation of the homeland was completed 
and the plans for its economic development were implemented, it was ready 
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to opt for independence. Although KwaNdebele is one of the less credible 
homelands as an independent state, it is also the only homeland established 
after repeated requests of its ethnic group for a homeland, and thus it 
is possible that the choice of independence would have proportionately 
a higher degree of support here than in other homelands. 
In June 1982 there was another development even more startling. Out 
of the blue the government announced that, after consultation with all 
the interested parties, an agreement was reached with Swaziland, by virtue 
of which Swaziland would receive, after the necessary approval of 
Parliament, the whole of Kangwane and the northernmost district of KwaZulu, 
the Ingwavuma district. In this way the South African government would 
get around the stated refusal of Kangwane to opt for independence, uniting 
it with the internationally recognised Swaziland, and transferring to the 
latter also the roughly three quarters of a million Swazis living in South 
Africa. Swaziland, or at least King Sobhuza, would see its dream of an 
access to the sea and of the recovery of part of the territory lost in 
the last century become reality, although perhaps at too high a price. 
This move stirred up a veritable storm of protests from almost every 
quarter. Quite understandably the Kangwane leaders and the urban Swazis 
were totally against this deal. Also Buthelezi, who saw a big district 
with almost one hundred thousand inhabitants being excised from KwaZulu, 
was not more in favour of it than they were. Buthelezi's opposition was 
not softened by the South African offer of other territories in exchange 
for the Ingwavuma district. However, the fact that amongst these 
territories there were the Hluhluwe and Umfolozi National Parks raised 
the strong opposition of the Natal Administration. The government 
clearly did not expect that such a clever move would raise so many 
protests. It is also possible, since old vices die hard, that the 
idea that the deal could be strongly opposed by the black leaders did 
not even cross the mind of some of its elaborators. 
The proclamations which dissolved the Kangwane Legislative Assembly 
and returned Kangwane and the Ingwavuma district under the control of 
the South African government were challenged in the courts and quite 
surprisingly the challenge was successful (surprisingly because it seems 
impossible that the government had taken such important a step in so 
amateurish a way to be taken to the courts and defeated)', The government 
had to restore the status quo ante, and immediately established a 
commission to study all the implications of the deal and to suggest 
alternative approaches. 
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At the moment the deal is kept in cold storage: on the one hand, 
more urgent and important matters, such as the new constitution, are 
drawing the government's attention; on the other hand, the firmest 
supporter of the deal on the Swazi side, King Sobhuza, has died and his 
successor is not obsessed with the idea. This does not mean that the 
idea is dead. From the South African government's point of view this 
deal was extremely attractive and sound, and if Swaziland is still 
interested in it, as it appears to be, it should be concluded even at 
a higher material price. The problems rise when one contemplates the 
political price of it. Given the still total dominance of the National 
Party in white politics, white opposition to the deal can almost be 
ignored, although the Natal Administration will not let it pass without 
a fight; also the opposition of the Kangwane leaders might be considered 
not too important; but if to conclude the deal it is necessary to 
provide Swaziland with an access to the sea, this would inevitably 
antagonise Buthelezi. At the moment he is the only black leader with a 
considerable following amongst the urban Blacks to keep a relatively 
moderate line and his control of KwaZulu is almost absolute. He is thus 
a force to be reckoned with, and many in the white group consider him as 
the only hope of a moderate pro-western and philo-capitalist leader of 
a future black-ruled South Africa. It thus appears unwise to antagonise 
him and to stress his basic powerlessness to oppose any government move 
when the government gives it priority. However, it must be kept in mind 
that with all his moderation, Buthelezi's aim is totally incompatible 
with the aims of the South African government. From this point of view 
there would be little point in not antagonising him, since even his 
'moderate' success would mean the utter defeat of Afrikaner nationalism. 
The South African government wou.ld dearly like to see KwaZulu opt for 
independence, and if Buthelezi cannot be convinced of the advantages 
of independence, he might be convinced of the disadvantages of not 
taking it. 
PART I I 
THE RATIONALE .BEHIND INDEPENDENCE 
.. CHAPTER 4 
SOUTH AFRICA'S INDEPENDENCE TACTICS 
As we have seen, independence for the homelands was considered as 
the final means through which the aim of separate development could be 
achieved, at least since the late fifties. Truly, the concept of 
separate development can be retraced back to the early forties,(!) when 
a scattered Afrikanerdom was regrouping and preparing its ascent, 
but in this period even the most audacious suggestion fell short of 
total independence. It was only with the Prime Ministership of Dr. 
Verwoerd that homeland independence was considered as the necessary 
step at the end of the road of separate development. Certainly, Dr. 
Verwoerd 1 s vision was the driving force of this momentous development 
in South African policy. 
4.1 Verwoerd 1 s quest for homeland independence 
There is no doubt that Verwoerd 1 s policy constituted a sharp shift 
from that of his predecessor. Although both were devised with the 
same aim, i.e., the preservation of white control over South Africa or 
at least over the greatest part of South Africa as was possible, the 
difference between the two approaches was noticeable, not only in its 
formal enunciation but also in its substance. Certainly, Strjidom's 
enunciation of his policy left few doubts regarding its substance: 
"Ca 11 it paramountcy, baasskap or what you wi 11, it is sti 11 domination 
•.. the only way the Whites can maintain domination is by withholding 
the vote from the Blacks". (2) In this period, therefore, the 'positive• 
side of apartheid had not yet been discovered by the government, and 
white domination was considered a perfectly respectable objective which 
did not need any embellishment to be supported by every decent person. 
A few years later, the Tomlinson Commission presented the conclusions 
of its long work. The Commission proposed the constitution of seven 
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territories for the Blacks, territorially consolidated and based on 
ethnic criteria, but although it considered essential the inclusion 
of the High Commission Territories as the core of three of these 
consolidated black areas,( 3) it did not even once mention independence 
in its report. Nor was the government entertaining any such ideas, as 
it is made clear by its decision on the recommendations of the 
Tomlinson Commission. The government did accept "the principle that 
territorial Authorities ••• should be founded on an ethnic basis and, 
furthennore, that •.• more geographic consolidation will be effected, 11 ( 4) 
but it also refused to enter into particulars with regard to this 
consolidation or even to give consolidation even a minimum degree of 
priority: "it is, however, unrealistic to indicate at present vague 
boundaries on maps ..• Future governments may have reason to return 
to such theories. At the present moment this is not a practical issue". (S) 
It seems quite clear that in the mid-fifties the idea of independence 
for the black territories in South Africa was completely absent from 
the minds of South African policy-makers. 
It was with Verwoerd that apartheid became separate development. 
This was the 'positive' aspect of apartheid, introduced in order to 
cater for the 'national' aspirations of the black groups while, and 
above all, safeguarding the future of the Whites. Although safe-
guarding the future of the Whites - and this means maintaining political 
control, domination in the South African environment - was obviously the 
main aim, it was felt necessary that a quid pro quo be given to Blacks.( 6) 
This quid was to be the possibility for the Blacks to pursue their 
economic and political development in their own areas. This was part of 
the original Nationalist policy, but it was an often overlooked part. 
It was with the Verwoerd Prime Ministership that the stress was put on 
this aspect of the National Party's policy. 
In this period, the main effort was toward the creation of an 
institutional framework to accommodate the political aspirations of the 
Blacks. In 1959 there were the first official statements regarding the 
possibility of independence for the black territories at some future 
date. During the no-confidence debate at the beginning of the 
Parliamentary session of that year, Verwoerd made it clear that "indeed 
we regard the territorial authorities as independent bodies in the first 
stage of development"(?) and although the idea of giving fndependence to 
the black areas caused a storm of criticisms from the Opposition 
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(ranging from the doubtful viability of such independent states, to 
the threats to South African secur.ity caused by a possible pro-
communist foothold inside the borders of the Union, and to the threats 
to the South African economy caused by the economic development of 
those areas), he stated a few months later that "if it is within the 
power of the Bantu and if the territories in which now lives can 
develop to fu 11 independence, it wi 11 develop in this way". ( 8) 
This meant that in order to maintain white supremacy in South 
Africa, the government was ready to accept a future partition of South 
Africa itself. (It was a partition on their tenns and scheduled for a 
distant and undetermined future, but nevertheless a partition.) 
There were two reasons for this important change. On the one hand, 
it was implicit in the ideology of apartheid - at least in the inter-
pretation given to it by those who were not only concerned with 
baassap; furthermore it was necessary, after having accomplished the 
separation of the races, to put into practice the 'positive' aspects 
of apartheid, whoseexistence was, up to this time, more or less an 
article of faith (for many it still remains so). It was also evident 
that in order to have the "permanent friendship and co-operation" of 
the Blacks it was necessary to provide a way in which their aspirat_ions 
could be satisfied and in the meanwhile channeled towards non-dangerous 
aims. On the other hand, the international pressures on South Africa 
were beginning to make themselves felt, South Africa's stand in the 
international community was rapidly worsening, and the government 
decided it was time to show the world that South Africa's internal 
policy was aimed also at developing the black nations living within 
its borders~ __ :respecting the principles of self-determination of 
peoples. 
The implementation of this policy as a reaction to foreign criticisms 
and as a way to break South Africa's isolation, and the limits beyond 
which the government was not prepared to go in pleasing international 
critics, can be seen particularly in the next few years. In this period, 
the hope of an improvement in the international position of South Africa 
was amongst the most important factors of the decision to confer self-
government on Transkei (or at least of its timing). 
The announcement of the government's decision to grant self-
government to Transkei( 9) came less than a year after South Africa had 
to withdraw from the Commonwealth - a move that emphasised the level of 
isolation of this country in the international community - and preceded 
(• 
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by a few months the first ruling of the International Court of 
Justice on South West Africa. Although the government realised that 
its policies made the international position of South Africa weak, it 
was of course not prepared to court the favours of the international 
public opinion at the cost of the 'suicide' of the Whites. {lO) However, 
the decision to give Transkei self-government was considered by the 
government not only in line with the ideology of apartheid, but also 
in line with "the internationally stated principles", and thus as a 
vindication of South Africa's· image in the world. Indeed, this decision 
was taken in the hope 
.•. that after what we are doing to-day, after the proof we 
are giving to-day in regard to the liberation of nations ... 
this international action taken against us and the international 
understanding of our policy will change, as indeed it ought to.(11) 
The first elections in Transkei and the constitution of Transkei 
as a self-governing territory did indeed provoke a considerable interest 
abroad, but although many observers found the elections relative fair 
and free, and the experiment of self-government interesting enough,{ 12 ) 
the many drawbacks of Transkei as a self-governing territory - from its 
almost non-existent economic infrastructure to the limits of the 
territorial and constitutional competence of the T.L.A. - caused even 
neutral observers to conclude that: "what has happened to and in the 
Transkei has made it clear .•. that far more has been claimed for 
separate development than either the process or the accomplishments 
warrant". {l3) 
The reaction of the i nternati ona 1 community to the granting of self-
government to Transkei was certainly not the one hoped for by South 
Africa - particularly because international attention focused on the 
contemporary enactment of new security legislation - and the South 
African image was not enhanced by it, but this did not deter the 
government from the implementation of its policy. The lack of inter-
national support, although disappointing, was not considered a sufficient 
reason to change direction, ahd had yet been foreseen and taken int~ 
consideration by Verwoerd when he said: "The downfall of one's nation, 
the sacrifice of White government in South Africa is a price which can-
not be paid for friends and partners". (l4) 
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Although Verwoerd's commitment to the future independence of the 
homelands was not in doubt, how far in the future this independence 
would have been attained was not clear. At the beginning it was seen 
as a very long and slow process, spanning two or three generations. (lS) 
This was certainly a sign of the reluctance of the National Party to 
follow words with deeds in the sensitive topic of partition of South 
Africa, and also of the conviction - widespread amongst the Whites -
that, after all, the Blacks were not able to run a country, and that 
they still needed the white man's expertise for a long time before they 
could do it alone. A good example of this attitude can be found in the 
words of the then Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, 
Mr. M.D.C. de Wet Nel: 11 I believe that for generations they will remain 
part of the R.S.A., for they realize what is good for them". (l6) (The 
last part of this statement is quite interesting, considering that ten 
years later the government would be pressing the homeland leaders to 
accept independence.) A commission on the position of white traders and 
settlers in Transkei (the Halloway Commission) also arrived at the same 
conclusions: 11 The White man must be kept to help. the Black man build up 
the Transkei until he could do without the White man, and that is a 100-
years job 11 .(l?) Certainly this kind of statement did not improve the 
credibility of separate development, nor its attractiveness for the 
Blacks. 
In the following years the timetable for independence remained as 
vague as ever, but the foreseen span of time was reduced and its length 
made to depend on the wishes of the black leaders.(lB) This exposed the 
government to the charge from the Opposition that it was losing the 
control of the process and that the likely conclusion of the policy 
would be the establishment of black dictatorships over parts of South 
Africa. The government however realised that to maintain some 
credibility for separate development it was necessary to accept its 
logical consequences and not to postpone them to the next century. 
Although probably being uncomfortable with the idea of a near independence 
for Transkei, Verwoerd reduced drastically his forecast of the time needed 
by Transkei before being ready for independence, putting the date of this 
achievement somewhere in the future but within his active political life: 
"What Matanzima is going to ask is independence for his black territory, 
and I shall be prepared to grant him that at the right time". (l9) 
Notwithstanding the vagueness of all the references to the homelands' 
92 
independence, this became the main issue of the March 1966 election. 
The results of this election - the National Party won ten seats from 
the United Party and all the new ten seats created for this election -
were widely interpreted as a mandate to the government to pursue its 
policy of separate development, and as the proof of the white 
electorate's acceptance of the future partition of South Africa. In 
the words of a comment in the Sunday Times: 
The people of South Africa made clear that what they want 
is separate development; .•• they do want the Bantustans. 
They do want eight independent Black States with eight 
Prime Ministers.(20) 
4.2 Reluctance to grant full independence 
A few months after this election, the pace of the implementation 
of this policy was abruptly slowed by Verwoerd's death. With his 
disappearance separate development lost its driving force and its most 
convinced supporter. The new leadership, although believing 11 in 
separate development •.• as the only practical solution ... to do 
justice to every population group 11 ,( 2l) was apparently much less 
enthusiastic at the idea of eight separate states within the borders of 
South Africa, and remained very vague in its comments on the future 
independence of the homelands.( 22 ) This attitude did not mean that 
separate development was now put in cold storage. On the contrary, 
the government agreed that 
We should develop the homelands in all aspects of the 
economic sphere ..• we should see to it that we activate the 
organized authorities of the Bantu nations •.• we should 
help them ..• to create a proper, orderly national economy 
in their own context ••. we should actually convert and 23 develop those territorial authorities into national authorities. ( ) 
but all this did not have a high priority, and, in particular, the 
constitutional development of the homelands was not meant to go too 
far too fast: 11All this •.• does not imply in one single respect that 
other systems similar to that of the Transkei have to be established 
immediately 11 .( 24 ) This was because 11 the Bantu authorities as we have 
' 
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at present should be first given more work to do .•. as they become 
better activated with new duties they will be able to progress to 
higher levels of self-government".( 25 ) Certainly the ultimate target 
of this policy was still independence. Indeed, the new Minister of 
Bantu Administration and Development, Mr. M.C. Botha, wanted "to give 
shape to every Bantu nation", and 
this shaping ••. should be carried out •.• on the basis of 
these separate national identities ••• towards the fulfilment 
of their own separate destinies ••• in the( arduous_ process of 
attaining true ••• independent nationhood. 26) 
However, he was less precise about the exact steps to be taken to 
accomplish his policy: 
Independence to a lesser extent, to a greater extent, to an 
ultimate extent •.. Independence (is) not something with a 
purely political meaning .•. It includes the economic 
the education •.. all those manifestations ••• of the 
activities of a nation.(27) 
but he had clear in his mind that this process was to be quite a long 
one because "One should bear in mind that no nation has ever achieved 
full maturity in one century". (28) 
The change of attitude towards the perspectives of independence 
for the homelands was not only due to the death of Verwoerd. In the 
mid-sixties, the pressures towards change - whose existence, both out-
side and within South Africa, was one of the principal reasons of the 
Verwoerdian 'revolution' - were relenting, or at least were no more felt 
as a menace. The internal militant opposition had been crushed and its 
leaders were in jail or in exile; and international attention was 
diverted towards new, and perhaps easier, targets, such as rebellious 
Rhodesia. The African states, which in the first years of their 
independence had assumed a militant posture, had to switch their 
attention to their pressing internal troubles. And-although their 
yearly condemnation of South Africa and its policy at the General 
Assembly of the U.N.O. and at the O.A.U. summits was becoming 
customary, the economic power of South Africa was stronger than 
ideological differences, and unofficial trade relations between black 
African countries and the bastion of white supremacy flowered. In 
the absence of strong pressures the need of change lost its character 
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of urgency and, furthermore, also amongst its supporters old and 
deeply rooted prejudices were not easy to overcome. The attitude 
and the statements of M.C. Botha are a good example of the ambivalence 
of this period: on the one hand it was accepted that the final result 
of separate development should be independence fortheblack territories, 
but there was great reluctance in putting these principles into practice, 
reluctance due partially to fear and partially to distrust in the 
capacities of the Blacks. (29 ) 
The rationalisation for the decision to slow down the pace of 
separate development was a clear one. And it was difficult not to 
agree with this argument: political independence alone, without social 
and economic development which could give independence a concrete 
meaning, would be a sham. Economic viability became the password of 
the day, and future development beyond the Transkeian level or even 
beyond the territorial authority level, was linked to a visible develop-
ment in the socio-economic field. The stress on the economic factors 
caused a welcome change in the government's policy: after having been 
fiercely opposed to direct intervention of white private capital in 
the homelands, on the ground of its exploitatory character,( 30) they 
had to realise that without the enterprise and the flexibility of the 
private sector economic development of the homelands was unattainable. 
The government thus agreed "that white capital and white know-how must 
be utilized and harnessed in order to develop the Bantu homelands 11 .( 3l) 
But even with the help of private capital (and it was not sure that 
this help was forthcoming) the economic development of the homelands 
was not to be attained in a short time (if it could ever be attained) 
and this meant that the pace of political development was to be slower 
than it was thought by Verwoerd and other enthusiastic supporters of 
his policy. Of course, this new assessment of the tempo of the 
implementation of separate development was made taking into consideration 
the 'interests' of the black peoples. Vorster himself made this clear 
when he kept the subject of homeland independence safely clouded. in the 
mists of a still distant future, although reducing the time foreseen 
for the accomplishment of the necessary development from more or less 
a century, as it was heavily hinted by his Minister of Bantu 
Administration and Development, to a more reasonable span.( 32 ) 
Thus~ towards the end of the sixties the independence of the home-
lands was again seen, as it was ten years earlier, as the distant final 
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target of separate development, something to strive for, but safely 
far in the future. This attitude is well illustrated by the answer 
given by M.C. Botha to the request of speeding the process towards 
independence for Transkei. During the 1968 session of the T.L.A., a 
motion was passed asking the South African government to do every-
thing in its power to prepare Transkei for independence in the shortest 
time possible. The Minister of Bantu Administration and Development 
gave a reply in the House of Assembly, which was directed to all the 
black peoples of South Africa. He said that the road to independence 
was 11 a long and difficult one 11 and that 11 the process of becoming 
independent ••• is not a process which can be accomplished overhastily 
and overnight at as a rapid pace as possible 11 • ( 33 ) Before any people 
could aspire to it, certain prerequisities had to be fulfilled: 
(a) considerable administrative experience in the management and 
control of government departments; 
(b) deep-rooted reliability in all actions, particularly in the 
control of finance and budgeting; 
(c) integrity of purpose in public affairs from the highest to the 
lowest official; 
(d) a democratic way of life and a sense of complete responsibility; 
(e) the control and management of all fields of administration by 
its own citizens and not on a large scale by citizens of another 
country (South Africa) because there were not enough local men 
qualified to do the work; 
(f) economic development and the provision of jobs for its own 
people by its own government; and 
(g) a firm desire for peaceful co-existence: a nation that wished 
to govern itself independently must show by word and deed that 
it is prepared to live in peace with its own people and with 
other nations, especially its neighbours. (34 ) 
This last prerequisite indicates that the government's concern for 
South African external security has always been foremost, even to the 
point of exaggeration. It can be said without any doubt that in the 
conditions existing in 1968, the idea of a possible hostile or even 
belligerent behaviour from the leaders of an independent homeland could 
constitute a worry only to people really oversensitive to the question 
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of national security. 
Such prerequisites were not easy to be fulfilled, and certainly to 
fulfil them would take, in the Minister's opinion, a very long· time: 
I cannot predict whether (it will take) three years or ten years, 
and whether this or that will happen. There is a very large 
human factor involved, namely that of the Bantu peoples themselves 
What their capacity is their Creator alone knows ... I shall 
perhaps be no longe5)alive when it will be possible to say when 
that day will be.t3 
In this period then, the government was quite content with the 
situation as it was, and did not feel compelled to move at a quicker 
pace towards this almost mythical independence for the homelands. It 
was again for requirements of international policy that the government 
decided to speed up the process. We have already seen that this time 
it was not a reaction to pressure from outside, but the decision to 
take the diplomatic 'offensive' with the 'outward policy' that ignited 
the new phase of separate development. The discovery that independent 
Lesotho and Botswana did not become a springboard for attacks against 
South Africa, and that, on the contrary, they kept close economic ties 
with it, helped to relieve South African fears (excessive fears 
certainly) about security. The government realised that there was room 
for manoeuvre, and that relatively good relations with the African 
states were in the realm of possibilities. But manoeuvring for this 
objective meant to do something about race relations within South Africa. 
Although South African conditions for dialogue very clearly included 
non-interference in South African internal affairs,( 36 ) it was as much 
clear that only some development in the internal situation in South 
Africa could be a sufficient incentive for African leaders to negotiate 
and to open friendly relations with South Africa. The only field in 
which the government was prepared to do something in this regard was 
the implementation of separate development. Independence, however, 
was still not regarded as imminent, since in the government's view 
considerable development was necessary, both in the economic and in 
. I 
the institutional fields, before it could become a realistic prospect. 
Although up to this time, the bulk of the criticisms levelled at South 
Africa in this regard concerned the fact that black territories did 
not enjoy a sufficient degree of autonomy, and that South Africa should 
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really give Transkei independence to prove the earnestness of its 
policy, the government decided that many steps were needed before 
it was possible to take independence into consideration. As it was 
explained by P. Koornhof, then Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration 
and Education, the gov~rnment's policy 
of having a maximum number of Bantu in the Bantu homelands and 
a minimum number of Bantu in our white areas very clearly implies 
vigorous economic development around and within these homelands, 
and also in particular greater self-government for the Black 
peoples in their own territories. It means more and more self-
detennination for each Bantu people in each one of the homelands . 
••• Under our policy the road for each Bantu people to develop 
to full self-determination is clear. This does not exclude 
independence ... All possibilities are open to the Bantu peoples 
in their own homeland, and when the time arrives, full indepen- (37 ) dence for them can be considered. This time may be soon or not. 
He even made a discount on the time foreseen by Vorster a year earlier, 
since he thought that it was "quite possible that that time would arrive 
long before the year 2000 11 • The most revealing part of this speech, 
however, was when he said that "It (the date of independence) will 
depend on the Bantu themselves and on other circumstances which may 
come into play". (My emphasis)( 3B) There can be no better demon-
stration of the essentially pragmatic approach of the South African 
government to the implementation of their policy of separate development 
than this statement, although this pragmatic approach did not prevent 
some ideological rigidity which caused waste of time and money. 
In this period, new provisions were taken to speed up the tempo of 
the implementation of separate development, including the Economic 
Development of Bantu Homelands Act (No. 46 of 1968), and in the 
following years the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act (No. 26 of 1970) 
and the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act (No. 21 of 1971). (39 ) Those 
provisions, however, were related to independence only because they 
were considered as the necessary premise to it, and even the Bantu 
Homelands Constitution Act in reality provided simply for a Transkei-
type of self-government to be granted to the homelands in a two step 
move and in due course. 
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4.3 Foreign policy and the revitalization of the independence goal 
Independence for the homelands was still probably not wholeheartedly 
accepted by all the National Party members, and it is possible to see 
also in this subject the growing differences that in a short time would 
create the division between verligte and verkrampte and would eventually 
lead to the split in the National Party. While the Deputy Ministers of 
Bantu Administration and Development (first A. Koornhof and then 
A.J. Raubenheimer) were preparing the ground for the big decision (of 
really giving independence to the homelands) which they saw approaching 
because 'other circumstances' were coming into play, the Minister, 
Mr. M.C. Botha, sometimes cquld not resist the temptation of dragging 
his heels. He clearly accepted the aims of separate development, but 
his scepticism about the capability of the Blacks kept surfacing in 
almost all his statements.( 40) 
But the requirements of foreign policy were pressing for a clear 
acceptance of the next steps of separate development. Since the first 
overtures to African states had an acceptable success, the independence 
of the homelands was again foreseen as a short term possibility. In 
September 1970, Vorster declared that "any Black state is free to come 
to this Parliament and say that its time has arrived and that it wants 
to follow its own course II . . . . It was still not the green light, however, 
since in the same breath he also said: 
(then we) will deliberate with that state. As there are dozens 
of matters to which consideration will have to be given •.. 
tho~e tal~l)will probably have to be held over very long 
pen ods. { 
Having accepted that some of the homelands could become independent 
in the short term, another problem presented itself to the government: 
it was clearly impossible to fulfil some (or many) of the prerequisites 
to independence which had been laid down as late as 1968, if the home-
lands were to receive independence in a relatively short time. In 
particular, the economic condition of the homelands was quite dismal,( 42 ) 
and economic viability was an ever receding target. In this regard, the 
government took the short way out and decided that: "Economic viability 
is not a prerequisite for future political development". (43 ) 
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In 1971, the declarations of readiness for giving homelands 
independence multiplied, and Vorster was at pains to make it plain 
that there were no tricks in South Africa's stance: 
The policy of this government is to lead these black states 
to independence. When I use the word 'independeQce' I use it 
in the ordinary, every-day sense of the word.(44J 
In this period, at last, also a time limit was indicated: "We declare 
that we shall do it {leading the homelands to independence), and we are 
doing it in this dynamic decade". (45 ) 
In the meanwhile the results of the diplomatic offensive were good, 
and trade and political contacts with a number of African states were 
in expansion. A measure of the dimension of this successful attempt to 
break South African isolation is given by the fact that in this period 
a number of mostly French-speaking African states, led by Ivory Coast's 
President Houphuet-Boigny, was pressing for an open dialogue with 
Pretoria. In fact, the number of the states supporting this position 
was limited, and at the summit of the O.A.U., held in Addis Ababa in 
June 1971, a resolution instructing member states to make no attempt 
to collaborate with South Africa was passed with a large majority. But 
the simple fact that it was necessary to debate this matter was a proof 
of the success of South Africa's diplomatic offensive. Moreover the 
approval of this motion was not unanimous: twenty-eight states voted 
for it, but six (Ivory Coast, Gabon, Lesotho, the Malagasy Republic, 
Malawi, and Mauritius) were against it, and five others(Dahomey, Niger, 
Swaziland, Togo, Upper Volta) abstained. At this point thtis, a quarter 
of the African states were inclined to dialogue with South Africa. The 
issue of opening relations with South Africa caused considerable 
friction amongst O.A.U. members which almost divided in two bitterly 
contending sides: Lesotho suggested, in September, a summit conference 
of the pro-dialogue states, to be held in the Malagasy Republic, while 
the following month, a summit of fourteen East and Central African 
states, held in Mogadishu, adopted a resolution reaffirming the policy 
of anned struggle against South Africa. 
On the wave of this success, the South African government confirmed 
the decision of granting independence to some of the homelands in a 
very short time: 
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If there is a Bantu people that believes the time has arrived 
for it to become independent, it can come and discuss the 
matter with me, and then my door stands open to it ... when I 
speak of independence I mean independence in the normal sense 
of the word, the independence which Botswana or any other 
country has. ( 46) 
There were, however, two weak points in Vorster's 'outward policy'. 
Over one of them the South African government did not have any 
influence - this was the fact that the trend towards dialogue with 
South Africa depended on the leaders of the various African states 
themselves, and the chronic instability of these states was the reason 
of a great degree of uncertainty in the long term relations with each 
one of them. (47 ) The other weak point was the direct responsibility of 
the South African government: the slow pace of progress inside South 
Africa, indeed the total absence of it, excluding the institution of 
some new self-governing territories, disappointed and discouraged 
many of the 'pro-dialogue' African leaders. 1971 was the high tide mark 
of the South African diplomatic offensive, and the following years saw a 
slow but steady worsening of South African relations 'With many African 
states. 
It being impossible for South African leaders to accept changes to 
the sys tern, the only hope they had (or they thought to have) to give 
a new impulse to their African 'detente' was an acceleration of those 
changes which were possible within the system. Transkeian independence 
was, from this point of view, a very appropriate way to show the 
seriousness of South Africa's intentions. 
For a while a new, and:·unexpected, obstacle appeared on the road to 
independence. This was caused by the attitude of the homeland leaders, 
who took the resolution of not asking for independence until and unless 
their claims for more land were met. 
turned down by the government( 48 ) the 
Since their requests were flatly 
situation seemed deadlocked, but 
South African leverage was powerful enough to convince some of them to 
change their attitude. However, Pretoria cou.ld not impose independence 
against the will of the homeland leaders, and it could not be sure that 
the pressure it exerted on them would bring positive results. Even if 
Matanzima had always been a staunch supporter of separate development, 
his attitude on the land issue hardened, and even at the beginning of 
1974 M.C. Botha was not completely sure of his position: 
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The Transkei area ... may and can become an independent area. 
In terms of our policy it ought to do so. We will not force 
the area to become independent if they do not want to.(49J 
Matanzima's attitude became clear, probably to Pretoria's relief, when, 
during March 1974, the T.L.A. passed a motion - moved by Matanzima 
himself - asking the Republican government to grant full independence 
to Transkei within five years. The South African answer was positive, 
and Mr. Vorster announced in the House, on the 10th September, that 
in the constitutional field an important development took place 
in the Republic •.. the Government was requested to grant 
independence to Transkei •.• the Government has considered the 
request and is in favour of granting independence to the Transkei. (SO) 
This was a real breakthrough which heralded the implementation of 
the last phase of separate development. This was not however the 
almost unmitigated success for the National Party policy which it could 
have been only a few years earlier. As a matter of fact, the inter-
national situation was rapidly changing, putting out of balance Pretoria's 
leaders. The military putsch in Lisbon, on the 25th April 1974, was an 
ominous sign for Pretoria, and the collapse of the Portuguese empire 
which followed, was a plain disaster. Although the South African 
government put on a brave face, and tried to weather the changing 
situation as graciously as possible, the new balance of power emerging 
in Southern Africa was clearly to the detriment of South Africa. How 
much all this worried the South African government is demonstrated by 
the fact that Vorster felt it necessary to make an important policy 
statement in the Senate, in which, amongst other things, he said: 
I believe that Southern Africa has come to the crossroads. I 
think that Southern Africa has to make a choice. I think that 
that choice lies between peace on one hand or an escalation of 
strife on the other •.. The toll of major confrontation will be 
high. I would go as far a~ to say that it will be too high for 
Southern Africa to pay.(51J 
This statement, which implied a South African readiness to collaborate 
with African countries towards the solution of the numerous problems of 
the sub-continent, was well received in the African capitals, and was 
even hailed by Kaunda as "the voice of reason for which Africa and the 
rest of the world have been waiting••.( 52 ) 
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During this period there was a revival of high level contacts 
between South Africa and African states, with visits by Vorster to 
Ivory Coast (22nd to 24th September 1974) and Liberia (11th and 12th 
February 1975). This development revived Vorster's enthusiasm for his 
policy of 'outward movement', and his hopes of being able to convince 
the African countries of the merits of separate development: 
I will go out of my way •.• to normalise relations in Africa 
•.. attempts have been made., ..• to a lesser extent these met 
with success ••. to a greater extent perhaps these met with 
failure, but did not cause (us) to flag in (our) zeal to 
normalise those relations. •• . It is true that the outward 
movement ..• did fail at times .•. (But) ... there is today 
a greater understanding of South Africa and its problems 
than there has been in many decades.(53) 
Notwithstanding that at an extraordinary conference of the Foreign 
Ministers of the O.A.U. states, held in Dar es Salaam in April 1975, 
it was again decided to have nothing to do with the homeland leaders,( 54 ) 
Vorster hoped that the homeland leaders would in the end be accepted 
as legitimate heads of state in the international community, and perhaps 
was convinced that it would happen: 
I hold talks on the basis of the policy of separate development; 
... I hold talks on the basis that the Black homelands will 
become independent; and I hold talks in the hope of clearing 
the way for those homeland leaders ••• to take their full and 
equal place in world organisations.(55) 
This was not an impossible thing because the attitude of the African 
states has never been so unanimous as one could think looking at the 
O.A.U. resolutions. And, after all, Chief G. Buthelezi had already 
attended an O.A.U. summit in Addis Ababa in 1974, although not in his 
capacity as Chief Minister of KwaZulu; and as early as 1971, Kenya's 
Foreign Minister, Dr. N. Mungai, suggested that the leaders of the 
South African homelands should be invited to attend O.A.U. meetings. (56 ) 
This was very little, but on the whole, amongst the African countries 
there was a great difference of attitude towards South Africa and even 
towards separate development, the condemnatory resolutions customarily 
passed at every meeting notwithstanding, and it was not foolish on 
South Africa's part to hope for international respectability for 
separate development. 
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4.4 Acceleration of independence moves after 1975 
In 1975, while a joint committee (three South Africtans and three 
Transkeians) worked on the various problems which had to be solved 
before giving independence to Transkei, a second homeland, 
Bophuthatswana, decided to opt for independence. For a while it 
seemed that the South African government was going to score an 
incredible victory in its struggle to guarantee white supremacy in 
South Africa. 
But again external factors and internal problems worked to 
disappoint the government's hopes. Certainly the main misunderstanding 
in the South African detente offensive, i.e., the fact that while for 
Pretoria detente was a means of selling to the African states separate 
development, for the African states it was a means of bringing about 
changes in the race relations in South Africa, again played an important 
part. While Vorster was claiming that 
more and more leaders throughout the world (were) asking them-
selves whether separate development •.. (was) not tge)solution 
to the problems of a country such as South Africa,( 7 
even the moderate African leaders who were favourably disposed towards 
South Africa insisted that an improvement was necessary in race 
relations within South Africa: "We feel that what is crucial is that 
there be an interior dialogue within South Africa among the members of 
the various communities". (58) 
But it was the failure of South African intervention in Angola( 59 ) 
which caused the definitive cooling of African enthusiasm towards 
Pretoria. Then Pretoria's decisions - the decision to press Ian Smith's 
government to accept in principle majority rule in Rhodesia and start 
negotiating a settlement, and the decision to give South West Africa/ 
Namibia independence - on one hand helped to improve for a while South 
Africa's stance in the eyes of the African countries, but on the other 
hand gave the black South Africans the impression that the 'wind of 
change' was finally blowing also around Pretoria. Thus, while Pretoria 
was still trying to promote international recognition of an independent 
Transkei, inside South Africa an upheaval was maturing which was to sound 
the deathknell ·of the international respectability of separate development. 
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Even before the June uprising in Soweto, the most Pretoria could 
hope for in terms of i nternati ona 1 recognition of Transkei was the 
support of the 'pariah' group (Taiwan, Israel et similia) and of some 
western ·countrie§, and even this was an ever fainter hope.( 60) At the 
end of June, when the black townships on the Rand were in turmoil, the 
O.A.U. decided that member states should not recognise Transkei. The 
same decision was taken in September by the E.E.C. countries, and 
although in the U.S.A. the issue was well contested, hopes of western 
support definitely faded. The day after the Transkeian independence, 
the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution declaring the independence 
of Transkei to be null and void, and calling on all governments not to 
establish diplomatic or economic contacts with Transkei 11 or any other 
Bantustan". (By 134 votes to nil.) Although..:. spes ultima dea - some 
quarters still believed that diplomatic recognition of Transkei was 
possible,( 6l) it was clear that in the existing circumstances Transkei 
had no chance of having its independence recognised. 
In theory this fa i1 ure shou 1 d have been the end of separate 
development, but in practice it did not deter South Africa in pressing 
ahead with this policy, nor did it deter other homeland leaders from 
following the trail blazed by Matanzima: in 1977 Bophuthatswana became 
independent, and in the same year there were the first signs that Venda 
could become the third homeland to make this choice. 
In view of the failure of Transkei to gain international recognition, 
it would have been logical for the South African government to wait and 
reassess the validity of separate development. Certainly, a debate on 
the validity of the existing policies for the solution of South Africa's 
problems was undertaken - and this brought about the National Party 
constitutional proposals which led to the establishment of the President's 
Council. This revision, however, fell short of changing the envisioned 
role of the homelands. On the contrary, separate development was the 
reaffirmed policy, and independence for the black territories the 
reaffirmed aim of the government. Indeed, not only the official policy 
was confirmed, but a sense of urgency was instilled in its implementation. 
This urgency was particularly due to the changing and worsening strategic 
situation in South Africa. The end of the Portuguese empire and the 
foreshadowed end of white rule in Rhodesia and South West Africa meant 
that the outer ring of defence was disappearing and that in a short time 
South Africa would find itself surrounded by potentially hostile 
neighbours. In such a situation the existence of a horseshoe of independent 
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and presumably sympathetic black states around the most senstive 
borders of the Republic would be of great advantage for South Africa, 
constituting a useful buffer and a first line of defence. 
One of the first results of the urgency in seeing more homelands 
become independent was the unlamented departure of the Bantu Homelands 
Constitution Amendment Bill of 1977. Since the 'internally autonomous 
country 1 envisaged in this bi 11 would .have had a higher degree of 
autonomy than the existing 'self-governing territory' and it was, at 
least in theory,( 62 ) within its powers to modify the racial legislation, 
this status would have given the homelands many of the advantages of 
independence without having its negative aspects. The decision of 
withdrawing this bill shows that the government considered unnecessary 
(and perhaps detrimental) another constitutional step on the road to 
independence, and that it preferred to see the homelands opting for 
independence rather than giving them the possibility of remaining part 
of South Africa with a higher degree of autonomy. In fact, the 
implementation of the Bantu Homelands Constitution Amendment Bill would 
have been a self-defeating move on the part of the government, considering 
that its aim is to lead the homelands towards independence as a means 
of reducing, and possibly removing totally, the number of people who 
can legally claim to be black South Africans. An 'internally autonomous 
country' would have felt in a lesser measure the disadvantages of being 
part of South Africa and this would have taken the pressure off it. 
Indeed, the leaders of the two homelands that at the time had already 
opted for independence had made clear that they took that decision not 
because they were enthralled by the idea of independence but mainly 
because they wanted to get rid of a system they loathed (See Chapter 6). 
An 1 internally autonomous country 1 had the poss i bi 1 ity of getting rid 
within its territory of most of the apartheid measures without becoming 
independent. This would have blocked any further step towards indepen-
dence more effectively than any sanction or threat by the U.N.O., the 
O.A.U. or the A.N.C., and the whole purpose of separate development 
(cancelling the Blacks as part of the population of South Africa) would 
have been defeated. Thus it is not surprising that after a careful 
consideration the government dropped the bill and continued exerting 
pressure on the homelands to convince them to accept independence. 
Therefore, the process of partial partition of South Africa progressed, 
and in 1979 a third homeland, Venda, became independent. 
106 
During this year a new elaboration of the policy of separate 
development was advanced, namely the constellation of states. Although 
this concept was alluded to before( 63 ) - since the times of Verwoerd, 
the E.E.C. 'and/or the British Commonwealth have been used from time to 
time as examples of the way in which South Africa and the (future) 
independent homelands could collaborate in matters of common interest -
only now it received close attention from the government. The decision 
of underlining the endorsement of the confederal scenario was not a 
change of policy. It was certainly due to the progressive implementation 
of separate development: until no homeland was independent there was no 
point in worrying about a future eventual confederal relationship with 
not yet existing subjects; besides that, it could have called in 
question the most important part of the process. (After all, if you 
· want to create a confederation between Sou.th Africa and the home 1 ands, 
what is the point of stirring up a hornets' nest with a controversial 
independence?) Once the first group of homelands became independent, 
it was necessary to set up a framework' of relations which could enable 
the various sides to manage the affairs of mutual interest. Given the 
weakness of these tilack states, their scattered form and their 
dependence on the South African infrastructure, the matters of common 
interest are quite numerous. And althougi in the late sixties/early 
seventies the government insisted that the homelands would become 
economically viable and have an independent economy, it has always been 
clear to everybody that, since the homelands were not isolated in the 
middle of an ocean, their economic viability could not and will not be 
attained in isolation from the wider South African, or Southern African 
economic framework. The idea of a constellation of states - which 
could be extended to other Southern African countries, although in the 
present situation this is politically impossible( 64 ) - and of the 
evolution of this constellation in an institutional confederation is 
thus a logical and perhaps inevitable( 65 ) evolution of the government's 
po 1 icy. 
107 
4.5 Conclusion 
Why then pretend that the homelands become independent before 
setting up a confederal framework which will inevitably limit this 
independence? Because while confederation will be a concession to 
geographic and economic realities, ideology - and the perception of 
an increasingly threatening situation - make necessary independent 
black states as the way to divert black people's claims to a share 
(which necessarily would be a majority share) in the government of 
'white' South Africa. 
This was already spelt out more than twenty years ago by Verwoerd: 
That is not what we would have liked to see ... there is 
however no doubt that eventually this will have to be done, 
thereby buying for the white man the right to retain his 
domination in what is his country.(b6J 
He wanted, and his successors want, to make sure that in future the 
Whites will have a place, a dominant place, in South Africa, and since 
it is a widespread opinion that majority rule, i.e., black rule, would 
pose an unacceptable threat to the future of the Whites,( 67 ) he had to 
find a different· solution. 
When Verwoerd started to talk in terms of a possible future 
independence of the black territories, the statement that "the White 
man will never be under any form of Bantu control 11 ( 68 ) was not only 
agreed upon, but also considered as a plain enunciation of facts, with 
relevance not only to South Africa, but also to many other regions of 
Africa. Verwoerd realised that the rising tide of African nationalism 
was inarrestable and that it was vitally necessary to channel this 
tide in a direction which would not threaten white interests, or, at 
least, white survival. He also realised that any form of qualified 
franchise would have been swept away, and would have taken with it 
also every chance the Whites had to maintain their control over their 
country. Furthermore, in view of the enormous importance that ethnicity 
has for the Afrikaners, there are no doubts that in giving the Blacks 
the chance to develop their ethnic feelings and to form their own ethnic 
states, Verwoerd and his fellow Afrikaners sincerely felt, as many of 
them still feel, that not only were they solving their own problems, 
but that they were also having a fundamental role in the liberation of 
the black nations. 
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It is still open to discussion if the homelands can be the right 
solution to the South African problem, but, at least in view of the 
stated aim of maintaining white control over South Africa or a part 
thereof, it was a better answer than those offered by others. The 
present government wants to give the homelands independence for exactly 
the same reason: to eliminate (albeit with a legal fiction) the 
existence of black South Africans and to maintain white (i.e. Afrikaner) 
control over a white homeland which should comprise as large a part of 
South Africa as possible. Again it is open to discussion if it is 
the best way of obtaining this. However, at the moment the government 
and the majority of Whites feel that no other solution exists which 
will not involve unacceptable losses. 
This is certainly the main reason for South Africa to give inde-
pendence to the homelands. Other reasons do exist, but they are 
ancillary to the mainpurpose. It is possible to discern these sub-
ordinate motivations particularly in the tempo of the implementation 
of separate development. Although the implementation of this policy 
has its own course, and some intermediate objectives had to be attained 
before moving another step, the timing of every new step and the 
explanations given for it show that each step of this policy had, in 
addition to the main strategic aim, also tactical objective.s not directly 
related to separate development itself. The attempts to influence South 
Africa's foreign relations are the most remarkable of these tactical 
objectives. 
Verwoerd's decision to consider the future independence of the 
homelands as the aim of his policy can certainly be considered as an 
attempt to find international respectability after the shock of 
Sharpeville. In the same way, the decision to confer the 'self-governing 
territory' status to Transkei in 1963 was directly related to the 
Odendaal plan of extending the ethnic policy to South West Africa, and 
to the fact that a ruling of the International Court of Justice was 
expected on the rightofSouth Africato administer that territory. 
As the periods of activity in the institutional progress of separate 
development were related to international policy factors, also the 
periods of standstill in this progress had this relationship. In the 
second half of the sixties, South Africa was not in the spotlight of 
international interest. The pressures, external and internal, on Pretoria 
were almost non-existent, and this can be enough of an explanation for 
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which insulated South Africa from the direct influence of black 
nationalism, underlined the urgency of carrying out successfully 
the government's policy. In this framework, Transkei's independence 
was seen as a preemptive strike against the easily foreseeable wave 
of external pressures and possible internal unrest which would follow 
this victory of black liberation movements. In Pretoria's wishes, an 
independent Transkei would demonstrate the validity of separate develop-
ment, gain lasting respectability for this policy and for Pretoria in 
the eyes of public opinion, and appeal to the Blacksin South Africa 
(those of Transkeian origin at least) as the fulfilment of their 
expectations. 1976 was thus quite a frustrating year for Pretoria, 
and worse was to come. 
After the international failure of Transkeian independence, 
separate development ceased to be considered by the government as the 
'quid' in exchange of which the rjght of the Whites to live in and 
rule the largest part of South Africa could be internationally accepted. 
However, this unquestionable failure did not stop Pretoria in conceding 
independence to other homelands. Incidentally, this should be the best 
evidence against the theory that separate development is simply an 
expendient device envisaged under international pressure and changing 
in its forms and objectives according to circumstances. In these 
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latest years, tactical reasons for giving independence to the various 
homelands are becoming insignificant. while there is an increased 
urgency to see accomplished the main objective of this policy, and 
perhaps doubts are growing regarding the viability of this solution. 
There are however complementary motives for wanting to see an increasing 
number of homelands become independent. One of the most important is 
the creation of a fait accompli. Already the homelands as territorial 
and administrative entities - after having been ridiculed by many -
are recognised and taken into consideration by the majority of South 
African political forces and by almost all the scholars examining 
South African problems. Excluding the solution of 'one man one vote' 
in a unitary state, all the other ways taken into consideration to 
solve the South African political problems take into account the 
homelands in one form or another. From those who argue for a federal 
solution to those who think that partition is the only solution, 
passing through the federal-confederal hypothesis, the confederation 
and the constellation of states, everybody, to a greater or a lesser 
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degree, consider the homelands as part of the solution {federal-
confederal hypothesis, confederation and constellation of states) 
or as lesser components of the final picture (federation). Even 
those partitionists who want to divide South Africa into a black 
dominated part and a white or non-black part, although not considering 
the homelands in their present form relevant to their solution, save 
as administrative units of the black state, accept the basis principle 
which lies at the basis of separate development, i.e., the establish-
ment of black-ruled areas so that in the remaining part of South 
Africa the Blacks will constitute only a minority of the population. 
The existence of independent homelands, with their police and 
their army, could not be ignored in the case of negotiations on the 
future order of South Africa and this would certainly strengthen the 
hand of the P,resent government even if it were to use them only as 
bargaining cards to be discarded as 'concession' during the negotiations 
(but this is at the moment really a 'worse case' scenario). To this 
can be added the fact that after ten or more years of even 'sham' 
independence, there would be in existence the machinery of a state, 
with the Civil Service and other members of the establishment having 
a vested interest in the perpetuation of this state. And if the 
programme of economic development is even partially successful, there 
would be in the homelands a black middle class whose main interest 
would be stability, that could be convinced, in exchange for their 
prosperity, to limit their political aspirations to their independent 
state. All this would change the balance of the forces and would 
create a group of Blacks interested in safeguarding the system. 
(Certainly those Blacks would be called 'quislings'; but it always 
depends on the numbers and on the distribution of power: if there 
were enough 'quislings' and they were strong enough, they could become 
'kadars'. Perhaps all South Africa's problems would boil down to how 
many 'quislings' there would be on the day of reckoning.) Another 
useful consequence of the independence of the black states is the 
creation of a belt of black-ruled countries as a buffer at the north-
eastern borders, the militarily most sensitive borders of South Africa. 
This buffer cannot substitute the disappeared Angola-Rhodesia-Mozambique 
belt, but would at any rate be a valuable complement to the white laager. 
Separate development has been envisaged as the way to avoid an open 
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struggle for power in South Africa and to secure for the Whites the 
control of a 'white homeland' almost as big as the whole South Africa. 
It has been implemented for this purpose, while the tempo of its 
implementation was often decided by tactical reasons. And it is still 
being implemented for this motive, albeit among growing doubts that it 
alone could be the way for attaining the aims for which it was 
envisaged. 
CHAPTER 5 
HOMELAND INDEPENDENCE TACTICS 
5.1 Decision-makers in the homelands and their attitude 
towards independence 
The political environment in _the homelands is relatively rudimentary. 
There are very few independent centres where different interest groups 
may coagulate and decide how to influence the res publica. The interest 
groups themselves, particularly those which might oppose the decisions 
of the ruling elite, are almost non-existent. Since the land is mainly 
communal property, there are almost no farmers or 'kulaks' who might 
form a strong pressure group. Because of the limited extent of the 
secondary sector and the inexistence of trade unions, the working class 
is politically inexistent. The business community is formed mainly by 
expatriates who are not at all interested in local politics. Professional 
men are so limited in number to be hardly worth political consideration. 
In the commercial sector there is the basis of an influential interest 
group, but it is possible to say that up to this moment this group has 
drawn advantage from political decisions taken by somebody else, and this 
from a ·s·ubordinate position. Rather than a pressure group they can be 
considered as a group of 'clientes' which, although having interests to 
protect and to further and being able to exert some degree of pressure to 
this end, are not likely to hinder those to whom they owe their position. 
The civil servants and, perhaps to a lesser extent, the teachers, too, 
are in the same condition: they form groups with definite interests and 
a moderate capacity to influence the decision-making process in their 
favour, but their prosperity is so dependent on the existence of the 
homelands and on the goodwill of their leaders to make them uninfluential 
when the most important decisions are taken. Or at least their 
influence is directly proportional to the degree in which they agree 
with the intentions of the leadership. Only the political parties and 
the traditional elite are left, and in reality, they have been the same 
thing for a long time and still are the same thing to a certain extent. 
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Indeed, a common pattern is discernible in the birth of almost 
every important political party in the homelands. These parties were 
not founded by members who shared a common political or ideological 
position and dedicated themselves to the furtherance of this stance. 
Nor were their leaders elected as the best me~ for implementing a 
political line agreed upon in some party congress. On the contrary, 
the homeland parties crystallized from original loose groups of 
supporters of prominent personages, usually traditional leaders. (ll) 
In a number of cases personality differences were at the root of the 
political struggle which caused the formation of two competing parties, 
and party members, more than supporting some political party line, were 
supporters of the person who founded the party. Thus, in the homelands' 
policy, instead of speaking of party leaders, it would be more 
appropriate to speak of leaders' parties. (72 ) In such a condition 
the attitude of the party towards major issues is strongly conditioned 
by the personal attitude of the leader. 
Also on the independence issue therefore, the position of the 
leader of the homeland is determinant. If, or until, the leader does 
not want to request it, independence is not an issue at all; When he 
decides to start negotiating with Pretoria on this subject, his decision 
is endorsed with little or no opposition by his party and by the 
legislative assembly. 
Of course, the Matanzimas and the Mangopes - and the Buthelezis too -
do not hold their position simply by the force of their personality. 
They are the most visible exponents of that traditional elite which 
had seen separate development as the manner to preserve and increase 
its dominant role in the black society. (73 ) Chiefs and headmen have 
gained much, in status as well as materially,from the political trans-
formation of the 'Native reserves' into homelands. At the inception of 
separate development they came into power endowed with a degree of 
traditional legitimacy, and they - although perhaps not gaining a wider 
and unquestioned legitimacy - have managed to consolidate their power 
effectively. As a group, they never questioned separate development 
and they, in general, enthusiastically endorsed this policy, including, 
and in particula~ its final aim of establishing independent black 
states,( 74 ) the main exception being for the moment the Zulu chiefs 
who almost unanimously support Buthelezi's refusal of independence. 
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The most influential group within the homelands was therefore in 
favour, in line of principle, of independence, 
Since many of the parties in the four homelands which opted for 
independence based their initial support and their recruiting efforts 
on the traditional elite,( 75 ) it is not very strange that, also, those 
parties were generally favourable towards independence. Indeed, in these 
four homelands, only one party was clearly and consistently opposed to 
independence, and to the very concept of separate development, and it 
was Transkei's Democratic Party (D.P.), that pledged itself to the 
"continued retention of Transkei as part of the Republic of South 
Africa 11 ( 76 ) and reaffirmed its belief that "the Transkei 's future 
is full of promise so long as it continues to remain an integral part 
of the ·Republic of South Africa". {7l} The other parties in the four 
homelands in the beginning either openly supported separate develop-
ment and clearly stated as their goal the independence of their 
homeland, or left the question of independence in the background, 
stressing, however, the importtnce of their homeland and the need to 
build on this basis. Only later on, some of these parties changed 
their position and decided to oppose independence. The party most 
in favour of separate development was certainly the Transkei National 
Independence Party (T.N.I.P.) - Chief K. Matanzima's party - which in 
the manifesto for the general election of 1968 stated: "We believe 
in the policy of separate development, since it has proved that it is 
the only policy that can successfully be applied in South Africa" and 
"We strive for the entire independence of Transkei 11 • ( 7B) Also both 
the Ciskeian parties, Mr. (now Chief) L. Sebe's Ciskei National 
Independence Party (C.N.I.P.) and Chief J. Mabandla's Ciskei National 
Party (C.N.P.), stated repeatedly their support for independence.( 79 ) 
In Bophuthatswana, of the two main parties existing on the eve of 
the 1972 general election, Chief L. Mangope's Bophuthatswana National 
Party (B._N.P.} and Chief T. Pilane's Seoposengwe Party (S.P.), the most 
clearly in favour of _independence was the latter, which accepted 
the policy of separate development only for the implied promise 
of handing back to us our homeland (forefather's land) and 
particularly for the promise of graQting Bophuthatswana its 
ultimate sovereign independence.(80J 
Mangope's party did not, in the beginning, talk of independence in its 
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programme, but in its statements there is implicit support for it. 
The fact that 11 the Bophuthatswana National Party firmly reaffirms its 
acceptance of the positive aspects of the policy of separate develop-
ment" and that 11 the party aims to build a strong and secure 
Bophuthatswana Nationalism 11 (Bl) left little doubt as to where the party 
stood on the independence issue. Bophuthatswana politics in the five 
years between the first general election and independence were quite 
lively. Mangope came to a clash with members of his cabinet and tried 
to expel them from the party. Failing to do this (because the Supreme 
Court annulled his decision), he himself resigned from the party and 
established the Bophuthatswana Democratic Party (B.D.P.) which became 
the majority party in the legislative assembly. The B.N.P., now led 
by Chief H. Maseolane and in the opposition, united with the S.P. 
forming the National Seoposengwe Party (N.S.P.),but then some members 
of the S.P. defected to the B.D.P .. The N.S.P. changed its position 
on the independence issue, and in 1977 fought, and lost, a bitter 
battle against it. The party asked for at least a referendum to test 
the wishes of the Bophuthatswana people on this issue, but Mangope 
answered that if they were against independence, they could make it 
clear by voting for the N.S.P. at the election. 
Also in Venda the two contending parties implicitly accepted 
independence from the beginning. Venda Independence People's Party 
(V.I.P.) was for 11 0ne Venda nation - one Venda Cou.ntry 11 ( 82 ) and Chief 
P. Mphephu supporters pledged to spare no effort 11 to fulfil the ideals 
of freedom, self-reliance and independence". (B3) 
In general, then, in the early seventies almost all the parties in 
the four homelands were more or less openly in favour of independence. 
Some of these parties, when the moment came to really opt for it, 
changed their position, but somet~mes this change reflected not only a 
deeply felt hostility to the type of independence on offer, but also 
the need to differentiate their position from that of the ruling parties. 
In general, however, and taking into consideration, too, the relative 
insignificance of the opposition parties - the only opposition party 
that had a remarkable support, V.I.P., was also the one which less 
opposed the decision to opt for independence - it is possible to say 
that the political establishment in these four homelands was solidly 
in favour of independence. 
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5.2 Attitudes and election results 
How great was the support for this choice amongst the population, 
however, is not easy to estiimate because, excluding the case of 
Ciskei, there was no possibility for it to express its opinion clearly 
on this issue. Furthermore, the fact must be emphasised that in the 
homelands, public opinion, as it is understood in western democratic 
countries or in 'white' South Africa, does not exist. There is 
nothing strange in this: it is the situation which predominates 
in third world cauntries. In these countries, the main interests of 
the majority of the population are food and shelter, and the quest 
for these two basic needs leaves very little time and energy to pursue 
more abstract interests; this pursuit is hindered further by the 
generally low level of education and the limited diffusion of the 
press, which is normally strictly controlled by the government. Most 
people are not interested or have not the possibility or capacity to 
be involved politically except on local topics, those which most 
directly affect their lives. In this situation, the growth of public 
opinion as an autonomous force is practically impossible. 
In Transkei, as well as in Bophuthatswana and Venda, there was an 
election on the eve of independence, and the leaders of those homelands 
decided that the people had enough of a choice voting for those who 
were negotiating independence. This deprived independence of any 
credibility as a popular choice, perhaps even more than the real 
opposition to it could justify. The homeland leaders 's argument 
that the population, voting for them after they made known that they 
were leading their territory to independence, gave them a popular 
mandate to do so, can be accepted, at least in so far as this can 
provide a rough gauge of the extent of some kind of support. 
It is difficult to determine how much in favour of independence 
were those who participated in the elections. The elections were held 
in circumstances which did not guarantee the free expression of all the 
opinions. In particular, in all four homelands in the years before 
independence, emergency regulations were in force. Furthermore, in the 
light of the almost total control on the very lives of the tribesmen 
which is held by chiefs and headmen, the high turnout in the polls and 
the resounding success of the government parties in many rural areas 
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appear suspicious. However, an important example against this interpre-
tation is the case of Venda, which is not the homeland most renowned for 
its respect of democratic principles. In this homeland, in both the 
elections held before independence, the opposition party won a big majority 
of the elective seats, only to be beaten in the legislative assembly by the 
compact stance of the chiefs in favour of one of them. It seems logical 
to say that if the chiefs and headmen have the possibility of influencing 
in a determinant way the results of the elections, such victories of the 
opposition should not happen; and conversely, that if the opposition 
wins, the power of the chiefs in determining the outcome of an election 
is not as great as commonly believed. 
This is not to say that they do not influence the attitude of the 
electorate. They most certainly influence it. But rather as 'notables' 
than as mini-dictators. Their influence is the influence of the rich 
and/or politically powerful, who can dispense favours in a society where 
much depends on the benevolence and the favour of the powerful. In 
addition, most of the people do not have strongly held opinions on subjects 
different to those which affect their basic needs. In these communities, 
the 'notables' assume the function of opinion leaders in almost all the 
po 1 i ti ca 1 issues, thanks both to the generic influence they can exert 
as 'important' people, and, more important, to the possibility of 
patronage they have. In such a situation it is not necessary to threaten 
the electors or to frighten them into voting in a particular way: the 
electors themselves will willingly vote in such a way to please the 
'notable'o· This is not democracy at its best, nonetheless it is a 
common occurrence also in countries with better democratic credentials 
than the homelands. 
The main factor which detracts credibility from the claim that the 
results of the electionsindicate popular support for independence is 
the very 1.ow turn-out in those elections. In particular, the turn-out 
amongst the urban electorate in the white areas was always negligible. 
It is difficult to ascertain the causes of abstention, but c~rtainly the 
disinterest in the homeland framework and the rejection of independence 
had a great influence in determining the 1 ow turn-out. In reality, it 
is not possible to draft every abstention in the army of the opposers 
of homeland independence. Nevertheless, even when one takes this into 
consideration, the only numbers one can quote are those of the voters, 
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and these numbers do not hint at a great popular enthusiasm for 
independence. 
s.2.1 Transkei 
In the case of Transkei the elections were held on the 29th 
September 1976, less than a month before the date of independence. (B4) 
There is no doubt that, although the decision had been already taken, 
the main issue of this election was independence, or at least, an 
endorsement by the electorate of the decision taken by Matanzima. 
Proclamation R400 - an effective means of curbing dissent - was in 
vigour, and shortly before the election, the leader of the radicalized 
D.P., H. Ncokasi, and almost all its directive staff were arrested. 
Although it is unsustainable that the outcome of the election would 
have been different if these detentions had not occurred, they have 
been quite a heavy blow to the credibility of the whole independence 
process, and to the prestige of the new state. The outcome of the 
election was never really in doubt, because Matanzima's T.N.I.P., 
after coming out a bad second in 1963, managed to overturn this early 
defeat in the elections of 1968 and 1973 which it won with an 
increasingly wide margin against the opposition. (BS) Moreover, in 
1976, the opposition was in disarray, following the ousting of K. Guzana 
as leader of the D.P. and his substitution by the more radical H. Ncokasi. 
The radicalization of the party under the new leadership caused its 
disintegration, and prominent members of the party in the legislative 
assembly left that party becoming independent or even crossing the floor 
joining the T.N.I.P .• After a while, K. Guzana formed the New 
Democratic Party (N.D.P.), and rallied some of the independents around 
his old policy. But, with such an example of disorganisation and 
infightings few months before the general election, the opposition 
effectively put itself out of the electoral race. 
For many reasons, including the effects of the application of 
Proclamation R 400, the opposition parties were able to enter candidates 
in only ten of the twenty-eight constituencies, contesting only twenty-
six seats out of seventy-five(86 hn six constituencies, electing sixteen 
members, the T.N.I.P. candidates were unopposed; and in another twelve, 
electing thirty-three members, the contest was between two lists of 
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T.N.I.P. supporters. Even taking into consideration all this, the 
performance of the opposition was dismal, being able to.gain only less 
than a sixth of the contested seats. Two seats went to the N.D.P. -
but its leader, K. Guzana, lost the seat he had held since the first 
election in 1963 -,one to the D.P. and one to an independent. The 
defeat of the opposition was of such a dimension to make irrelevant 
any influence of Proclamation R 400. The T.N.I.P. won seventy-one 
of the seventy-five elective seats in the assembly, and its control 
of Transkeian politics is undeniable. More questionable is if the 
support of the Transkeian people for independence was as overwhelming 
as the results of the election could suggest. The interest of the 
Transkeians in the elections has been fading since 1963, when 68,3% of 
the registered voters cast their vote. Although in 1976 there was a 
slight improvement in comparison with the 1973 election, the percentage 
poll was only 43,5%. (See Table 10) The declining participation in 
the polls after 1963 has been widely interpreted as a sign of a 
progressive alienation of the Transkeian electorate from the homelands 
policy, and this interpretation must be accepted, although I think it 
is worth noting that while percentage and absolute number of votes 
cast declined, the number of registered voters steadily increased from 
880 425 in 1963 to 1 053 175 in 1976. This shrinking of the number of 
actua 1 voters removes a great dea 1 of meaning from the increase in the 
T.N.I.P. 's share of the total vote, from 44% in 1968 to 55,2% in 1973 
and to an unknown but very high (probably in the order of 75-80%) 
figure in 1976. Nor can this apparently overwhelming support for 
independence be confirmed by the result of a referendum sui generis 
held early that year by the Transkeian government which induced 
Matanzima to claim that "it is perfectly clear that the Transkei people 
overwhelming want independence". (87 ) In reality, it was not a 
referendum in the accepted sense of the word, but a series of votings 
held during meetings of tribes, public bodies and various associations. 
Besides the fact that these meetings involved less than 170 000 people - less 
than 20% of the number of registered voters for the 1976 general election -
the modality of the votings and the particulars of the result( 88 ) make 
the whole exercise totally useless for an objective evaluation of the 
opinion of the Transkeians. 
From all these considerations it should ensue the conclusion that 
the majority of the Transkeians did not actively support independence. 
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TABLE 10: Election results in selected homelands. 
TRANSKEI 1963 
Registered voters 880 425 
Voters inside Transkei 478 358 
Voters outside Transkei 127 964 
Total voters 606 322 




T. N. I. P. sea ts 15 
D. P. seats 29 
Independents 1 
BOPHUTHATSWANA 
Voters inside Bophuthatswana 
Voters outside Bophuthatswana 
Tota 1 voters 
Unopposed candidates 
Seats for government party 
Seats for the opposition 
VENDA 
Voters inside Venda 
Voters outside Venda 
Tota 1 voters 
Seats for government party 

















































* One seat went to Ncokasi's D.P. and two to Guzana's N.D.P. 
SOURCES: BENSO, Statistical Survey of Black Development, 1980, 
and S.A.I.R.R., Surveys of the appropriate years. 
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It is however exaggerated to conclude from this, as it is done by the 
authors of 11 Transkei In Dependence" that 11 Matanzima (accepted) 
'independence' for Transkei with the support of less than 15% of the 
people 11 .(B9) 
But as clear as the lack of a majority support for independence is 
the fact that the Transkeian electorate did not give their leaders a 
mandate not to ask for independence. Furthermore, if we take into 
consideration the different attitudes of the Transkeians living outside 
Transkei and separate the results of the elections within Transkei from 
those in the 'white areas' - inside Transkei there were 297 161 voters 
while in the 'white areas' the votes cast were 62 924 - we will find 
that within Transkei the percentage poll was at least around 55%. It 
is thus possible to affirm that while the majority of the Transkeians 
living outside Transkei were indifferent or hostile to independence, a 
little more than half the Transkeians living in Transkei showed 
positive signs of interest in this regard, and a big majority of these 
people accepted or supported Matanzima's decision,( 90) although, for 
many, independence was not their preferr~d option but only an expedient 
to free themselves from a condition they liked even less. 
5.2.2 Bophuthatswana 
In the case of Bophuthatswana, too, it is possible to make more or 
less the same considerations. The opposition party, the N.S.P., was 
opposed to independence, but its importance has always been limited 
and Mangope's group had always had a comfortable majority. In this 
case, too, the opposition party asked for a referendum and again it 
was denied, elections being held in its stead. The voting took place . 
between the 22nd and 24th August 1977, three and a half months before 
independence. Although it was claimed that some chiefs, supporters 
of Mangope, were refusing N.S.P. permission to hold meetings in their 
villages,{ 9l) the fairness of this election is generally accepted. 
About 350 000 Tswanas registered as voters, and 163 141 of them, 
about 47,7%,actually cast their vote, giving an overwhelming majority 
to Mangope's B.D.P .. The number of elective seats in the 
Bophuthatswana legislative assembly was forty-eight. Of these, 
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forty-three were contested and the B.D.P. won thirty-nine of them. 
The uncontested seats were five, four of them held by B.D.P. members. 
Again, the interest within the homeland was far higher than outside 
it: only 37 041 Tswanas living outside Bophuthatswana voted, while 
within it the votes cast were 126 100. (92 ) But the interest this 
election aroused in the Tswanas was even lower than the interest the 
Transkeians had in theirs; how disinterested the Tswanas were 'in 
their second general election is demonstrated by the fact that in this 
election on the eve of independence the number of voters was about one 
third of those who voted during the 1972 election (163 141 against 
424 993). In particular, the number of votes cast outside Bophuthatswana 
was so low (37 041) that it is clear that for the Tswanas living in the 
'white areas', the existence of an independent Bophuthatswana was 
completely irrelevant. 
In the case of these two states, it is possible to say that 
independence did not arouse a great interest among their citizens, and 
amongst those citizens who did not live wtthin the homeland, the 
interest was almost completely non-existent. There was not however an 
active refusal of independence, and the overwhelming majority of those 
who voted, did vote in favour of parties openly committed to it. If it 
is not possible to say that independence was actively supported by the 
majority of the population, it is also impossible to say that the 
majority was totally hostile to it. Since a percentage poll of 99% or 
more is a phenomenon peculiar to the people's democracies which has 
never been repeated in countries where registration and voting are 
voluntary, the low participation of these elections cannot be construed 
as a downright rejection of independence. The majority was simply not 
interested, and it is bad enough that in occasion of what should have 
been a momentous event - perhaps the most important in the collective 
life of a people - only a relatively small percentage of the population 
felt involved enough to express their opinion. The only point which 
can be considered positive is the relatively high turn-out within the 
homelands themselves. This suggests that at least the people living 
within the territory feel involved to some degree in the 1 ife of their 
state and are willing to give it a chance to show its possible 
worthiness. It will then be up to the ruling groups to spread whatever 
benefits independence could bring w~dely enough to transform the indifference 
with which independence was greeted into vested interest in the existence 
of their independent state and active support for it. 
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5.2.3 Venda 
The case of Venda is a particular one. At the end of April 1978 
the Chief Minister, Chief P. Mphephu, made formal application for 
independence. At the beginning of July a general election was held 
in which the number of votes cast was, for homeland standards, 
surprisingly high: an estimated 52% of the eligible voters turned 
out, and this percentage was certainly in the range of 60-70% within 
Venda. It is also worth noting that, strangely enough in the light 
of the high handed attitude of Mphephu's government towards the 
opposition, which in 1973 won thirteen out of eighteen seats, the 
number of voters in 1978 was almost double that of 1973, making Venda 
the only homeland in which the number of voters actually increased 
after the first election. Furthermore, all the seats were contested 
and it is thus possible to say that a relevant number of Vendas 
expressed their opinion in this election. The result of the election 
was an unequivocal rebuff for Mphephu's government: his V.N.P. won 
only eleven of the forty-two seats contested. This could allow us to 
draw as much unequivocal a conclusion if it were not for the fact that 
the V.I.P. which had formerly been opposed to independence, decided, 
shortly prior to the decision of the legislative assembly to ask for 
it, to maintain a neutral stand on-this issue. It is thus 
impossible to evaluate the degree of support for independence from 
the results of this election, although it is legitimate to guess that 
this support was higher than in the case of Transkei and Bophuthatswana. 
It can be noted that only a third of the Vendas lives outside Venda, 
Since usually the higher percentage of supporters of independent 
homelands is to be found in the rural areas within the homelands, it 
is consistent to assume that the degree of support for independence 
could be and was higher amongst the Venda people. 
5.2.4 Ciskei 
In the eyes of a western observer however, the results of this kind 
of election is not sufficient to be accepted as an unmistakeable show 
in favour of independence. To consider something as an expression of 
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support for independence, it is necessary to have a clear cut question 
posed to the voters, to which the majority answers positively. Such a 
thing could be a referendum, and the Ciskeian government, the fourth 
homeland government to opt for independence, decided to test the opinion 
of their fellow Ciskeians in this way. 
A little more than 503 000 Ciskeians registered for this refer~ndurn. 
Since the de jure population of Ciskei is not exactly known, it is 
difficult to say how high a proportion of the total number of adult 
Ciskeians these 503 000 registered voters represent. The Ciskei 
Commission estimated a total of 2 099 000 Ciskeians, while the 
preliminary results of the 1980 census give the number of Ciskeians as 
1 071 515. This almost incredible difference is due to a different 
estimate of the number of Ciskeians living in the 'white' areas of 
South Africa. (See Table 11 below.) 
TABLE 11: Number and place of residence of Ciskeians in 1980. 
Ciskei 
Other homelands ) 
'White' South Africa ~ 
TOTAL 
Estimates of the 
Ciskei Commission 
666 000 
1 433 000 
2 099 000 






1 073 447 
SOURCES: Ciskei Commission Report, para. 20, and BENSO, Statistical 
Survey of Black Development(l980), Table 8. 
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This discrepancy can be partially explained by the fact that the 
census considers more than three quarters of the Xhosa living in 'white' 
South Africa as Transkeians, while the Commission presupposed that a 
higher proportion of Xhosa is of Ciskeian origin or gives their 
allegiance to Ciskei. Another explanation can be the number of illegal 
residents in the 'white' areas who would certainly be reluctant to show 
up for an official census. From the way in which the Commission arrives 
at its estimates,( 93 ) it seems however that the highest discrepancy is 
in the number of minors, while the number of adults is reasonably close 
in both estimates. 
If we take as good the preliminary results of the census, the number 
of registered voters for the referendum represents almost the totality 
of the eligible voters. If we choose the Commission estimates and 
suppose that 60% of the total is below voting age, the registered 
voters would be 60% of those eligible. The Commission, however, seems 
to consider the proportion of adults as one third or less of the total 
and in this case the registered voters would be between 72,5% and 80% 
of the adult Ciskeians. 
On the 4th December 1980, 299 731 Ciskeians actually cast their 
vote in the referendum. The actual voters were thus 59,5% of the 
registered voters and between 43 and 47,5% of the adult Ciskeians. It 
is again a relatively high proportion for homeland standards, and such 
a proportion could be accepted as normal in many countries of long 
democratic tradition. However, in such an important occasion, one 
could expect a higher turn-out. Of the votes cast, 2 198 were spoilt 
papers, 1642 were 'noes' and 295 891 were 'ayes'. The pr,oportion of 
votes in favour of independence was thus of 98,7%. The explanation for 
such high a proportion of positive votes can be that a number of voters 
feared retaliation in case they cast a negative vote. Also, and more 
significant, all the organisations which opposed independence called 
for a boycott of the referendum, and apparently the near totality of 
those who opposed independence stayed at home. In this case, however, 
it is clear that those who voted in favour of independence were 
almost all genuine supporters of independence. The number of votes in 
favour of independence represents 58,2% of the registered voters and 
between 42,7 and 46,9% of the adult Ciskeians. It is not enough to say 
that the Ciskeians enthusiastically welcomed the opportunity of 




even perhaps a slight majority, did really support this choice. This 
would be a comfortable discovery were it not for the fact that few 
months before the referendum, Chief Sebe announced that a 'package 
deal' was being negotiated with the South African government which 
would ensure that Ciskei's independence would be very different from 
that negotiated by Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda. In reality, at 
the time of independence, the 'package deal' looked very different 
and far poorer than what Sebe had asked for and had announced he would 
receive. (94 ) It is then possible to argue that the majority of the 
Ciskeians voted for a 'package deal~type' of independence and not for 
what, in the end, they got. Certainly, a part of them fell into the 
misunderstanding, but to presume that this could have significantly 
influenced the outcome of the referendum is unveri fi ab 1 e and presumes 
also an exceedingly high degree of political naivety of the average 
Ciskeian voter. Furthermore, the result of the referendum is reasonably 
consistent with the findings of the survey of the attitude of Ciskeians 
done for the Quail Commission. Having to rate various things they 
really wanted or needed on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (want most), 
53,7% of the respondents rated Ciskei becoming independent at 6 or more 
(37% rated is 10}, while 33,7% rated it at 4 or less. Independence was 
less valued by the Ciskeians living the P.W.V. area and in the Western 
Cape (29% rat1ng it 6 or more; 55% rating it 4 or less), while the 
strongest support for it came from the rural areas of Ciskei (60% against 
25%) and the Port Elizabeth/Eastern Cape area (59,6% against 27,5%), (95 ) 
This does not mean, however, that more than half the Ciskeians 
enthusiastically support the independence of Ciskei. Indeed, the first 
choice of the greatest part of them would be to participate in the 
political life of a unitary South Africa. Having to rate 'being able 
to vote with Whites for South African Parliament', 61,6% of the respondents 
rated it at 10, and 76,5% at 6 or more (against 14,4% rating it 4 or 
less). (96 ) Furthermore, 90,4% of them declared themselves in favour of 
'all people, White and Black, voting together for anyone they like for 
one single multi-racial government'. (97) The re.sults of this survey 
confirm that 'one man one vote' is the political solution most wanted 
by the Ciskeians - and we can safety assume that in this field they are 
representative of all the black ethnic groups. (The attitude survey 
conducted for the Buthelezi Commission gives 78% of the Zulu 11 happy 11 or 
"willing to accept if nothing better is attainable" "one South African 
Parliament where the largest group, the Blacks, have power to make 
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decisions for everybody".)( 98 ) 
This preference, however, does not exclude a pragmatic attitude: 
given the existing situation, the chance of obtaining their preferred 
solution is considered quite small, and in this case, a sizeable 
number is willing to take into consideration the homelands as a second 
best solution, particularly if some improvements are suggested. 
Amongst the things most wanted, "more 1 and given to the Ci skei 11 was 
rated at 10 by 68,9% of the respondents, and 83,9% of them rated it 
at 6 or more. Asked if they would be willing "to accept as worthwhile, 
the way matters seem at the moment" Blacks having "rights and a future 
in homelands like the Ciskei as they are now, but governing themselves 
completely", 70,1% of the respondents answered positively; and 87,3% 
answered positively in the case of Ciskei having "more land, towns and 
factories", (this is the choice which received the second highest 
score of all, the highest being received by 'one man one vote'). (99 ) 
And although this is not their first choice, a good proportion of them 
think that in an independent Ciskei in ten years' time, things could go 
better than now. Asked how they feel about the existing political 
situation in South Africa, 39% said they were 'angry and impatient' and 
23,3% that they were unhappy - 62,3% were thus dissatisfied with the 
situation, and only 34,6% declared themselves happy or neutral (only 
6,7% said they were very happy, 8% were happy and 19,9% neutral). 
However, asked how they will most probably feel in an independent 
Ciskei ten years from now, only 36,7% of them thought they would feel 
'angry' (22%) or 'unhappy', 18,7% thought they would be 'not happy or 
unhappy', and 39,7% optimistically thought they would be 'happy' (13%) 
or 'very happy' ( 26, 7%). ( lOO) 
In reality, it is difficult to understand clearly the attitude of 
the respondents, since many answers are contradictory, but one thing 
can be affirmed, i.e., that they consider their conditions bad enough 
that they are willing to try almost everything else, even an independent 
homeland. It thus seems possible to say that in the situation in which 
they found themselves, the Ciskeians decided, without great enthusiasm, 
to go ahead with independence, with the sceptical hope that it could 
help improve their situation. This seems also to be the conclusion one 
can draw from the results of the various elections held in the other 
homelands before their independence: the people were not enthusiastic 
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at the move - although on average about one third of them actively 
supported independence - but also they were not exceedingly hostile 
to it, excluding those living in the great urban areas (but not so in 
the Eastern Cape for Ci skei). The majority accepted this more with 
indifference, rather than with enthusiasm or hostility. 
5.3 Public opinion and leadership in the·non~independent homelands 
The centres of power are the same in all the homelands. This means 
that also in the homelands that have not up to now opted for independence, 
the decision to follow this line is mainly due to the local Chief 
Minister who acts like a plenipotentiary representative of an elite 
mainly limited to the traditional power-holders, the chiefs. There is 
no doubt that in refusing independence those homeland leaders express 
the wishes of a large part of their people. However, the fact that 
this choice is generally supported by a majority of the local population, 
does not mean that such a choice is the direct result of the 'will of 
the people'. In every society there is a reciprocal relationship 
between the rulers and the ruled, therefore also in these homelands 
the leaders have to take into consideration the opinion of the population. 
But notwithstanding the fact that the decisions of these leaders appear 
to be more in line with the opinion of the majority of their population 
than those of the leaders who opted for independence, the reality is 
that the decisions are taken by the leader who at most has to obtain 
the consensus of the political elite. Such consensus is generally not 
difficult to obtain if one considers the almost total inexistence of 
organised political opposition in the homelands and the dependence.of 
chiefs and headmen on the homeland governments. 
Once the leader's decision is approved by this small .group, the 
previous opinions of the majority of the population have a 1.imited 
importance. The majority can be convinced of the justness of the 
leader's decision, or some form of consensus can be engineered, and, at 
any rate, in the existing situation the sweeping powers of the homeland 
governments in the field of the maintenance of 'law and order' make 
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organised opposition impossible or ineffective. All this is to say that 
if at the moment a number of homelands refuse to accept independence and 
thus appear to interprete the wishes of their population, this does not 
mean that they will not become independent until the majority of their 
population presses for independence. It is sufficient that the leader 
becomes convinced of the advantages (for himself, for the elite of which 
he is part or for his people) of independence, and independence will 
become the definite choice of that homeland. 
The history of the summit meetings of the homeland leaders 
demonstrates this rea 1 ity. At every meeting the participants (ex cl udi ng 
Mangope or his representatives) reaffirmed the common decision to 
have no intention whatever of opting for so-called independence, 
as we do not want to abdicate our birthright as South Africans, 
as well as forfeiting our share of the economy and wealth which 
we have jointly built.(101) 
And almost every time, at the following occasion they were one less, 
because in the meantime one of the signatories of such high sounding 
declarations had changed his mind and opted for independence. The 
leader had reassessed the cost and profit balance of independence and 
made his decision. On this, the opinion of his people had only a 
scant influence. 
All the homeland leaders accepted to be involved in the policy of 
separate development, and indeed to become the most visible instruments 
of it, because they thought that this policy would give them the means 
of influencing the attitude of the South African government to the 
advantage of their people. (Of course, the material advantages for the 
leaders themselves inherent in this collaboration played a role in 
their calculation, but it would be simplistic to overemphasise this role.) 
Even Buthelezi, whose opposition to the government's aims is of long 
standing and whose good faith in the effort to improve the lot of his 
people is hardly questionable, reckoned that in the conditions existing 
in the early 1970's, the homelands could play a positive role. He was 
convinced "that the homelands concept could easily be the formula for 
the basis of a .future South Africa, provided certain conditions are met". (l02) 
His conditions were numerous and some of them unacceptable to the 
government, {l03) nevertheless he felt that the homelands as they were 
would at least give him and other black leaders a useful power basis 
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from which they could negotiate with the South African government. 
Buthelezi's position on the independence question was that first of 
all it should be the object of negotiations and dialogue between the 
South African government and the governments of the homelands concerned. 
And "dialogue implies that South Africa as we all know it should not be 
broken up into a series of independent states by unilateral decisions 
of the White group only". (l04) Furthermore, he would not take 
independence into consideration if it meant the exclusion of the Blacks 
from a share of the wealth of South Africa: 
Let us ... get clear the point that independence or autonomy of 
those new states should not be conditional on the breaking up 
of the integrated economy which is the life blood of all the 
peoples of South Africa.{105) 
In this he did not differ from his colleagues. Also the leader of 
Gazankulu, H. Ntsanwisi, held the same position. He was prepared to 
talk about independence, but he made it clear that any form of indepen-
dence would have to be granted within the framework of a broader 
South Africa, and, ,most important, should not deprive Gazankulu 
inhabitants of their "inherent birthright which is reflected in their 
South African citizenship 11 .(l06) The economic considerations, the 
poverty of the homelands and their unviability as self-contained units, 
was - and is - amongst the most important reasons for the scepticism of 
these leaders. All of them consider South Africa as "one economic unit" 
with their homelands as "an unviable portion"(l07) of it. 
The concern about the unvi ability of the economy of the homelands 
was compounded by the worry that once a homeland became independent, 
its people would lose South African citizenship and with it the right 
to claim a share of South African wealth and to participate in a possible 
future political evolution of South Africa. This worry was confirmed by 
the reality of the independence of Transkei and Bophuthatswana. In the 
estimation of leaders such as Buthelezi, the kind of independence 
received by Transkei and Bophuthatswana was nothing better than a 
robbery on grand scale of the rights of the Blacks who became their 
citizens: 
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The ultimate erosion of civil rights - or should I rather say -
the final destruction of human rights, is to be robbed of your 
citizenship. To be made alien~ in the land of your birth is an 
act of political treachery .•. And that is precisely what the 
South African governm~nt ~et out to do as it began implementing 
its homelands policy.tl08J 
His opposition to this type of independence has always been outspoken. 
He was convinced that the policy of separate development, although 
having some positive aspects,(l09) was doomed to ultimate failure 
because it had been envisaged and was being implemented to preserve 
white interests: 
My stance was that apartheid would fail. My stance now is that 
apartheid ha's failed. My stance was that homeland development 
would suffer from lack of white sincerity. My stance is now that 
it has suffered irreparably from white insincerity ... The change 
I want for mi 11 ions of b 1 acks in the country iI the scrapping of 
apartheid and the so-called homeland policy.( 0) 
Since he wanted the scrapping of the homelands policy, he certainly 
could not entertain any idea of independence, Indeed, he had always 
insisted on the fundamental unity of South Africa and all its peoples, 
particularly the Blacks: 
I want to make it ve~y clear that blacks in this count~y have one 
homeland which they all share together: South Africa. The myth 
that we blacks have no rights in so-called white areas can no 
longer be sustained. South Africa.will never be divided into a 
number of black mini-states dominated by a sprawling white monster-
s ta te. ( 111) 
In reality, the virulence of his opposition to independence was subject 
to changes of intensity according to the occasions. When talking to 
Blacks or to foreigners, when he needed to stress his independence 
from Pretoria to avoid being considered a 'puppet', he was quite liberal 
with his '1 nevers 1 • When he was speaking to Afrikaners, when he had to 
put the stress on his reasonableness, he was careful to qualify his 
refusal (which, however, remained clear): 
We are categoric that the independence of KwaZulu, as presently 
conceived, is unacceptable to us. We also cannot see that it 
could be in the interest of our people as a whole to seek a complete 
amputation of KwaZulyi which would amount to a complete forfeiture 
of our birth rights. l 12) 
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This was an attitude common to all the homeland leaders who 
refused independence (including~ at the time, Sebe): independence 
in the South African context was almost meaningless and, furthermore, 
would amount to selling 'one's own bi~th rights for a dish of soup'; 
and at any rate, it could not be accepted at the existing conditions, 
when only limited and scattered pieces of land, without urban centres 
and significant infrastructures, were set apart as black areas; and, 
finally, it would not be acceptable even at improved conditions, because 
' 
the real solution to South Africa's problems could be found only in 
equality of rights between Blacks and Whites. (l13} 
For many of the homeland leaders, in the late 1970's, the 
opposition to independence was still mainly a tactical stance. The 
most evident example of this is Sebe, who, after repeatedly saying that 
there was no point in sitting at the 'empty table' of independence, led 
Ciskei to this goal. Although Sebe was the only leader of the 
'steadfastness front' actually to lead his homeland to independence, 
others too, made clear that their refusal was not their last word on 
the subject. H. Ntsanwisi, for example, stated in March 1978 that he 
would not opt for independence as this could offer his people nothing 
until such time as Gazankulu was economically independent. He did, 
however, say that he would keep his option open on this matter. (ll 4} 
It is difficult to say which consideration influenced most this 
position. If in showing unwillingness to opt for independence, these 
leaders hoped to extract better conditions from the South African 
government before accepting it, or if in showing unwillingness to opt 
for independence at the existing conditions but keeping their option 
open in case of improvements, they not only tried to obtain better 
conditions, but, above all, to gain time to build a stable power base 
from which to challenge the South African government. Probably it was 
a mixture of the two trends, each becoming from time to time more 
important than the other according to the developments of the situation. 
In the end, the first aspect was the most important for Sebe, while the 
second appears to be the most important for Buthelezi. 
Buthelezi has been able to use the freedom and the means inherent 
in his position as leader of a homeland to build a political movement 
which enjoys a wide support, particularly amongst the Zulus, but also 
outside KwaZulu and amongst other Blacks. He is the most popular and 
arguably the most powerful of the Black leaders operating within the 
South African system. He is aware of this and he is trying to use the 
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power base given by the support Inkatha has gained amongst the Blacks 
to become an important, or if possible, a privileged interlocutor of 
the South African government: "We have created a power base which 
commands the kind of respect that makes any attempt to work politically 
without it, simply a waste of time and energy."(llS} 
In his attempt to become the recognised internal leader of the Blacks, 
he used his position as Chief Minister of KwaZulu and his refusal to 
accept independence as instruments both for expanding his support 
amongst the Blacks and for compelling the government to take him into 
consideration as the representative of the Blacks, including the urban 
Blacks. By refusing independence he .tries to force the government to modify 
its policy towards the Blacks: 
I am convinced that our continued non compliance in the further 
evolution of homeland policies will force the whites-only 
government to find ways and means of dealing with us and incly?lQ9 
us in the political process which lies behind power control.l J 
Buthelezi is convinced that 
The government has been encouraged by the leaders of these so-
cal led independent homeland regions who have opted for so-called 
independence, to pursue their apartheid policy ... the problem 
that bedevils the situation is the lack of black unity which has 
guaranteed the continuation of apartheid ••• (117) 
Thus, he reckons that the decision of the TBVC leaders to opt for 
independence has encouraged the South African government to pursue 
its policy and has weakened the leverage the black leaders have for 
inducing it to change this policy, in particular towards the urban 
Blacks. However, he is also convinced that the government can pursue 
its policy disregarding the political aspirations of the Blacks only if 
it can induce all the homelands to opt for independence, or at least if 
the homelands which are induced to do so will include the most numerous 
black ethnic groups. In his reckoning, if enough homelands refuse 
independence to maintain black numerical superiority amongst South 
African citizens, the government wi 11 have to change its po 1 icy and to 
negotiate with the Blacks their place in the political set-up of the 
South Africa of the future. Since the Zulus already outnumber the 
Whites, his refusal to opt for independence would - in his reckoning -
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wreck separate development and compel the South African government 
to negotiate with him the future political set-up of South Africa.(llB) 
Buthelezi is probably the firmest of the homeland leaders in his 
refusal of independence. The simple fact that he is considered as the 
most representative of the homeland leaders, if not the only one 
enjoying true and wide popular support, might become a weakening factor 
in the other's resolve. Buthelezi is already claiming the merit for a 
possible change in government policy: 
.•. The defeat of the ultimate ends of the homeland policy is now 
a political trophy on Inkatha 1 s wall. We do not rest here, 
however. We are going on to Qffer a helping hand to those who have 
already been made aliens.(119J 
Even if other leaders could match Buthelezi 1 s popularity with their 
popularity amongst their own group, the numerical strength of the Zulus 
would give their chief the leading role amongst the internal leaders. 
Considering that strong personality and a strong streak of personal 
ambition are characteristic common to all the homeland leaders, it is 
doubtful that they will be prepared to take a secondary and less 
rewarding role. It is thus possible that having to choose between 
accepting to fade slowly into oblivion and becoming the president of 
an independent state, they will choose independence, even if it is not 
completely satisfying. 
The possibility of being bribed or cajoled or bullied into accepting 
inde~endence is present also for Buthelezi himself. The government does 
not seem to consider important the fact that he is arguably the only 
black leader to accept that one-man-one-vote in a unitary state is not 
the solution to South Africa's problems and to maintain, at the same 
time, a substantial support amongst Blacks, including urban Blacks. 
Often it seems more interested in 'keeping Buthelezi in his place• 
rather than in exploring the perspectives that his unique condition 
may offer. Certainly, the government's actions in the latest years, 
from the proposed Swaziland land deal to the new constitutional 
dispensation within South Africa, show that it does not even taken into 
consideration Buthelezi 1 s opinion when it makes its decisions. 
Perhaps as a way to pre-empt the government in going too far in its 
use of the carrot and the stick, Buthelezi has often warned that (being 
a Zulu prince of royal blood) he is not a pushover and that there are 
things that cannot be accepted: 11 Homelands politics are a pipe dream. 
136 
The whole idea that we blacks can be declared foreigners in any part 
of our land ... causes such revulsion that its enforcement can only 
mean ultimate war. 11 ( 120 ) He often insists on this argument lately. 
He knows that although ''Inkatha has mobilized an effective veto on 
independence for KwaZul u11 and that "We in KwaZulu wi 11 never 
voluntarily opt for independence'', the South African government might 
feel able to overcome this opposition and tempted to do so. He thus 
made clear that his quest for a peaceful solution to the South African 
problems might be stopped if the South African government tried to 
impose its will on the subject of independence: 11 We have gone much 
further and stated that to force us to go for independence will define 
the battle lines outside our non-violent strategy. 11 ( 121 ) 
It is possible that Bu~h~lezi personifies the general attitude of 
the majority of the Blacks better than the other leaders, both internal 
and external. It is, however, difficult to define what the attitude of 
the majority of the Blacks might be. In South Africa until recently, 
the opinion of the Blacks has received scant attention. Also in recent 
years the only way to have an indication of what the attitude of the 
Blacks might be has been to interprete few nation-wide surveys. (122 ) 
One of the drawbacks of this situation is that while one can reasonably 
identify the main points which arouse black passions and in which 
general direction they would like to see the situation evolve, one 
cannot infer from this what their actual behaviour might be in 
determined circumstances. In the words of the report of the Buthelezi 
Commission: 
While one may be able to make broad assumptions about what the 
different groups want and aspire to, it is more difficult to 
make correct assumptions about what they may be prepared to 
accept as compromises.(123) 
However, on the subject of homeland independence, which is a 
relatively clear cut topic, these surveys shed much light on the general 
attitudes of the Blacks. Indeed, in the one case when it was possible 
to compare the results of a survey with the real thing, i.e., in the 
' 
case of the referendum on the Ciskeian independence, the findings of 
the survey have come remarkably close to the actual response of the 
electorate. (124) It is then possible to accept the surveys on this 
topic as reasonably indicative of the real attitude of the Blacks. 
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It is noteworthy that on the topic of homeland government and 
homeland independence, the survey made for the Buthelezi Commission 
showed results remarkably similar to those of that made for the Quail 
Commission. Only on one point the results markedly differed, and 
this was on the perception people have of the benefits derived from 
the establishment of the homelands. For the Buthelezi Commission, 
the question "What benefits for Black people came when the KwaZulu 
Goverment took over the government for people in the Black areas?" 
was asked only in Natal/KwaZulu, where 33% of the respondents said 
that they found that the establishment of the KwaZulu government gave 
no benefits whatsoever to the Blacks (44% of the respondents in the 
metropolitan areas thought so and 26% in rural KwaZulu). The report, 
after pointing out the relatively high number of people finding no 
benefits in the existence of the home 1 and, adds: "However, among a 11 
groups, either 50% of people or more tend to see benefits in the degree 
of self-government which has been granted and the way it has been 
handled by the KwaZulu leadership". (125 ) These results are strikingly 
different from the findings of the Quail Commission, which found that 
only 4,4% of the respondents had something positive to say in answer 
to the question: "The Ciskei is now a homeland with its own govern-
ment making decisions about many but not all of its internal affairs. 
What has this meant for you personally in your life?". Partly this 
difference can be attributed to the different way the question was 
formulated. Indeed, also the negative answers were minimal (4,9%), 
while the great majority (90,7%) felt that the existence of the 
Ciskeian homeland was meaningless for them.( 126 ) Whatever the reason 
for the difference in the answers to the two surveys, it seems safe 
to say that the Zulus feel much more than the Ciskei Xhosa that the 
introduction of self-government for their homeland has given them some 
benefits. 
The general attitude toward ethnicity and the desirability of an 
ethnic homeland can be inferred, as far as the Zulus are concerned, 
from the fact that 26% of the respondents in Natal/KwaZulu felt them-
selves to be Zulu before anything else (but only 5% of the Soweto Zulus 
and 21% of the Zulu migrants in Transvaal felt in this way),( 127 ) and 
that 42% of them answered KwaZulu or Zululand to the question: "t~hich 
place or places is the country of the Zulus?" (23% of the Soweto Zulus 
and 33% of the Zulu migrants answered in the same way).( 128) Thus, the 
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support for ethnic exclusivity, as opposed to the identification with 
a wider South Africa, is not very great among the Zulus. Indeed, the 
report has concluded that although ~ "group of avowed separatists and 
fierce Zulu nationalists who find aspects of separate development 
considerably of their liking" exists, it constitutes only about 10% of 
the Zulus in KwaZulu.( 129 ) 
In reality, the basic concept of separate development, i.e., the 
preservation of a 'white homeland', has even less support than that. 
To the question "Are there places in South Africa that Whites should 
be able to keep for themselves only?", 5% answered positively in 
Natal/KwaZulu {6% among the Soweto Zulus and 9% among the Zulu migrants).(l30) 
It is thus evident that the basis of the government policy towards the 
Blacks is in principle rejected by almost the totality of the Blacks 
themselves. 
The abysmally low popularity of the basic concept of separate 
development does not extend in the same measure to the homelands, however. 
To the question "What would you say about the homelands?", in Transvaal 
72% of the answers were negative or critical, 24% positive and 10% 
ambivalent or evasive; in Natal the results were: 57% negative, 45% 
positive, 10% ambivalent. (These percentages add up to more than 100%. 
This is due to the fact that some respondents answered mentioning both 
positive and negative aspects.) ·The comment of the report is that 
a very clear majority of people in the Transvaal responded negatively 
to the idea of their 'national state', whereas in KwaZulu/Natal, 
although more people respond negatively than positively, the sentiments· 
are much more evenly balanced.(131) 
It appears that there is a sizeable minority of black people, which in 
Natal/KwaZulu assumes substantial proportions, that accepts the home-
lands as positive. Among the people giving positive answers, a sub-
stantial part, not much less than half of them, mentioned as the positive 
factor the idea of autonomy, self-rule or freedom (about 10% of the total 
in Transvaal and 21% in Natal/KwaZulu). (132) However, the remainder of 
those who gave a positive answer, more than half of them, considered 
instrumental factors, such as being able to keep livestock as the reason 
to take a positive view of the homelands. These practical reasons do 
not mean support for the homeland~ per se. Therefore, it i~ possible 
to conclude that 
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no more than one-tenth of people on the Witwatersrand and 
roughly one-fifth .•. in KwaZulu/Natal are prepared to 
endorse the idea of national states from the point of view 
of it being a positive political development in an intrinsic 
sense. ( 133) 
Although endorsement of the idea of national states does not 
necessarily mean support for independence, particularly at the existing 
conditions, it should be possible to consider this 10% of the Blacks in 
urban Transvaal and 20% in KwaZulu/Natal as the basis from which a 
homeland leader, intending to opt for independence, could start to 
build up a sufficient degree of support for this move. A verification 
of this can be found in other findings of the survey. In assessing 
the popularity of alternative political dispensations, the alternative 
with the best rating was "KwaZulu, etc., should not exist. It should 
become part of Natal and South Africa", which was considered a good or 
acceptable solution by 73% of the Soweto Zulus, 65% of the Zulu migrants, 
72% of people in rural KwaZulu and 82% of people in metropolitan Natal. (134) 
Similar results had the enquiry in political and constitutional 
alternatives ("Plans for African people in the future"). The most 
popular of these alternatives was "one South African Parliament where 
the largest group in the government, the blacks have power to make 
decisions for everyone". 74% of the Soweto Zulus were happy with this 
solution or willing to accept it, as were 73% of the Zulu migrants, 
77% of those living in rural KwaZulu and 84% of those living in 
metropolitan Natal. (135 ) Therefore, little more than 20% of the Zulus 
found the solution of 'one man one vote' not of their liking. It can 
be reasonably to identify this 20% with the 20% of people prepared to 
endorse the idea of national states. 
It is clear that as in the case of all the other black groups, the 
great majority of the Zulus too, does not consider the homelands as an 
acceptable way to fulfil their political aspirations. To the contrary, 
between three quarters and four fifths of them see as the ideal 
solution the one-man-one-vote in a united, if not unitary South Africa. 
However, it seems that, realising the difficulty and the probably high 
cost of attaining this goal, they are prepared to compromise and to 
accept solutions that can be acceptable also to the white group. Of 
the various alternatives proposed in the survey, I will take into 
consideration only those that include the independence of KwaZulu, \1Jith 
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different conditions attached to it but always moderate enough to be 
in the realm of possibility witho~t postulating a major change in 
government policy. (See Table 12) 
The less popular of these alternative solutions is that of 
independence in the existing conditions. A Transkei-type of indepen-
dence is considered as 'good' by 18% of the Soweto Zulus, and 'not good 
but acceptable' by 7%. · The attitude of other groups living in Soweto 
is remarkably similar: 25% is prepared to accept independence (13% 
'good, 12% 'not good but acceptable'). Thus, around a quarter of the 
people of Soweto might be prepared to accept independent homelands as 
a solution even with things as they are now. The appeal of this 
solution does not change much in Natal/KwaZulu, where 26% in the rural 
areas and 30% in the big cities consider it acceptable. Only amongst 
the Zulu migrants this solution is accepted by a considerable 
proportion of the respondents (39%). (l36) 
If some improvements to the present conditions are suggested, the 
number of people prepared to accept independence increases noticeably. 
46% of the respondents in Soweto are prepared to accept independence 
if some more land (but not much more) is given to KwaZulu, together 
with more towns and industries. This number increases to 47% in rural 
KwaZulu, to 51% in metropolitan Natal and to 65% among the migrants. 
More popular, particularly withi h KwaZulu, is independence if a 
considerable amount of land is added to the homeland. In Soweto, 47% 
of the Zulus accept this (32% considering it 'good'), 51% have the 
same view in metropolitan Natal (only 25% 'good'), 62% in rural KwaZulu 
(44% 'good') and 68% in the small towns of KwaZulu/Natal (48% 'good'). 
It must be said that when various items are added to basic 
independence, there is the danger that the respondent will forget about 
the context of homeland independence and think only of the advantages 
of the added item. The report warns: "One dare not, therefore, see the 
positive endorsement of these items as in any way positively endorsing 
a mere variant of separate development 11 .(l3?) However, this point must 
not be overstressed: otherwise one should have to conclude that the 
level of stupidity of the respondents is far higher than that of the 
population in general. 
In conclusion, in the non-independent homelands, the majority of the 
population does not consider independence at the existing conditions as 
an acceptable solution. The leaders of these homelands are of the same 
TABLE 12: Reactions to various alternative political futures for the homelands among major groups of 
black South Africans associated with KwaZulu/Natal. (Selected items.)· 
SOWETO WITWATERSRAND KWAZULU/NATAL 
ZULU SMALL 
ALTERNATIVE DISPENSATIONS ZULU OTHER ZULU OTHER ~IGRANT METRO TOWN RURAL 
Of % 0/ % OI % % % lo IV lo 
KwaZulu, etc., independent like 
Bophuthatswana or Transkei. Good 18 13 11 7 23 12 16 13 
Not good but accept 7 12 8 9 16 18 10 13 
TOTAL 25 25 19 16 39 30 26 26 
Independent but with a little more 
land, towns and industries. 
Accept 22 17 23 20 38 23 39 32 
Accept if nothing else 24 16 16 19 27 28 14 15 
TOTAL 46 33 39 39 65 51 53 47 
Independent but with more farming .... 
land. Good 31 18 29 28 44 25 48 44 ..i;::. 
Not good but accept 16 20 . . · 15 14 21 . 26 20 18 .... 
TOTAL .. 47. 38 .. 44 42 . . · 65 .... 51 . 68 62 
Independent but with some towns 
and factories added. Good 31 21 27 29 36 25 50 46 
Not good but accept 21 ... 22 .. 17 19 30 26 19 25 
TOTAL 52 43 44 48. 65 52 69 71 
Independent but with big towns like 
Richards Bay, Eshowe, etc., added. 
Good 34 ( 1 27 {l 51 31 54 59 
Not good but accept 20 18 16 32 18 19 
TOTAL 54 45 67 63 72 78 
KwaZulu, etc., should not exist - it 
should become part of Natal and S.A. 
Good 61 (1 71 (1 50 62 54 47 
Not good but accept 12 9 15 20 15 25 
TOTAL 73 80 65 82 69 72 
(1 Not processed. 
SOURCE: The Buthelezi -- Commission; The requirements for stability and development in KwaZulu and Natal, Durban 1982. 
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opinion. However, the influence of the 'will of the people' in the 
leaders' decisions is limited. 
independence is not definitive. 
The~e leaders' refusal to opt for 
Only Buthelezi enjoys a supoort 
widespread enough to maintain his position of important black leader 
even in spite of government's hostility. All the others 0\11e their 
position and their influence to the South African government and have 
not been able to become popular enough to survive politically without 
its support or at least its neutrality. Therefore, they might be 
induced to change their position in regard to independence, particularly 
s i nee the South African government has demonstrated a no ti ceab 1 e skill 
in using the stick and the carrot. In this case, popular opinion will 
have scant importance. Also because the proportion of people prepared 
to accept independence, if better conditions were offered, is big 
enough to allow these leaders to engineer some form of consensus, albeit 
manipulated, for their decision. 
5.4 Key elements in the choice of independence and 
in its timetable 
In the context of homeland politics the most important, and indeed 
the only determinant factor is the leader himself. Therefore every 
important political decision is taken by the leader, according to his 
perception of the situation and to his evaluation of the relative 
advantages each move involves for his people, for the elite of which he 
is part and expression and, last but not least, for himself personally. 
This personal factor is discernible also in the choice of time in the 
process towards independence. 
Since Transkei was the senior homeland, it was logical that the 
first signs that independence was becoming a real issue came from there. 
Also came the evidence that Chief Matanzima - as well as the other 
homeland leaders - did not feel inclined to jump to independence for 
independence's sake. 
At the end of 1965 (22nd December), the Maluti branch of the T.N.I.P. 
adopted a resolution, calling on the South African government to grant 
complete independence to Transkei by May 1967. The mover of this motion 
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was S.M. Sinaba, first vice-chairman of the T.N.I.P. and its chief 
Whip in the assembly. Having been rebuffed by Matanzima, Sinaba 
resigned from the T. N. I. P. ca 11 i ng for a referendum on the independence 
issue. Matanzima made it clear that he considered.this to be a rash 
move, and declared that "The road to freedom is a long one which has 
to be negotiated carefully step by step 11 ~(l 3B) Sinaba established the 
Transkei People's Freedom Party (T.P.F.P.) a short time thereafter, 
and in the assembly moved a motion calling for independence. His motion 
was defeated( 139 ) and in its stead a government motion stating that the 
territory was not yet ripe for independence was approved. Matanzima 
explained his rejection of immediate independence saying that "political 
independence witfuout economic independence will get us nowhere". {l40) 
This was ~o remain his position also in the following years, although 
he never forgot that independence was his ultimate aim. Explaining 
his reluctance to hurry towards independence he always underlined the 
backwardness of Transkei and the need to solve more immediate problems 
before starting to think of independence: 
At this stage of our development there are far more important 
tasks that claim our undivided attention, tasks such as the 
education and upliftment of our people, the agricultural economic 
and industrial development of our country and the laying of solid 
foundations for our administration. Only after substantial 
success is attained by us in these important spheres will inderen-
dence enter into the realm of practical politics for the Transkei.(141) 
This was clearly not a refusal in principle to consider independence. 
Indeed, independence was listed as an objective in the T.N.I.P. manifesto 
for the general election of 1968, which pledged the party to "strive for 
the entire independence of the Transkei along the lines of steady 
constitutional development".( 142 ) 
In the meanwhile Matanzima was trying to obtain better conditions 
for Transkei, and in particular, was making territorial claims and 
asking for a Greater Xhosaland including Transkei, Ciskei and the 'white 
corridor' with East London. The land issue and the problem of the 
resettlement of Blacks from the white areas were, however, two points 
in which he made little headway, and again in 1972 he declared his 
unwillingness to consider independence in the existing conditions: 
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We do not see our way to ever requesting a declaration of 
independence if part of our land still remains in the Republic 
and we sha 11 oppose any endorsement of ·Q.lur peop 1 e from the 
cities if sufficient land, as claimed, is not provided for 
them. To us, this is fundamental to our acceptance of the 
policy of separate development as against a multi-racial 
society in South Africa.(143) 
Matanzima was not alone in'taking this attitude. All the other 
leaders maintained that the policy of separate development could be 
accomplished only if the conditions of the homelands were improved 
and if more land were given to them. They also maintaihed that even 
after independence, South.Africa would have some responsibility for 
the welfare of the Blacks living in the homelands. Mangope warned 
the Whites not to think that simply a few lines on the map could solve 
all the problems: 
I cannot think of a more disastrous self-delusion than the idea 
still ghosting around in the minds of some White South Africans 
namely: Create the Homelands, give them independence, yes, even 
fully-fledged sovereign independence, and then push them out of 
your though ts, forget about them, 1 et them work out their own 
salvation.(144) 
In this period the black leaders fully realised how weak was their 
bargaining position against the South African government, and they 
started to work together in order to be able to exert greater pressure 
on Pretoria. This necessity and the realisation that after independence 
each homeland would still be totally dependent on South Africa, helped 
to bring to the surface the federalist approach. 
To counter the divide et impera aspect of separate development, 
some of those leaders floated the idea of an eventual federation of 
the black states after independence. The clear advantage of this 
solution would be that it would give a single, and arguably stronger, 
voice to the Blacks of South Africa and a stronger hand to their leaders 
on the negotiation table. Matanzima - perhaps thinking he was entitled 
to the leading role in such a federation because of his seniority as 
Chief Minister - was one of the strongest supporters of this idea, and 
the T.N.I.P. even included the federation of the black states in its 
programmatic manifesto for the 1973 general election. (145 ) 
The first result of this policy was the summit conference in Umtata 
on the 8th November 1973, attended by the leaders, or their representatives, 
of six out of eight homelands. At the end of the conference, no official 
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statement was issued, but it was .reported that all the participants 
were agreed in principle that a future federation of the homelands was 
vital to the unity of the Blacks in South Africa. (146 ) This could have 
been a very important moment in the political life of South Africa: 
for the first time recognised leaders of the greater part of the Blacks 
- and leaders wielding effective albeit limited powers - met together 
and hammered out a common strategy to follow in their relations with 
the white government. In reality, however, this unity and community 
of intent were only superficial, and were destined to be shattered within 
a short ti me • 
Two of the homelands (QwaQwa and Venda) were not represented at the 
summit, and although their relative importance was not great, they were 
the sign that not everybody was happy with the idea of federation, or 
even of a common policy. In addition, not all the leaders who 
participated in the summit were wholeheartedly in support of that idea. 
In particular, Mangope and Sebe were sceptical. Although the latter 
had not yet spelt out his very strong Ciskeian nationalism, he could 
certainly not forget Matanzima's ambitions for a Greater Xhosaland. 
Mangope, on his part, has al1ways been a Tswana nationalist and his 
idea of federation was not Matanzima's. In reality, he preferred to 
think of the unity of the Tswana people: 
You know that my colleagues, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi and Chief 
Kaizer (sic) have been speaking of a federation of the homelands. 
I am not very keen about it ... I feel that we must have some 
~ort of referendum if we were to have it. But I think, personally, 
that we would prefer to incorporate with Botswana, since we shar~ a 
common border and we are the same people in almost all respects.(147) 
The homeland leaders were able to put up a common front again at the 
first summit meeting with the South African Prime Minister, Mr. J. Vorster, 
held on the 6th March 1974. On this occasion, they reiterated their 
request for more land, and refused to take into consideration independence 
if their claims were not acceded to. 
A week later, however, Matanzima, after having received a mandate to 
negotiate independence from the annual T.N.I.P. conference, introduced 
in the T.L.A. a motion calling on the South African government to 
grant independence to Transkei within five years. The only conditions 
were that the land promised to Transkei under the 1936 Land Act be 
granted, and that this move would not prejudice Transkei's claim to 
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other disputed areas. By the end of March the debate was over, the 
motion approved and a committee started drafting the constitution for 
the independent Transkei. 
Since all the previous Transkeian land claims had been rejected, 
this decision can be considered as an about-face from the position held 
in the past. (But shortly afterwards, the 1975 consolidation proposals 
approved by Parliament gave Transkei the district of Port St. John's, 
and in a three-cornered deal, Ciskei ceded the districts of Herschel 
and Glen Grey to it.) It was perhaps an inevitable about-face, in the 
light of Matanzima's convictions and of his previous acceptance of 
separate development. Matanzima could see three alternatives in the 
existing situation, and he had no doubts about which one was the best 
suited to the interest of Transkei, and even of all the Blacks in South 
Africa. He reviewed his choice in a speech at a symposium organised by 
the Foreign Affairs Association in Umtata, in April 1976: 
I shall tell you what they (the alternatives) are: 
(a) We can accept that South Africa is immutable; or 
(b) We can engage in a bloody revolution in an attempt to bring 
about the collapse of what is to the Black man an unjust 
society, upon the rubble of whith a new, just, multi-racial 
society ..• will arise; or 
(c) \.<le can try to achieve the same end without violence and blood-
shed by working within the system. 
Acceptance of the status quo as permanent we ... rejected out of 
hand. Revolution along classical Marxist lines, the next alternative, 
is a concept relatively easy to 'sell' to those who have nothing to 
lose ... We in Transkei know poverty. But we are a 1 so not in the 
position of having nothing to lose .... My Government ... can see 
no virtue in mobilising ... peaceful people into a revolutionary 
army bent on military confrontation with the Republic. Firstly, it 
would be militarily suicidal; s~c6ridly, it is quite unacceptable 
to us morally ••. lastly, it is quite unnecessary - we are closing 
the wage gap, and generilly getting all we want without a shot 
being fired! •.. 
This brings me to the third alternative. In South Africa ... the 
only evolution possible is within the framework of the policy of 
separate development .•. We opted for this alternative for ... 
Firstly: To remove from Whites the fear that a better deal for 
Blacks in any field, particularly in politics and economics, 
threatens the existence of the Whites as a group ... 
Secondly: To create identifiable areas ... where Blacks have 
politic~l rights and can exercise them without running int6 White 
oppos i ti ori .•. 
Thi~dly: To develop these areas economically to stop the drift of 
young Blacks to those areas designated for White egemony .•. 
hopefully ... (to make) ..• possible the relaxation or sc~apping of 
influx control. 
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Fourthly: To create an atmosphere in which it is possible for 
Whites to accept the leaders of these new Black political entities 
as equals .. . 
Lastly: ... to restore personal dignity to Black ... South Africans 
and gradually to condition Whites to the equality ... of Black and 
Brown people who meet the requisite norms. In this way the social 
intercourse between the various population groups will, jn time, 
assume a profile acceptable to all population groups ... tl48J 
The decision to ask for independence flows from this without a ripple: 
having accepted separate development, having accepted in principle 
independence as a target of this policy, having ascertained that 
impos·ing pre-conditions did not bring any concession, independence was 
the only practicable choice for Matanzim9. However, it would be wrong 
to consider the reluctance of the previous years merely as a tactical 
move. The problems and shortcomings of the homelands were there for all 
to see, and everybody worth his salt would have tried to obtain better 
conditions. But in the first half of the seventies, white South 
Africa was not in the mood for making concessions and the situation 
reached a stalemate. It can be argued that time is working for the 
Blacks, and that the Whites are those who should feel interested in 
making concessions to get out of a stalemate. But even if it is so 
now, this was far less clear at the beginning of 1974 when the Portuguese 
were still in control of their empire and the guerrilla movements in the 
areas closer to South Africa little more than a nuisance. Furthermore, 
even if time was on the side of the Blacks in general, this did not 
mean that it was also on Matanzima's side. In reality, in the years 
from 1972 onwards, Matanzima's leading role amongst the recognised 
black leaders was increasingly challenged by newcomers of good quality, 
such as L. Mangope, H. Ntsanwisi, C. Phatudi and G. Buthelezi. The 
latter in particular, being the leader of the most numerous and compact 
black ethnic group and having wider support among urban Blacks for his 
outspoken criticism of the South African government, was rapidly stealing 
the stage from Matanzima. In this situation, a common policy of the 
black leaders, aimed at extracting concessions from Pretoria by refusing 
independence and at a federation of the homelands, rapidly lost its 
appeal for Matanzima: the South African government stubbornly continued 
to refuse any meaningful concession to the claims of the black leaders, 
whether they were performed in choir or a solo, and a common policy was 
increasingly meaning to work with, and under the lead of Buthelezi. 
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Another factor which can have influenced the decision to opt for indepen-
dence was tha~ accepting it, it was possible to obtain some of those 
concessions which Pretoria refused to make previously, Indeed, after 
Transkei asked to be granted independence, it received part of the land 
it claimed and a greater economic and financial support.(See Chapter 7.2) 
At the end of 1975 another homeland, Bophuthatswana, made the same 
choice. The annual conference of the ruling Bophuthatswana Democratic 
Party (B.D.P.) gave Chief Mangope a mandate to lead Bophuthatswana to 
independence, even if the South African government refused first to 
consolidate the country in a satisfactory way, and this mandate was 
endorsed by the B.L.A. shortly thereafter. Again the realisation that 
persisting in laying down pre-conditions for opting for independence was 
leading nowhere was a very important factor. The 1975 consolidation 
proposals 'consolidated' Bophuthatswana in six pieces and there was no 
chance of further concessions. The frustrating effects of the South 
African attitude and their influence on his choice were confirmed by 
Mangope at the beginning of 1976: 
Indeed the question arises: in the profound dilemma which is South 
Africa, what else can we really do except to embrace independence? 
What other options are open by which we can restore our self-respect, 
our sense of dignity, or give expression to our own identity? Truly, 
if we remain at our present constitutional status, what other( 149 ) harvest can we gather except a bitter harvest of frustration? 
tHth Mangope breaking the ranks too, the common policy of the black 
leaders was losing meaning, and Buthelezi accused him of betraying the 
interest of his people and of all the Blacks by breaking their unity. 
Mangope's answer to this charge shows that although separate development 
is a divide et impera policy, it is also based on an ethnic consciousness 
which in many cases is strongly felt: 
Ek as leier van een van die klein swarte volke in Suid-Afrika sal 
my nie by 'n beweging aansluit waarin ek altyd in die minderheid 
sal wees nie. Bowendien is ek nie aan Kaptein Buthelezi (l50} veraantwoordig vir my optrede nie. Ek ken my volk beter as hy. 
Since Mangope is above all a Tswana nationalist, it was inevitable that 
he would start asking himself which role the Tswana (and himself} could 
play in a united black front. The simple fact that the Tswana are about 
two million out of twenty million Blacks was enough to make him unhappy 
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with a unitary front. 
Although among many of the politically conscious Blacks ethnicity 
has become a swear word, it is not possible to ignore the role that the 
ethnic factor has played, a~ bo~a fide motivation, in the decision to 
opt for independence. This ethnic, or, in my opinion more correctly, 
nationalistic factor did play an important role not only in the case 
-of Bophuthatswana, but also in the decision of Venda to ask for 
independence in 1979. However, the arguably most striking example of 
the influence and importance of the ethnic factor is perhaps the case 
of KwaNdebele. Due to their limited number and to the great dispersion 
of their areas of settlement, the Ndebele were not recognised as a 
'national unit' in terms of the 1959 legislation, and only after 
repeated requests and a long insistence a homeland Was created for 
them. The pressure on the government to grant the Ndebeles the status 
of 'national unit' and thus a homeland of their own came mostly from a 
number of chiefs, who were, however, generally supported by their 
tribesmen. This may introduce some suspicion on the real weight of the 
ethnic nationalism factor in the moves which led to the establishment 
of KwaNdebele. It cannot be.denied that the prospect of becoming a 
minister in a homeland government, with all that it means in terms of 
personal wealth and possibility of patronage, played an important role 
in awakening the nationalistic spirit of some of these chiefs. However, 
it is not possible to reduce the raison d'etre of KwaNdebele to the 
personal ambition of a few individuals who saw their chance to gain a 
position of power. The attachment of the Ndebeles to their ethnic 
identity also played a significant role. Although not all the Ndebele 
tribes have supported the creation of KwaNdebele, the number of those 
that have done so is substantial. In many cases, those chiefs who 
agitated for the creation of KwaNdebele and wanted to secede from the 
homeland in which they were, had the support of the great majority of 
their tribe. A number of tribes voluntarily decided to leave the area 
in which they lived to resettle in KwaNdebele. {l5l) 
Certainly, a contributing factor to the awakening of ethnic 
identification among the Ndebeles was the harassment some Ndebele tribes 
and individuals suffered at the hands of the authorities of other home-
lands, in particular Bophuthatswana. (152 ) This point, however, only 
increases the importance of ethnic feeling in the establishment of 
KwaNdebele: being discriminated against on ethnic grounds or having one's 
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own ethnic identity threatened cannot but enhance one's perception of 
one's own ethnic identification. 
In regard to the spontaneousness of the desire for a Ndebele 
homeland among the Ndebele, the authors of the Surplus People ProjectReport, 
who certainly do not hide their conviction about the artfulness of the 
'bantustans', after saying: 
It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which various Ndebele 
groups identified with a common Ndebele bantustan and as a 
result attempted to secede from either Lebowa or Bophuthatswana. 
Other factors playing an important part in this process have been 
the harassment and discrimination experienced in the bantustans 
and the possible alleviation of that in the Ndebele bantustan, 
went on to give some example of pressures for the establishment of a 
Ndebele homeland stemming from Ndebele nationalism and conclude: "This 
identification has facilitated the formation of KwaNdebele and has led 
to the movement of many thousands of Ndebele people". (153 ) 
The part played by ethnic nationalism in the formation of KwaNdebele 
can be thus considered significant, if not substantial. Indeed, it is 
arguable that in the case of KwaNdebele the establishment of an ethnic 
homeland had the active support of many of the people concerned and 
certainly a higher level of popular support than any other homeland. 
Being the smallest group and having already suffered from ethnic 
discrimination at the hands of their fellow Blacks, a considerable 
number of Ndebeles felt that only as an autonomous entity could they 
properly protect their interests. 
Therefore, although Mangope was the first to spell out the relevance 
of the ethnic factor in the decision to opt for independence, he was by 
no means the only one to give greater importance to ethnicity than to 
racial affiliation. 
The fact that Mangope received the mandate to lead Bophuthatswana 
to independence even if South Africa did not consolidate satisfactorily 
the territory did not mean that he was ready to accept everything: 
"Although I emphatically believe that our destiny lies in early 
independent nationhood, we are equally emphatic that we still do not 
want independence at all costs 11 .(l54 ) However, he was wise to phrase 
his conditions in a relatively vague way and thus to leave himself a 
wide margin of manoeuvre, because there were few chances that he could 
gain anything meaningful from negotiations. Of this he was fully aware, 
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and in one occasion he remarked that "We are negotiating, at this 
moment, from a position of such powerlessness that they can do as 
they please".( 155 ) 
Indeed the negotiations were quite stormy and on more than one 
occasion they arrived at breaking point. Pretoria seemed determined 
not to budge an inch from its position on the land and citizenship 
issues, and Mangope expressed his frustration and despair at the way 
in which negotiations were developing: 
We •.. have recently experienced the full blast of ... painful 
humiliation and disillusionment .•.. it is the question-mark 
about the motives of the ... Government which is trying to trick 
us into an independence which smells of fraud ... an independence 
which will only cater for certain White people's dreams of 
continued 'baasskap' ..• while shatterin~ for ever my people's 
dreams of a place in the sun for all.( 5) 
For a while it seemed that the negotiations were deadlocked and that 
Bophuthatswana would not accept independence after all. In the second 
half of 1977, agreement was slowly reached on the contentious points, 
with some concessions to Bophuthatswana on the land and citizenship 
issues. On the latter point, the modification Mangope obtained (it 
was provided that a Bophuthatswana citizen might renounce his 
Bophuthatswana citizenship and regain the South African one on 
conditions agreed upon between the two governments), although small, 
was just about everything that could be obtained on that matter in the 
existing situation. Furthermore, it had effects on the other home;lands 
and on Transkei, because, as a result of the agreement with Bophuthatswana, 
the South African Parliament enacted the Bantu Homelands Citizenship 
Amendment Act (No. 13 of 1978) which provided for a person who is a 
citizen of an independent black state and who was a South African citizen, 
to regain South African citizenship by being granted citizenship of a non-
independent homeland. 
The advantages gained by Mangope in his independence negotiations 
were, in reality, of little significance and fell short of his objectives, 
but in the end the possibility of being at last able to get rid of the 
South African control and of the apartheid legislation had a paramount 
importance in the decision to become independent. As Mangope put it in 
the independence speech: 
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.•• why we opted for independence? •.. If we stand together to 
make the most of the new challenge, then ou.r greater independence 
will put us on the road towards all those things which generations 
of our people have been crying and yearning and praying for. What 
it means is our liberation from the indignity of colonial bondage, 
so that at long last .•• we can carry our heads high. 
What it means is that at last we are no longer helplessly at the 
mercy of the arbitrary arrogance of those who ..• trampled our 
human dignity into dust. At last we can demand that our human 
dignity be respected ..• 
~Jith pride we can now turn into rea 1 ity the yearning towards taking 
our destiny into our own hands ... (157) 
Furthermore, it was Mangope' s opinion that an independent Bophuthatswana 
could be an example of good inter-racial relations which could modify 
the attitude of the Whites in this regard: 
We believe that the road taken by Bophuthatswana is acting as a 
potent catalyst. We have committed ourselves to building here a 
model of a non-discriminatory society which, we believe, will prove 
to be extremely infectious and will inevitably help to give 
direction to the ~ocial, economic and political evolution of this 
subcontinent.(158) 
The year 1978 saw two other homelands taking independence into 
consideration. The Venda government, which in the eyes of Pretoria 
had been one of the least troublesome of all, decided to opt for indepen-
dence, which it attained after uneventful negotiations that gained for 
Venda some little territorial concession. The Ciskeian government, on 
its part, appointed a commission "to enquire into and report and make 
recommendations to the government of the Ciskei on the practical 
feasibility considering all political, economic and social aspects of 
independence for the Ciskei. 11 ( 159) 
In the early 1970's Sebe, too~ was opposed to independence on the 
grounds of excessive poverty of Ciskei and insufficient allocation of 
land to it. When, on the eve of the Transkeian independence, the 
possibility was aired of Ciskei joining Transkei and forming one 
independent state, his reaction was: 
I have often said that our people cannot eat flags or constitutions 
... of what benefit would it be to the Ciskei to become part of an 
independent Transkei which ... has completely inadequate resources 
... ? Is any benefit to be found in on~ de$titute family joining 
another to sit down at an empty table?tl60J 
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In the following years, being confronted with the frustrating inability 
to stop the resettlement policy of the South African government, and 
finding always more difficulty in extending the scope of his autonomy, 
he slowly changed position. 
Needing to secure the support of the Ciskeian population, he 
decided to awake the Ciskeian nationalism and to present his C.N.I.P. 
not simply as a political party but as the movement representing the 
national spirit of Ciskei and heralding its national rebirth. 
The use of national feelings - sometimes even artificially whipped 
up - as a means to nally and mobilize a people in order to muster its 
energies and use them for developing a country is an old device which 
has often proved successful. Indeed, in a developing country, 1~here 
one of the biggest obstacles to development is the apathy of the 
people and where the first priority must be to involve them in the 
development process, the revival of the nationalist spirit (or its 
creation if there are no historical precedents) is often the only means 
to mobilize and involve the people. The need to resort to tresemeans 
did not escape any of the homeland leaders' notice, and it played a 
role in their decision to opt for independence. As Mangope had 
occasion to remark: 
The ... prospect ... to mobilize our people's will to economic 
self-help by means of own decision making ... was in fact a major 
consideration in adopting our present status. Under the old 
dispensation the hopes of pulling ourselves by our own bootstraps 
out of the apathy of an artificia116 maintained economic ghetto 
appeared to be unbearably remote.(l 1) 
In Sebe's case, it was not possible to exploit ethnic nationalism, 
since there are two foci for the Xhosa ethnic feelings. Thus he 
resorted to the history of .the western Xhosa and found in the long 
history of struggles against the Whites( 162 ) and in the old warrior 
chiefs the uniting force of Ciskeian nationalism. (After all, over-
crowded graveyards have often been good breeding grounds of nationalism): 
For myself, I find my strength, . . . my total commitment to our 
national goal in the stirring examples of our warrior leaders of 
the past ... For over a hundred years these mighty chiefs fought 
with great courage ... to defend 9~r $OVereign right of survival 
as a free and independent people.l 63) 
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However, although wanting nationalism to play an important part in 
Ciskei and wanting to satisfy this nationalism with independence, Sebe 
did not forget "the existence of a total South African culture and an 
intimate relationship between all of the South African peoples". (164 ) 
He wanted to preserve the "differences in culture and hi story which 
give all the groups an individuality", but he recognised also that "the 
Ciskeians .•. do not want to lose that which identifies them not only 
as Ciskeians but in the broader context as South Africans",( 165 ) Thus 
he identified Ciskei 1 s objectives as follows: 
Today the Ciskei Nation has but a single objective: the restoration 
and regathering of the nation to the land of its forefathers and 
the establishment of its economic and political autonomy - all with-
in the community or commonwealth of nations of Southern Africa,(166) 
This hope of a future close collaboration, possibly in the form of 
a federation or confederation, with all the states and territories of 
South - or Southern - 1Uri ca, and in particular with 1whi te 1 Sou th Africa, 
has been evinced also by other leaders who accepted independence. Jn 
Mangope 1 s opinion "our survival is rooted in our interdependence"because 
"the fact is that Blacks and Whites in South Africa are crowd~d together 
in one little boat". (l67) For this reason, he talked of •greater 
independence• for Bophuthatswana and not of •sovereign independence•, 
and remarked that: 
By adopting greater independence we have by no means opted out of 
the Pan-South African destiny. On the contrary, we have now ... 
established an indisputable and meaningful power base which gives 
us the freedom and privilege to create viable and convincing models 
for the direction and quality of changes which are required •.. if 
every man and woman i~ the region is to be entitled to his rightful 
place in the sun.(168J 
and he hoped that "this process will eventually lead to the emergence 
of a strong, peaceful and prosperous Southern African Community". ( 169 ) 
Also Sebe has the same hope, and he sees 
the future political framework of Southern Africa taking the form 
of a confederacy of self-governed autonomous states, comprising the 
individual national units of all the black races together with the 
white South African unit in a str9n~A harmonious and peaceful 
United States of Southern Africa.ll u) 
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Since it is evident that the aim of these leaders is the creation 
of some kind of confederal structure in South Africa, possibly as a 
forerunner of a federation, which inevitably would limit the scope and 
the meaning of their independence, one can ask oneself why they felt 
necessary to go through the option of independence. Probably there are 
two main reasons. One is that only after independence they would have 
been free of the controls and pressures of the South African government, 
at least within their homeland. Another is that the personal ambition 
which moves every politician made itself felt. The prospective of 
becoming presidents or prime ministers of their country and acquiring 
the same formal rank as their former rulers must have been a powerful 
incentive to opt for independence. Furthermore, the South African 
government has many ways of exerting direct and indirect pressure on 
the homeland leaders, and certainly its willingness to increase the 
amount of financial aid to those homelands which choose independence 
can be a powerful incentive for exercising this option. 
·cHAPTER 6 
ASSESSING REASONS~:TACTICS AND 
THE DYNAMICS OF THE INDEPENDENCE PROCESS 
The decision taken by some homeland leaders to opt for independence 
has been criticised from many quarters and for many reasons. In 
particular, this choice has been condemned as treason against the 
Blacks, both those who became citizens of the new states and those 
who were left under white rule. The homeland leaders who decided to 
lead their territories to independence were thus accused of being 'sell 
outs' and 'puppets' of the white government who, for lust of power and 
for the sake of personal gain, sold the rights of their peoples and 
crippled the chances of a fairer division of the wealth of South Africa. 
Although in some cases there is more than some substance in the 
charge that homeland leaders have considerably enlarged their personal 
and family fortunes (the most well-known case is that of the Matanzima 
brothers},(lJl} the decision to opt for independence cannot be reduced 
to this. Deeper and sounder reasons have been advanced by these leaders 
to justify their move, and they are worth taking into consideration. 
In accepting to work within the framework of the policy of separate 
development, many homeland leaders accepted, explicitly or implicitly, 
also its final consequence: independence. Even more, the promise of 
future independence was the sweet coating which made some traditional 
leaders and some political groups within the homelands swallow the pill 
( 17") of separate development. L 
This acceptance of separate development and the readiness to work 
within its ftamework did not mean that these Blacks were wholeheartedly 
supporting its aims and the apartheid system. The position of middle-
high ranking Blacks, such as petty chiefs and civil servants, has been 
well explained by Chief J. Mabandla (Ciskei's former Chief Minister): 
those blacks who were in a position to make the policy a working 
... proposition ... were very much aware of the conduct or 
utterances which might result in the banning of opposition to 
the government. the black personnel responsible for the running 
of the policy of separate development can be classified as: 
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(a) those who accept the policy, while indifferent to its aim and 
finality; they enjoy the minor benefits within their immediate 
surrounding, such as an M,P; 's salary at the end of the month •.. ; 
{b) those who accept the policy only as a medium for free 
expression, in order to voice what would be difficult outside the 
enclosure of expressed government policy; and finally, (173) (c) those who accept the policy as a 'while we wait' device. · 
Also the leaders, the very people who accepted separate development 
and started implementing it, did not give their unflinching support to 
this policy. Some of them expressed approval of separate development, 
as Mangope did: 11 1 believe that this principle, if it is implemented 
with integrity, can provide a lasting solution to the unique historical 
and cultural situation which we South Africans of today have inherited. 11 ( 174 ) 
Matanzima even found that "this apartheid policy of the Nationalists 
was most attractive to me as an individual", but this was not because 
aims and means of apartheid were in his dreams, but "because it came 
at a time when black people wanted to control their own affairs. It 
coincided with my desire to see my people free". (t 75 ) 
Their approval was not for apartheid, but for the possibility 
inherent in the homelands' policy of putting the black people's case to 
the government and of taking into black hands the administration of 
b 1 ack territories. Indeed, their acceptance of the government policy 
was motivated mainly by the hope of bringing about a change in the 
political and economic situation of the Blacks in South Africa. The 
homeland leaders themselves have repeatedly spelt this out: 
... I doubt whether there is a single homeland leader in South 
Africa who has taken the step to self-government because of his 
commitment to this policy. In the majority if not all cases co-
operation within the policy is seen as a means, indeed the only 
legal and peaceful means 4 of using the institutions provided to 
bring about change ... (116) 
The homeland leaders did realise that separate development was a white 
invention, implemented by the Whites for safeguarding white interests. 
But they also realised that this was a unique chance to assert the 
black claims and peacefully to fight for an improvement of the conditions 
of the Blacks. This was aptly expressed by Matanzima in one of his 
speeches: 
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•.. this policy of separate development is a White man's policy. 
Its primary goal is unashamedly the preservation of a White 
identity and control by the Whites over their own destiny •..• 
If separate development is the only way in which the vast 
majority of Whites in South Africa can be persuaded to allow 
their Black countrymen a better way of life, then my Government 
will do everything in its power to assist the Republican 
Government • .. to make the po 1 icy work in so far as the Home 1 ands 
are concerned. We must not precipitate a WhH~ backlash by 
immediate demands and extremist posturing.(1 J 
The same reason was given by Buthelezi, when, after a long opposition, 
he accepted to work within the framework of separate development: 
Those who believe in change through non-violent methods should 
explore other possibilities of averting such a danger. Dialogue, 
and meaningful dialogue, can begin on the basis of homelands 
policy ... By participating in the implementation of separate 
development we are by implication committed to a meaningful 
negotiation even on its basis ..• This policy could easily 
be the basis of a future South Africa if 1~6)government were 
prepared to negotiate with us seriously.( 
Their attitude was thus not one of 'yes-men', but that of leaders of a 
discriminated community, and arguably responsible leaders, who were 
trying to improve the condition of their people without running foul 
of the main white interests, which would mean confrontation and the end 
of any chance of peaceful change. 
Indeed, in the political situation of the 1960's, few alternatives 
were left to a Black who wanted to act in the political field. The 
A.N.C. and the P.A.C., which were the traditional and most active and 
popular black political organisations, had been outlawed, their members 
persecuted and their attempts to overthrow white rule with violent 
methods ruthlessly and effectively crushed. Internal opposition having 
been silenced, the alternatives were either to resign oneself to the 
situation, losing interest in political activity and acc~pting the 
immut~bility of the system, or to leave the country to live in exile 
trying to form a better organised guerrilla movement to overthrow the 
white government ma~u militari. 
The first alternative was unacceptable, and no politically active 
Black could ever have subscribed to it. The second was of doubtful 
outcome and morally distasteful to people politically brought up in 
the school of non-violent action which had been one of the basic tenets 
of the A.N.C. until 1960. 
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A realistic appreciation of the balance of power within South Africa 
and in Southern Africa in the mid-1960's would have left few hopes that 
an external liberation movement could effectively influence South 
African policies. Indeed, if one excludes those already compromised 
and wanted by the police, very few Blacks made this choice before 
the change in the internal and international situation in the mid-
1970's. Furthermore, the resort to violent action was totally alien 
to the philosophy of the great majority of black nationalists. 
The traumatic events of 1960-61 forced the black nationalists to 
take violent action into consideration as a means of furthering their 
objectives, but violent action was not necessarily the only course 
of action left open to them. It is possible to say that black 
nationalism, in this crucial period of its history, split into two 
divergent streams. 
The traditional A.N.C. policy was to work within the system, or at 
any rate with legal means, to bring about a gradual but irreversible 
change in the political and economic condition of the Blacks. The 
security legislation gradually introduced during the 1950's made it 
more and more difficult for the A.N.C. to pursue its aims within the 
legal framework, and the repressive measures of the early 1960's made 
it impossible. Every politically active Black had to contemplate a 
break from the traditional and deeply ingrained attitude of black 
nationalism. This break could take two different forms. One was 
to put the stress on the final aim of black nationalism: a South 
Africa where political rights and economic opportunities would not 
depend on the colour of one's skin. And since white repression made 
it impossible to fight for this with legal and peaceful means, the 
only alternative left was to fight to obtain this aim through a 
revolutionary action. The other form was to put the stress on the 
necessity to avoid violence, both for moral and tactical reasons, and 
to work with the limited legal means left to try to improve, step by 
tiny step, the position of the Blacks, in this way slowly creating the 
conditions for overcoming racial prejudices. This choice implied 
renouncing, for the time being, to fight for 'one man one vote' and 
accepting to work within the framework of the ethnic policy imposed 
by the government. 
One group, personified by the leadership of the A.N.C. and P.A.C., 
opted for violent action. This choice was not taken lightheartedly, and 
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it was resorted to only when repression of black political activity 
made violence appear the only way Blacks could make their voice heard. 
Although sympathy for the A.N.C. remained widespread amongst the Blacks, 
only a limited number of them was prepared to follow this course. 
Another group preferred the other alternative. The most important 
reason for this choice was the moral repulsion that the use of violence 
roused in many of them. Almost all the educated Blacks, who constituted 
the backbone of the nationalist movements, had been educated in the 
missionary schools, and many of them were deeply committed Christians. 
As such, violence was repugnant to them, whoever used it for whatever 
reason. Other reasons compounded, to a different degree in different 
people, this basic refusal to use violence. Tactical reasons were 
important: the rapid suppression of the first actions of Poqo and 
Umkhonto weSizwe and the elimination of the embryonic clandestine net-
work of these organisations showed that a revolutionary overthrow of 
white rule was outside the realm of possibility. However desirable 
the aims of the A.N.C. could be for a Black, the chances appeared that 
it would take decades before a revolutionary movement could defeat the 
government. In the meanwhile the external liberation movements could 
do nothing to improve the daily condition of living of the Blacks. 
Certainly, to work within the limits imposed by the Nationalist govern-
ment would leave little room to manoeuvre, but it offered more 
occasions to do something practical to improve the conditions of the 
Blacks than leaving the country to train for guerrilla warfare. 
Furthermore, and this also had an influence on those who took this 
decision, to work within the legality and in collaboration with the 
government was certainly less dangerous than trying to launch guerrilla 
attacks from Dar es Salaam, and opened up perspectives for a more 
immediate and tangible reward. 
From the second of these streams in which black nationalism had 
divided in the early 1960's came at least some of the homeland leaders, 
in particular those, such as Matanzima and Buthelezi, who in their 
position do not put the stress mainly on ethnicity. Matanzima's links 
with the A.N.C. are often dismissed as 'youth's mistakes', but his 
frequent insistence on black consciousness and his, admittedly weak, 
attempts to free himself of the strait-jacket of government policies 
pennit one to consider him as a moderate black nationalist (as opposed 
to an ethnic nationalist such as Mangope). Buthelezi is the homeland 
leader who most frequently had made the point that his aims are those 
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of a black nationalist of the old A.N.C. school and that his actions 
are in the mould of the traditional political action of the black 
nationalists: 
I have openly identified with the A.N.C.'s traditions •..• There 
is nothing whatsoever in that which the A.N.C. have ever sto9d 
for, which says that liberation will come by violence alone.ll79) 
These leaders accepted to collaborate with government policies because 
it was the only way they had to influence, however weakly, the attitude 
and the policy of the government. {l80) 
While working within the framework of separate development, all the 
homeland leaders insisted on the separate-but-equal doctrine,( 181) and 
they all agreed with Mangope when he said that he would like "more 
emphasis to be placed on development rather than on separation". (182 ) 
Furthermore, although having to operate within a policy of racial 
separation, almost all the leaders stressed that their aim was a multi-
racial society which could set an example of armonious relations between 
Blacks and Whites; to allay Whites' fear of black rule. Only Matanzima 
accepted and supported racial exclusiveness in his homeland for a 
number of years, on the principle that since the Whites were 
discriminating against the Blacks in the 'white' areas, the Blacks 
could as well discriminate against the Whites in the 'black' areas. 
However, he had to discard this aspect of his policy after realising 
that without white expertise and capital the development of Transkei 
would never take off. 
The support given to separate development by the homeland leaders 
was not unqualified, and Whites too were requested to show goodwill and 
to make concessions. In Mangope's view, the success of this policy 
would 
... depend on progress in four fields: the reconsideration of 
the land issue so that the Africans could obtain more land; the 
need for Whites to make meaningful sacrifices for their policy 
by spending more on African education, social services, homeland 
development and wages; Black dignity and the rejection of 
discrimin~fio~; and the assumption of responsabilities by the 
Africans. l 83 J 
The same concepts have been expressed, perhaps in a somewhat cruder 
way, by Buthelezi: 
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(I want to share) •.. some of the fat of South Africa. South 
Africa is a wealthy country, and we should get our pound of flesh. 
If they are giving us our own nation~ that is okay, we are not 
against being given nationhood. But it must be a true nation.(184) 
The decision to collaborate with the government in making the home-
lands policy work undoubtedly yielded some fruits. In the decade from 
the mid-1960's to the mid-1970's there have been important, albeit not 
conspicuous, changes in the position of the Blacks. On practical 
matters, the establishment of the homeland governments put sizeable 
resources at the disposal of the Blacks for the fi~st time in South 
African history, and put them under their direct control. These 
resources were limited and constituted a small portion, in some people's 
opinion a ludicrously small portion, of South Africa's resources. 
Furthennore, the amount given each year to the homeland governments were 
decided by the South African government and approved by the South 
African Parliament, without even the slightest participation of the 
homeland leaders in the decision. The homeland leaders could plea for 
more money but they did not have any part in actually deciding how much 
money they would receive. Direct taxation of its citizens was the only 
source of revenue which a home 1 and government could count on without 
having to wait and hope for South African largesse. For the rest, the 
South African government budgeted an amount to be spent by or on behalf 
of the homelands, more or less arbitrarily increasing or decreasing it 
(usually increasing it), and that was all. Despite these restrictions, 
however, the homeland governments had the power to decide how to spend 
these resources; and with the increase in the number of departments 
left under their responsibility, an ever increasing amount of resources 
was put under their direct control. 
If one of the attributes of power is to have resources and the 
capacity to allocate them according to one's own interests and decisions, 
the decade up to the mid-1970's saw a perceptible shift of power in 
favour of the Blacks. Admittedly, since on average only about 20% of 
the budget of the homelands was covered by 'own resources' ,(lSS) it was 
a limited power. The origin of the homelands' resources was mainly 
under South African control, as it was logical since the homelands, 
albeit as 'self-governing territories', are an integral part of South 
Africa. Thus, great part of the power wielded by the homeland 
governments was wielded with the leave of the South African government. 
Nevertheless, it was real power. 
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It might sound excessive to say that the power of the Blacks 
increased in that decade. The reality of poverty, pass-laws and 
political repression remained unchanged for most of them. Further-
more, part of the resources at the disposal of the homeland 
governments was used to further personal or clan interests of the 
small political elite. The average black man-in-the-street be~efitted 
very little, if at all, from this limited shift of power in favour of 
the Blacks. Nevertheless, in this decade the foundations were laid 
down for an increase in the influence of the Blacks in South African 
life. For the first time, black actors appeared on the South African 
political stage to play a part. For the first time, they were not 
considered mere walkers-on on that stage, but had a recognised role to 
play. 
With their decision to collaborate with the government the homeland 
leaders created for themselves a small space of political freedom. In 
a society where political opposition from the Blacks had been silenced 
and where any fonn of cri ti ci sm from them was subject to immediate 
repression, the homeland leaders, by virtue of their office, had an 
undreamt of freedom of speech. They made use of it, prudently at the 
beginning, more outspokenly with the passing of the years, to voice 
black grievances. Sensitive topics were discussed in public by these 
leaders and their critical statements, even on topics which had been 
almost taboo for the Blacks, were widely publicised in the press. Some 
of these statements would have earned their authors the immediat~ 
attention of the police had they been proferred by any other Black. 
Instead they were discussed by the white establishment and sometimes 
even answered to by the government. The sma 11 space of freedom the 
homeland leaders procured for themselves slowly enlarged, and extended 
also to other Blacks. The homeland leaders made statements which the 
government found unpleasant and which, although expressing the opinion 
of almost all the Blacks, only they could make. However, slowly other 
Blacks outside the group of 'collaborationists' started to voice the 
same opinion, and the government had to tolerate them instead of banning 
them as it would have liked to do. 
It is possible to say that, up to the early 1970's, one of the most 
important results of the decision of some Blacks to collaborate with 
the government in the homelands policy was that this collaboration 
allowed black opinions to be expressed and black interests to be pointed 
out to the government, and sometimes protected, in a period when 
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government attitude was to silence every form of black dissension to 
its policy. Black opposition was indeed silenced, but some of its 
arguments were then taken up by the homeland leaders, and this brought 
about, with time, a wider scope for black criticism than the government 
expected. 
In conclusion: the black leaders accepted to work within the 
framework of separate development because they saw that there were 
only two choices for a black person who seeks to ... influence 
future events. He can seek the way of bloody confrontation ... 
and enter into an internal and external war which will rip the 
very guts of the country .•. or he c~n seek the way of peaceful 
co-operation and negotiation ... (186) 
and they chose the latter course 
not because it ... (the Ciskei in this case) ... endorses the 
policy of apartheid, not because it seeks eternal white 
domination, ... but because it is the only acceptable way of 
achieving progres$ towards the attainment of a just society in 
South Africa.ll87J 
It was the choice of the lesser evil, in the hope that this initial 
development, however slow and limited it was, could bring about a 
meaningful change: 
As the ultimate ideal I can never depart ... from the principle of 
'one man one vote', But it would be utterly futile at this stage 
to disregard the historical realities and their practical 
implications. The fear on the part of .... Whites of the power 
falling ... into the hands of sixteen million Blacks is a natural 
and not unreasonable reaction ... 
At the same time it is not unreasonable to postulate that in the 
long run developments may bring about a situation where this fear 
loses all substance ... A society will then emerge in(~~~~h 
all will have an equal stake in peace and progress ... J 
In the black leaders' opinion, their choice did really cause a 
modification in Pretoria's attitude. Matanzima expressed his conviction 
that ''our quiet progress has done much to allay white fears",(lB9) and 
Sebe thought that "such change as has been effected in the thinking of 
white politicians has been achieved through pressure brought via the 
medium of these institutions (the homelands)". (l90) Also Buthelezi, 
perhaps from a different point of view, emphasised the important role 
the homelands had in improving the situation of the Blacks, also in the 
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political field: 
Among the so-called homeland leaders there are some like myself 
who believe in Black consciousness, and who believe they have 
done more in promoting the concept of Black consciousn~ss than 
those who arrogantly dismiss them as 'irrelevant' ,(191) 
Although all the homeland leaders accepted to work within the 
framework of separate development in order to create a platform from 
which they could further black interests, the degree of their acceptance 
of that policy varied considerably from one to the other. Some, such 
as Buthelezi, accepted it only when its forced imposition was threatened 
and only as a means to build an unassailable power basis from which to 
oppose some aspects of the policy which they considered unacceptable. 
These leaders did not want independence for their homelands, they 
wanted for all the Blacks a larger share of power and wealth within 
South Africa. Others, such as Matanzima, willingly accepted separate 
development because they reckoned that it was the only way the Blacks 
had to take the control of their future, at least in some territories 
since it appeared impossible to modify their political situation within 
the whole of South Africa. Thus, they accepted independence as a 
substitute for an unattainable participation of the Blacks in the 
political process within South Africa. Others still, such as Mangope, 
saw in separate development not only a surrogate for black presence in 
South African politics, but also a way to protect and promote the 
interests of their ethnic group. These nationalist (in an ethnic sense) 
leaders considered independence as a positive and fundamental aspect of 
separate development and one of the reasons for which they accepted to 
support it. 
This nationalistic factor undoubtedly played a significant part in 
Mangope's decision to opt for independence and also in that of the Venda 
and KwaNdebele leadership. These three territories are the homelands 
assigned to small black ethnic groups (Venda and Ndebele are the 
smallest recognised 'national units') and their leaders do not ignore 
that in a multi-ethnic country the ethnic factor often plays a 
determinant role, particularly when the moment of the allocation of 
scarce resources comes. In the South African situation, in particular 
after Matanzima led Transkei on its independent way, the most numerous 
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group is the Zulu group. It is also the best organised and its 
leader can count on the compact support of his people. The Zulu are 
at the moment the ~otentially strongest black group, and, in whichever 
way the South African situation will evolve, the chances are that the 
Zulus will have a hegemonic position amongst the black groups, be it 
in a united black front negotiating with the white government or in 
the government of a black Azania. Mangope did not want to participate 
in a movement in which he would always be in the minority( 192 ) and 
where the protection of the 'vital interests' of his people would be 
entrusted to the fair play of other groups whose 'vital interests' 
could clash with those of his own group. This argument was certainly 
taken into consideration by Mphephu, while KwaNdebele's leaders did 
not have to guess what the situation of a minority group might 
theoretically be since some Ndebele tribes had already had a taste of 
ethnic discrimination at the hands of bigger black groups. This 
nationalistic factor has also played a part in Sebe's decision, although 
probably not as big as in the previous cases .. At any rate, the Xhosas 
were the main potential challenger to the possible Zulu hegemony in 
black politics. However, after the independence of Transkei their 
relative importance amongst the black groups decreased considerably, 
and the Xhosas in Ciskei might well have thought that their interests 
would be better protected by an independent Ciskeian government rather 
than by a black united front where for each one of them there would be 
nine of the others, and five of them Zulus. 
However important this nationalistic factor has been, it was not 
the only factor which influenced the decision to opt for independence 
nor was it the :most important. Another reason for making this choice 
was that the homelands had a limited scope for exerting really 
autonomous decisions. Time and again homeland initiatives and requests 
met with government ref us a 1. Those homeland leaders fe 1t the need to 
shake off the control of the white government and the sovereignty of 
the white Parliament, in order to be able to refuse to bend to South 
Africa's wishes every time there was dissension with it. The leaders 
of these homelands reckoned that they had exploited all the room of 
manoeuvre they had in the existing circumstances. The self-governing 
homelands were becoming a dead end in which the occasions for mis-
understandings and for increase of tension with the South African 
government were becoming more numerous. The necessity to wait always 
for the platet of the South African government was frustrating and 
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sometimes was felt like a strait-jacket which prevented them from 
taking their own decisions. 
Furthermore, South African sovereignty did not only mean limited 
decisional autonomy for the homeland leaders, it also meant that all 
the laws and regulations of South Africa applied to these territories. 
The possibility of getting rid at last of the discriminatory legislation 
has certainly been a powerful incentive to choose independence. Indeed, 
this is the one advantage which everybody admits independence brought to 
the homelands and their people: the abolition of apartheid legislation. 
The possibility of getting rid of discriminatory legislation and of the 
sometimes suffocating control of the white government was certainly 
alluring for all the homeland leaders, and strongly influenced the 
decision whether to opt for independence or not. Refusing independence 
meant continuing to act in an increasingly frustrating environment, with 
no hope of being able to change the basic characteristics of the South 
African society, at least in the short term. Only leaders with extremely 
long term plans, determined to outlast white government can find this 
line of action worth following. 
In addition to this, one must not forget the influence the personal 
factor had in the decision to opt for independence. This is not to say 
that the perspective of personal gain had an overwhelming importance. 
Certainly, the personal interest in becoming leader of an independent 
state (and the lack of international recognition does not detract from 
their salary and other fringe benefits) had its importance, although 
not much more importance than this factor has in the desire of every 
politician to get to the top. 
Almost all the homeland leaders aim at changing South Africa's 
society. This is a long term objective which might be attained 
following different strategies: total opposition to the white govern-
ment and open war; total opposition within legality; political 
collaboration with the government accepting separate development up to 
a point; and almost total collaboration with it, accepting separate 
development to the point of opting for independence. The homeland 
leaders refused to follow one of the first two strategies, when in the 
early 1960's, they accepted to work within the framework of separate 
development. The choice between the two other strategies depended on 
the assessment each leader made of the costs and benefits of each 
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alternative. In this analysis of cost and benefits, the personal 
factor plays its role. To continue to work in an increasingly 
frustrating condition, a homeland leader had to be convinced not only 
that his strategy is the one which will reap the better fruits, but 
also that he will be there to reap these fruits himself. A leader 
such as Buthelezi can reckon that however high both for himself and 
his people are the costs of remaining under white control, the possible 
benefits of success will be higher still. A leader such as Mphephu, 
whose popularity is almost non-existent, found refusing independence 
in the hope of a change in the political condition of the Blacks in 
South Africa pointless: such a change would mean his disappearance 
from the political scene. A leader such as Mangope, whose popularity 
is arguably high among the Tswana, might have considered that no 
matter how popular he is with his people, the small size of his group 
would prevent him from being among the principal actors of black 
politics. From this point of view, the benefits of independence exceed 
its costs, particularly in the case of Bophuthatswana whose resources 
put it in its own class among the homelands. Perhaps the case in which 
the relevance of this calculation of the personal perspectives in 
different developments of the political situation is most apparent is 
the case of Matanzima. As long as he was the most important of the 
homeland leaders, he found merit in the idea of a united black front 
as a means of changing the condition of the Blacks in South Africa. 
When other homeland leaders became more sure of their position and 
started to challenge his prominence, his enthusiasm for it cooled 
considerably and it disappeared altogether when it became clear that 
Buthelezi was going to become the most prominent of all. A last element 
which reinforced the influence of the personal factor in the choice to 
opt for independence was the desire to see the fruits of one's efforts. 
Refusing independence may mean to defeat the white government's policy 
as Buthelezi maintains(I93 ) and may or may not be the way to bring 
about a decisive change in the condition of the Blacks in South Africa. 
However, even if this were the case, and the homeland leaders who opted 
for independence did not think so, this would be a long process which 
might well take another generation to be accomplished. Many black 
leaders found, and others may still find, that between a possible great 
or decisive improvement in the conditions of the Blacks to be attained 
by the next generation and a smaller and less important improvement to 
be attained now with themselves as principal author of this improvement, 
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the decision is heavily weighed in favour of the latter. 
Even those leaders who accepted separate development because of the 
prospective of independence( 194 ) have been reluctant to go ahead too 
fast; despite the fact that at the beginning one of their misgivings 
was that they were afraid that the South African government was not 
really committed to it. They realised that the conditions of their 
territories were so wretched that these threatened to make indepen-
dence meaningless. They had doubts over the fairness of the deal 
offered to them and wanted to obtain better conditions before opting 
for independence. 
The list of the drawbacks of the homelands was almost inexhaustible 
and while the South African government was prepared to offer its help 
to relieve some of them, in other cases it was not. It was prepared to 
make a financial effort to improve the economic conditions of these 
territories and to help them build the necessary infrastructures, but 
on such topics as land and citizenship it was not prepared to concede 
anything. The homeland leaders tried to convince the South African 
government to make concessions, but their capacity to exert pressure 
on it was limited. 
They first tried a common approach, which, however, did not bring 
any result. The South African government discouraged the establishment 
of a united front of the homeland leaders, continuing to deal with each 
of them individually. It was logical that the South African government, 
after having devised separate development as a way of accommodating the 
ethnic differences of the Blacks and of exploiting these differences to 
maintain its control over South Africa, would not consider with favour 
the possibility of a concerted action of all the homelands. However, 
this common approach was doomed to failure by intrinsic factors. 
Different strategies or even different aims pursued by the various 
leaders made a common action impossible. To these political differences 
must be added personal rivalries which put out of the question the 
possibility that the ambitions of each of them could be subordinated to 
the attainment of a common objective. 
Therefore, the homeland leaders had to confront the South African 
government individually and this enhanced their basic weakness. All 
those who opted for independence adopted the same tactics and all of 
them obtained meagre results, at least on the most controversial issues. 
This persistence on the same tactics even when they appeared to be 
ineffective may seem dull, but in reality, once they had decided to go 
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for independence, these leaders had little choice. 
They started by saying that they would not opt for independence 
unless the South African government met their conditions. These 
conditions were generally the same: more money, more land, no 
automatic loss of South African citizenship for those homeland 
citizens living in the white areas (only Mphephu did not insist on 
the citizenship issue). Th~ South African government was prepared 
to give money, although the homeland leaders had to fight for it, but 
on the land issue it was less obliging, making only small concessions 
far short of the homelands' claims, and on the citizenship issue it was 
absolutely uncompromising. Concessions on this last topic were, of 
course, out of the question: the main reason for giving independence 
to the homelands was to deprive of South African citizenship as great 
a number of Blacks as it was possible. and no amount of pressure from 
the homeland leaders could change the government's attitude. Also on 
the land issue the attitude of the South African government was 
negative, but it made some concessions which, although far from what 
the homelands had asked for, were in some cases rather important. Most 
of them were made in the crucial period when the negotiating weight of 
the homeland leaders was maximised. 
The maximum degree of leverage is attained by the homeland leaders 
in the period when they have made it known that they are prepared to 
accept independence but when they are not yet firmly commited to it. 
This is the only moment in which the homeland leaders, too, have a 
carrot to dangle in front of the government's eyes. This is the moment 
when the government, finding itself close to the attainment of its 
objective, can be induced to commit itself to concessions which it 
would not make in other circumstances. How much can be extracted from 
the government in this period depends on the ability of each homeland 
leader and on how hard a bargainer he is. 
This is, however, only a short period which ends the moment a 
homeland leader commits himself to independence. Once he has decided 
that he wants independence, that he wants to become the president of an 
independent country, he loses most of the leverage he has towards the 
South African government. This is what happened to all of them. They 
decided they were interested in independence and started negotiating 
with the South African government, obtained some concessions which 
induced them to commit themselves to accept independence, a date was 
fixed for independence day and they went on negotiating on the many 
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points still unresolved. From this moment onwards, the South African 
government concentrated on the technical aspects of the independence 
process and made almost no concession on the most important issues. 
The homeland leaders tried to pressure the government for more 
concessions but found that, no matter how much they recalcitrated, 
they were unab 1 e to preva i1 over it. Some of them threatened to go 
back on their decision and refuse independence, but this was an empty 
threat. Once a homeland leader has taken the decision to opt for 
independence, and it is a difficult decision, he is committed to it 
and often finds that he is forced by himself to go along with this 
decision. A factor which helps them to accept this situation is the 
close interdependence of the homelands with South Africa. Also after 
they have become independent, their economy is so entwined with that 
of South Africa that close contact and collaboration between them are 
a vital necessity, particularly for the homelands. In this situation, 
their leaders are able to put again and again their case to the South 
African government hoping to obtain improved conditions, and sometimes 
they succeed in it. 
This interdependence is welcomed by the homeland leaders not only 
because it guarantees a constant flow of South African money and offers 
the chance of obtaining the odd concession from the South African 
government, but also because it gives them the chance of influencing 
the situation of the Blacks within South Africa. Indeed, this is one 
of their long term objectives: to induce the South African government 
to change its attitude and its policy towards the Blacks. None of the 
leaders who accepted independence considered it as the final step in 
the institutional development of South Africa, and each one of them, in 
various degrees, hopes that in a not too distant future there will be a 
confederal or federal agreement which would bring about a fairer sharing 
of the wealth of South Africa. And they are convinced that their 
decision will positively influence the political evolution of South 
Africa towards this target. (195 ) 
Mangope expressed well the main reasons which led him to opt for 
independence, the hope he has that this move would be a step towards 
a greater aim and his fear that lacking a further evolution the political 
situation in Southern Africa would undergo an involution towards 
disaster: 
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•.. we deliberately chose independence for Bophuthatswana in the 
faith that the example we have committed ourselves to, namely of 
non racialism and tolerance and of democratic freedoms enshrined 
in a Bill of Rights, would help to soften the political rigidities 
and serve as a catalyst for accelerated, creative change in the 
whole subcontinent. 
By chasing independence we did not opt out of the South African 
situation. We emphatically opted in, hoping that through our 
experience and our example we coulahelp to create a new and 
greater whole ..• in Southern Africa, with justice to all. Such a 
settl~ment, to be truly a settlement, would have to be negotiated 
- and for true negotiations Black and White both need visible 
bases of power and proven experience and ability in statecraft to 
allay the fears of minorities . 
... Those with a limited view of history regard territorial 
independence as the final stage of the independence process. They 
have forgotten the lesson that Europe has taught us twice in this 
century ... (when it) ... was a boiling-pot of countries stridently 
independent against each other, with frontiers not reflecting the 
ethnic or economic realities and with minorities complaining 
bitterly that they were being tr~ated badly. This led directly to 
the most destructive war ... \196) 
But whatever rationalization the homeland leaders gave for their 
choice, the reality is that theirs was a reaction to the South African 
system. Many were the motivations that influenced the choice of those 
who opted for independence, but perhaps the most important reason for 
this choice has been poignantly pointed out by Mangope himself: 
Let this hour go down in history as marking the beginning of the 
end of racial discrimination in South Africa! Let it be known 
that our main reason for cho9I~9g independence is that we utterly 
abhor racial discrimination.\ J 
PART III 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF INDEPENDENCE. 
CHAPTER 7 
INTERDEPENDENCE.AND CO-OPERATION 
BETWEEN SOUTH.AFRICA AND THE INDEPENDENT STATES 
7.1 Inter-state agreements 
In preparation for independence, a number of subjects was discussed 
by the South African government and the government of the homelands 
concerned, with the aim of guaranteeing a smooth transition to the new 
status, and of helping the fledgling countries to face and solve the 
problems inherent in their independent existence. To this end, a number 
of agreements was entered into between South Africa and each future 
independent state, the agreements usually having validity from the day 
of independence. 
The number of agreements entered into - some of them in the form of 
an exchange of notes - is relatively large (from 54 in the case of 
Transkei to about 80 in the case of Ciskei). Most of them have mainly 
technical and/or administrative importance, particularly in helping the 
black states maintain services of an adequate standard after independence. 
Of course, these agreements make sure that the independent states conform 
to South African rules in all the matters taken into consideration. Some 
of them make South African collaboration necessary in potentially sensitive 
matters, such as broadcasting, thereby giving South Africa a form of 
control on the activity of the independent states in these matters. Of 
particular political significance are the agreements on financial and 
security matters. 
7.1.1 General observations 
Although the number of agreements entered into between South Africa 
and the different black states varies, and increases from the first 
homeland to become independent to the latest,(!) it is difficult to find 
any noticeable difference in the treatment of the various black states. 
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Particularly in the case of the first three homelands to gain independence, 
the differences were almost non-existent. Indeed, if one excludes the 
lack of the sentence "Whereas the Qovernment of the Republic of South 
Africa and the Government of •.. recognize the friendly relations existing 
between the two Governments and their peoples" at the beginning of the 
preamble of the agreements with Transkei - a lack certainly due to an 
oversight rather than to ill-will, the agreements entered into between 
South Africa and Venda are almost ~ ~~~b~tim repetition of those signed 
by South Africa with Bophuthatswana and with Transkei. (2) The few 
exceptions are mainly due to small adaptations, or to the peculiarity 
of the topic of the agreement. Sometimes an agreement entered into with 
one black state is divided into more than one when the following home-
land to become independent signs its own agreements, or vice versa. For 
example, the South African Ministry of Industries entered into three 
agreements with Venda, but the text of these three agreements corresponds 
almost word for word with the text of a single agreement signed by the 
South African Ministry of Economic Affairs and Bophuthatswana. In short, 
excluding the case where the differences are due to the 'environment' 
there is, of course, no agreement with Venda regarding common measures 
to be taken to prevent and combat sea pollution - the few cases in 
which different topics have been the subject of an agreement with one 
homeland and not with another, or not with all tre others, are apparently 
due to almost an afterthought: some topics of scarce relevance which 
were ignored in one case were considered worthy of an agreement in the 
following and vice versa. 
The agreements signed with the independent black states touch almost 
every field, from agriculture to water affairs. They include among 
others a non-aggression pact, provisions for the continued secondment of 
personnel, from judges to teachers, to the independent black states from 
the South African government, and agreements with regard to economic 
relations and development. Other agreements concern co-operation in the 
most various fields, from mining and civil aviation to fuel conservation 
measures and health services, from telecommunications and international 
bridges to veterinary services and forest technology. The main aim of 
these agreements is to assure the conformity of the future l egi s 1 ati on 
of the independent black states to the existing legislation in South 
Africa, and to provide that any future modification thereof would be 
agreed upon beforehand. Furthermore, in many cases these are framework 
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agreements, with the two sides agreeing in principle and in general 
terms on some subject, leaving operational particulars to be spelled 
out in future negotiations to be held at departmental level. 
If one excludes the agreements related to economic and financial 
co-operation, few of these agreements have great political relevance. 
Among them there is the non-aggression pact, which commits the 
signatory parties not only not to "resort to the use of armed force 
against the territorial sovereignty or political independence of each 
other11 , ( 3) but also not to allow their territory "to be used as a base, 
thoroughfare or in any other way by any state, government, organization 
or person for military, subversive or any other hostile actions or 
activities against the other Party". (4) Since the meaning of 'hostile 
actions' is open to a wide range of interpretations, particularly in the 
South Affican context, the result of this pact is that the independent 
black states, pledging themselves not to allow any organisation hostile 
to the South African government to operate from, or to be present in 
their territories, would have not only to prevent the nationalist 
movements opening representative offices in their territories, but also 
to refuse to harbour eventual refugees from South Africa. Of course, in 
the present circumstances, the independent black states would do so even 
without a pact with South Africa, since the black nationalists consider 
the leaders of the black states as puppets of the white government, do 
not recognise the independence of these black states (even their 
existence as administrative units is refused), and their programme is 
the destruction of both the white government in South Africa and of its 
'puppets' in the national states. But it often happens in politics that 
the enemy of one day becomes a more or less trusted friend another day, 
and not signing a non-aggression pact with South Africa, or signing one 
on different terms, might have left the independent black states more 
room to manoeuvre in case of unexpected events. With this pact however, 
the independent black states clearly side with South Africa, and in 
practice pledge themselves to fight on behalf of South Africa in case 
of a future worsening of the situation. However, it was not possible 
for them to promise otherwise, since this is precisely one of the aims 
of the South African government, i.e., to have a belt of black states 
to act as a buffer for white South Africa and to fight on its side against 
the A.N.C. and other black nationalist forces. 
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As regards land and citiz&nship, the treaties did not touch 
politically sensitive issues because those issues were solved, from 
the South African point of view, with the 'status' acts, which delimited 
the areas over which South African sovereignty was to be relinquished 
and removed ope legis the South African citizenship from all those 
people who were deemed to be citizens of the independent states. Both 
these subjects will be examined later (Chapter 8~ and suffice it to say 
here that, by force of some of the treaties, the citizens of the 
independent black states must have a special endorsement if they wish 
to remain in South Africa for more than fourteen days (the same applies 
to South African citizens in the black states), and that if they wish 
to take up employment there, they can enter the Republic for this purpose 
only if they have written contracts or 'call-in' cards. The South African 
government also pledged itself to give the independent black states all 
the land which in the 1975 consolidation proposals was assigned to them 
and which had not yet been transferred to them. 
Other treaties of relevance are those referring to economic aid and 
financial assistance. Also in this case, there is no real difference in 
what the various black states have obtained. Although different agree-
ments were signed at the moment of independence of different black states 
(Transkei having fewer agreements of narrower scope and Ciskei more of 
wider scope), the financial support given by South Africa does not 
change, in relative terms, from one country to the other, because other 
instruments exist (e.g. the 'Financial Arrangements' acts) to assure an 
equivalent treatment to'all the independent black states. Those treaties 
are mostly pro forma since they transform the financial support given by 
South Africa to the homelands from a handout of the South African 
government to a dependent territory into international aid, or even into 
a share of a pooled amount (as in the case of the Rand Monetary Area and 
the Customs Union) which therefore becomes part of the own resources of 
the independent black state. The participation of the independent black 
states in the Rand Monetary Area and in the Customs Union might appear 
strange when one considers that the other countries which are partie~ 
to the Monetary Agreement (Lesotho and Swaziland) and to the Customs 
Union Agreement (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) do not recognise the 
independence of the TBVC countries, and that they refused to accept any 
'ex-homeland' as a new member of the club. The problem was solved by 
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bilateral agreements between South Africa and the independent black 
states by which South Africa considers the two agreements as referring 
also to the TBVC countries, and transfers to them part of its share 
of the resources pooled with the BLS countries. In this way, the BLS 
countries share the resources with South Africa as they did since the 
signature of the Monetary and Customs Union agreements without ever 
naming any of the TBVC countries, and the latter receive their share 
from South Africa as if they were full parties of those agreements. 
7.1.2 Differences in !he agreements signed with the various 
independent black states 
When agreements cover important matters there is in general a 
complete equality in their wording no matter which is the country 
concerned. This assures that each black state is dealt with in the 
same way. In three cases only, agreements covering matters of 
consequence have not been entered into with all the independent states. 
The first case was the absence of an extradition agreement between 
South Africa and Transkei. This absence was odd, and since it is 
difficult to believe that such an agreement was not signed because 
the parties concerned could not agree on its terms, it is possible 
that it was not signed with all the other agreements in time for 
independence just because nobody thought of signing an extradition 
agreement until it was Bophuthatswana's turn to become independent. 
Indeed the extradition agreement with Transkei was eventually signed at 
the beginning of November 1977,(S) solving this little anomaly. 
The other two cases of important agreements not signed with all the 
independent black states involve Ciskei. One is in regard to an agree-
ment concerning "Development Co-operation", whose effect is, among others, 
to put into the form of an international agreement the clauses of 
Section 2 of the Financial Arrangements with Ciskei Act (Act No. 118 of 
1981).( 6) With this, the source of the bulk of direct financial aid 
from South Africa to Ciskei became an international agreement instead 
of being an act of the South African Parliament. This agreement with' 
its annexure provides also for further financial aid to be made available 
to Ciskei on a project basis,(?) and for consultation between the parties 
after three years "with a view to determining what adjustments, if any, 
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should be effected in order to take account of changed circumstances". (8) 
The agreement manages to increase both the South African control on the 
funds transferred to Ciskei, and Ciskeian participation in the assign-
ment and utilization of these funds. Tighter South African control of 
the funds is achieved by finalising the concession of money to specified 
projects, which are then monitored in their implementation by South 
Africa. This provision is given more force by Article 4 of the agree-
ment which allows South Africa to earmark part of the sums transferred 
to Ciskei in terms of Article l(b) for specific services or programmes, 
and binds Ciskei to "utilise such amount exclusively for the purpose so 
earmarked and on conditions mutually agreed upon". Cl early, the 
cavalier way in which Transkei used South African financial aid in past 
years has made South African authorities more cautious about the 
allotment of South African money. 
The increased Ciskeian participation is guaranteed in the 
annexure( 9) which pledges close co-operation between South African and 
Ci skei an governments 11 in imp 1 ementi ng projects financed by the former"; 
co-operation to be achieved "through active participation by the 
Government of Ciskei in each of the various stages of a project". 
Furthermore, 11 the preparation of the projects and programmes in respect 
of which aid is required shall be the responsibility of the Government 
of Ciskei or other approved beneficiaries". In this way a remedy was 
found for one of the most cri ti ci zed aspects of the South African 
financial aid, viz., the propensity of the South African government to 
decide not only how much money to give the independent black states -
a legitimate desire after all - but also how and when to spend such 
money. Of course, it was only a partial remedy, since the dossiers 
concerning these projects or programmes, when ready, "are to be sub-
mitted to the Government of the Republic of South Africa by the 
Government of Ciskei 11 • 
The contradiction between South Africa's desire to tighten its 
control on the financial aid it gives to the independent black states 
and the accusation to South Africa of imposing the utilisation of its 
money on projects which were more in South African interests than in 
the interest of the black state receiving this help is solved if one 
considers that the great majority of South African aid was given to the 
black states with only a generic specification on how to spend it, and 
once the receiving government budgeted this money for the generic use 
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it was earmarked for, the control of its spending was in the hands of 
the black states. On the other hand, the few projects initially financed 
specifically with South 'African money, or also the more general fields 
in which South African money was to be used, were often decided in 
Pretoria with a limited participation, if any, of the representatives 
of the black state concerned. In some occasions, the results of this 
state of affairs were that the South African authorities dictated to 
the black states the priorities in their investments and thus their 
economic policy, and the black states' authorities had the greatest 
freedom of spending money in useless or prestige projects, provided 
that the heading of the relevant expenditure was within South African 
specifications. 
This agreement can therefore be considered as an indication of a 
change of attitude of the South African government towards the supply 
of financial aid to the independent black states. This change of 
attitude implies both a stricter South African control on how the money 
is spent, and a higher degree of participation of the black states' 
governments in deciding what this money is spent for. This change 
should be welcome, since it could help to eliminate a few obstacles 
on the path to an effective development policy in the independent black 
states. 
The second important agreement signed only with Ciskei is the one 
11
( ••• ) concerning consultations, co-operation, and reciprocal assistance 
in matters which concern the common security ( ... )11 • With this agree-
ment, 11 the Government of the Republic of South Africa agrees through 
its Department of Police ( ... ) 11 and at the request of the Ciskeian 
government 
( ... )to make available to the Law Enforcement Branch of the 
Ciskei Department of State Security professional and technical 
advice ( ... ); ( ... ) to place at the disposal of the Law 
Enforcement Branch of the Ciskei Department of State Security 
in the event of riots in Ciskei or in the event of any 
emergency ( ..• ) such trained personnel and other means as may 
be necessary to meet any such situation; and( ... ) 
( ... ) to second to the Law Enforcement Branch of the Ciskei 
Department of State Security qualified personnel to assist in 
the prevention of terrorist infiltration into Ciskei, terrorist 
activities within Ciskei, and any other common security matters.(10) 
Ciskeian obligations are: to confer to members of the South African 
Police serving in Ciskei the same powers as the members of the Ciskeian 
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Law Enforcement Branch; to allow members of the South African Police 
to serve under South African command and contra 1; to pay for the 
services it requires under the agreement; and "to consider to render, 
at the request of the South African Police, { ... )assistance( •.. ) with 
a view to suppress any riot occurring in the Republic of South Africa. 
or any emergency arising therefrom or from other causes". ( ll) 
The effect of this agreement is to formalize, in the case of Ciskei, 
that co 11 aborati on on security matters betv-1een South Africa and the 
independent black states t>lhich was already well established, and to 
give legal basis to intervention of South African security units in 
Ciskei in the case of danger to the political establishment. Although 
collaboration between the South African Police and the police forces of 
the independent black states was already a common practice, and although 
some black leaders had expressed on some occasions their desire to see 
their armed forces fight together with the South African Defence Forces 
against the 'common enemy', this is the first case in which an 
independent black state formally commits itself actively to support 
South African efforts in curbing 'subversive' activities and to allow 
South African forces, albeit on request, to enter its territory to 
suppress riots or any other menace to the established authority. 1t is 
also worth noticing that under the terms of the agreement, the South 
African forces, once called in by the Ciskeian authorities, will be 
under exclusive South African command and control, and thus able to 
ignore any local exception to their actions unless such exception is 
passed through by Pretoria. Even the non-aggression pacts, which already 
indicated that the independent black states had chosen, if one can speak 
of choice, to side with South Africa, were not so expli.cit and did not 
give South Africa such a wide possibility of action in case of 
political emergencies. 
What were the reasons for which such an agreement was considered 
necessary when Ciskei became independent, while it was not so when the 
other black states did? This agreement suggests that although its 
control of the guerrilla ambitions of the black nationalist movements 
is almost total, and that the militant mass defiance of the system 
which flared up in 1976-77 has been effectively quenched and does not 
appear to be able to flare up again in the short term, the South African 
government perceives a general worsening of the security situation, and 
feels that a closer co-operation in this field with the independent black 
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states is necessary. It could also mean that the South African 
government wants to see, at least in this field, the first fruits of 
its policy: black forces under black operational and, most importantly, 
political command fighting to defend the established order. It can also 
be that South Africa considers Ciskei as the weakest of the independent 
black states - particularly for the high proportion of urban dwellers, 
commuting to work in areas where the black trade unions are quite active, 
and for the high number of resettlement camps which can easily become a 
focus of dissatisfaction and unrest - and thus the most probable area 
to receive the attentions of the black nationalists. 
Examination of the Government Gazette shows that apparently in two 
other cases important agreements were signed with only three of the four 
independent black states. One is the non-aggression pact, and the other 
is the agreement on the monetary relations (which regulates the black 
state's participation in the Rand Monetary Area): there is no sign in 
the Government Gazette of a non-aggression pact between South Africa and 
Venda, nor is there any sign of an agreement on the monetary relations 
between South Africa and Transkei. This is bizarre, in particular 
because, since independence, Transkei has regularly received the 
compensatory payments which should be its due by the terms of such an 
agreement. The even odder explanation of this oddity is that this 
agreement, as well as the non-aggression pact with Venda, had simply 
been forgotten out of the list of the agreements which was published 
in the Government Gazette.( 12 ) 
It has already been remarked here that, excluding the above mentioned 
cases, there is little difference in the way the independent black states 
have been treated by South Africa. Only Ciskei could obtain something 
more from it thani the others. The two most significant differences have 
already been seen. (Also the agreement on security co-operation can 
be considered, from the point of view of the Ciskeian leadership, better 
than what the others obtained.} There is also another area where Ciskei 
extracted from South Africa something which others could not. This is 
in respect of South African expenditure on specific works (buildings, 
roads, clinics and so on) to be completed after independence at South 
African expense as a bonus for the newly independent country, While 
the other black states had to be content with the construction, at 
South African expense, of residences for the ministers, barracks for 
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the army and/or police, a few new government offices and a new prison 
(more or less), Ciskei was able to convince the South African government 
to pay for a number of projects - from the installation of sprinkler 
i rri ga ti on sys terns on certain farms, to the building of a number of 
dams, schools and clinics, in particular for the areas of heavy 
resettlement, (and the residence for the Head of State) - which are 
specified in an agreement that occupies four pages of the Government 
Gazette.(l3) . 
In conclusion, if one excludes the few cases mentioned, the 
agreements entered into between South Africa and the independent black 
states, numerous and covering a wide range of subjects as they are, 
are not of prominent importance. Indeed, it is possible to say that 
only those agreements concerning economic relations and aid have a 
real impact on the life of the black states, because a considerable 
proportion of the economic resources of these countries are received, 
in one way or another, from South Africa. 
7.2 Economic Relations 
7.2.1 The provision of 'aid' by South Africa: the instr~ments 
There is not doubt that the most important aspect of the collaboration 
between South Africa and the independent black states lies in the field 
of economic and financial relations, and, in particular, in the financial 
and development aid given by the former to the latter. The provision 
of this aid is based partly on agreements between South Africa and the 
black states, and partly on laws passed by the South African Parliament. 
In some cases the content of some of these laws is also embodied in 
agreements between South Africa and the black state concerned. 
Several ways have been envisaged to permit the transfer of financial 
and development aid from South Africa to the independent black states. 
They are: 
1. The participation of the independent black states in a share of the 
revenues pooled in the Customs Union, and the compensation due to 
them for their quota of Rand circulation in the Rand Monetary Area; 
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2. a direct subsidy to the budget of the independent black states by 
means of a statutory grant in terms of the Financial Arrangements 
acts; 
3. the transfer of taxes levied by the South African government from 
TBVC citizens who live and work in the 'white areas' of the 
Republic of South Africa; 
4. the provision of loan capital to the independent black states at a 
very low interest (2% - 3%); 
5. the provision of technical aid or advice at a subsided cost; 
6. the secondment of South African personnel to the civil service of 
the independent black states; 
7. perhaps as 'independence bonus', the agreement to build or complete 
a number of buildings and other works, always at South African 
expenses, in a short time after independence, 
Points 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are covered by bilateral agreements, while points 
2 and 3 are covered by the Financial Arrangements acts (As we have seen, 
in the case of Ciskei, points 2 and 3 are covered both by the Financial 
Arrangements act and by a bilateral agreement.). Another and more recent 
way to channel resources from South Africa to the independent black 
states is through multilateral undertakings, some of them aimed at 
harnessing white private enterprise for the economic development of the 
black states. These undertakings are multilateral in the sense that both 
South Africa and the independent black states are represented on their 
boards, and that while South Africa puts in public and private money, 
all the independent black states are entitled to use this money without 
'political' preferences. Examples of this kind of undertakings are the 
Development Bank for Southern Africa and the Small Business Development 
Corporation. 
The agreements that regulated the participation of the independent 
black states to a share of the resources pooled in the Customs Union and 
to the Rand circulation in the Rand Monetary Area have already been 
examined under point (1) of this chapter. Suffice it to say here that a 
simple way was found to avoid the problems caused by the refusal of the 
other signatories of the Customs Union agreement (Botswana, Lesotho, 
Swaziland) to allow independent homelands to be official parties to those 
agreements. In terms of the agreements with the BLS countries, South 
Africa receives its share as it did before 1976, and then in terms of 
the 'interim' agreements with the TBVC countri~s, it divides its share 
with them. The terms of the agreements with the TBVC countries are the 
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same as those with the BLS countries. In this regard then, the 
independent black states are in the same condition and receive the 
same treatment as the BLS countries do, even if it was necessary to 
make separate arrangements with them. 
The provision of loans at low interest.is mainly covered by 
agreements relating to the economic development of the independent 
black states. These agreements do not introduce anything new, but are 
simply made to regulate the activity of the National Development 
Corporation {NDC} of the independent black states after those states 
acquired a new status with independence. Such agreements provide for 
the National Development Corporation concerned the possibility "to 
request the Corporation for Economic Development Limited {CED} or any 
other development or other corporation established in the Republic of 
South Africa to afford it such assistance as it may deem necessary". (l4) 
The government of the independent black state undertakes to guarantee 
the repayment of loans granted to the NDC by the CED,( 15 ) as every self-
respecting state does, but, given the.noticeable amount granted by 
South Africa to the independent black states as budgetary aid, in practice 
it is almost a case of the South African government guaranteeing through a 
third party a South African state-owned corporation. Another article of 
these agreements provides for the NDC concerned to negotiate joint 
participations in "companies operated and controlled in ... {the independent 
black states) ..• for the promotion of economic development"(l6) with the 
CED or other corporations. In substance, these agreements allow the NDC 1 s 
of the independent black states to maintain the working collaboration 
with the CED and other South African state corporations which existed 
before independence. Another way to make loans from South Africa to the 
independent black states is through the Economic Co-operation Promotion 
Fund, established by Act No. 68 of 1968 with the purpose of utilising its 
money "for the promotion of economic co-operation between the Republic 
and other countries by the granting of loans or the rendering of other 
financial assistance in respect of development projects in such countries". (ll) 
This Fund is now the main source of funds for soft loans.(18) 
The provision of technical aid or advice is regulated by a number of 
agreements. Almost every South African government department which was 
involved in negotiations and agreements with the homelands that chose 
independence undertook to provide services, aid and advice in the field 
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of its competence. It would be tedious to examine the particulars of 
these agreements; it is enough to say that they are imprinted with an 
open readiness on South Africa's part to give all the aid that is 
requested, and that this aid is sometimes given gratis and sometimes 
paid for at a favourable rate. To finance technical assistance to the 
independent black states a Technical Assistance Fund is used. To give 
an idea of the dimensions of this aid, it may be noted that in the 
financial year 1981/82 the budget of the Fund was R6,5 million.( 19 ) 
The secondment of South African personnel to the civil service of 
the independent black states may be considered as another form of 
technical aid. Again this field is covered by a number of agreements 
signed with each independent black state. In each case, there is a main 
agreement on the "provision of technical and administrative personnel" 
and then some other agreements which involve the secondment of specific 
South African personnel, such as the agreement on the secondment of 
judges. However, it is difficult to understand the reason for the 
existence of particular agreements for certain kinds of seconded officials 
because the conditions for the secondment are exactly the same. In the 
terms of the agreements relating to the basic conditions governing the 
provision pf technical and administrative personnel, South Africa under-
takes "to second officials to serve in the Government Service" of the 
black state concerned and "to assist in recruiting other suitable 
personnel on behalf of the Government" of the black state.( 20) The South 
African government undertakes to "be responsible for the payment of 
{seconded officials') emoluments; ... to pay subsistence allowances for 
official absences ... ; ... to pay the cost of forward and return passages 
between the Republic of South Africa and (the independent black states) 
..• for them and their dependants ... ".( 21 ) The government of the black 
state undertakes, amongst other things, to provide the seconded officials 
"free housing of a standard appropriate to their ranks", to "facilitate 
the repatriation of them and their families in the event of civil 
commotion and other crisis" and to "grant them immunity .. , . and indemnity 
... in respect of ... all acts performed by them in the course of their 
duties". (22 ) However, the black state maintains the right to refuse 
entry into its territory or to expel therefrom any persona n~~[ra!_~ 
amongst the seconded officials. In the case of personnel coming from 
the private sector, the South African government has no obligation, since 
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the relation is between the black state and the individual, but the 
latter is guaranteed the same immunity and indemnity as a seconded 
official. 
It is difficult to evaluate the exact number of seconded officials 
and of white expatriates working in the independent black states, but 
it is possible to say that, although the process of 'indigenization' of 
the civil service is in full swing and the percentage of Whites in it 
is continuously shrinking, many key places in the civil service of 
those states are still occupied by them. From some quarters, doubts 
about the quality of seconded officials have been raised. To make an 
assessment in this regard is p~actically impossible, but it is still 
feasible to make a few comments about it. It is quite possible that 
the best brains and the best organisers in the South African civil 
service are kept in South Africa where they are necessary, although 
their short term secondment to a homeland to solve some difficult problem 
cannot be ruled out. The bulk of the seconded officials is probably a 
cross-section of the human material at the disposal of the South African 
civil service: some good and competent, many average, some not too good 
and uninterested and a few outright bad. Nevertheless, it is possible 
that in some cases they do not perform at the best of their ability: 
this may happen when the interests of the black state to which they are 
seconded contrast with the interests of South Africa. In this instance 
it is difficult for a South African civil servant, although seconded to 
another country, not to side, perhaps unconsciously, with South Africa. 
The last form of aid is the pledge of South Africa to complete a 
number of buildings or other works in the black states in the period 
following independence at South African expense. Those works range from 
military bases to hospitals, from prisons to bridges, but usually are 
not in great number,{ 23 ) Nevertheless, in the case of Ciskei, there is 
a considerable number of these projects and some of them are fairly 
important. 
The bulk of South African financial aid to the independent black 
states, however, is not regulated by bilateral agreements but by laws 
of the South African Parliament. These laws are the Financial Arrangements 
acts, which, passed in relation to each homeland in the period immediately 
preceding independence, allow the South African government to transfer 
considerable amounts of money to the independent black states in the year 
of independence and in the following years. {24 ) The amounts which can be 
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transferred fall into three categories: 
a) transfer of taxes levied from citizens of the independent black 
states within South Africa in accordance with the Black Taxation 
Act (Act No. 92 of 1969),( 25 ) 
b) the so-called annual statutory grant or budgetary aid,( 26 ) and, 
c) further additional amounts at the discretion of the government( 27 ) 
(Of course these additional amounts must then be approved by 
Parliament). 
The amounts transferred under point (a) are, of course, the results of 
estimates, since it is impossible to establish with precision how much 
has been paid in form of taxes by citizens of the independent black 
states living and working in South Africa. This leaves the South African 
government with a great discretion in this regard, since it might increase 
or decrease this amount without much control: not only do the black 
states not have ways of claiming that the estimate is wrong, but also 
the South African Parliament has no power of control in this regard. 
Indeed, Section 2(2) of the acts provides that the amounts transferred 
to the black states as taxes levied in South Africa from the black 
states' citizens will not be regarded as revenue for the purpose of the 
Exchequer and Audit Act (Act No. 66 of 1975), Consequently, these 
amounts are regarded as income from own sources of the black states and 
not as financial aid from South Africa to these states, and the Parliament 
is powerless to object. 
The most important part of the financial aid is the budgetary aid 
which is authorised by Section 2(1)(b)(i) and (ii) of the acts. This 
section authorises the transfer to the black state concerned of an 
amount determined by the Minister of Finance, but not exceeding the sum 
of the amounts appropriated for the black state in the financial year of 
its independence by an act of Parliament and the amounts provided to the 
same black state by the Provincial Administrations (if any) in the same 
year,( 28) plus an amount determined by the Minister of Finance to be 
necessary for the government of the black state concerned to carry out 
the services for which it is responsible.( 29 ) From this sum will be 
deducted an "amount equal to the total additional revenue accruing to ..• 
(the independent black state) in the financial year after independence 
which prior to the introduction of the act accrued to the State Revenue 
Fund, the Post Office Fund or any other fund or account established by 
law". (30) This statutory grant or budgetary aid constitutes the main 
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source of financial aid to the independent black states, in particular 
in the cases of Transkei and Venda. 
There are other agreements relating to South African money being 
spent in the independent black states, but since they cover the 
establishment and completion at South African expenses of resettlement 
projects, this can hardly be considered a form of aid. By these agree-
ments, South Africa undertook to "continue to develop and complete 
planned development and settlement projects" and to finance all these 
projects from its own funds. South Africa also reserves for itself the 
right to undertake "further settlement projects as may be deemed necessary 
for purposes to be determined 11 ( 3l) ·in consultations between South Africa 
and the black state concerned. Although all the decisions regarding 
future resettlement projects are to be endorsed first by a mixed 
Settlement Board and then by a Control Committee,( 32 ) the composition 
of these bodies and the rules by which they work make it almost impossible 
for the government of a black state successfully to oppose for more than 
one year any resettlement project. This would be going by the letter of 
the agreement; of course, it is possible that South Africa may not be 
willing to pay the political price of promoting an unwanted resettlement 
project, however limited this price may be. At any rate, it is certain 
that the governments of the independent black states would willingly do 
without this kind of aid. In fact, this 'aid' results from an agreement 
that puts on South Africa the financial cost (and only the initial 
financial cost at that) of actions, viz., the resettlement of citizens 
of the black state concerned from South Africa to the black state, which 
is in the exclusive interest of South Africa( 33 ) and which is bitterly 
opposed by the government of the black states that will have to bear the 
economic· and social costs of such resettlements. 
Another and more recent way to transfer resources from South Africa 
to the independent black states is through multilateral undertakings aimed 
at involving white private enterprise in their development. The South 
African government has always been wary of the participation of private 
enterprise in the efforts for developing the homelands. Nevertheless, 
under the force of circumstances its position changed from the original 
pledge to keep the 'capitalist vultures' out of the homelands to a 
grudging acceptance of their presence under well defined conditions (See 
Chapter 2). Because in the late sixties and early seventies the homelands 
were not a place where an industrialist would invest his money, a set of 
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concessions and rebates was launched to attract investments in these 
territories. Although this policy and the 'agency system' had some 
limited success in starting industrial activities in the homelands, the 
rate of economic development and of creation of employment therein was 
still far inferior to the needs. Towards the end of the seventies it 
became apparent that a more direct involvement of the private sector was 
necessary. 
In March 1979 there was a meeting of the Minister of Co-operation 
and Development, homeland leaders, directors of the National Development 
Corporations and industrialists from 46 of South Africa's leading 
companies to discuss ways to assure the future economic growth of the 
homelands. (34 ) Later in that year at the Carlton Conference with 
selected industrialists, the Prime Minister emphasised the importance 
of developing the homelands and insisted on the need of a deeper 
participation of the ~rivate sector in this effort. The hoped-for 
increase of private sector involvement in the economic development of 
the homelands was not seen as an isolated effort of independent 
entrepreneurs, but as a co-ordinated endeavour of the state, the private 
sector and the homelands themselves towards the economic development of 
these areas as a part of a more general effort for a decentralised 
economic development in South Africa. As part of this strategy, the 
South African Prime Minister and the leaders of the independent black 
states agreed on the establishment of regional co-operation in the fields 
of economic development, social affairs and so on. (35 ) Among the 
instruments for implementing regional co-operation in the field of 
economic development, the establishment of a Development Bank for 
Southern Africa was considered. Initially the bank was to be open to 
all the countries of Southern Africa ready to participate in the 
constellation of states. Since the political ambitions regarding the 
constellation of states had to be reduced because of the cold reception 
this proposal received from the other states of the region, the 
participation in this multilateral Development Bank for Southern Africa 
was limited to South Africa, the independent black states and the home-
lands. The gestation of this bank, however, took longer than foreseen 
because it was necessary to iron out differences of opinion about 
methods of operation of such an international organisation( 36 ) and also 
because of some pressure from right-wingers within the National Party 
who feared that the establishment of the bank would blunt the ideological 
sharpness of separate development.( 37 ) 
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The bank started its operations at last in 1983, representing one 
of the prongs of the new offensive of the government aimed at the 
economic development of the homelands. Another prong of this offensive 
is the decentralisation plan, which is based on the Industrial Development 
Proposals released by the South African Prime Minister at the Good Hope 
Conference on the 12th November 1981. The aims of this plan are to 
obtain a more balanced distribution of economic activity in South Africa 
stimulating the economic growth of new industrial poles outside the main 
industrial areas of the country, and to promote economic development in 
and around the homelands identifying a number of growth points nearby 
or within them. (38) This plan stresses the need for an organic regional 
development in which the homelands are i~volved not as autonomous 
entities but as part of wider development regions. (39 ) In this strategy 
the part reserved for the private sector is quite important and both the 
South African government and the governments of the independent states 
repeatedly emphasised their desire for a greater involvement of private 
capital in the development of the homelands. A good example of this 
desire is given by the "Declaration to promote private investment" 
agreed to at the summit meeting on the 23rd July 1980 in Pretoria, and 
subscribe·d by South Africa, Bophuthatswana, Transkei and Venda 
(subsequently also Ciskei subscribed). (40) The signatory countries, 
believing that the "private ... sector can and.must play a vital role 
in •.. (their) ... economic development", resolved to encourage private 
investment by promoting the necessary stability and by providing the 
most attractive conditions to private investment that the circumstances 
make possible. The answer, however, has not been up to now overly 
enthusiastic and the private sector is still playing a limited role in 
the economic development of the black states. 
7.2.2 Natur~ a~d ~xt~nt Of the econO~it support from South Africa 
The financial aid from South Africa is the most important source of 
(41) . revenue for the budget of the homelands, and also after independence 
this situation has not greatly changed. The main difference is that 
after independence a considerable part of the resources at the disposal 
of the black states' governments is formed by amounts coming from the 
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Customs Union or other agreements. These amounts accrue rightfully to 
the black states and are not a grant from South Africa, nevertheless they 
are transferred to them by South Africa. The transfer of money to the 
governments of the homelands is not, however, the only way South African 
money is spent in those territories: there are also direct interventions 
and expenses of various South African government departments or 
corporations. 
As is shown in Table 13, the bulk of the direct South African 
expenditure in the homelands consists of the statutory grants and the 
additional amounts in terms of Sections 6(2)(c) and 6(2)(d) of Act 21 
of 1971,( 42 ) and the corresponding sections of Act 48 of 1963. (43 ) After 
a homeland attains independence, the bulk of this expenditure is still in 
the form of a statutory grant (for the first three years) or budgetary 
aid, in terms of Section 2(1)(b) of the Financial Arrangements acts. The 
proportion of these grants varies from about two thirds to about three 
quarters of the total expenditure, and rises sharply after independence. 
This is natural, since the expenditure of the various South African 
departments, after a noticeable increase in the years around independence, 
tends to disappear; obviously all their functions are taken over by the 
new state's departments. Also the expenditure of the S.A.D.T. tends to 
diminish after independent, although not sharply and not to the point 
of extinction. This is because the expenditure of the S.A.D.T., which 
is concentrated on three fields, viz., buying land to be transferred to 
the homelands, buying white businesses in the homelands for a subsequent 
transfer to black control and establishing and maintaining resettlement 
projects, are not necessarily finished when the homeland becomes 
independent. To the contrary, up to now it has always been impossible 
to buy out before independence all the white businessmen who did not want 
to stay under black rule. Likewise not one of the homelands which became 
independent received within the day of independence all the land it was 
promised under the consolidation proposals. Furthermore, occasionally 
more land was given to the homelands than that promised in the 1975 
proposals. And to conclude, the South African government is always 
anxious to start new resettlement projects or to expand old ones. It is 
thus clear that the S.A.D.T. still has numerous engagements to fulfil in 
the independent black states. Thus although S.A.D.T. expenditure becomes 
a small part of the total after independence - in 1981/82 both for Transkei 
TABLE 13: SOUTH AFRICA'.S EXPENDITURE ON GRANTS TO ANO SERVICES RENDERED IN SELECTED 




Other Bantu Adm Other 
& Develop- Depart- TOTAL & Develop- SABT Depart- TOTAL 
ment men ts ment men ts 
BOPH UTHATSWANA 41 473 766 12 091 914 2 848 930 56 414 610 45 825 462 14 502 614 3 816 638 64 144 714 
CISKEI 28 300 596 14 850 095 2 245 489 45 396 180 40 445 153 10 630 711 2 220 430 53 296 294 
GAZANKULU 10 129 436 4 784 382 561 391 15 475 209 11 990 124 4 571 883 695 506 17 257 513 
KWAZULU 75 653 972 42 964 605 8 859 650 127 478 227 85 041 082 47 135 859 9 888 435 142 065 376 
LEBOWA 27 626 374 15 765 501 1 569 390 44 961 265 47 797 476 4 401 192 1 856 806 54 064 474 
TRANSKEI 74 154 572 10 015 115 12 182 170 96 351 857 107 743 187 15 113 994 11 149 810 134 006 991 






Cooperation {3) Cooperation {3) Other Other 
& Develop- SAOT Depart- TOTAL & Develop- SADT Depart- TOTAL 
ment men ts ment men ts 
BOPHUTHATSWANA 57 103 169 23 595 158 3 468 864 84 167 191 29 647 723 7 821 034 55 200 37 523 957 
CISKEI 42 896 404 6 942 662 2 471 209 52 310 275 51 197 108 9 266 849 1 174 187 61 638 144 
GAZANKULU 17 282 646 972 743 758 794 19 014 183 21 187 146 1 416 274 225 138 22 828 558 
KWAZULU 89 139 216 51 317 119 10 395 841 150 852 176 149 253 046 27 035 531 11 150 674 187 439 251 
LEBOWA 52 003 982 3 845 547 .2 158 151 58 007 680 63 160 196 6 768 880 1 688 606 71 618 682 
TRANSKEI 119 859 654 10 470 573 5 806 130 336 033 119 027 661 7 245 112 2 589 126 275 362 
VENDA 19 109 903 320 942 676 162 20 107 007 30 456 390 3 436 731 1 614 844 35 507 965 







& Develop- SADT Depart- TOTAL & Devel op- SADT Depart- TOTAL 
ment men ts ment men ts 
BOPHUTH/\TSWANA 31 200 530 10 956 225 14 255 42 171 010 37 541 348 9 885 031 705 47 427 084 
CISKEI 64 237 411 9 826 214 535 509 74 598 134 97 345 939 11 618 544 575 746 109 540 229 
GAZANKULU 32 974 633 7 587 359 447 264 41 009 286 44 679 098 2 312 767 597 309 47 589 174 
KWAZULU 168 649 570 29 822 746 14 574 790 213 047 106 218 529 553 31 535 713 18 364 851 268 430 117 
LEBOWA 78 651 956 6 778 233 1 810 993 87 241 082 104 404 353 9 131 075 1 818 840 115 354 268 
TRANSKEI 121 265 132 3 957 175 616 125 222 923 115 402 036 3 031 315 4 064 118 487 415 
VENDA 38 355 651 5 105 228 1 914 649 45 375 528 49 730·117 1 805 918 13 239 51 549 274 
1981/82 
Cooperation (3) Other TOTAL & Develop- SADT Depart-
ment men ts 
BOPHUTHATSWANA 40 694 154 8 218 162 1 177 48 913 493 
CISKEI 147 442 593 28 102 271 3 084 387 178 629 231 
, GAZANKULU 65 050 975 8 352 735 784 021 74 187 731 
KWAZULU 289 398 719 38 033 081 21 238 132 348 669 932 
LEBOWA 131 911 869 10 720 921 2 346 110 144 978 900 
TRANS KE I 156 088 901 4 628 868 1 660 160 719 429 
VENDA 62 535 789 1 265 583 1 420 63 802 792 
Notes: (1) More tha~ 90% of the money spent ~nder the vote of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development (later 
Cooperatio~ and De~elopment) consisted of grants in terms of Sections 6(2)(c) and 6(2)(d) of Act 21 of 1971 and 
correspond~ng sections of Act 48 of 1963 (Statutory grant and additional amount). 
Source: 
(2) South- African Bantu Trust, later South.African Development Trust. 
(3) ~fter a homeland gained independence the amounts given to it as Statutory Grant and Additional Amount were paid 
in t~rms of the relevant sections of the Financial Arrangements Act under the vote of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs. 





and Venda, it was 2% of the total South African expenditure( 44) - the 
Trust still spends millions of Rands in each of these states every year. 
Table 14 shows that the total expenditure of the South African 
government in the homelands has constantly increased from 1975/76 to 
1981/82, by far outpacing both the rate of inflation (excluding 1977/78) 
and the rate of growth of the South African G.D.P .• This indicates that 
in those years the South African government has given a higher degree of 
priority to the reinforcement of the structures ·of the homelands and to 
the improvement of the capability of the homeland governments. The rate 
of increase in South African expenditure varies for each homeland from 
year to year for contingent reasons without any apparent rule. Besides 
these variations from year to year, it is possible to notice a trend 
common to all those homelands that have chosen independence. In these 
cases there is a sharp increase in South African expenditure in the year 
of independence (Transkei about 40%; Bophuthatswana almost 58%; Venda 
76%; Ciskei 63%), and also the proportion of expenditure assigned to 
those homelands increases noticeably in such a year {from 23,7% to 27,4% 
for Transkei; from 13,1% to 16,1% for Bophuthatswana; from 3,8% to 6,2% 
for Venda; from 13,2% to 15,8%, after a similar increase the previous 
year when its choice was already known, for Ciskei). These are not, 
however, the only homelands to show sudden increases in the total South 
African expenditure or in the percentage of this expenditure received: 
Gazankulu and QwaQwa also show such an increase. It is in the 1979/80 
financial year when the expenditure in Gazankulu increases by 79,6% and 
that in QwaQwa increases even by 125% from the previous year, and their 
share of the total expenditure increases from 3,9 to 6,1% and from 1,3 
to 2,6% respectively. The only possible explanation is that in 1978 
Kangwane obtained the legislative assembly with 'Chapter I' rights and 
the expenditure of the South African government in this homeland in the 
year 1978/79 was quite high and practically at the same level as that 
in Gazankulu. It is then possible that the following year the statutory 
grants and additional amounts of Gazankulu and QwaQwa had been increased 
to keep fair the distribution of the South African expenditure in these 
homelands. This might have two explanations. Either the South African 
government is really trying to be equitable, as far as it is possible, 
in its dealings with the homelands, or the South African government is 
not at the moment interested in pushing Gazankulu and QwaQwa towards 
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45 396 180 
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127 478 227 
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4 687 298 
96 351 857 
15 353 528 
TABLE 14: THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S TOTAL EXPENDITURE ON GRANTS TO AND SERVICES RENDERED 
IN INDEPENDENT BLACK STATES AND HOMELANDS, AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION 
1976/77 1977 /78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 




13,89 64 144 714 13,12 84 167 191 16'15 37 523 957l 6,55 42 171 010 6,28 47 427 084 
I 
I 
11,17 53 296 294 10.90 52 310 275 10,44 61 638 144: 10,76 74 598 134 11,12 109 540 229 
I 
I 
3,81 17 257 513 3,53 19 014 183 3,65 22 828 558: 3,98 41 009 286 6 ,11 47 589 174 
I 
I - - - 79 020 I 0,01 22 088 468: 3,85 24 737 193 3,68 27 888 667 
I I 
I I - - I - 40 638: - 21 027 083 - - - - I 
I I 
I I 
31,39 142 065 376 29,06 150 852 176 28,95 187 439 251: 
I 
32,73 213 047 106: 
I 
31,75 268 430 117 
I I 
11,07 54 064 474 11,06 58 007 680 11,13 71 618 682: 12,50 87 241 082: 13,00 115 354 268 
I 1 
I I 
1,15 6 035 466 1,23 6 065 632 1,16 7 745 189: 
I 
1,35 17 445 666: 
I 
2,60 19 883 736 
I I 
23, 72 134 006 9911 27,42 
I 
130 336 033 25,02 126 275 362: 22,05 125 222 923: 18,66 118 487 415 
1 I 
I I I 
3,78 17 851 673: 3,65 20 107 007 3,86 
I 
35 507 965: 6,20 45 375 s28: 6,76 51 549 247 
I I 
I I I 
I I I . 













406 118 175:100.00 488 722 485!100,00 520 933 197 100 ,00 572 665 576! 100,00 670 888 416: 100,00 827 177 0381100 ,oc 
I I I I I 
1 I 1 I 1 
I I 1 1 I 
1!J81/82 




48 913 493: 4,33 
I 
I 
178 629 231 : 15,84 
I 
I 
74 181 731: 6,58 
I 
43 517 556 3,86 
31 7.58 318 2,81 . 
348 669 932 30,92 
144 978 900 12,85 
32 369 627 2,87 
160 719 429 14,25 
I 









SOURCE: Republic of South Africa; .Report of the Auditor General (Part I} for the years 1975/76 to 1981/82. 
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Another trend which is possible to discern from Table 14 is that 
after independence the direct expenditure of the South African government 
in the new states tends to decrease both as percentage distribution and 
(less clearly) as absolute amount. Since the Table is limited to the 
1981/82 financial year it is not possible to take Ciskei into 
consideration. The three independent black states remaining are perhaps 
too few to make a rule. Indeed not one of them follows clearly a common 
pattern. 
In Transkei, after the South African expenditure increased in the 
1976/77 financial year, it decreased slowly but continuously in the 
following years, both as a percentage share of the total and as an 
absolute amount. In 1981/82, the decrease in percentage distribution 
was almost halted and that in absolute amount reversed with an increase 
of more than R40 million (more than 35% increase from the previous year). 
The case of Bophuthatswana is partially different. In fact, after the 
sharp increase in the year of independence, the expenditure dropped 
dramatically the following year, being more than halved (increase -55,4%). 
From then onwards, it increased slightly in total amount (little more 
than 12% per year in 1979/80 and in 1980/81, and only about 3% in 1981/82), 
but at a rate inferior to the rate of inflation, while the percentage 
share of the total expenditure continued to drop (from a maximum of 
16,15% in 1977/78 to 4,33% in 1981/82). The case of Venda is again 
different. The large increase in expenditure in this homeland happened 
in 1978/79, i.e., in the financial year before independence. This may 
be explained as the incentive used by the South African government to 
convince the Venda leaders of the attractiveness of independence. The 
following year, during which Venda became independent, the expenditure 
increased again, although not as much as in the year before (27% vs 76%), 
and also as percentage of the total expenditure in the homelands it 
slightly increased (from 6,2% to 6,7%, but in 1977/78 it was 3,8%). In 
the following years the expenditure in Venda followed only partially the 
pattern of the two homelands which preceded it in chosing independence. 
The share given to Venda decreased in percentage but not dramatically 
(in 1981/82 it was still as high as 5,6%), while the absolute amount 
continued to increa9e and at a faster pace than inflation. 
The series of figures is still too limited to draw from it a general 
rule, and also the comments on the single cases must be taken as 
tentative. Nevertheless, it is possible to say that after independence 
the direct South African expenditure on grants to and services rendered 
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in the independent black states tends to decrease. This decrease is due 
to the disappearance of the direct expenditure of the South African 
government departments and to the reduced activity of the S.A.D.T .. This 
decrease in the activity of South African institutions in the territory 
of the independent black states is logical and common to all the three 
black states considered. Where they differ is in the amount of the 
statutory grant or budgetary aid granted them. In the case of Transkei 
it remained almost unchanged for the first three years after independence 
at a slightly higher level than in the year 1976/77, to increase sharply 
in 1981/82. In the case of Bophuthatswana it was almost halved the year 
after independence and afterwards it increased slightly, neither keeping 
pace with inflation nor rising to the level of 1977/78. The case of 
Venda is different because the statutory grant to it continued to 
increase every year after independence, outpacing inflation and thus 
assuring an increase also in real terms. 
This different treatment of the various independent black states is 
probably due to contingent reasons. As we will see when examining Table 15, 
Venda is not able to earn an appreciable amount from the Customs Union 
or the Rand Monetary Area agreements. Its position far away from the 
main centres of South Africa is not conducive to economic activities 
and thus its budget needs to be buttressed with direct grants from South 
Africa. Exactly contrary is the case of Bophuthatswana. Already from 
Table 14 it is possible to surmise that Bophuthatswana is the success 
story in the homeland policy. Indeed, in 1981/82 the amount of South 
African money given to it was only slightly larger than the amount given 
to Kangwane and in the same year that amount was still less than the 
amount given in 1975/76. Evidently the South African government felt 
that Bophuthatswana could manage on its own with only a little help in 
the form of grants. In the case of Transkei the figures suggest that 
the needs of this country were urgent enough to convince the South African 
government to maintain a relatively high amount of grants to it. 
Particularly worth noting is that also during the years in which the 
diplomatic relations between Transkei and South Africa were broken, the 
amount of money granted by the 1 atter to the former did not decrease 
considerably (the difference between the amount of 1977/78 and that of 
1980/81 is -9%). This in a way underlines the total dependence of the 
independent black states on South Africa and the South African quiet 
certainty that in matters of importance the independent black states will 
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always have to toe the line. After Transkei broke diplomatic relations, 
South Africa did not feel the need to resort to sanctions against it or 
to assume a hostile attitude. It felt confident enough in its dominant 
position towards Transkei to continue to finance its budget to the tune 
of more than one hundred million Rand, considering remote the possibility 
that all that money might have been used by a hostile country for hostile 
purposes against South Africa itself. Of course, in this period South 
Africa did not feel the urge to increase the amount given to Transkei 
either. But after the resumption of diplomatic relations this .amount 
was notably increased, to remind Transkei and to prove to it which side 
of its 'half loaf' was buttered. 
At this point,one might ask oneself what was the point of choosing 
independence if after it the amount of South African money, which is the 
economic lifeline of the new states, decreased. The answer is, of 
course, that while the direct South African expenditure in these states 
declined, they gained by their independence a number of sources of 
money from which they were formerly excluded. These are, as we have 
already seen (See 7.2.1), their participation in a share of the revenues 
pooled in the Customs Union, the compensation due to them for their 
quota of Rand circulation and the transfer of taxes levied by South 
Africa from their citizens living and working in the Republic. 
Table 15 shows how much money these sources provided for them. (45 ) 
It appears immediately that the bulk of this money comes from the share 
of the Customs Union, the quota of currency circulation representing 
less than 5% of the total (and often as little as 2%), and the General 
Tax constituting less than 10%. These figures reinforce the interpretation 
given above of the different pattern of the grants given by South Africa 
to the independent black states. The share in the Customs Union indicates 
the strength and the vivacity of the economy of the black state concerned. 
From this it appears that Venda's economy, even after its smaller 
population in comparison with the two other states is taken into 
consideration, has not the inherent strength to act as the motor power 
for the country, thus the need for South African help remains high, 
simply to make the structure work. In the case of Transkei, it is 
possible to see that although the economy is not much livelier or 
stronger, the size of the Transkeian market is large enough to contribute 
to a significant extent to the resources of the country. Nevertheless, 
the amount directly spent in or granted to Transkei by South Africa is 
TABLE 15: SOURCES OF FINANCE OF THE INDEPENDENT BLACK STATES RECEIVED THROUGH SOUTH AFRICA (thousands of Rands) 
1976/77 1977 /78 1978/79 
General Customs R.M.A. General Customs R.M.A. General Customs R.M.A. Tax Union Tax Union Tax Union 
BOPHUTHATSWANA 6 162 8 542 71 137 1 415 
TRANS KE I 10 907 8 327 40 000 3 074 9 900 62 377 1 887 
VENDA 
1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 
General Customs R.M.A. General Customs R.M.A. General Customs R.M.A. 
:)) Tax Union Tax Union Tax Union 
:)) 
-I BOPHUTHATSWANA 9 446 85 281 981 10 390 114 944 2 043 6 000 128 337 1 700 
TRANSKEI 6 503 88 497 2 047 7 000 119 704 1 000 6 000 91 947 3 500 
VENDA 180 10 186 300 1 000 11 300. 500 
SOURCES: Years 1976/77 to 1980/81: Benso, Statistical Survey of Black Development, 1980. 
Year 1981/82: S.A.I.R.R., Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1982, p.365. 
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still the largest contribution to Transkeian resources. The figures 
·referring to Bophuthatswana show that its economy is working much better 
than the economy of the other two independent states considered, and 
that its share of the Customs Union is a remarkable amount in absolute 
terms, particularly if one considers that its population is only half 
that of Transkei. This indicates the relative prosperity {one might 
say: a less desperate poverty} of Bophuthatswana in comparison with the 
. other homelands, and the capability of this country to provide for its 
basic needs with only limited help from South Africa. Indeed, in the 
1981/82 financial year the revenues of the government of Bophuthatswana 
were covered only for 14,7% of the total by South African money {opening 
balance excluded}. (45 ) 
It may seem arbitrary to put together in the same set of figures the 
amount spent by South Africa in the homelands with the amount spent in 
the independent states plus the revenues accured to these states in terms 
of the Customs Union and other agreements. These last mentioned revenues 
are not strictly speaking South African money and thus do not fall within 
the category of South African aid. Nevertheless, it is useful to include 
these amounts to give an idea of the result independence had on the 
financial resources of the TBVC states. After all, these amounts accrue 
to them only because they are now independent, and conversely the transfer 
of certain amounts of Sout~ African money was stopped because after 
independence the source of certain revenues passed under their control. 
Table 16 shows such a total flow of financial resources to the 
homelands and the independent states for each year from 1975/76 to 
1981/82. The figures for the non-independent homelands are of course 
the same as in Table 14. Also the figures for Ciskei are the same because 
in the last year taken into consideration there were no transfers to it in 
terms of the Customs Union or other agreements, this being the year of 
independence (at least BENSO 1980 gives no figures in this regard}. For 
the other three independent states it is possible to see again the sharp 
increase in the year of independence. This increase is illustrated in 
Diagram 1. The increase remained noticeable also in the following year, 
the cut in direct South African expenditure being more than offset by 
the resources made available by the Customs Union agreement and to a 
minor extent by the Rand Monetary Area agreement and the transfer of 
General Tax. For Transkei the increase from the financial year before 
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TABLE 16: TOTAL ·EXPENDITURE (INCLUDING TRANSFERS) BY. THE.. SOUTH AFR I.CAN .. GOVE~i'IMENT IN 
TIIE INOEPEflDENT BLACK STATES AND HOMELANDS, ANO PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION 
.. • 
1976/77 1977 /78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 
% R I % R I % R I % R I % R I % 
I I I t t 
I I I I I 
I I I I I 
I I I I t 
I I I I t 
13,89 64 144 714l 12,83 90 329 191: 15 ,61 118 617 957 : 16,29 137 879 010: 15,96 174 804 084: 15,99 
I I I I 
I I I 1 
11,17 53 296 294: 10,66 52 310 275: 9,04 61 638 144 l 8,46 74 598 l34l 8,63 109 540 229 10.02 
I I I I 
I I I ' 3,82 17 257 513l 3,45 19 014 183! 3,28 22 828 558 : 3,13 41 009 286: 4 ,74 47 589 174 .4,35 
I I I ' I t I I 
I 79 020: 0,01 22 088 468 : 3,03 24 737 193: 2 ,86 27 888 667 2,55 - - I -
I I ' I I 1 I I 
I - ' - I 40 638: - 21 027 083 1,92 - - I - I - I -
I I I I 
I I I I 
31,39 142 065 376: 28,43 150 852 176 26,07 187 439 251: 25,75 213 047 106: 24,66 268 430 117 24,56 
I I I 
I t I 
11,07 54 064 474: 10,82 58 007 680 10,02 71 618 682 : 9,84 87 240 932: 10 ,10 115 354 268 10 ,55 
I I I 
I I I 
1,15 6 035 466: 1,20 6 065 632 1,04 7 745 189 : 1,06 17 445 666l 2 ,01 19 883 736 t 1,81 
t I I I 
I I I I 
23,72 144 913 911: 29,00 181 767 033 31,42 200 439 362 : 27 ,53 222 269 926: ·25,73 246 191 415: 22,52 
' ' I I ' f I I 3,78 17 851 673l 3,57 20 107 007 3,47 35 507 965 : 4,88 45 375 528: 5,25 62 215 247: 5,68 
I I I ' I I I I 
I I 
I I ' I t I I I ' ' I I I 406 118 175: 100 • 00 499 629 485: 100,00 578 496 197 100 ,00 121 923 576 :100,00 863 643 416: 100,00 1 092 924 038:100.00 
I I I I I 
I I . I ., I 
SOURCE: Own elaboration from Tables B and C. 
1981/82 
R . I % 
134 950 493 13,42 
178 629 231 12,96 
74 187 731 5,38 
43 517 556: 3,15 
I 
' 31 758 318: 2,30 
I 
I 
348 669 932' 25,30 
144 978 900 10,52 
32 369 627 2 ,35 
262 166 429 19 ,02 
.. ~ 








Bophuthatswana, the increase from 1976/77 to 1978/79 was 85%; for 
Venda, from 1977/78 to 1979/80 - it will be remembered that for Venda 
the big increase in South African expenditure came the year before 
independence - the growth was 125,6%. From the second year after 
independence, the total amount continued to grow, but at a steadily 
slower pace, until in the fourth financial year after independence, the 
rate of increase for the independent states became slower than the rate 
of increase of the sum of South African direct expenditure in and 
transfers to all the independent states and homelands. 
Such a course is well shown by Diagram 2 in which the increase of 
financial resources for each independent state and homeland ~s given in 
Diagram 1 is plotted against the increase in the total, again as in 
Diagram 1 but kept as a constant value 100. (47) From this diagram it 
is easy to see the sharp rise in the years around independence, the 
subsequent levelling off and the trend to a limited increase - inferior 
to the rate of increase of the total - after the fourth year. This 
reduced rate of growth can be explained by the fact that, after all, the 
resources are limited and as soon as another homeland requires independence, 
the South African government exerts its efforts in considerably augmenting 
the resource at the disposal of this homeland and automatically reduces 
its efforts in favour of the others. Certainly, sources like the Customs 
Union share or the Rand circulation quota are dependent on international 
treaties and on the economic situation, thus the amounts accruing to the 
independent states under this heading should not be dependent on South 
Afri.can activity in ·other homelands. Nevertheless, Diagram 2 shows 
clearly the existence of such a relation, with the levelling off and 
the dropping of the curves relating to each independent state corresponding 
to the surge of the curve relating to another. For example, Transkei's 
goes down when Venda's rises, Bophuthatswana's levels off when Gazankulu's 
rises and drops when Ciskei's goes up, and Venda's levels off in the same 
time. (4B) These are too many similar facts to consider as a mere 
coincidence. This induces one to surmise that many more things are at 
the discretion of South Africa than appears at first sight. 
From these figures it appears that the increase of financial resources 
of comparable homelands and independent states (e.g., KwaZulu and Transkei, 
Lebowa and Bophuthatswana, Gazankulu and Venda) was from the 1975/76 to 
the 1981/82 financial year roughly comparable, and in two cases out of 
three the independent state came on top. (From 1975/76 to 1981/82 the 
amount of KwaZulu grew by 173,5% and that of Transkei by 172,1%. The 
DIAGRAM 1: Increase of amount spent by the South African government in, or trans-
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figures for Lebowa and Bophuthatswana are 222,5% and 227,8% respectively, 
those for Gazankulu and Venda 379,4% and 399% respectively.) This does 
not mean, of course, that in the seven years considered the total 
amount received by them was equally comparable. 
Table 17 gives the total amount of each homeland and independent 
state and shows already some differences, particularly in the case of 
Bophuthatswana which has received in these seven years 43,5% more than 
the amount received by Lebowa. The situation of KwaZulu and Transkei 
appears not only not to follow this trend, but to reverse it. The amount 
received by KwaZulu is, in fact, superior to that received by Transkei, 
although only by 6,2%. The reason for this is that in the years before 
independence KwaZulu received a considerably higher amount than Transkei 
(in 1975/76, the last year before Transkeian independence, the amount 
given to the former was 32,3% s1uperior to that given to the latter). 
TABLE 17: TOTAL EXPENDITURE (INCLUDING TRANSFERS) BY THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN GOVERNMENT IN THE INDEPENDENT BLACK STATES AND 
SELECTED HOMELANDS. SUM OF THE AMOUNTS FROM THE 1975/76 
TO THE 1981/82 FINANCIAL YEARS. 
RAND RAND 
Bophuthatswana 828 139 291 Gazankulu 237 361 264 
Ciskei 575 408 487 KwaZulu 1 437 982 185 
Transkei 1 354 099 933 Lebow a 576 226 201 
Venda 273 013 740 
SOURCE: As for Table 16. 
This anomaly is explained if one looks at how much the amount received 
by homelands and independent states has increased from the 1975/76 
financial year, which was the last one before the first homeland became 
independent. Diagram 3 shows that, in general, the homelands which 
chose independence fared better than those which did not, and certainly 
much better than their direct counterpart. Ciskei is the only 
independent state which does not follow this trend, but this is explained 
by the fact that the last year to be taken into consideration is the 
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1981/82 financial year, that is the year of Ciskeian independence. Thus 
up to this year Ciskei cannot be considered as an independent state. 
DIAGRAM 3: PERCENTAGE INCREASE OF SOUTH AFRICAN EXPENDITURE IN, OR 
TRANSFERS TO· THE INDEPENDENT BLACK STATES AND SELECTED 
HOMELANDS 1975/76~1981/82 (THE LATTER YEAR AS PERCENTAGE 
OF THE FORMER). . 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
O~O~M~Q~N~O~M~O~~~o~~~o~~~o~~ 
MN~~MN~~-N~~-N~~-N~~-N~~-N~~-
A'f I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
The pattern indicated by Diagram 3 is confirmed by the examination of 
the pro capite* share of the amounts received by each of these territories. 
This is shown in Diagram 4. This diagram may perhaps be considered a 
little arbitrary since the figures for the population used are those of 
the mid-year estimates reported by BENSO. These figures may be at best 
considered as educated guesses,( 49 ) because of the difficulty of determining 
* NOTE: Since in the English-speaking world the expression per capita is used, 
I will use it too. However, I would like to point ·out that these are 
Latin words used with the meaning of 'for each head (person)'. To 
say this in Latin, there are different ways. One is by using pro 
plus the ablative singular: pro tapite (as is the Italian custom). 
Another is by using per plus the accusative singular: per caput (this 
construction has bee"fladopted in English for various expressfOrls, e.g., 
per annum). Even the adverb ca~itim could be used, although it would 
be less correct. It baffles me"t'fiaf having available three different 
expressions with the required meaning, a fourth one had been chosen 
which does not mean what it is supposed to mean. 
DIAGRAM 4: South African expenditure in and transfers to independent black states 
and selected homelands. Per capita. 1975/76 to 1080/81. 
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the exact number of deaths and births in the homelands and also because 
the estimates do not always take into consideration resettlements of 
population and/or changes of borders. Furthermore, I could not find 
estimates for the year 1975 and thus the figure I used for arriving at 
the per capita figure for the 1975/76 financial year is that of the 1970 
census. (5o) This explains the drop in the per capita figures for every 
homeland between the years 1975/76 and 1976/77. Only the figure for 
Transkei does not drop, and this indicates that in the year of its 
independence, the amount of South African money spent per capita in 
Transkei in reality increased more sharply than the diagram shows. (5l) 
From this diagram it is again possible to notice the sharp increase in 
the money given to the independent states in the year of their indepen-
dence (for Venda it must again be remembered that the main increase came 
in the financial year before independence), while the levelling off in 
the following years is less noticeable, or does not appear at all. This 
diagram shows that those homelands which chose independence, received 
from the years of independence a greater amount per capita of South 
African money than they did before and than other homelands which 
remained within South Africa did. However, Gazankulu is again shown 
not to be following this trend to the point that in 1980/81 its per 
capita figure was higher than Transkei's. The curve of Ciskei too is 
anomalous. This anomaly may be explained by a considerable under-
enumeration of its population in the 1970 census and the failure of the 
population estimates of the following years to take this, and also the 
great number of resettlement projects affecting Ciskei, into consideration. 
From the data shown above it is possible to draw a few reasonable 
inferences. The first is that the choice of independence has yielded 
a few economic benefits: all the independent states received more South 
African money, in absolute terms and in per capita amount, than the 
homelands directly comparable with them. Furthermore, with the exception 
of Gazankulu from 1980/81, all the homelands have received a lower amount 
of South African aid per capita than the independent states. Also the 
rate of South African aid has been lower in the case of the homelands 
than in the case of the independent states. However, it is necessary 
to qualify carefully these conclusions. First of all, the data cover 
only a short period after independence. Therefore, it is not possible 
to extrapolate from them a definite trend. Furthermore, the amount of 
money spent by South Africa in the independent states or given to th~m 
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increased noticeably in the.two or three years around independence, but 
the rate of such increase became slower in the following years and in 
the fourth year after independence it actually became less than the 
rate of increase in total South African expenditure in, or aid to the 
independent states and homelands together. This indicates that the 
bulk of South African expenditure in the newly independent states was 
tied' to particular projects directly related to the independence 
process, and not to activities having a long term effect on their economy. 
Only in per capita terms is it possible to see a clear and persistent 
(remembering the short period after independence covered by the data) 
advantage for the independent states. And also in this case comparing 
the per capita figures of similar (in size and population) homelands 
it appears that the advantage of the independent states, although 
considerable, is not excessive. Only in the case of Bophuthatswana and 
Lebowa is the per capita figure of the independent state double that of 
the homeland. Therefore, it seems possible to say that those homelands 
which opted for independence had some financial incentives to do so, 
and were advantaged over the other homelands in the allocation of South 
African money. However, this advantage was not as great nor as lasting 
as to make a significant difference for their economy. 
Another fact which deserves to be pointed out is the high rate of 
increase of South African expenditure in and transfers to Venda and 
Gazankulu. One of the reasons for this is certainly the low amount 
received by these two homelands up to 1975/76: it is easier to treb.le 
a R15 million grant than to double a R90 million one. The case of 
QwaQwa, whose amount increased almost eightfold from 1975/76 to 1981/82, 
confirms that the lower the amount received by a homeland in 1975/76, the 
higher the rate of increase of this amount in the years considered. But 
this is not enough of an explanation. The relatively low absolute amount 
of South African expenditure can explain the higher rate of increase for 
these two homelands, but cannot explain the fact that from 1978/79 Venda 
has the highest figure per capita of all the independent states and 
Gazankulu the highest figure per capita of all the homelands' (and from 
1980/81 the per capita figure of Gazankulu is higher even than that of 
Transkei). There can be two reasons for the particular attention given 
to these two territories. One is that Venda and Gazankulu are the 
homelands situated furthest from the most economically advanced areas of 
South Africa. They have thus only a limited possibility of autonomous 
economic growth, and to overcome this limitation a higher input of South 
African money is necessary. 
badly situated in regard to 
their per capita figure is 
207 
However, also Lebowa and Transkei are 
access to markets and infrastructures, and 
very low. There must then be another reason, 
and this second reason can be found in the strategic field. Venda and 
Gazankulu are situated in a part of the Eastern Transvaal where white 
presence is very scarce; there are no obstacles and no populated areas 
between them and the borders of a potentially hostile country; the 
terrain in this area is amongst the most conducive to guerrilla warfare 
that one can find at the borders of South Africa. It is then quite 
possible that the reason for the largest amount of South African money 
spent in these two homelands is a preventive effort to win 'the hearts 
and minds' of the local population, to make it less responsive to the 
appeals of a guerrilla force which might appear in the area in the event 
of a deterioration in the relations with the frontline states. 
7.3 Development progress in tha Indepandant Black States 
The financial efforts made by the South African government in 
favour of the homelands had a definite aim. They aimed at stimulating 
some form of economic development in these territories in order to 
facilitate the achievement of one of the main aims of separate development: 
the stopping first and the reversal afterwards of the influx of people 
from the black reserves to the white areas. The mythi ca] objective of the 
economic growth of the homelands attracting back thereto black people 
from the white urban areas has long ago been abandoned. However, the 
performance of the economy of the independent states is of fundame-nfal 
\ importan~e-for a political evaluation of the role these territories can 
have in the solution of the South African problems. Furthermore, the 
legitimacy of the independent states in the eyes of their population 
depends, in the long tenn, on their ability to improve the standard of 
living of at least a significant proportion of the resident population. 
If the economic conditions in the independent states have improved since 
independence, and particularly if their economy has fared better than 
that of the homelands which have refused independence, then the case of 
those leaders who opted for independence will be strengthened. 
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The proper evaluation of the economic development of a country would 
require at least a treatise on its own, let alone what would be required 
for the examination of the economic development of four different 
countries. Moreover, economics is not the writer's chief focus of 
interest. Thus only an outline of the economic development in the 
independent states will be given here. 
Furthermore, only the cases of Transkei and Bophuthatswana wi 11 be 
discussed in some detail, although the figures for Ciskei and Venda will 
also be given in some of the tables. The reasons for the exclusion of 
these two countries are that they are dimensionally less important and 
that their economic development is in absolute terms less noticeable than 
that of the two others. ~Jranskei and Bophuthatswana have been chosen 
- -- - ""-• ·- . - - ·- -- . 
for their importance, for the fact that they have been independent for 
a longer time and because they typify two different conditions in which 
the economy of a black state can find itself in the struggle for develop-
ment. 
Bophuthatswana is~relatively well endowed with natural resources, 
is in part situated close to the industrial core of South Africa and 
thus enjoys a number of advantages in terms of accessibility to markets 
and advanced infrastructures. These relatively good basic conditions 
have helped to make Bophuthatswana the economically most successful 
homeland. Transkei instead, is totally devoid of natural resources, 
if its potential for agriculture is excluded. In theory, in Transkei 
there is some of the best agricultural land of South Africa, but the 
sorry state of its agriculture reduces the practical contribution of 
the primary sector to the economy of the country to a minimal part of 
its potential, as happens in all the homelands. Transkei is situated 
far from the principal industrial areas of South Africa and thus its 
economy feels only in a limited way the pulling effect of the South 
African economy. In such circumstances the economic development of 
Transkei has been limited, and this country has been even less capable 
than Bophuthatswana of absorbing the waves of newcomers on the job 
market. ~e.nda and Ciskei are, for different reasons, in an even worse 
situation than Transkei, although in both of them there has been lately 
some progress. Thus all the negative consideration made on the 
Transkeian economy will be applicable to these two countries, only more so. 
The first indicators which may be taken into consideration in 
examining the conditions of the economy of a country are the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), the Gross National Product (GNP) when it is 
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significantly different from the GDP, and their per capita values. 
Usually the GNP should suffice for a first evaluation, but it is 
well-known that the homelands and the independent states are dependent 
for a considerable part of their GNP on income generated outside their 
borders. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the GDP, i.e., the 
product generated within their borders only, to know the real state 
of the economic development of these territories. 
The figures I quote are from various BENSO publications and it is 
necessary to point out again that these figures must be taken tum_ll.rano 
salis. The figures of the GDP include both the product generated by 
the market economy and that generated by the subsistence sector. The 
figures of this 'non-market' sector are necessarily estimates only, 
and therefore are only indicative of the size of this sector. The 
figures of the GNP are obtained subtracting from the GDP the 'foreign 
factor payments', which are computable with exactitude, and adding to 
it the 'foreign factor receipts', i.e., the income of the commuters and 
part of the income of the migrant workers. Apparently it is not 
possible to know the exact figures in this regard, and BENSO publishes 
estimates which are revised year by year. Consequently, also these 
figures must be considered only as indicative of the size of these 
factors and not as actual figures. Furthermore, the method used by 
BENSO to obtain the GNP figures is controversial. In fact, many think 
that these figures overestimate the real contribution of commuters and 
migrant workers to the economy of the homelands because a considerable 
part of their income is spent in the Republic of South Africa. The 
figures of the GDP and the GNP per capita are even less reliable, because 
to the uncertainties of the GDP and GNP figures they add the unreliability 
of the population figures which are only estimates, and sometimes rough 
estimates at that. However, the figures, all considered, may be taken 
as reasonably accurate, and since they are the only figures available 
one has to make do with them. (52 ) 
7.3.1 Outline of the economic conditions of Tra~skei and Bophuthatswana 
A first idea of how the ~conomy of Transkei and Bophuthatswana has 
fared since independence is given by Table 18 which gives the GDP of both 
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TABLE 18: GDP OF TRANSKEI AND BOPHUTHATSWANA 
TRANSKEI 
1977 1978 1979 1980 
R1 000 % R1 000. .% R'OOO % R'OOO % 
Market 155 745 54,1 202 787 58,8 272 918 64,0 379 599 69,3 
Non-market 131 960. 45,9 142. 105 41,2 153.850 36,0 167 740 30,7 
TOTAL 287 705 100,0 344 892 100,0 '426. 768 100,0 547 339 100,0 
countries, divided in market and 'non-market' sectors. From 1977 to 1980 
the GDP of both countries has noticeably increased, almost doubling in 
the case of Trans kei and more than do.ub ling in the :case of Bophuthatswana 
(the GDP of Transkei was in 1980 190% of the GDP in 1977 and that of 
Bophuthatswana 230%). The average annual rate of growth of the GDP in 
the period 1975-1980 was 20,5% for Transkei and 22,4% for Bophuthatswana. 
Although a sizeable part of this growth in monetary terms was due to 
inflation, also at constant 1970 prices the increase is remarkable, 
averaging 7,6% and 9,3% per year respectively. This is without any doubt -------- .... _ ~- ... - ------- ~ 
a positive aspect of the economy of both countries, and suggests that 
-some kfna-oreconomic development is really taking place. 
---Anbtfier positive aspect is the decreasing incidence_ that the 
subsistence sector has in the formation of the GDP. This- is an indication 
that these countries, and in particular Bophuthatswana where the market 
economy contributed the 93,4% of the GDP in 1980, are giving _themselves 
a more modern economic structure, which is one of the first steps 
necessary for development. As it is logical, agriculture has the biggest 
r- - -· · 
share in the subsistence sector. However, it is unfortunate that 
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subsistence agriculture has maintained its dominant share in the total 
agricultural output (in the years taken into consideration it was in 
the range of 86-91%, in 1980 it was 90,7% in Transkei and 90,9% in 
Bophuthatswana). This means_that the _bulk of the agricultural production 
---------------~ 
is for-self-consumption· and, that distribution and marketing of 
~ultural products are still in an embryonic state. The lack of 
-- . -------channels for selJjng_the __ products of the land reduces 'the incentives 
~ncr~asing production and this perpetuates the predominanc~~i self-
---- - . - -
consumption, thus ensuring that the great majority of the people living 
on the land will not advance beyond subsistence level. 
Fr-0mTable_19 i~i_s PQssible to see that the incidence of agriculture 
in the formation of the GDP has steadily decreased both in Transkei and 
~in-Bophuthatswana. This can be considered a positive step because it 
means that the subsistence sector is occupying a constantly minor part 
,..--in the economy of these countries. The negative aspect of this is that 
. th~ production has remained almost constant at a very low level. Up to 
,...--1980 neither of the two countries had been able to meet its food 
- requirements and it appears difficult that they will do so in the near 
--future, although Bophuthatswana is coming quite close to it. 
In Transkei, agriculture is almost the only component of the primary 
sector and in 1980 contributed~27,2% of the GDP {down from 44,9% in ------·- ~-
1977), while in Bophuthatswana it is a minor component of this sector, 
contributing only 5,6% of the GDP in 1980 (down from 10,5% in 1977). 
While the role of agriculture in Bophuthatswana is rather small, the 
.,.__._... __ -- - ---- ·- --- - -
Pr:.imary_sector contributes more than half of the GDP. The importance 
of _!!.ipj__:!!D-l_n the economy of this country is clearly pointed out by the 
fact that in 1980 it alone contributed 52,9% of the GDP {up from 41,8% 
-c;=q--- ......_.... 
in 1977), almost trebling its value (from RIOS million to R309 million). 
Mining is certainly the most important part of the Bophuthatswana 
economy and this puts the country in a better condition than the other 
independent black states. Although the possible oscillation in the price 
of minerals may be a cause of concern, the presence of a strong mining 
sector guarantees a considerable source of income to the government and 
to the communities to which royalties are paid. The fact that, although 
platinum is the most important mineral mined, other minerals contribute 
noticeably to the mining activity makes an eventual collapse in the price 
of one commodity less dangerous than it is for other countries which are 
dependent on one single major source of income. Also in the mining 
sector, however, not everything that glitters is gold. One of the problems 
TABLE 19: GDP of Transkei and Bophuthatswana according to main economic activity 
Agriculture 
Mininq 
TOTAL PRIMARY SECTOR 
Manufacturing, 
electricity and water 
Construction 
TOTAL SECONDARY SECTOR 
Trade, financing, 
catering and business 
services 
Public Administration, 
Health and Education 
Transport and other 
services 
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0, 1, 183 






8,6: 29 414 
I 
3,8: 13 203 







13,4: 60 687 
' I 
I 




5 ,3: 17 531 




TRANS KE I 
I I 
I 1979 I 1980 I I 





39,1:141 446 33,1 : 148 563 
I I 
0, l' 197 0' 1 : 212 
39,2 141 643 33 ,2 : 148 775 
8,5 35 617 8,4 44 046 
3,91 16 350 3,8 20 648 











25 ,7: 114 826 26,9 148 629 
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5' 1: 20 231 4,7 23 391 
48,4:233 158 
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54,6 333 870 
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TOTAL 287 705 100 ,o: 344 
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SOURCE: BENSO, op.cit., 1981, Part II. 
1977 
% R'OOO 
27,1 26 758 
0,1 105 737 
27 ,2 132 495 
8, 1 26 192 
3,7 14 382 
11,8 40 574 
29,5 22 600 
27,1 42 42.1 
4,4 15 234 
61,0 80 255 
100 ,0 253 234 
BOPH UTHATSWANA 
I I I 
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% I R'OOO % I R'OOO % I R'OOO % I I I 
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I I I 
I I I 
I I I 
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I I I 
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213 
is that the Bophuthatswana government thinks that royalties and taxes 
paid by the mining industry are too low,.but it is clearly reluctant 
to act in this regard lest its relations with the South African private 
sector and the South African government become bad. Another negative 
aspect, although this is possibly considered as negative only by the 
Bophuthatswana government, is that only a limited number of Tswanas is 
employed in the mines,( 53 ) and a considerably part of the miners are not 
only migrant workers, but even 'foreign migrants', i.e., from the BLS 
and other countries. This is negative in the sense that it means that 
some tens of thousands of jobs within Bophuthatswana are not occupied 
by the local population, which certainly needs all the jobs that can 
be created in the country. 
~~_e __ s~~o_n_dary sector is clearly still in its infancy, and both in 
Transkei and in Bophuthatswana it has maintained its contribufion to the 
GNP at a fairly constant level (around 12% in Transkei and around 15-16% 
in Bophuthatswana). i"n"general, two thirds of this contribution are due 
...... -~ - -
to the manufacturing sector and one third to construction. Although the 
expansion of the secondary sector is undeniable, particularly in the case 
of Bophuthatswana, it remains far below what is necessary. The Tomlinson 
Commission had already regarded the development of the secondary sector 
as one of the pre-requisites for the success of the policy of separate 
development. In its report the Commission noted that the pressure on 
the land was too high and recommended the creation of employment in 
other sectors in order to move approximately half of the rural 
population to the towns so that the remaining half might start building 
a viable agriculture. Great part of this new employment had to be per 
force created in the secondary sector. To this requirement had to be 
added the need to find employment for the natural growth of the labour 
force. When one looks at the results, one has to conclude that they 
have been up to now rather short of the minimum requirements. In Transkei, 
there were 12 393 Transkeians employed in manufacturing enterprises in 
1978, and in 1980 there were about 20 000 (the figure reported is 23 308, 
but the author says that this is doubtful and probably too high).( 54 ) 
This constituted less than 13% of the total local paid employment 
(excluding the informal sector) which in its turn constitutes 19,6% of the 
labour force. In Bophuthatswana there were 9 870 paid employees in the 
manufacturing sector in 1978,( 55 ) and in 1980 at least 12 100 (12 108 were 
employed in the enterprises established with the aid of concessions)( 56 ) 
and possibly as many as 20 000 (this figure probably includes also the 
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informal sector). Also in the case of Bophuthatswana the employment in 
manufacturing constituted less than 13% of the total local paid employ-
ment which, however, con·stituted more than 36% of the labour force .. 
(Again it must be pointed out that these figures must be taken·cu~ grano 
salis.) 




and_i.ts_pr.ospects_Q_f_ growth are mainly dependent on the 
---cOnCe-;sions.g_tven to the businessmen to-att~act them to the growth points ------ - - - . - - - - . --
within the country. Another drawbackfs that many of these newly --
r-e;tabl i shed industries will-~ot- operate for the local market which _ _.,......--:-----~---:-- - -- - ---- - --
-remains depressed. However, the growth points, in particular those in 
~ - - - -
Bophuthatswana,are attracting a steady flow of industrial concerns, many 
of them from overseas, and this will certainly have some positive effects. 
Another noticeable difference between Transkei and Bophuthatswana is 
the dffferent incidence of the-teYtfary-sector--in their-economy-.- -The 
terfi ary sector has increased its contribution to the GOP of Transkei ----- - -
from 42,7% in 1977 to 61% in 1980. Both commerce~!l_d_p~blic_asJ!TIJn_is_tration 
-.(-rn-cludi.~g • ;d~cati'On =~~~_}l_e~_l_th') _ ha_ve i ncreas~d their share, th~ 1 a_tter 
doubling the absolute amount and growing from 23,9% to 27,1% of the GDP, ----- --T- - - - --
the former gµadrupling the absolute amount and growing from 13,4% to 
29,5% of the GDP. Thus almost half of the Transkeian GDP in 1980 was 
-.~~-- -
produced by commerce and government. Such oversized incidence of the ,.-- - -
tertiary secto_r jn the formation of the GOP of Transkei cannot be 
considered positive. In particular, if on the one hand the fact that 
... --- - - '... ·--~ ...... -
-the public administration contributes more than a quarter of the GOP 
- - " - ~ - I~ - •W - -- -
suggests a commendable attention on the part of the government to the 
-
need ~or_social services (~n~_ indeed Transkei has, e.g., a relatively 
high per capita expend_iture on ~d_1~cation), on the other hand it under-
-nnes the fact that a considerable proportion of the very scarce resources 
at the disposal of this country are utilised in sectors which do not 
directly produce wealth. It is possible to devote such a high proportion 
of the resources td social services only because of the South African aid. 
But the fact that a considerable part of this aid is not used to enlarge 
<:..a-~d ~trengthen.the. productive basis of the count!'Y !Ii il--makeft-more--
di ffi cult for Transkei to start a process of se.1.f.=.susta.in.ing~ecor,iomic 
,,,,______ - -
development. Furthennore, public administration includes also a bureau-
cratic civil service whose utility may be questionable. A second 
component of the tertiary sector which has grown noticeably in these years 
is -~The quadrupling of the sector's product in four years and 
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the increase of its contribution to the GDP from 13% to 29% strikingly 
indicates that the traders are those wh~ most benefitted from independence. 
To the contrary of Transkei, the incidence of the tertiary sector in 
the GDP of Bophuthatswana is rather small and, although the absolute 
amount almost doubled from 1977 to 1980, its share in the GDP fell from 
31,7% to 25,7%. Of this 25,7%, 7% was due to commerce and 13,2% to 
public administration, education and health. Thus it is possible to say 
that in Bophuthatswana the tertiary sector is of a reasonable size 
(perhaps even too small), and to note that its growth has been moderate. - ----· .....- _.,....... 
Another i ndi ca ti on of _ho~ ..I_ra.nskei and Bophuthatswana have fared 
sin~ce independence is given by Table 20 which ·re-porfs-the sources of 
finance of the two governments. In both countries there has been a 
steady growth of the resources at the disposal of the government. 
Particularly significant is the increase in 'own sources' and in this 
respect the two countries differ markedly. In Transkei this increase 
has been from R74 million in 1977/78 to R172 million in 1981/82, while 
in Bophuthatswana it has been from R108 million in 1978/79 to R285 
million in 1981/82 (the figure for, 1977/78 is not comparable because it 
was the year of independence and the control of financial resources was 
still mainly in the hands of the South African government). In these 
figures the transfers under the Customs Union agreement are included 
which in 1981/82 amounted to R91 million for Transkei and R128 million 
for Bophuthatswana. Notwithstanding the remarkable growth in the money 
raised with their own means, both countries receive a sizeable amount 
of money in the form of development aid from South Africa. In 1981/82 
this aid constituted 50% of the resources at the disposal of the 
Transkeian government (excluding opening balance) and little more than 
14% of those at the disposal of the Bophuthatswana government. (See 
Table 2J.) This is a most striking indication of the different achi~ve­
ments of these countries in their struggle for development. DespJ~te_~_ts 
undeniable progress, Transkei is s ti 1l heavily dependent on South -- ~ - ·- -.......-~- - - - -- - - -
~African aid simply to continue working, while Bophuthatswana is reducing 
its dependence almost yea~ by year and is approaching the moment it will -- - . -
be able to stand on its own feet. 
There is, however, another aspect which, in my opinion, must be used 
as the main yardstick in evaluating the degree of development in these 
countries and judging how successful they have been up to now. It is 
the ability of these countries to absorb the newcomers on the joS---- -
market. Table 22 gives a rough estimate of the increase in local 
TABLE 20: Sources of finance of the governments ·of Transkei and Bophuthats~vana - 1977/78-1981/82 (RI 000) 
YEAR OPENING OHN (1) 
RSA DEVELOPJ
2
) OTHER ~3) TOTAL BALANCE SOWRCES MENT AID SOURCE 
TRANS KE I 1977 /78 1 903 74 034 121 152 27 586 224 675 
1978/79 (1 429) 111 310 123 422 39 802 273 105 
1979/80 10 010 150 722 134 148 55 466 350 346 
1980/81 10 177 190 400 130 148 51 818 383 060 
1981/82 48 453 172 347 210 156 37 000 467 956 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- N 
....... 
BOPHUTHATSWANA 1977 /78 8 351 _20 910 59 993 8 000 97 254 O'\ 
~ ... -':. ~, ... J :· ..... 
1978/79 14 314 W8 800 30 605 6 125 . 159 844 
1979/80 39 463 192 348 47 012 981 279 804 
1980/81 92 968 270 844 45 700 4 600 414 112 
1981/82 103 812 285 258 53 400 31 700 474 170 
NOTES: (1) Includes self-generation and Customs Union. 
(2) Includes statutory grand or budgetary assistance, General Tax and project aid. 
(3) Includes Rand Monetary Union and loans. 
SOURCE: BENSO 1981, T.66. 
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TABLE 21: Own source and RSA aid as proportion of source of finance. 
Transkei and Bophuthatswana. 1977/78-1981/82 (%). 
INCLUDING OPENING BALANCE EXCLUDING OPENING BALANCE 
OWN.SOURCES. RSA AID .. OWN . SOURCES RSA AID 
Transkei 
1977 /78 32,9 53,9 33,2 54,4 
1978/79 40,7 45,2 40,5 44,9 
1979/80 43,0 38,3 44,3 39,4 
1980/81 49,7 34,1 51,0 35,0 
1981/82 36,8 44,9 .41,0 50,0 
Bophuthatswana 
1977/78 21,5 61,7 23,5 67 ,5 
1978/79 68,0 19,l 74,4 21,0 
1979/80 68,7 16,8 80,0 19,5 
1980/81 65,4 11,0 84,3 14,2 
1981/82 60,1 11,2 77 ,0 14,4 
SOURCE: Elaboration from previous table. 
employment from 1970 to 1980 and the estimate of the increase of the 
economically active population in these two countries in the same period. 
The difference between the two figures is the estimated number of new-
comers on the job market who did not find any job locally and thus went 
to increase the number of unemployed or migrants. This table is only 
indicative, because many of its figures are open to contestation and 
only contestable may be the way the table was put together. Nevertheless, 
it allows one to draw a few rough conclusions which have a general 
validity. 
It is evident that neither of the two countries has been able to give 
employmen~to all the-newcomers on the job market in the period taken -· - -- - - ·- - - ~ - ~ -~ 
into consideration. This should be the very minimum requirement these 
countries have to meet. And even if this occurred, it would certainly-
not be sufficient to consider them a success. Indeed, if all the new-
comers were absorbed, there would still remain all those who were 
un~Tf1ploy_ed at the beginning, those who had been resettled, the migrant 
workers and part of the 'permanently absent' to be accommodated before 
these countries could be considered a success in terms of the original 
policy of separate development. 
TABLE 22: Increase in the demand and supply of labour. Transkei and Bophuthatswana. 1970-1980. 
TRANS KE I BOPHUTHATSWANA 
Local Employment 1970( l) 403 000 215 000 
Local Employment 1980(l) 530 000 316 000 
Increase in local 
employment 1970-1980 +127 000 +101 000 
Estimated increase in 
fconomically Active (2) Population 1970-1980 267 000 129 000 
DIFFERENCE -160 000 - 28 000 
NOTES (1) From BENSO figures relating to Economically Active Population. These figures include 
estimated self-employment in agriculture and the informal sector and are considered 
inflated by many scholars. According to Thomas, W.H., Socio-Economic Development in 
Transkei, UCT 1983, Transkeian local employment amounted to about 380 000 in 1980, to 
which can be added an estimated open unemployment of about 145 000. 
(2) Estimates by BENSO based on geographical distribution of female population in 1970 to 
reduce the effect of migrant labour on population distribution figures. Resettlement 
since was not taken into account. 
SOURCES: BENSO Black Development in South Africa, 1967. 





Transkei in these ten years has not been able to give employment to 
more than half its people entering the job market. This means that 
notwithstanding the development which took place in these ten years, 
Transkei is now more dependent on South African than ever, and 
Transkeians will continue to flock, legally or illegally, to the 
Republic to find that work which they cannot find at home. The case of 
Bophuthatswana is different, because, there, in these same years job 
opportunities were created locally to absorb the equivalent of almost 
four fifths of the newcomers on the job market. It is thus clear that 
Bophuthatswana fared better than Transkei. Indeed, if the contemporary 
increase of commuters to the border areas is taken into consideration, 
it is possible to surmise that it has been able to absorb even a part 
of those who were previously' unemployed. Bophuthatswana, then, might 
almost be considered a success. Almost, because the ability of absorbing 
all the newcomers on the job market is only the first step along the road 
to economic viability (which, however, does not mean economic independence), 
and unless this road is covered, any exultance about the economic 
prospects of these countries would be out of place. 
In conclusion, it can be said that although Transkei and Bophuthatswana 
have achieved some positive results, these results cannot by any means 
be considered sufficient to attain the aims which the South African 
government and the governments of the independent black states have, for 
different reasons, given to the strategy of separate development. Indeed, 
not only has none of these countries been able to attract back so~~~~-~ 
their people living in the Republic of South Africa, as was the dream 
of the South African government, but they have been unable to cope with 
the natural growth of their population. Furthermore, great part of the 
development that has been achieved is due to 'external' causes, namely, 
--~~-e _d_es:~Rtralisation_of industries, South African development aid, border 
areas development. Also in the case of Bophuthatswana, which has been 
the most successful of the independent black states, there are only 
limited forces which can stimulate an 'internal' growth. Unless these 
countries are able to absorb at least the natural increase of their 
economically active population, they have to be considered as a failure 
even in the terms of the government philosophy which is at the basis of 
separate development. 
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7.3.2 Independent black states and other homelands: 
A comparison of main economic indicators 
After having briefly examined the economic conditions of Transkei 
and Bophuthatswana, and having concluded that despite their undeniable 
progress they are still far from being satisfactory, it is interesting 
to compare summarily the main economic indicators of the independent 
states with those of the non-independent homelands. This might indicate 
whether the economy of the former has fared better than that of the 
latter and, therefore, whether the decision to ask for independence bore 
any fruits in this field. 
Although using the figures for the GDP and GNP, total and per capita, 
does not give a reliable picture of the economy of a country and sometimes 
may be misleading, it is nevertheless sufficient to give a general idea 
of the situation and to make some rough comparison. Therefore, only 
these indicators will be used, also to avoid an extension of the subject 
beyond the scope of this work. 
Tables 23, 24 and 27 give the GDP and the GNP of the independent 
states at factor costs, the GDP and GNP per capita and their average 
annual rate of growth in the years 1970-1980 and 1975-1980. In these 
tables the figures for Lebowa and KwaZulu are given as a control to see 
the differences between independent states and homelands. All these 
figures show a remarkable increase. However, also the prices have increased 
during the period taken into consideration, and, therefore, these figures 
are largely inflated. Tables 25, 26 and 28 give the same information as 
the previous ones, but at constant 1970 prices. This enables us to see 
how much of the increase registered in the previous tables is real and 
how much of it is only nominal, due only to inflation. It is now possible 
to see that a great part of this increase has been nominal, and this cuts 
down to size the impression of remarkable development given by the first 
three tables. For example, the nominal per capita GDP of Transkei 
increased more than fourfold from 1972 to 1980 and that of Bophuthatswana 
more than fivefold. When the deflator is applied, this astonishing 
progress reveals itself to be mostly illusory, since the per capita GDP 
of Transkei at 1970 prices increased in this period from R 55 to R 85, 
and that of Bophuthatswana from R 78 to R 159. Despite this cutting down 
to size, however, the figures show that there has been a real, albeit 
generally limited, improvement in the economy of the independent states; 
TABLE 23: GDP and GNP of the independent Black states and selected homelands at factor costs {R'OOO) 
TRANS KE I BOPHUTHATSWANA VENDA CISKEI LEBOWA KWAZULU 
GDP 
1972 114 218 83 263 9 770 31 516 55 128 99 190 
1975 210 356 200 960 23 152 54 791 106 032 181 335 
1977 287 705 253 324 32 189 71 225 118 532 278 021 
1978 344 892 305 639 39 799 91 180 128 755 295 026 
1979 426 768 . 430 194 48 013 106 282 182 907 354 413 
1980 547 339 584 300 60 791 131 919 221 685 425 674 
GNP 
1972 278 871 148 835 ' 42 677 67 098 165 360 352 004 
1975 543 106 490 064 54 998 149 812 298 572 734 525 
1977 736 455 678 531 78 421 197 011 389 651 1 073 131 
1978 853 504 794 212 94 464 235 526 452 525 1 318 510 
1979 1 012 324 1 008 001 118 893 272 941 566 309 1 598 310 
1980 -1 271 456 1 326 885 149 974 340 665 730 239 2 001 039 
SOURCES: BENSO Statistical Survey of Black Development 1980 and 1981. parts I and II. 
N.B.: As already pointed out in the text (p. 209), these data must be taken cum grano salis. Their reliability has been 
qu~stioned. and indeed, considering too the criteria used in their elaboration, their margin of error is quite wide. 
Therefore they can be considered only as indicative. 
't\) 
N .__. 
TABLE 24: GOP and GNP of the independent Black states and selected homelands. Per capita. Rands. 
. TRANSKEI BOPHUTHATSWANA VENDA CISKEI LEBOWA KWAZULU 
Total ·Blacks Total Blacks Total Blacks Total Blacks Total Blacks Total Blacks 
GDP 
Per capita ' 
1972 62 51 88 so 35 30 57 46 47 37 44 . 37 
1975 109 95 183 117 79 72 78 65 76 58 67 58 
1977 130 114 214 150 106 97 128 107 78 - 62 93 82 
1978 153 137 248 178 130 119 153 129 81 . 65 95 83 
1979 186 169 337 245 154 143 167 141 110 88 108 96 




Per <;api ta 
1972~ 132 126 148 138 127 124. 114 111: 124 122 140 139 
1975 244 237 388 359 172 168 199 196. 193 190 248 247 
1977 292 284 499 477 237 232 322 318 232 229 333 331 
1978 334 325 564 540 281 276 363 357. 258 257. 392 . 391 
1979 390 380 689 649 345 340 396 391· 309 305 455 
1980 481 471 870 820 427 424: 464 458. 380 375 543 
NOTE: Although it may seem inopportune to give per capita figures divided into Total and Blacks, particularly so in the case 
of the independent Black states where racial classification of the population was aborgated, I decided to· give them in this 
way because, in judging what value these countries may have for th~ir population, it is more interesting to know the general 
conditions of the Blacks rather .than that of the expatri~tes. 






TABLE 25: Real GOP and real GNP of the independent Black states and selected homelands at 1970 prices 
TRANS KE I BOPHUTHATSWANA VENDA CISKEI 
Real 
GDP 
1972 101 078 73 684 8 646 27 890 
1975 134 241 128 245 14 775 ·34 998 
1977 148 454 130 714 16 609 36 752 
• 
1978 160 415 142 156 18 511 42 409 
1979 175 336 176 744 19 726 43 666 
1980 197 667 211 015 21 954 47 641 
Real 
GNP 
1972 246 789 131 712 37 767(l) 59 379 
1975 346 590 312 740 35 098 95 604 
1977 380 001 350 119 40 465 101 657 
1978 396 979 369 401 43 937 109 547 
1979 415 910 414 134 48 400< 2) 112 137 
1980 459 175 479 193 54 162 123 028 
NOTES: (l) Figure doubtful, incompatible with correlated figures i~ other series. 
(2) My own estimate. BENSO's figure (77 060) is clearly wrong. 





























TABLE 26: Real GDP and real GNP per capita' of the independent Black states and selected homelands at 1970 prices (R). 
TRANS KE I BOPHUTHATSWANA VENDA CISKEI LEBOWA KWAZULU 
Real GDP 
per capita .. 
1972 55 78 31 50 42 39 
1975 70 117 50 55 49 43 
1977 67 110 55 66 40 48 N N 
1978 71 115 60 71 38 44 
~ 
1979 76 138 63 69 45 44 
1980 85 159 69 70 46 45 
Real GNP 
per ca pi ta 
" 
1972 117 131 N/A 101 110 124 
1975 156 248 110 127 123 158 
1977 151 257 122 166 120 172 
1978 155 262 131 169 120 182 
1979 160 283 142 163 127 187 
1980 174 314 154 168 137 196 
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also the economy of the non-independent homelands improved, but at a 
slower pace. This improvement, however, is of little meaning for a 
sustained economic development of these areas. Indeed, if the under-
developed countries can be divided according to the performance of their 
economy into those whose economy is taking off, those whose economy is 
awaiting to take off and those whose economy is still taxiing on the 
service runway, the homelands in 1972 had to be included in the unfortunate 
category of those countries whose economy had not yet started the engines. 
Since then there has been some progress, but most of the homelands and 
the independent states still remain in the same category. Also Bophutha-
tswana, which has shown better results, remains in the group of the very 
poor. 
With such a small GDP, the population of these territories would have 
difficulty in simply surviving, were it not for the income earned in 
'white' South Africa. The figures of the GNP show the importance of the 
contribution of commuters and migrant workers to the income of the local 
population. Two observationscan be made on this. One is that the GNP 
per capita is remarkably higher -~ha~ th"~-_ GDP per capita, and thiSmove_s 
these countries from the group of the hopeless failures to the group of 
extreme ly_P,o_or_but_w.i.th somechance- of-improving the fr- -con di t1on-:- - Further--- -- - ' ------- ---~-- -
more, whi 1 e the GD[J__p_er_cpp_i_ta_b.i ges profound differences in rea 1 i ~-c-ome: ------------· - - -
the income produced by commuters and migrant workers is more evenly -
TW ______ - -- - - --- -- --
distributed, therefore it gives a more accurate picture of-the-general 
--~ - - ~-- --
-~itjpns of the population. This means that the people living in the 
-homelands a_re nQt_ i_'! such a ~ad condition as might be infer:-r_e·d~JY:om - - ·--
taking int? consideration the GDP only. 
GNP at factor costs and at constant 1970 prices. They show that in the 
decade 1970-1980 there has been an undeniable increase. Although it 
might be said that it is not overly difficult to have a considerable 
growth rate when the starting point is so low, nevertheless the increase 
is there. However, it must also be pointed out that in many cases the 
growth rate in the years 1970-75 has been higher than that of the years 
1975-80. This is certainly due also to the fact that in 1970 almost the 
TABLE 27: Average annual growth of the GOP and GNP of the independent Black states and selected homelands. 
Total and per capita. (%) 
1970-1980 1975-1980 
GOP. GNP GDP GNP 
Total Per ca pi ta Total Per capita Total Per capita Total Per capita 




BOPHUTHATSWANA 25,9 21,1 22,4 17,8 22,4 .17 ,8 21,l 16,7 
VENDA 25,0 23,2 21,7 19,8 21,7 19,8 22,3 20,0 
CISKEI 19 '7 18,6 19,5 17,9 19,5 17,9 17,6 16,0 
LEBOWA 18,5 13,6 20,3 15,3 15,3 10,2 18,8 13,8 
KWAZULU 18,9 13,5 23,7 18,5 17,4 12,0 21,8 16,6 
GAZANKULU 20,4 13,0 20,8 13,9 23,8 16,l 21,2 14,0 
SOURCES: As for Table 23. 
TABLE 28: Average annual growth rates of the real GOP and real GNP of the independent Black states and 
selected homelands. Total and per capita. (%) 
SOURCE: As for Table :23. 
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only economic activity in these countries was subsistence agriculture 
and thus in the early years -Of the decade every small development had 
a noticeable impact on the growth rate. The most hopeful aspect 
revealed by these tables is that both the GDP and GNP per capita in real 
tenns show an increase, particularly in the case of the independent states. 
This suggests that notwithstanding the high increase of population 
registered in these countries between 1970 and 1980 (due both to a 
high natural rate of increase and to the extensive resettlements) their 
economy grew at a faster pace, therefore the economic conditions of the 
average inhabitant of the independent states should be slightly better 
now than they were in 1970. Another positive aspect pointed out by the 
tables is the fact that in the independent states (excluding Ciskei) 
the rate of increase of the GDP has been higher than that of the GNP. 
This may be taken as an indication that the economy of the independent 
states is growing stronger. 
This indication is confirmed by Table 29 which gives the proportion 
of the GNP produced within the borders of the countries taken into 
consideration. Certainly, the fact that the GDP of Transkei in 1980 
constituted only 43% of its GNP (up from 38,7% in 1976) and that of 
Bophuthatswana was 44% of its GNP (up from 37,3% in 1976) clearly confirms 
that these countries are unable to sustain their own population even in 
its present state of poverty. It is, however, possible to make a positive 
annotation: }n three out of four independent states there appears to be 
a trend towards .a higher incidence of the GDP in the formation of the 
GNP. This suggests that something is moving in their economies, and 
that if this trend continues it might be possible to take the eventuality 
of a real economic development of these countries more seriously. 
Perhaps one of the most important facts revealed by these tables is 
the generally better performance of the economies of the independent 
states in comparison with that of the homelands. The average annual rate 
~ of increase of the GDP of the former has been generally higher than that 
of the latter: Transkei and Ciskei had the lowest growth rate of the 
real GDP amongst the independent states with 8% and 7,9% respectively; 
KwaZulu's growth rate was 7,1% and Lebowa's 6,8%. Amongst the homelands 
only Gazankulu, with 8,5%, fared better than Transkei, while Bophuthatswana 
and Venda are in a class of their own with 13,4% and 12,6% respectively. 
The anomalous situation of Gazankulu, which has been already pointed out 
in Chapter 5.2, is confirmed here. 
If the growth rate of the real GDP per capita is taken into consideration, 
TABLE 29: The GDP of the independent Black states and selected homelands as percentage of their GNP. 
TRANS KE I BOPHUTHATSWANA VENDA CISKEI LEBOWA KWAZULU 
1972 40,9 55,9 22,9 47,0 33,3 28,2 N 
N 
1975 38,7 41,0 42,0 36,6 35,5 24,7 . l.C 
1977 39,0 37,3 41,0 .36, 1 30,4 25,9 
1978 40,4 38,5 42,1 38,7 28,4 22,4 
1979 42,1 42,7 40,4 38,9 32~3 22,2 
1980 43,0 44,0 40,5 38,7 30,3 21,3 
... .,. 
SOURCE: Elaboration from previous tables. 
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the different and better performance of the independent states is more 
striking (and the Gazankulu anomaly disappears): the lowest growth 
rate amongst the independent states is that of Transkei which is 5,7%, 
the highest one amongst the homelands is that of Lebowa which is 2,3%. 
However, before drawing any conclusion from the foregoing data, it must 
again be pointed out that the figures are not totally reliable, and that 
the margin of error is wide enough to make differences of a few 
percentage points almost meaningless. However, if each figure is 
unreliable and only indicative of the magnitude of the activity taken 
into cons i dera ti on, a 11 the figures have been e 1 aborated with the same 
criteria. Therefore, they are consistent. It is possible that the 
figures of the GNP have a margin of error of 10% or even 20%. As such, 
they have only partial significance if one wants to know the real 
dimensions of the economy of a particular territory. However, it can 
be assumed that if the figures of the GNP of, e.g., Transkei for the 
year 1977 are overestimated by 12% roughly, the same applies to the 
figures of the GNP of the other homelands. And in this case the figures 
for the year 1978 might be overestimated by 10% or 15%, but it would be 
improbable that they were underestimated by 10%. Therefore, it can be 
considered acceptable to found on them an evaluation of the general 
performance of the economy of the independent states and the homelands. 
After having made that premise, it is possible to say that is 
appears that the independent states have fared better than the homelands. 
This is even more vis i b 1 e when-onetake(s-i'nTocorfsTderatfon-ure-·average--
growth rate for the years 1975-1980. In this period the rate of growth 
of the GDP of the homelands was much lower than that of the independent 
states (excluding again Gazankulu). ·When one takes into consideration 
the rate of growth of the GDP per capita, the situation of the homelands 
in comparison with the independent states becomes worse. Gazankulu is 
the only one which has a positive performance, while for Lebowa and 
KwaZulu the average rate of growth is even negative. Only because the 
remittances of the migrants grew with the increase of the wages in the 
Republic of South Africa, the population of these two homelands avoided 
in general being worse off in 1980 than in 1975. In these circumstances 
the contribution of the GDP to the GNP remained low and decreased: 
Table 29 shows that in 1980 it was lower than in 1972. This is another 
indication of the fact that the economy of these two homelands has been 
much less able to cope with the needs and the growth of their 
population than was the economy of the independent states. 
TABLE 30: Capital investment and employment in all enterprises established with the aid of concessions 
INDUSTRIALISTS~ INVESTMENTS (EST! MATES) R'OOO 3LACK EMPLOYMENT 
1977 1981 -
Bophuthatswana 40 081 74 240 
Venda 909 1 594 
Ciskei 2 659 10 783 
Transkei 31 245 30 932(l) 
KwaZulu 8 715 49 306 
Lebow a 5 673 11 847 
Gazankulu 601 2 510 




8 373 10 886 
759 1 098 
919 1 839 
5 600 7 155(l) 
2 197 4 945 
1 866 2 206 
670 688 
NOTE: To the investments of the industrialists must be ~dded the investments of the 
Development Corporations for industrial buildings, loans and share capital 
amounting on average to 15% more than those of the industrialists. 









17 731( 2) 
5 221( 2) 
9 578( 3) 
4 257( 3) r 




A further indication of this fact is given by the data on employ-
ment creation in these territories. The estimated number of salaried 
workers in the homelands in 1972 was 190 443, 88 125 of whom in Transkei, 
Bophuthatswana and Venda, and 102 318 in the other homelands. In 1980 
the estimated number of salaried workers in the homelands was 176 000, 
an increase of 73 682 units, equivalent to 72%. In the three 
independent states in 1980 it was 216 000, an increase of 127 875, 
equivalent to 145%. (57 ) The enlargement of the civil service after 
independence accounts for a sizeable proportion of this bigger increase, 
but it is worth pointing out that also the increase of job opportunities 
created by the investments of the private sector has been larger in the 
independent states than in the homelands. (See Table 30) 
It is of course impossible to conclude that the better performance 
of the independent states has been the result of independence, but 
certainly one of its main causes was the increase in the amount of money 
transferred from South Africa to the independent states which followed 
the decision to opt for independence. 
Too short a timespan is covered by the data on the economy of the 
TBVC countries since their independence to allow politically significant 
conclusions. Independence has certainly not meant that the TBVC 
countries have significantly lessened their economic dependence on South 
Africa, but since the whole sub-continent is one economic unit with 
South Africa as its pivotal element, these countries are not alone in 
their dependence. With the economy of all the states of the sub-
continent interlocked with that of South Africa, it is almost pointless 
to speak of self-sufficiency. However, it seems that the independent 
states have managed to increase the proportion of their population in 
local employment. Also in this regard, Bophuthatswana is far ahead of 
the rest, and this is obviously due to its closeness to the industrial 
core of South Africa rather than to any effect of independence. 
Nevertheless, from the available data it appears that the independent 
states have fared better than the homelands. This is shown also by the 
fact that the GDP per capita of the homelands in comparison with that 
of the independent states was generally lower in 1980 than it was in 
1972. For example, the GDP per capita of KwaZulu in 1972 was 71% of 
that of Transkei, 50% of that of Bophuthatswana, 125% of Venda's and 
78% of Ciskei's. In 1980, it was 53% of Transkei's,28,3% of that of 
Bophuthatswana, 65% of that of Venda and 64% of Ciskei's. The same 
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TABLE 31: Relation of the GDP of the homelands with that of 
the independent states 
As %'6f'GDP of: 
1972 'TRANSKEI. BOPHUTHATSWANA VENDA CISKEI 
GDP of 
KwaZulu 71 50 125 78 
Lebow a 76 54 135 84 
Gazankulu 60 42 106 66 
1980 
GDP of 
KwaZulu 53 28 62 64 
Lebowa 54 29 66 65 
Gazankulu 52 27 64 63 
SOURCE: Elaboration from Table 26. 
applies also to the other homelands. (See Table 31) 
Despite the limited data available and their unreliability, it 
seems justified 'to conclude that the independent states had from their 
choice a relative advantage in comparison with the homelands. This 
conclusion is provisional, because revised and more accurate data 
covering a longer timespan might change the picture. Nevertheless, 
until it is disproved by these new data that the economists are promising 
us, it must be taken into consideration when one tries to give a 
political evaluation of the effects of independence. 
CHAPTER 8 
UNRESOLVED ISSUES.BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA 
AND.THE.INDEPENDENT STATES 
Independence certainly did not solve the problems of the homelands 
which asked for it, nor those of their people. Indeed, some awkward 
issues have been left unresolved, They are those questions where the 
objectives of the South African government and the aspirations of the 
black governments or of the black population are most in contrast, viz., 
land and citizenship. 
The possession of land is everywhere an important and sensitive 
subject. It is particularly so in South Africa, where the territorial 
separation of the Blacks has long been and still is one of the corner-
stones of separate development. And indeed, for a country acceding to 
independence, land is one of the most important aspects of the deal. 
The request for more land has therefore been a constant in the attitude 
of the black leaders. 
The delimitation of land reserved to the Blacks was the first 
important measure of Native policy of the Union (See 1.3.1), and the 
1936 .legislation in this regard (See 1.3.2) has been one of the ~ost 
important guidelines of the government policy ever since. When the 
government started implementing separate development and establishing 
self-governing territories, it soon became evident that the haphazard 
way in which the obligations contained in the 1936 legislation were met 
was not equal to the necessity. It was also evident that the scattered 
form of the homelands made the administration of these territories 
complicated and the pretence of their being nations in the making 
ludicrous. In the early 1970s, the questions of land consolidation was 
again approached in a comprehensive way with the aim of solving it once 
and for all. The results of this activity were the 1975 'final' 
consolidation proposals (See 3!2.3) which were approved by Parliament. 
These proposals did not really obtain a real consolidation of the home-
lands but only reduced their scattered aspect. These proposals were not 
considered satisfactory by any of the black leaders, and territorial 
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claims remained one of the ~onstant points of disagreement with the 
South African government. Also the South African government realised 
the unsatisfactory nature of the situation, and in 1979 a commission 
was appointed to examine the whole question again, for the first time 
having the possibility of going beyond the 1936 legislation in its 
recommendations. This commission is still working on its very sensitive 
task and it does not appear that the land question will be solved in a 
short time. 
The other area where the government's policy is mostly in contrast 
with the aspirations of the black leaders and those of their people is 
that of citizenship. The fact that a citizen of a homeland loses South 
African citizenship ope legis at the moment of independence, irrespective 
of where he lives or what his desire in this regard is, has aroused the 
hostility of all the black leaders, who during independence negotiations, 
tried unsuccessfully to change it. 
This question is of course linked with the problem of the urban Blacks 
and thus is at the heart of the whole policy of separate development. 
The South African government has always been resolute in maintaining that 
once a homeland becomes independent all the Blacks linked with that home-
land cease to be South African citizens. It is difficult to see how the 
government could change its position, since this would mean the failure 
to achieve the final aim of the government policy. 
However, it appears that the government is searching for a solution 
which could permit on the one hand to safeguard the principle that 
independence means the loss of the citizenship of the Republic of South 
Africa, therefore assuring the achievement of the aim of separate develop-
ment (i.e., no Black will be citizen of the white homeland),* and on the other 
hand, at the same time to accommodate the Blacks' claims of participation 
in the political and economic life of a greater South Africa. (See 2.1.4) 
*NOTE: In this chapter I use the expression 'white homeland' to indicate 
the area where the Whites hold the power. The aim of the present 
government is to establish the conditions whereby the Whites can 
maintain an undisputed ruling position over as great a part of the 
original Republic of South Africa as possible. Coloureds, Asians 
and many Blacks will live in this area, but if the control of the 
most important decisions remains in the hands of the Whites, this 
area will still be the 'white homeland'. 
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a.1 Citiienship 
As it has been repeatedly pointed out, the citizenship issue is one 
of the main points of contention between the South African government 
and the leaders of the homelands. Moreover, the fact that the Blacks 
lose their South African citizenship at the moment their homeland (or 
the homeland to which they are assigned ope legis) becomes independent 
is the cause of a great deal of hostility against the idea of independence 
on their part. 
The Blacks living in the homelands may accept independence, and 
sections of the de facto population of the homelands find advantages in 
it, but the Blacks living in the white areas, in particular the urban 
Blacks, are in their great majority totally opposed to it. They feel 
that independence means that they will be cut off from prosperous South 
Africa to be linked with impoverished territories, losing in this way 
the chance of finally taking a share of the South African wealth 
proportional to their contribution to the prosperity of the country and 
to their number. 
Although it is not the intention of the South African government to 
deny the Blacks a share of the wealth of South Africa, it is not prepared 
to give them a share of the South African cake even only vaguely 
proportional to their number. To accept this would mean the end of white 
rule over the whole of South Africa, while the aim of the government is to 
make white rule over a great part of South Africa undisputed. 
The main obstacle to the achievement of this aim is, of course, the 
presence of millions of Blacks in those areas of South Africa which the 
government has decided should form part of the white homeland. The 
solution to this problem had been seen for a long time in the forcible 
limitation of the influx of the Blacks to the white areas and in their 
resettlement in the homelands. This anxiety about the growing number of 
Blacks in the white area and the government's commitment to the reduction 
of this number was repeatedly emphasised: 
{the) figures prove once more the untenable imbalance of numbers 
within and without the homelands .•• 48,9% of the Blacks live inside 
their homeland and more than half - i.e., 51,5% - live outside ..• 
If we project these figures to the year •.. 2020 .•. between 
approximately 27 million and 30 million Bantu will have to be provided 
with accommodation outside the Bantu homelands ••• The Government 
realizes that this Black preponderance of numbers as against the Whites 
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cannot be accepted on a permanent basis •.• The Blacks have to 
be re-channelled to the homelands and as far as the future is 
concerned, the number of Blacks in the Black (sic) homeland must 
be drastically reduced. 58) 
However, three big obstructions are in the way of a drastic. reduction 
of the number of the Blacks in the white homeland. 
One is the sheer size of the task: at present there are a little 
more than 10 million Blacks in the white areas. To reduce drastically 
their number would mean to remove many millions more to the homelands. 
The human and economic costs of such removals would be very large, and 
if the past shows that the government is prepared to face the former, 
it might baulk at the latter. 
A second problem is the effect such an influx of people can have on 
the weak structures and economy of the homelands. Despite the considerable 
economic support the South African government gives to the homelands, 
these are impoverished and underdeveloped territories and an influx of 
that dimension could easily break the weak fabric of their society. 
From the point of view of the South African government it is still 
acceptable to have the homelands as small dictatorial states where order 
is mainta·ined by black rulers with a mixture of manipulation of consensus 
and repression. It would, however, be too dangerous to dump there other 
millions of people who would find it difficult to eke out a living: this 
could well cause a sizeable part of the local population to cross the 
line between a resentful adaptation to the existing circumstances and 
open defiance. A state of continuous rural unrest and the inevitable 
opening this would give to internal guerrilla action is probably the 
only type of threat that South Africa would not be able to overcome. 
But even if these two obstacles could be surmounted, there will 
remain the fact that the presence of Blacks in the white ares is vital 
for the South African economy. Without the Blacks, white South Africa 
would grind to a standstill and its prosperity would disappear. Despite 
the extensive use of migrant labour and despite the existence of 
considerable unemployment amongst the Blacks in the white area, a 'drastic 
reduction' of their number would be detrimental to the good functioning 
of the economy and to the prosperity of a 11 its population groups. 
Furthermore, to achieve the aim of a reduction of the number of 
Blacks in the white area, the removals would have to be concentrated in 
time. In Chapter 2.1.3 we have seen that from 1960 to 1982 about 
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3 million Blacks have been removed, about two thirds of them from the 
white area to the homelands. These removals, however, did not achieve 
any reduction of the number of Blacks living in the white area. To the 
contrary, in those twenty years their number there doub 1 ed. It is thus 
evident that the solution to the government's dilemma cannot be given 
by a 'drastic reduction of the number of the Blacks in the white home-
land' because this is, in the present circumstances, impossible to achieve. 
After the government realised that it was materially impossible to 
reduce the number of Blacks living in the white area, the importance of 
formal independence of the homelands increased. If it was impossible 
to reduce materially their number, it would be possible to reduce the 
number of black South African citizens by force of law. 
When Transkei opted for independence, Matanzima tried to negotiate' 
on this subject too, but the South African government did not change its 
stance. It is difficult to think that Matanzima really believed he 
would succeed in this. Although he had his own objectives, which were 
not those of the South African government, when he accepted to work 
within the framework of separate development and then to ask for 
independence (See Chapter 6), he was certainly aware that the citizenship 
issue was possibly the only one 
could not make any concession. 
to be played on the negotiating 
on which the South African government 
Probably he regarded this only as a card 
table to obtain some concession in other 
fields, while letting time work for a different solution of the citizen-
ship issue. 
the Status of Transkei Act (No. 100 of 1976) granted independence 
to Transkei and its Section 6 took care of the question of citizenship 
as the South African government wanted. The schedule of this Act 
defining the categories of persons who "shall be ... citizen of the 
Transkei and shall cease to be South African citizen" has seven headings, 
and starting from "every person who (is) citizen of the Transkei in terms 
of any law" goes on reducing the mesh of the net until it includes 
every person who, not being citizen of another territory within the 
Republic of South Africa, is related to any member of the Transkeian 
population or "has identified himself with any part of such population 
or is culturally or otherwise associated with any member or part of such 
population". (59 ) 
Despite the fact that Section 6(3) assures that "no citizen of the 
Transkei resident in the Republic ... shall, except as regards citizenship, 
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forfeit any existing rights, privileges or benefits by reason only of 
this Act", the clause on citizenship was seen by the urban Blacks as 
extremely threatening. On the face of it not rights were lost by the 
Blacks living in the white area, but in reality the loss of citizenship 
was profoundly unsettling for them. Even if their present rights were 
not affected (but often over-zealous officials make them feel the 
difference), they lose in two ways. They are cut off from possible 
future changes affecting the black group at constitutional level, and 
their children born after independence will not be automatically entitled 
to those rights, such as Section 10 rights, which are most important for 
the urban Blacks. 
During the negotiations for the independence of Bophuthatswana, the 
citizenship issue was again one of the points of contention, and again 
the South African government did not concede anything of substance. 
However, Mangope was able to extract a small concession. Section 6 of 
the Status of Bophuthatswana Act (No. 86 of 1977) is slightly different 
from Section 6 of the Status of Transkei Act: subsection 6(3) says that 
"a citizen of Bophuthatswana may renounce his Bophuthatswana citizenship 
after independence on conditions agreed upon between the Government of 
the Republic of South Africa and the Goverment of Bophuthatswana, and 
in a manner prescribed by the Government of Bophuthatswana". Apparently, 
with this provision the South African government abandoned its position 
of principle that once a homeland becomes independent its citizens 
become foreigners and have nothing more to do with South Africa as far 
as citizenship (and all that goes with it) is concerned. It recognised 
that some of the Blacks who 'by order' lose their South African citizen-
ship to become citizens of an independent homeland might take exception 
to this and desire to maintain their South African citizenship. The 
obvious catch in that provision is that the conditions for regaining 
South African citizenship must be agreed upon by the~ South African 
government.( 60) It was evident that the South African government would 
be very careful not to open the door too much. 
Mangope negotiated this small concession for Bophuthatswana, but his 
achievement was of benefit to all the other independent states. In 1978 
the National States Citizenship Amendment Act (No. 13 of 1978) was passed. 
Section 3(3) of this Act makes provision for a citizen of an independent 
state to regain, subject to some conditions, South African citizenship. 
However, the only way he can do so is by acquiring the citizenship of 
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one of the non-independent homelands. With this, one is back to square 
one: the re-acquisition of South African citizenship is provisional, 
depending on the homeland not opting for independence. 
Indeed, the government policy did not change. This small concession 
is in practice meaningless, and only a limited number of people has been 
able to take advantage of it. {6l} Having obtained the concession embodied 
in the Citizenship Amendment Act might have been gratifying for Mangope, 
but it does not change the reality. And the reality is that in growing 
numbers the Blacks have lost, are losing and are going to lose their 
South African citizenship. 
8.1.1 Urban Blacks 
The loss of South African citizenship affects different categories 
of Blacks in different ways. For the urban Blacks it has greater and 
more negative effects than for any other section of the black population. 
They are the section of the black population that presents the most 
visible obstacle to the maintenance of undisputed white rule over the 
white area and therefore the most likely to suffer as a consequence of 
a policy aimed at preserving that rule. 
In Chapters 1.2 and 2.1 the attitude of the previous South African 
governments in regard to the presence of Blacks in the white area has 
already been discussed. It is sufficient to repeat here that all the 
South African governments considered the Blacks residing in the white 
area only as temporary sojourners, devoid of, and not entitled to any 
political rights therein. This position was often reaffirmed, and as 
late as 1977 prominent cabinet members stated that "the Black man who 
is in the white area is here at the moment to sell his labour and to 
improve his standard of living". (62 ) 
The independence of Transkei did not change this attitude. However., 
the fact that the Transkeians were now foreigners with no legal ground 
for claiming a participation in the political life of South Africa removed 
them from the 'potential threat' category from the government perspective. 
This induced a more relaxed attitude towards those 'de-South Africanized' 
Blacks. The government decided that it did not have 
great objections of principle against the presence of Bantu persons 
here in White South Africa, especially if they identify themselves 
with their own specific Black nation. In fact, such Bantu persons 
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who identify themselves with their own nations are much more 
welcome here in the White area than those who deny or hide their 
relationship with a Black nation of their own •.• To those who 
acknowledge their own specific national context, we must grant 
more and more privileges here in the White area. Preference must 
be given to them in regard tQ available jobs .•• They must be 
provided with housing ••• (63J 
This position implied the decision of favouring the Blacks who 
became citizens of an independent homeland in terms of improved quality 
of life as a reward of their renunciation to South African citizenship 
and as an incentive to the others to follow suit. The preference to be 
accorded to the citizens of the independent states was, however, to be 
limited to those aspects of life in which they were legally in the same 
conditions of all ~he other Blacks. The preferential treatment did not 
extend to a lightening of the measures of influx control or to more 
relaxed conditions for the attainment of residential rights in the 
urban areas. 
In theory, the government wanted to give a definite, albeit small, 
advantage to the Blacks who became citizens of an independent state. 
In reality, however, excluding the members of diplomatic missions, no 
black citizen of the TBVC countries ever felt this supposedly preferential 
treatment. Indeed, often they met with petty harassment instead, and 
the tentative policy of giving them better conditions in exchange for the 
loss of citizenship foundered before getting under way. It is 
apparently strange that the government did not implement such a policy, 
bec~use it would be logical for it to reward those Blacks who cease to 
be a 'potential threat' to white rule as a way to engineer some degree 
of acceptance of independence also amongst the urban Blacks. 
There have been two main reasons for the government not adopting 
this logical course of action. One is that, excluding the migrants, in 
practice there are few urban Blacks who are to all effects citizens of 
the TBVC countries. This is another example of the difference between 
the legal appearance and the reality in South Africa. When a homeland 
becomes independent, all the Blacks legally linked to it cease to be 
South African citizens and take its citizenship. This is the theory. 
The reality is that because of the great number of Blacks involved it 
was not possible to provide them with all the necessary documents in 
. time for the date of independence of their homeland. A period of grace 
of two years, extendable upon agreement, was then agreed upon, during 
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which time those Blacks could present themselves to the competent 
authority to exchange their South African documents for those of their 
independent state,( 54 ) becoming in this way true citizens of their 
independent state. 
The naive expectation of the South African government that the 
Blacks \<Jould flock to the competent authorities to formalize the change 
of citizenship was rapidly frustrated. The Blacks kept well away and 
refused to take the documents of their independent state. The provision 
for the extension of the period of grace for technical reasons was used 
more and more, as a screen behind which to hide their passive resistance 
to the government's citizenship policy, by the TBVC authorities, who are 
not overly keen to register as citizens more recalcitrant people than 
they have to. In these circumstances, that provision has become an 
opportune safety valve which allows an indefinite postponement of the 
deadline for the actual registration of the urban Blacks as citizens of 
the independent states without causing a dangerous increase of the 
tension both between South Africa and the independent states and amongst 
the urban Blacks. This leaves the things as they were, with the Blacks 
officially losing South African citizenship, but in practice refusing 
to ask for the citizenship of their independent state and continuing 
to use South African documents. As a result of this, the South African 
government gave up its hope of formally freeing itself of that category 
of Blacks that in the 1970 census was classified as 'de jure' population 
of the TBVC homelands in a short time after independence, but it did not 
renounce its aim of making them citizens of these countries. 
The lack of recipients for the policy of preferential treatment of 
the citizens of the TBVC countries in the white area helped to shelve 
it before it started to be implemented. In its stead was adopted a 
waiting policy: sooner or later those Blacks would need a new document, 
and then they would have to ask for that of their independent state. 
The final result would be the same, even if it could take many years to 
be obtained. For the moment, until they do not have contact with the 
South African authorities, the life of these Blacks goes on just as it 
did before. Their security of residence and work, however, is limited. 
They can be more subject to harassment than other Blacks, and the 
possibility that a change of policy would lead to a crackdown against 
them hangs always over their heads.. Evidently, however, they prefer 
this situation to the alternative of taking the citizenship of the 
independent states, and this says a lot more about the popularity of 
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independence amongst the urban Blacks than a whole treatise. 
The second reason for which the policy of preferential treatment for 
the urban Blacks who are citizens of the TBVC countries did not 
materialize is that the policy towards the urban Blacks has slowly 
changed after 1976. The riots of 1976-77 has been a turning point in 
many aspects of South African policy. Amongst many other effects, they 
compelled the government to face the reality of a growing, increasingly 
stable and increasingly demanding black urban community. This led to a 
re-elaboration of the policy towards the urban Blacks and to a 
reappraisal of their role in the South African society. 
The first area in which this change of policy was felt was that of 
the material conditions of life in the black townships. Upgrading the 
conditions of the townships did not require any important shift from the 
ideological basis of separate development; to the contrary~ it could be 
presented as part of the same policy. However, the resources that could 
have been used for the preferential treatment policy were thus used for 
a general improvement of the conditions of life in the townships. 
Furthermore, in the light of the potential reactions from the other urban 
Blacks, it was evidently considered not advisable to concentrate the 
effort on the citizens of the TBVC countries. 
The 'Soweto effect' went, of course, deeper than that. While the 
position on the theoretical level remained unchanged,( 65 ) the government's 
attitude towards the urban Blacks began slowly to change. One of the 
most important signs of this change was the decision to grant 99-year 
leasehold rights in the townships. Leasehold is not freehold, of course, 
but 99 years is a far longer timespan than anybody could reasonably 
expect for enjoying any property right, and therefore this leasehold 
could be considered as a lifelong title of property. 
This was the first sign that the government was reassessing the place 
of the urban Blacks in the South African future, and was definitely 
abandoning its hope of disposing of the South African Blacks. This was 
not an easy process and the opposition from the 'verkrampte' in the 
National Party was strong. When, in February 1979, the then Minister 
of Health said publicly that he could not "envisage that the day will 
ever come when we have no black South Africans", he had to go back to 
the press the following day to say that it was only his "personal opinion 
of the way I think things are moving", (66 ) 
But despite the rearguard action of the right wing of the National 
/ 
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Party, the government was slowly catching up with the reality of a 
pennanent black presence in the white urban areas. The early 1980s 
saw the government's acceptance of this permanent presence and its 
first attempts at finding a political place foi the urban Blacks within 
the framework of its policy and without endangering its main objective 
of a white (Afrikaner) controlled homeland. 
8.1.2 Signs~re~integration of urban Blacks in the 
decision~making at central level 
The prime ministership of P.W. Botha opened a period in which the 
government hastened slowly to reassess its policy towards the urban 
Blacks. The first measures were taken in the social and economic field, 
with the increase in spending on behalf of the black townships, the 
introduction of the 99-year leasehold, and the significant changes in 
the field of labour relations. (See 2,1.5) The political aspect of this 
reassessment was a more thorny issue and was handled cautiously. Two 
facets of this issue were taken into consideration: the question of 
citizenship for the people of the TBVC and othereventual independent 
st~tes, and the problem of the participation of non-homeland Blacks to 
the decision-making process at least on the issues that more immediately 
affect their lives. 
There was still a noticeable reluctance to de-couple the urban 
Blacks from the homelands, but at least the fact that a number of urban 
Blacks might not be satisfied with their links with the homelands was 
recognised( 6?) and some thought was given to the possibility that that 
number might be great enough to require alternative solutions. At the 
beginning of 1980, the Prime Minister admitted that such an alternative 
solution might be necessary. He said that he believed: 
that most Black people in our urban areas have homeland ties, and 
consequently I believe that they would prefer to participate in 
such a constellation through their national States. However, if 
there are still those, who for some practical reason or other, 
cannot be accommodated in this way ... one can all)ow them to 
participate in such a constellation of States.(68 
The way in which such a participation might take place was not yet 
decided. It was, however, tentatively identified in a slow institutional 
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growth from the basis of the improved local powers envisaged in one 
of the 'Koornhof bills' (the one which would result in the Black Local 
Authorities Act of 1982) and in the representation of the urban Blacks 
in the constellation of states: 
We shall ..• grant them a higher status than municipal status, 
but not overnight ... That higher degree of local government ... 
can receive a say in some co-ordinated form or other in this 
council of States where the constellation of State~ deliberate 
with one another on matters of common interest.(69J 
The reluctance of the government to accept the participation of the 
urban Blacks at higher levels of the decision-making process is revealed 
by its insistence on the need of develop1ng close contacts between the 
homelands and the urban Blacks. It was becoming evident that it was 
necessary to find a political accommodation for these Blacks, but still 
this accommodation was identified in some kind of link with the home-
lands. The need to avoid a serious confrontation with the 'verkrampte' 
in the National Party was an important factor in the government's 
cautiousness in this field. Even if Botha had accepted that his policy 
would lead to a split in the party and, worse, in the Afrikanerdom, to 
force it on the issue of the participation of urban Blacks in the 
decision-making process, even if only within the framework of the 
constellation of states, would have been a tactical blunder which could 
have caused the detachment of the majority of the Afrikaners from the 
National Party. Thus, after the 1981 elections, P .. Koornhof stressed 
again that the urban Blacks should maintain and tighten their links with 
the homelands: 
As a result of the economic interdependence of nations, we find 
ourselves in a situation in which approximately 10 million Blacks 
are resident outside the national States in White South Africa, 
and the presence of some of these is accepted as permanent today. 
Those people must be accommodated politically ... it is essential 
for these Blacks to remain bound to their national States as far 
as possible. both politically and otherwise ... it is our duty to 
develop that bond to the full.(70) 
However, the most important part of this statement was the almost 
incidental clause referring to the acceptance of some of the urban Blacks 
as permanent residents in the white area. This was one of the first 
occasions in which the taboo of the temporary presence of the Blacks in 
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·the white area was officially broken by senior cabinet ministers. 
Indeed, such a break with the traditional policy required a revolution 
in the ideological thinking of the National Party. Accepting some of 
the Blacks as permanent residents of the white area was exactly the 
contrary of the National Party policy since its estabiishment. It was 
the recognition that one of the corners tones of the government po 1i cy 
had been laid down on sand and was giving way. 
When the National Party made a public self-criticism, it recognised 
that the assumption that the Blacks were only temporary residents in the 
white area was wrong and that provisions had to be taken to change the 
foundations on which the policy towards the urban Blacks rested: 
The National Party Government has made mistakes with the entire 
urban Black problem. For a long time we said that the group of 
people in the tirban areas were merely temporary, and we thought 
that they .could return to whence they came. However, that was 
a mistake ..• the Government is now saying ... that it admits the 
permanence of the problem, an~ y~ this basis we are now coming 
forward with practical steps. (7 J -
However, it is difficult to say that the bulk of the National Party 
thought in terms of sweeping changes of policy. Probably, the majority 
of the Nati ona 1 Party was s ti 11 too busy digesting the notion of a 
permanent presence of Blacks in the white a·rea to think about the political 
changes such a recognition implied. Indeed, while the party was slowly 
accepting the idea of a new constitutional dispensation for the Coloureds 
and the Indians, there was no chance that it could be innovative in this 
field as well. The rank and file -M.P.s could not go further than using 
an improved type of local government institution to accommodate the 
political aspirations of the urban Blacks: 
It has become necessary for a truly effective 1oca1 self-government 
with real power and responsibility to be granted to the Black urban 
tommunities on an ethnic basis as far as possible. And this was the 
way the Community Councils were established. The Community Councils 
therefore aim at accommodating the needs and aspirations characteristic 
of the urban Black man within the R;~vblic in the new constitutional 
dispensation that we are entering,( J 
In the meanwhile, with the approaching of the independence of Ciskei, 
the question of citizenship came a~ain to.the fore. Also the .Ciskeiah 
government tried to obtain concessions on this issue, but again without 
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and was prepared to retake some responsibility for their citizens in a 
wider international context, but it was not prepared to compromise on 
the question of political rights for the Blacks within South Africa. 
Again this solution had one major drawback. It took into consideration 
some of the problems faced by the citizens of the independent states, 
and it may well be acceptable for those Blacks who live there, but it 
did not take into consideration the urban Blacks and thus failed to 
address their problems. Indeed, as far as the urban Blacks were 
concerned this was a non-solution. 
However, the government had definitely accepted that the urban 
Blacks could not be ignored any longer. The split in the National Party 
and the departure of the most 'verkrampte' of its members allowed the 
government a larger room of manoeuvre for facing in a more constructive 
way the problem of their place in the constitutional arrangement of 
South Africa. The first step was to recognise that since the pressure 
of the Blacks in the urban areas had been accepted,( 75 ) now the govern· 
ment had to face the consequences of this and had to 
accept the reality of the Black people in our urban areas •.. the 
constitutional problem of the urban Black people will have to be 
solved .•• we are not prepared to tell th~ Black people in the 
urban complexes that they have no rights.(77) 
Having admitted that "some of the N.P.'s political ideas, too, in 
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an absolute form, as we foresaw they would apply in the future, have 
fallen flat ..• in the face of realities in South Africa 11 ,( 7B) did not 
mean that the National Party had renounced to its aim of safeguarding 
the white homeland. It recognised that: 
the problems surrounding the urban Blacks ... are •.. the most 
important issue that bears on the future of all of us in South 
Africa •.. 
but the moving force behind this recognition was logically the preservation 
of white control over South Africa: 
we are considering the realities and how(J~}deal with those 
realities in the interest of the Whites. 
At the opening of the 1983 session of Parliament, the Minister of 
Co-operation and Development, P. Koornhof, gave a lengthy explanation 
of the government's position and intentions in this regard. Although 
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it was more a statement of intentions rather than a precise programme, 
and was devoid of practical proposals or timetables, it can rightly be 
considered as the government's manifesto on the future of the Blacks: 
Black constitutional development is one of the Government's 
highest priorities ..• Black people constitute part of any 
reform which is undertaken .•• the Government ... is therefore 
working on the rightful Black claims to participation in the 
processes which affect their interests. The policy of including 
Black people too, in the decision making processes ... has 
already gathered an irreversible momentum ... The Government 
remains convinced ••. that the opt1mum form of self-determination 
for the Black people is the gaining of independence in their own 
territory ... Against this background of clear objectives ... I 
wish to state clearly that the Government accepts the fact that 
large numbers of the Black peoples will be present in the Republic 
of South Africa on a permanent basis. This fact, too, must be 
taken into account in the responsible planning of constitutional 
development ... we are working towards accommodating the position 
of this section of the Black population in one way or another. 
Provision for the exercising of powers at the local authority 
level by Black people in the Republic of South Africa reflects 
an ongoing movement in the direction of management bodies which 
are elected by the residents themselves and which are being invested 
with constantly increasing powers .•. Last year, with the acceptance 
of the Black Local Authorities Act, the stage of fully-fledged Black 
local authorities was achieved. This process is still under way •.. 
such local authorities form structures which offer the potential for 
the co-ordination of common local interests ... Now in this set-up 
there are ••• problem areas, such as the possible establishment of 
regional institutions ... to serve rural communities ... It is 
accepted that Black people in the Republic of South Africa also 
have expectations beyond local authorities level ... The meaningful 
satisfaction of those expectations is undoubtedly one of t~e most 
important constitutional challenges we face at present.(80) 
The dilemma facing the government in its quest for a workable solution 
to the problems presented by the permanent presence of great numbers of 
Blacks in the white area is that, on the one hand, it recognises that 
it has to take the initiative and find solutions acceptable to the Blacks, 
and on the other hand, it considers it its duty to preserve white control 
over South Africa. In his speech, Koornhof pointed out the direction in 
which the government intends moving for finding this solution. 
The first point is that the government has irreversibly decided that 
in some form or another the Blacks living in the white area will be part 
of any further constitutional development in South Africa so that they 
will have a say in the decision-making process, at least in those aspects 
of South African policy which affect them. Here we have both one of the 
greatest changes in government policy and the first safety net for its 
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tightrope exercises. In fact, one could safely argue that there are no 
aspects of South African policy that do not affect the Blacks. However, 
the government's view is bound to be different and the scope of the 
eventual black participation in the decision-making process will be hard 
fought over. It is safe to assume that this participation will be quite 
restricted to begin with, and that it might be slowly exp~nded as the 
progress in other fields of the government's policy (such as further 
homelands opting for independence and successful developments in the 
co-option of Coloureds and Indians) allow or as the circumstances require. 
The second point is that independence for all the homelands, and 
thus the loss of South African citizenship for the Blacks and the 
consequent elimination of their claim to direct voting rights for the 
South African Pailiament, is still the main aim of the government. 
Therefore, it will be difficult that the envisaged participation of 
the Blacks in the decision-making process could be on the basis of a 
more or less equal participation in the political life of the Republic 
of South Africa. The Blacks living in the white area will probably end 
with having a say in political decision-making; however, not in that 
they are regarded as fellow countrymen in the Republic, but in that they 
happen to live therein, irrespective of their citizenship. This means 
that their participation may become reality only through a separate 
place in the eventual constellation of states and not as an integral 
component of the Republic of South Africa. Although such a solution 
would not be easily accepted by many Blacks, it seems to me that it can 
be considered as a last line of defence on which the government will 
hold unguibus et rostri.s. This solution would allow.the government to 
accommodate at least some of the Blacks' claims while at the same time 
preserving an almost absolute control on the Republic. A change from 
this position would mean relinquishing white control over the country 
and might be contemplated by the government only under extreme duress, 
and, in this case, it would probably be rejected in favour of a 
drastically partitionist line. 
A third interesting point is the refernce to the inclusion of 'rural 
communities' in a structure at regional level co-ordinating black local 
authorities. The Blacks living in the white areas have been almost 
completely ignored in political terms not only by the government, which 
considered them perfectly assimilable in the homelands' political 
structure, but also by white opposition parties, which tended to accept 
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the government's point of view or to concentrate on the urban Blacks, 
and by the black opposition, which also found the urban areas a more 
promising ground.for political activity. 
The decision to take those Blacks into political consideration 
appears a logical consequence of the government's main decision: after 
all, after having accepted that the urban Blacks have a rightful claim 
to participation in decision-making processes, it would be difficult 
to explain why the Blacks living in the white rural areas should not 
be entitled to a similar treatment. But South African politics are not 
always logical, particularly if the logical consequence clashes with 
the overriding requirement of preservation of white control. 
Considering that the rural Blacks in the white area are almost as 
numerous as the urban Blacks, the decision to involve those rural Blacks 
means a doubling of the number of people for whom a political accommodation 
must be found. While Whites, Coloureds and Indians are more numerous 
than the urban Blacks and might remain so for some time, they are 
hopelessly outnumbered by the Blacks living in the white area, urban 
and rural. This constatation strengthens the case for supposing that 
the participation of the Blacks in the decision-making process would 
take place within a framework separate from that of Whites, Coloureds 
and Indians. 
Koornhof's speech did not spell out any particular of the proposed 
structure which would accommodate black political aspirations. This is 
probably because at the time these particulars were not known even to 
the government itself: the whole affair was at the stage in which 
vague ideas are circulated within the circle of top level decision 
makers in the hope that these would coalesce into a workable proposition. 
It is thus too early to make any prediction on the outcome of this 
effort. The only firm points which have emerged up to now are two. The 
first is that the government accepts that "Black people in the Republic 
of South Africa also have expectations beyond local authorities level" 
and that ''the meaningful satisfaction of those expectations" is one of 
the long term objectives of the government's present policy. The 
second point is that "the granting of a say in decision-making processes 
may not endanger the overall security and stability". (Bl) 
The government intention is to move slowly and cautiously towards 
the creation of a structure able to accommodate the political aspirations 
of the Blacks living in the Republic of South Africa. Cautiousness is 
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dictated by the desire to preserve stability in South Africa and to 
contrive black participation in such a way that the final control of 
the most important political decision-making would remain in the hands 
of the National Party (i.e., in the hands of the Afrikaners). Slowness 
is dictated by the necessity of assuring the constant support of the 
majority of the Afrikaners for the government's policy. At the moment 
the right-wing backlash to the government's reforms has been success-
fully parried. However, for the first time since disgruntled extremist 
Afrikaners started rebelling to the 'progressive' moves of the 
National Party government, a relatively strong party has been able to 
establish itself on the right of the National Party, to act as a magnet 
for the right-wing protest. Afrikanerdom, on whose unity so many 
successes of the National Party rested, is definitely split. This will 
make it easier for people dissatisfied with the government's policy 
to leave the National Party. Until the government is as successful 
as it is now in the first half of 1984, the right-wing threat can be 
ignored, but if the government loses its momentum, or the general 
situation worsens, or if some of Botha's fireworks misfire, such a 
threat will grow again. And few aspects of the government's policy 
are more conducive to a possible right-wing backlash than its plan to 
allow the Blacks living in the white area to have a say in the 
decision-making process. 
However, this fear to move too fast lest frightened Afrikaners flock 
to the Conservative Party is balanced by other factors, internal and 
external, which push the government towards a more daring approach to 
the question. One of these factors is the bad experience of the late 
1970s. After Soweto, the government has been for a long time on the 
strategic defensive. Time and again it had to bend to internal or 
external pressures. to react, sometimes anxiously, to events outside 
its control or over which it was unable to exert enough control. There 
were moments in which it appeared that the government was unable to do 
much beyond holding on and trying to weather the storm. It was a 
dangerous and uncomfortable situation from which P.W. Botha has been 
able to get out also because changes in factors outside his control (such 
as the election of Reagan as President of the United States) created a 
general situation more favourable to South African than it was at the 
end of the 1970s. The experience was, however, quite disagreeable, and 
the government appears decided not to find itself in such a situation 
again. P. Koornhof expressed this attitude when he said: 
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(we are) seeking anxiously to develop constitutional structures 
to accommodate Black aspirations also at national level ..• (this) 
work ..• must be pursued with a view to achieving results as soon 
as possible ••. the improved quality of life that derives from 
economic and social development inevitably leads to greater 
political awareness, and in order to accommodate the political 
demands that will arise from that it will be necessary to continue 
unceasingly to create constitutional structures, where it is 
politically feasible to do so. A situation in which it is necessary 
to take action on a reactive basis under pressure as far as 
constitutional affairs are concerned, ought to be avoided as far 
as possible.(82) 
The government feels that it has been pushed around in the late 1970s, 
or at least that it was in the condition of being pushed around. It 
found this uncomfortable and dangerous. Now that it has retaken the 
strategic initiative, a feat of which few would have credited it of 
being able to accomplish so thoroughly, it cannot slow down lest it 
lose the initiative again. It is necessary for it to keep its many 
internal and external adversaries out of balance and divided. The only 
possibility it has to achieve this is by making reforms that must be 
attractive to at least a significant part of the group to which they 
are addressed. It is not possible to foresee which shape these 
reforms will have. Most certainly they will fall short of anything 
which would remove the final control of the most important decisions 
from the hands of the Whites, but it is equally certain that the South 
Africa which will emerge from that will be very different from Malan's 
or even Vorster's South Africa. 
8.2 Territorial consolidation 
The land issue is certainly one of the most contentious issues in 
the relations between South Africa and the homelands. Also on this 
topic the attitude of the South African g~vernment has been,and is, 
pragmatic (always within the limits of its ideology). The determination 
with which a solution to this problam is pursued is directly correlated 
with the general situation, with the advantages the South African govern-
ment expects from each move and with the reactions it fears each move 
may elicit from affected white interests. This explains the frequent 
changes that the priority of territorial consolidation underwent in the 
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course of the years. On the background of this continuously changing 
assessment of the relative importance of territorial consolidation for 
the South African government {of which more will be said later) some 
generally constant attitudes can be noticed. 
Every homeland since it was granted self-government has insisted on 
proper consolidation, to be achieved by transfer of South African 
territory. These requests fell on deaf ears. For a very long period 
the position of the South African government was that the amount of land 
destined for black occupation had been decided in 1936. The government 
had the 'moral duty' to fulfil 'the White man's promise to the Bantu' 
in regard to the land set apart by the Natives' Trust and Land Act of 
1936, but once this had been ~iven to the Blacks the government would 
not feel it had any obligation as far as the land issue was concerned. 
After the decision was taken to consider the black areas as embryonic 
states that would become independent sometime in the future, it became 
clear that a remedy had to be found for the fact that the reserves were 
scattered across half of South Africa and that in such a state they 
would make very sorry independent states indeed. The need of a 
territorial consolidation of the black areas was evident, and also 
evident was that "an enormous task ,,, awaits us in giving final geog-
raphic shape to the separate Bantu homelands" and that in this regard 
"a great deal rema·ins to be done". (B3) 
According to the government, this final and consolidated geographic 
shape was to be attained within the limits of the 1936 legislation. The 
most outlying of the reserves, which obviously could not be consolidated 
even using to the full the 1 imited amount of land earmarked for b 1 ack 
occupation, would be classified as 'black spots' or as 'badly situated 
black areas' and exchanged with equivalent land adjacent to bigger chunks 
of black land. Even within these limits the process of 'shaping' the 
homelands was to be a lengthy one. The main reason for the slowness of 
the implementation of the government's policy even within the limits of 
the 1936 legislation was the financial aspect: the residual 'quota land' 
and the 'compensatory land' to be acquired would require a sizeable 
financial effort, and this effort would increase with the passing of the 
years because of the gradual appreciation of land values. The financial 
problem was compounded by the reluctance of the government and 
Parliament to earmark considerable amounts of money for this task. This 
reluctance was - and is - clearly due to the absence of any political 
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constituency which could exert pressure in favour of a speedy transfer 
of land to the Blacks. The interests represented in the government or 
able to influence its decisions are many, but for all of them the 
cession of land to the Blacks was at the bottom of their interests, 
unless they were actively opposed to it. Therefore, whenever it was 
necessary to save money .out of government spending or to use government 
resources for a new activity, the funds for acquisition of land by the 
SABT were the first to go. The only people who were really interested 
in the implementation of the 1936 Land Act were the Blacks living in 
the homelands, and they were unable to exert any kind of pressure on 
the government. Other problems were caused by the attitude of the white 
farmers living in the areas set aside for black occupation. Often those 
farmers were unwilling to leave their land and had to be prudently 
convinced to sell, without causing a backlash in the farming community 
which was one of the strongpoints of the National Party, Also the 
Blacks living in the 'black spots' had to be convinced to leave their 
land, and this too was time- and money-consuming, although requiring 
less caution. (84 ) 
When the government first began to talk about territorial 
consolidation, it was in order to implement Verwoerd's policy aimed at 
giving independence to the homelands. However, it soon appeared evident 
that the degree of territorial consolidation practically obtainable 
would fall short of a total consolidation of each homeland in a single 
block. Therefore, at the end of the 1960s - beginning of the 1970s, 
when the pressure on the government was at its lowest, the amount of 
land acquired in terms of the 1936 legislation was limited and the 
importance of territorial consolidation itself for the successful outcome 
of the policy of separate development was downgraded: 
Consolidation cannot be absolute. Therefore it is not an 
absolute condition either .•• there are many states which do 
not have consolidated land ... It is, however, our aim to have 
the largest possible measure of consolidation.(85) 
The difficulty of the task of arriving at some degree of territorial 
consolidation of the homelands was enhanced by the government decision 
of not going beyond the 1936 legislation. (86 ) Since the 1936 Land Act 
was enacted when to all practical effects nobody thought that the Native 
reserves might become independent, the allocation of land provided for 
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in it was not geared to create the territorial basis of independent 
states. Sticking to that act in the process of giving land to perspective 
independent states clearly made any meaningful territorial consolidation 
impossible. This was, however, the position of Vorster's government, 
and even when his foreign policy offensive required that a new impulse 
should be given to separate development (See 4.3) and more attention to 
the homelands, the 1936 Land Act was the impassable limit in any 
discussion about land transfers: "I have told them (the homeland leaders) 
that we shall give them the land which the 1936 Act states they should 
have. Beyond the 1936 Act I am not prepared to go 1'.(B7) However, the 
foreign policy offensive required that progress had to be made in the 
homelands policy, and the land question was already one of the major 
issues of contention between the South African government and the home-
land leaders. Territorial consolidation became again a major topic of 
government interest and the 1973-1975 consolidatinn proposals were the 
result of this attention (See 3.2.3). No homeland leader was satisfied 
with these proposals, but the government was, or at least, although 
considering them not completely satisfactory, it regarded them as the 
best which could be accomplished within the impassable limits of the 
1936 legislation. Of course, the fact that the 1936 Act was considered 
immutable was a convenient excuse for avoiding the real problem of 
consolidation: the fact that the land earmarked by that Act was 
insufficient for the establishment of viable independent states and 
that nobody in the government was prepared to consider an extension 
of that land. After all, the 1936 Act, which had established the extent 
of land to be given to the Blacks province by province, was simply an 
act of Parliament not an act of God. The Parliament could amend or 
repeal it whenever there was the political will to do that. Therefore, 
to use the 1936 Land Act as the reason for which the government was 
unable to obtain a proper consolidation of the homelands was rather 
disingenuous. 
The government's determination to stick to these limits and the 
opposite determination of the homeland leaders not to take independence 
into consideration unless more land was granted to them, apparently 
posed a stumbling block on the path of future developments in the 
homelands policy. On the contrary, an important development took place 
tAe same year with Matanzima's decision to opt for independence. As 
far as the land issue is concerned, this decision again underlined the 
limited leverage of the homeland leaders towards the South African 
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government. But the negotiations following this decision also pointed 
out that, thanks to the fact that the 1975 proposals could not yet have 
been implemented and to the fact that in these proposals a certain 
amount of quota land was kept as reserve land for eventual rounding 
off, the government had left itself enough room of manoeuvre to make 
limited concessions to those homeland leaders who were prepared to opt 
.for independence, while at the same time respecting the self-imposed 
1936 limits. 
8.2.1 Tetritotial gain~ in tha indapandanca nagotiation~ ---
Despite the limited capability of the homeland 1 ea de rs to influence 
the decisions of the South African government, and the decision of the 
South African government not to go beyond the 1936 Land Act, the first 
homelands to become independent were able to extract some concession on 
the land issue. One of the reasons for which the government could 
make these concessions was that a limited amount of land (61 100 ha.)( 88) 
had been kept as a reserve in the 1975 proposals to be used in such 
cases. But this was really a limited extension of land and was not 
sufficient for making substantial concessions. 
Although the 1975 proposals were considered final, the howls of 
protest they elicited from the homeland leaders convinced the government 
that they could be improved. The decision to respect the limits of the 
quota land provided for black occupation in 1936, however, left the 
government with only one alternative to the straightforward implementation 
of the 1975 final consolidation proposals. This alternative was the 
exchange of land. If the homeland governments were not happy with the 
way the consolidation proposals left their homelands unconsolidated, 
they might come forward with proposals of their own for exchanging some 
outlying pieces of their territory with white land adjacent to the bulk 
of their territory: 11 There can be further negotiation between 
Government and Government to exchange land .•. at any time. 11 ( 89 ) The 
borders of each homeland were still open to negotiation (and thus the 
'finality' of the 1975 proposals was discarded already at the beginning 
of 1976), what was unchangeable was the quota of land provided by the 
1936 legislation. This was not acceptable to the homeland leaders who 
would have become responsible for the decision of uprooting and 
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resettling thousands of their people. Therefore exchange of land was 
never seriously taken into consideration by them as a means of obtaining 
greater consolidation of their horheland. 
Apparently therefore, any greater consolidation than that provided 
for in the 1975 proposals was impossible. Indeed, in the following 
years when Transkei and Bophuthatswana became independent, the 1975 
proposals were the basis of the allottment of land to them. However, 
the land given to them when they became independent was not quite that 
earmarked in the 1975 consolidation proposals. Both Matanzima and 
Mangope realised that the time when they enjoyed maximum leverage toward 
the South African government was the period before independence, when 
they had accepted independence in principle, thus givi_ng the South African 
government the incentive to show generosity, but when all the problems 
we're still being thrashed out at the negotiating table and the threat 
to go back on the decision of accepting independence could still have 
credibility. Even in this condition they obtained little, and indeed, 
as far as consolidation per·se is concerned, they ended up in a worse 
situation. However, this worse situation was due to the fact that they 
managed to keep under their control some pieces of land already earmarked 
for excision from the homeland or to take under their control some other 
piece of land originally intended for other homelands. In the end, they 
did obtain more land, and this must be scored as a success for them, even 
if the extra land thus obtained was not immediately transferred to the 
independent state and, indeed, much of it had still to be transferred 
at mid 1984. 
a) Transkei 
Matanzima's land claims can be divided into two categories: those 
referring to a Greater Xhosaland and those referring to a territorial 
enlargement of Transkei proper. Obviously, the land claimed for the 
former included all the land claimed for the latter. A Greater 
Xhosaland has been for a long time one of the dreams of Matanzima. This 
Greater Xhosaland shou~ result from the unification of the two Xhosa-
speaking homelands and the white area lying between them. Such a 
country would extend from the Mzimkulu River in the north to the Great 
Fi sh River in the south and from the Stormberg and Drakensberg mountains 
in the west to the Indian Ocean in the east. 
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Although Matanzima had on various occasions expressed his hope that 
a Greater Xhosaland might one day come into existence, it was obvious 
also to him that the South African government would consider his request 
of the whole territory comprising the Greater Xhosaland little more than 
a joke. Indeed, the official land claims of the Transkeian government 
were always limited to a number of districts adjoining the main body of 
the Transkeian territories. However, informal soundings were made at 
least in regard to a possible unification of the two Xhosa-speaking 
ho'me 1 ands (under Transkei an 1 eadershi p). The South African government 1 s 
answer was that this was a. matter to be solved by negotiations between 
the two homeland governments and that it was prepared to accept the 
outcome of these negotiations whatever it would be. The South African 
government would maintain a neutral stance and would neither press the 
Ciskeian government to accept the merger nor oppose it if the Ciskeian 
government accepted it. This neutral stance of the South African 
government was tantamount to a refusal since it was obvious that Sebe 
would not accept to stand aside and let Matanzima have his Greater 
Xhosaland. However, two facts tend to indicate that both leaders felt 
that the permanence of two Xhosa-speaking homelands was not a foregone 
conclusion. The first is, on Sebe's part, his sudden discovery of 
Ciskeian nationalism in the mid-1970s, and the great care he dedicated 
to the building and fostering of a purely eiskeian nationalism among the 
Ciskei.ans and his insistence on all the historical factors which could 
help to differentiate the Ciskeian population from the Transkeian one. 
Evidently he felt that this was necessary to counteract the possible 
attractiveness of a united Xhosa homeland in order to have the support 
of the Ciskeians in his opposition to Matanzima's 1 anschluss 1 moves. 
The other fact is the angry reaction of Matanzima to the announcement 
that the South African government would grant independence to Ciskei, 
and his almost sulking attitude in the following months when he 
threatened not to sit at any table where independent Ciskei was 
represented. Although Matanzima is inclined, sometimes, to act with 
seeming rashness, he is shrewd enough a politician to know what is 
possible and what is not. His reaction induces one to think that in 
1980 he was convinced that a Greater Xhosaland was still a possibility. 
However, even if he was convinced of the feasibility of Greater 
Xhosaland, this was considered, and perhaps still is, as a long term 
perspective. The territorial claims of Transkei were made with the 
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more immediate objective of increasing the extension of Transkei to the 
limits that the Transkeian government considered as its just borders. 
The Transkeian government started to claim more land practically 
since the day of its establishment, as all the other homeland govern-
ments did. After a period of general claims for more land, made with 
the aim of creating the basis for a Greater Xhosaland, the Transkeian 
government's appetite focused on a number of districts adjacent to 
Transkei. These were the districts of Elliot, Maclear, Matatiele and 
Port St. John's, to which were added, on different occasions and in 
different composition, the district of Mt. Currie and those parts of 
Natal and KwaZulu situated south of the Mzimkulu River. (90) The usual 
answer of the South African government to these requests was that 11 the 
representation cannot be favourably considered''. The main point raised 
by it to explain its refusal was that it was not possible to go beyond 
the 1936 Land Act. However, since not all the land earmarked for black 
occupation in terms of that legislation had already been assigned to a 
particular homeland, there was scope for some cession of land to Transkei. 
In the early 1970s the Select Committee on Bantu Affairs worked on 
the issue of territorial consolidation of the homelands, and the results 
of this work were a number of reports, discussed in Parliament in 1973 
and 1975, which gave the 'final' word of the government in regard to 
territorial consolidation. (9l} In tenns of these proposals, Transkei 
would receive the district of Port St. John's and various .Pieces of 
farming land in the districts of Elliot, Maclear,Matatiele and Mt. 
Currie. (92 ) Although the extension of the land which was to be thus 
ceded to Transkei was more than 100 000 ha., this fell short of the 
Transkeian requests. 
During the negotiations preceding independence the Transkeian 
government again asked for more land, in particular the districts of 
Elliot, Maclear and the two districts forming East Griqualand (Matatiele 
and Mt. Currie). Again these requests were refused, but the South 
African government became convinced that an enlargement of Transkei was 
necessary for paving the way to its independence. 
The solution the South African government found to its problem of 
giving more land to Transkei without exceeding the 1936 quota when almost 
all this quota had already been assigned was simply to transfer to 
Transkei two districts belonging to Ciskei. The two districts in 
question were the districts of Herschel and Glen Grey, two separate and 
relatively big pieces of black land to the north east of the main body 
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of Ciskei. The Herschel district, situated at the border with Lesotho 
and with the Orange Free State, is inhabitated mainly by Sotho tribes, 
while the Glen Grey district, now constituting the westernmost district 
of the main block of Transkei, is inhabitated mainly by Emigrant Thembu, 
whose Paramount Chief is Matanzima. 
It appears that neither of these two districts had ever been 
officially claimed by Transkei (which is strange, at least in the case 
of Glen Grey, considering the tribal affiliation of its people), but 
clearly some soundings in this regard must have been made. Indeed, in 
1971, in both these two districts a referendum was held in which the 
local population was asked if the districts were to be transferred to 
Transkei or to remain part of Ciskei. The referendum was a blow to 
Matanzima's image since more than four fifths of the voters in both 
districts were in favour of remaining part of Ciskei. (93 ) However, 
despite the clear indication that the local population did not want 
the annexation to Transkei, the South African government decided that 
these two districts were the territorial price to be paid for the 
independence of Transkei. In 1975 Ciskei agreed to cede them to South 
Africa in exchange for more land around the southern blocks of its 
territory in order to achieve proper consolidation in one single block. 
South Africa, in its turn, gave the two districts to Transkei. A 
sizeable part of the population left these districts not wanting to live 
under Matanzima's rule and ended in miserable resettlenrent camps in 
Ciskei. This was a heavy human price to be paid for the independence 
of Transkei, but since those who paid it were neither white South Africans 
nor Transkeians, both South Africa and Transkei were content with the 
result. The South African government saw the first of its homelands 
opting for independence, certainly helped along this path by that parting 
gift, and Matanzima gained more than 5 000 square km. of land which 
increased the territory of Transkei by about 14%. (See Map 1) 
b) Bophuthatswana 
In regard to territory and territorial consolidation, Bophuthatswana 
is in a far worse situation than Transkei; indeed, of all the homelands 
only KwaZulu is worse off than it. In the early 1970s Bophuthatswana: 
consisted of eight relatively big blocks and eleven smaller blocks or 
black spots, extending from the Northern Cape (to the north west of 
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Kuruman) to Central Transvaal (to the north east of Pretoria) with the 
enclave of Thaba· 'Nchu in the Orange Free State, and covering an 
extension few hectares short of 38 000 square km. 
The territorial aspirations of the Bophuthatswana government were 
directed at the consolidation of the homeland in one single block 
covering the north eastern Cape and the north western Transvaal 
(retaining Thaba 'Nchu as an enclave in the Orange Free State). Given 
the great distance between the scattered blocks of Bophuthatswana, the 
territory claimed by its government was large indeed, The whole area 
lying between the scattered blocks was claimed with the towns of 
Kuruman, Vryburg, Delareyville, Mafeking, Lichtenburg, Zeerust, 
Swartruggens, Rustenburg and Brits and great part of their districts.( 94 ) 
There was, of course, no chance that the South African government could 
seriously take into consideration such claims. 
Although Mangop~ too, did not think that his claims could be accepted, 
he hoped that wh~n the South African government talked about consolidation 
it meant it. Thus, when the 1975 consolidation proposals were published 
the Bophuthatswana government was shocked. According to these proposals, 
Bophuthatswana was to be 'consolidated' into six blocks covering less 
than 40 500 sq. km., and this consolidation was to be achieved mainly 
with the excision from the homeland of all the minor blocks and black 
spots and of the whole Morotele 2 district (the easternmost of the 
original eight blocks). 
Although the solution to the problem of territorial consolidation 
was totally unsatisfactory for Bophuthatswana, Mangope decided to opt 
for independence. During the independence negotiations the land issue 
was again one of the most· contentious points of disagreement. This time, 
however, Mangope had no delusion about consolidation, and his efforts 
aimed at avoiding the excision of land from Bophuthatswana in order to 
avoid being saddled with the forced resettlement of tens of thousands 
of people. His efforts were complicated by the inability of the South 
African government to go beyond the 1936 legislation and by its decision 
that, as a result of this, the only modifications of borders that were 
possible were those due to exchange of land within the limits of the 
total area which had been allocated to Bophuthatswana in the 1975 
consolidation proposals. In these conditions Mangope had to fight almost 
for every inch of land, and almost every piece of land whose excision was 
avoided had to be paid for with the renunciation of some piece of land 
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which had been earmarked in the 1975 proposals for transfer to 
Bophuthatswana. 
In the end, the South African government accepted to waive the 
excision of some of the areas whiCh according to the 1975 proposals 
should have reverted to South Africa in exchange for Bophuthatswana's 
renunciation of some of the areas earmarked for cession to it. In 
announcing to Parliament that "as a result of negotiations with 
Bophuthatswana, we have now decided not to excise some of these 
sections {those for whose excision from Bophuthatswana authorisation 
was granted by Parliament in 1975) any more", M.C. Botha also said 
that as a result of these negotiations the territory of Bophuthatswana 
would be greater than it was envisaged by the 1975 proposals.( 95 ) 
Bophuthatswana retained two relatively big areas in the districts of 
Ganyesa and Tlhaping-Tlharo (the westernmost block), few other small 
areas in the central block and great part of Morotele 2 district. (The 
parts of this district which were actually excised were inhabitated 
mostly by Ndebeles and formed the core of the newly constituted 
KwaNdebele.) In exchange, it renounced to some small and not so small areas 
adjacent to the districts of Tlhaping-Tlharo, Taung, Disotobola, Mankwe, 
Odi 1 and Morotele 1. At the time of independence, however, almost no 
land had been added to Bophuthatswana, and only in 1978, by the 
Bophuthatswana Extension Act (No. 8 of 1978) some parts were. Most of 
the land added in 1978 included those areas which according to the 
1973-75 proposals were to be excised from Bophuthatswana. These areas, 
in particular the Morotele 2 district, had always remained under the 
administration of Bophuthatswana, but were not included in the schedule 
of the Status of Bophuthatswana Act, by which South Africa relinquished 
its sovereignty over the land that formed Bophuthatswana. (See Maps 2 
and 3) 
. It was very little to show for the long and hard negotiations 
4 
-Mangope held with the South African government, but at least it was 
something, and it made unnecessary the resettlement of many tens of 
thousands of people who were living in the areas thus retained. It 
was also important because the South African government was induced 
to give Bophuthatswana more land than it planned in the 1975 proposals. 
It is true that in those proposals a small portion of quota land was 
kept as a reserve just in case such rounding off became necessary. 
However, the small extension of land kept in reserve in the Cape Province 
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(18 000 ha.) and in the Transvaal (22 000 ha.) had been used up, if 
not already exceeded, and any further rounding off of other homelands 
would require the abandonment of the 1936 legislation. 
c) Venda 
As in the case of all the other homelands, also the Venda government 
claimed large areas since its establishment. The areas claimed by it 
included large tracts of the Messina and Soutpansberg districts with the 
towns of Messina and Louis Trichardt to the west of Venda plus other 
areas to the south west of the homeland, including areas belonging to 
Gazankulu and Lebowa as well as to South Africa, up to include the town 
of Pietersburg. (96 ) Such claims had even less probability of being 
accepted than those made by Transkei and Bophuthatswana. 
In the early 1970s Venda was composed of one big block to the east 
of the main line to Messina, extending from the Limpopo to the Middle 
Letaba and from the borders of the Kruger Park to the vicinity of Louis 
Trichardt, plus two smaller blocks, one to the west of Louis Trichardt 
and the other south of the main block and north west of Soekmekaar, 
covering a total areas of about 6 181 sq. km .• The 1973-75 consolidation 
proposals provided for increasing the total area of Venda by about 
500 sq. km.( 97 ) The block of land to the west of Louis Trichardt was to 
be excised from Venda( 98) together with an almost uninhabitated strip of 
land five kilometres wide along the banks of the Limpopo (to isolate 
Venda from Rhodesia), and a few farms whose borders projected out from 
the main block. In exchange for these excisions, a large piece of land 
at the north west borders of the homeland and a few farms all around 
would be added to the main block of Venda and another large piece of 
land would be added to the remaining smaller block to the south. In 
this way, Venda would be 'consolidated' in two blocks covering an 
extension of about 6 680 sq. km. (See Map 4) 
When Mphephu decided to opt for independence the land question was 
again one of the most important topics of the negotiations. The result 
of these negotiations was that in exchange for Venda's renunciation of 
part of the area along its north west border earmarked for it in the 
1975 proposals, all the small areas protruding from the main block which 
were earmarked for excision would remain Venda's. Furthermore, the two 
blocks that constituted the 'consolidated' Venda according to the 1975 
proposals would be linked by a narrow strip of land along the northern 
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boundary of the 'Elim finger' of Gazankulu. The third block of Venda, 
the Kutama and Senthimula area to the west of Louis Trichardt, although 
having been earmarked for excision was still under Venda control. By an 
agreement on the eve of independence, it was agreed that this area, 
although remaining scheduled for excision and thus not being included 
in the areas over which Venda received sovereignty, would continue to 
be administered by Venda for the time being, pending further examination 
of the matter. (99 ) 
In this case too, very little was obtained by the homeland 
negotiators, but again the South African government agreed to the 
cession of more land than was scheduled in the 1975 proposals. This 
time the cession of land to Venda caused the total surface of the black 
areas (at least of the land scheduled to pass under black control) to 
• exceed slightly the provision of the 1936 legislation. Although the 
practical effect of this was limited because the areas thus earmarked 
for cession to the independent states was not immediately given to them 
(and in 1984 most of these areas still had to be transferred), .it was 
nonetheless significant. 
This enlargement of the black areas beyond the limited established 
in 1936 did not happen by chance: the change in the South African 
government from the Primeministership of Vorster to that of P.W. Botha 
introduced a new and apparently more dynamic approach also to this 
aspect of interracial relations. For the first time, the 1936 Land Act, 
the taboo which had thwarted any attempt to meaningful consolidation 
of the homelands, was not regarded as an immutable proposition (as far 
as the extent of the black areas is concerned). Already during the first 
year of Botha's tenure a commission was appointed to propose new 
solutions to the consolidation issue. The more open approach to the 
land question of the new South African leadership, however, met with 
strong resistance from the white communities involved, and much of the 
commission work remains as an enunciation of good intentions, without 
practical effects. 
8.2.2 The Primeministership of P~W~ Botha and a new approach 
to the land question 
Even if the practical results of the new course regarding the land 
issue have been up to now limited, the importance of this change must 
not be underestimated. 
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The position of the Vorster government was that althdugh 
It is ideal to leave one piece of land for these people as their 
eventual territory ••• various physical factors .•• made anything 
of this kind entirely impossible. The first was the issue of 
finances. The cost involved ran to vast sums of money .•. it 
could have landed us in financial difficulties ... (if) ~·· an 
attempt had been made to consolidate ••. in this way so that each 
separate government could have one separate territory. Further-
more the resettlement of people in their thousands would have 
resulted in inconvenience on a vast scale. One of the most 
important ••• factors ••. was the issue of the quota land provided 
by the 1936 legislation. Even though we had had the finance and 
even though we had been able to carry out the necessary resettlement 
of people, the quota land would still have remained •.. and the 
matter{ covld only have been negotiated by mutual exchange of 
land. lOOJ 
(from which it appears that the 1936 legislation was a greater physical 
obstacle than the financial availability and the problems of resettle-
ment.) The government was unwilling to exceed the limits of the 1936 
Land Act both because it was afraid of the reaction of the farmers, 
particularly those in the Transvaal and the Northern Capea and because 
of the reluctance, in principle, to give away land to the Blacks. How 
strongly the land question was felt is proved by an earlier statement 
made by Vorster, who said that "if a homeland does not want to become 
independent as a result of the fact that I do not want to give it more 
land, then that is its affair".(IOl) Certainly, he knew that he could 
exert enough pressure to convince some of the homeland leaders to opt 
for independence even if their land claims were not met and their 
homelands were a patchwork of scattered pieces of land. But he could 
not be sure if this could happen in many cases or not even in one. 
Therefore he'was prepared to risk the failure of, or at least, a long 
stalemate in the policy of separate development rather than give the 
homelands more land than it was provided for in 1936. It is true that 
in 1973 the South African government did not feel the urgent need for 
practical results from this policy, but one would think that in the 
middle of its push for detente with the African countries, it would 
be prepared to make concessions to the homeland leaders, since progress 
in the constitutional development of the homelands was its main weapon 
in this political offensive. Refusing to take into consideration any 
concession on the land issue when the homeland leaders were maintaining 
that they would not opt for independence unless more land was given to 
' 
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them, meant at least jeopardizing the work of the last few years and the 
hope of a success in foreign policy. 
Vorster realised that real consolidation would be a great incentive 
·for the homeland leaders to opt for independence, but the only way he 
was prepared to· consider in order to obtain a more meaningful 
consolidation than obtained in the 1975 proposals was through exchange 
of land within the limits of the 1936 legislation. He was prepared to 
give the homelands a considerable extent of white land but only if an 
equivalent extent of black land were given back to the Whites, (l02) 
However, the homeland leaders often stated that this was not their 
interpretation of 1 consolidation' and that ·they were unwilling to give 
away any part of their land, and face the problem of resettling all 
the people living on that land, in order to solve South Africa's 
problems about consolidation. 
In these conditions the only ways to satisfy the desire for more 
land of those leaders who were inclined to opt for independence were 
either to give them land belonging to other homelands, as in the case 
of Transkei, or using the limited amount of land kept as a reserve in 
the 1975 proposals, as.in the case of Bophuthatswana. However, both 
were short term expedients: the conditions of the three-cornered deal 
regarding Glen Grey and Herschel were unrepeatable, and the amount kept 
as a reserve was small and would rapidly be exhausted. The Vorster 
government was unable to find a constructive alternative, and immobilised 
itself in the strict observance of the 1936 taboo: "We stand by it •.• 
that undertaking we shall honour in the minutest detail .•. We cannot 
go any further than that". (l03) Vorster wanted to see more homelands 
become independent, but not at the price of more white land: "the land 
question is not negotiable beyond the 1936 Agreement",(l04) and that 
was the last word. 
Indeed, it was the last word of the Vorster government. A few 
months later a new Prime Minister came to power and he had a different 
opinion on this as on many other topics. The first statement of 
P.W. Botha on the land question, that the 1936 Land Act was 'a step in 
the right direction', implied that the new government was considering 
a change of policy in this regard. The confirmation that the policy 
was changing arrived shortly thereafter with the establishment of the 
Central Consolidation Committee, and with the confirmation arrived also 
a clarification of the limits of this change: 
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Although it is.not Government policy to exceed the 1936 Land 
quota unnecessarily, the investigating team is not being limited 
in its recommendations to so rec9mme~d if it is found essential 
for the achievement of our aims.{105J 
The Central Consolidation Committee started to work in earnest, and 
after his appointment as its chairman, H. van der Walt illustrated in 
broad outline its aims and said that the highest priority facing the 
country was the greatest possible meaningful consolidation of the home-
lands. (l05) After that, at its first meeting, P.W. Botha made it clear 
that the government was prepared to go farther than the 1936 
legislation,(l07) the committee started to think about new ways to solve 
the problems of consolidation. The most apparent obstacle was the 
considerable expenditure that the government would incur in simply 
implementing the 1975 proposals. This expenditure would obviously 
increase noticeably if more land than was allocated by the 1936 Land 
Act was to be added to the homelands to consolidate them properly. To 
lessen the costs of massive consolidation one of the first recommendations 
of the committee was that white farmers in the areas to be transferred to 
the homelands be encouraged to remain on their farms. Two reasons were 
given to justify this recommendation. One was that since in that case 
it would not be necessary to buy the land, the cost for the South African 
taxpayer would be minimised. The other was that if the white farmers 
remained on the land, their expertise would remain at the disposal of 
the homelands and they would assure a sound management of the land, 
avoiding one of the most widespread drawbacks of the system in vigour, 
i.e., the rapid decrease of productivity and economic value of the land 
when it is transferred to the homelands. To give security to those 
white farmers who accepted to stay on their land, it was proposed that 
after the transfer of their land to the homelands, they would not have 
to surrender their South African citizenship and that the value of 
their land would be guaranteed by the South African government. (lOB} 
The task of the committee was not an easy· one and numerous problems 
had to be solved. The scope of the committee activity had to be extended 
because "when we speak of the consolidation of the Black areas, we are 
/lot only speaking of geographical lines that have to be drawn, but also 
of economic development that has to take place within the boundaries". (l09) 
To spread the work load of the committee, four regional committees 
representing local interests were appointed to make representations to 
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the central committee concerning their areas. For the first time, 
representatives of the homelands were to take part directly in the 
works, and two representatives were to be nominated to serve in each 
regional committee by the homelands situated in the region concerned. (llO) 
The work of the Central Consolidation Committee and the regional 
committees, which was co-ordinated with the work of the Commission for 
Co-operation and Development, immediately aroused protest and 
opposition in all the quarters whose interests were affected by it. 
By the end of 1980, thirteen iriterim reports regarding territorial 
consolidation and related matters had been submitted to the government. 
Not one of these reports was released to the public(lll) and some of 
them were referred back to the commission for further examination, (l1 2) 
This was to be the fate of almost all the commission reports. By 1983 
more than forty reports had been submitted to the government, many of 
them have been referred back for reconsideration, very few have been 
released to the public and only two or three have been approved by the 
government. Most of what is known of the works of the commission and 
· committees is known from more or less authorised and authoritative leaks 
to the press. The reasons for this are that on the one hand, although 
the committees could not propose large additions of land, their 
recommendations were controversial enough to induce the government to 
keep them confidential; and on the other hand the government itself 
was not able to decide what it really wanted to do about land 
consolidation. While it was clear that the viability of the homelands 
and their attractiveness for the Blacks would be enhanced by a proper 
consolidation, it was also realised that to attain a proper consolidation 
much more land than the 1936 quota had to be given to them, and this 
would not include only farm land but also towns. If the usual procedure 
of buying out the white owners were to be followed, the financial costs 
would have been staggering and insurmountable. However, the financial 
aspect is not the most important, also because there is always the 
alternative suggested by the committee in 1979, i.e., to transfer the 
land leaving it to its owner. 
The main problem was, of course, political and the government, still 
afflicted by the verligte-verkrampte tug of war, could not summon enough 
courage and political will to fight for adding three or four per cent 
of South African territory to the black areas. How controversial and 
politically dangerous could be to accept or even only to make public the 
commission's recommendations is proved by the story of its proposals for 
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the Ciskei, which became public knowledge at the beginning of 1981, the 
year in which Ciskei was to become independent. The commission proposed 
the addition to Ciskei of approximately 137 000 ha. of land(ll3) in 
which were included the 'industrial' area of Berlin and the town of 
King Wil 1iam 1 s Town. The government neither accepted nor refused the 
recommendations, but decided to take its time in examining all their 
implications. Unfortunately for Ciskei, these proposals were made 
public in the period preceding the elections for Parliament. The 
reaction of the Whites concerned by these proposals - from farmers to 
townspeople, from PFP supporters to those of the HNP - was a howl of 
protests and the government was frightened by it. It started to say 
that these were only proposals and that the decisions would be taken 
only after having considered the opinion of the people concerned. Thus, 
the closer the elections approached the more numerous the recommendations 
were discarded. Sound reasons were found to keep one area after the 
other under white control, and in the end Ciskei had to be satisfied 
with the crumbs of the original proposals. (See Map 5)( 114 ) 
The hamfisted management of the affair of the consolidation proposals 
for Ciskei (hamfisted unless the aim of all the sectors of the govern-
ment was to sink them), was the visible symptom of the lack of a clear 
idea on what to do about consolidation and of the hard fought rearguard 
battle of the verkrampte in the National Party, and in the government 
itself, in defence of the 1936 Land Act. This double obstacle to an 
innovative consolidation policy had already caused,, in 1980, another 
of those usual shifts of stress on the various aspects of separate 
development which are the normal government answer to a confused or 
problematic situation. 
The impression was given that, after the establishment of the Central 
Consolidation Committee, the policy on territorial consolidation had 
undergone a major redefinition. It was no longer a question of drawing 
lines on a map because the stress was now put on economic development. 
As in the mid-1960s, when internal resistance to the prospect of self-
governing and independent black territories was particularly strong, 
the government covered its incapacity or reluctance to face evolutionary 
moves in the constitutional development of these territories by stressing 
the importance of economic development and the need of an improvement in 
this field before further steps could be taken in other fields. 
This time the stress was put on the need for a harmonious economic 
development in the whole of South Africa, if not of the subcontinent, 
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and for inserting the policy for the development of the homelands in 
the new policy for regional development in South Africa and in the 
framework of the constellation of states. The establishment of a 
constellation of states might cause a redistribution of power at 
regional level, Then the whole South African economic structure would 
have to be re-examined on a regional basis and the need for territorial 
consolidation as a way of enhancing the viability of the homelands 
would lose importance. (llS) The insistence on regional development and 
the concept of a constellation of states led to a proliferation of 
suggestions about the establishment of a system of co-property or multi-
racial condominium between South Africa and the homelands over areas 
of economic interest adjoining the homelands (such as the Quail 
Commission proposal regarding East London and the 'white corridor'),( 116 ) 
or at least of a sharing of existing South African facilities and 
infrastructures with the homelands (such as proposals reported to be 
under consideration of the Central Consolidation Committee to share, 
in an unspecified way, the infrastructures of East London with Ciskei 
and Transkei, or those of Richards Bay with KwaZulu). (ll7} 
Also another aspect of the process of territorial consolidation 
appeared now to worry the government and to give it a justification 
for further slowing down the transfer of land. This was the fact that 
usually the land which was transferred to the homelands was badly used -
from the economic point of view - and its value and productivity 
sharply decreased after the transfer. Therefore, the government decided 
that further land would be transferred to the homelands only if the 
government was s~tisfied that it would be used productively and on an 
economic basis. Considering that the homelands needed the land to settle 
a great number of traditional peasant-farmers, and that this land usually 
consisted of big farms under modern management, it meant almost stopping 
the land transfers. Furthermore, to realise how little progress had 
been made in the consolidation issue, it must be remembered that this 
land was nothing but that earmarked for transfer to the homelands in the 
1975 proposals, i.e., it was still part of the quota set apart in the 
1936 Land Act. Even the 'step in the right direction' was far from 
being finally taken, 
The position of the government on the consolidation issue was 
explained at some length by P.W. Botha at the beginning of 1981: 
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The land consolidation programm~ cannot be viewed in isolation. 
It must be seen as part of our overall plan for decentralization, 
for regional development and to assist in creating new growth 
points .•• We should not simply continue to add land. We do have 
an undertaking in terms of the 1936 legislation, and we shall 
abide by the undertaking that the 1975 proposals.will be implemented. 
All new land, apart from that which was agreed upon in the 1936 
legislation, which can be added, or considered for addition, will 
not be added unless we receive guarantees on the question of 
private ownership .•. . 
•.• We want to discharge our obligations in terms of the 1936 
legislation, and where it is in the interest of South Africa and 
of the Black States concerned, we shall go further in certain 
respects and made adjustments .•. 
.•. It must be emphasized that there is a close relationship between 
the consolidation processes and the policy of establishing a 
confederatjon or constellation of States 1 based on the. inter-
dependenc~ of States in Southern Africa.\118) · .· 
It then appeared that the government had definitively taken the decision 
to increase the amount of land to be given to the homelands beyond the 
1936 limits, if it was necessary, and that to alleviate the costs of 
this cession the white owners would be encouraged to stay on their 
properties which the government would not buy. 
This actual change of policy had already been experimented in 1980 
with the cession of the town of Mafeking to Bophuthatswana. The decision 
that it was not necessary for the government to buy all the white 
properties before transferring a piece of land to the homelands, not 
only opened the way to an acceleration in the implementation of the 1975 
proposals, but also to an important modification of the policy followed 
by the government up to that point in regard to consolidation, i.e., to 
the possibility of transferring to the homelands not only farm land but 
also towns with their infrastructures. 
The opinions within the government, however, were not all in agreement. 
The realisation that the addition of a few tens of thousands of hectares 
here and there would not change the situation of the homelands, induced 
some to consider the task of consolidation as a hopeless enterprise which 
would drain away much needed resources almost uselessly: 
I think the time is past in South Africa to speak about consolidation 
in terms of merely drawing lines and borders. It is no longer 
possible. Geographic consolidation in South Africa is definitely not 
possible. If we wanted to carry out consolidation on a geographic 
basis, then we could possibly have succeeded forty years ago, but 
today it is no longer possible. If we think of geographic 
consolidation today, we must think of 3 million ha. plus ••• which 
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have to be added .•• at a cost ••• of R6 000 million over a 
period of ten years. Once one has done this, one has not 
increased the economic potential of the independent and 
national States by a half of a per c~nt,.. Therefore, the 
addition of land is not the answer.lll~) 
Perplexity about consolidation was not a monopoly of those who wanted 
to stress the need for economic development. The verkrampte were still 
alive and kicking in the government and were quick in appropriating the 
doubts about the effectiveness of consolidation to strengthen their 
opposition to any concession beyond the 1936 quota: 
When we intimated that we were prepared to have another look at 
the proposals of 1936, .•• that was not to say that we were going 
to grant more land, but that we were going to reconsider the 
allocation of land on the basis of the question whether the 
consolidation of the national States was consonant with our 
striving for freedom and the striving for freedom of various 
Black peoples.(120) 
At this point then, two different currents about consolidation can 
be individuated within the National Party and the government. One was 
the verkrampte's opinion that the 1936 division of land between Whites 
and Blacks was untouchable, that all that was necessary in regard to 
consolidation was the implementation of the 1975 proposals and this also 
without hurrying because there were more important ways of spending 
taxpayers' money than buying land for the Blacks, and that if some 
modification to the 1975 proposals was necessary, it could come only 
through exchange of land. The second was that of most of the verligte 
headed by P.W. Botha and P. Koornhof, who were prepared to go beyond the 
1936 division of land in order to bring about a better consolidation of 
the homelands, but were reluctant to press for the implementation of 
their views because of the potential costs, economic and political, of 
such an implementation. Within this second current, however, a 
differentiation was taking place between those who regarded political 
and economic problems as temporary obstacles which, in the long term, 
could and would be surmounted when the circumstances allowed, and those 
who felt that a different interpretation of 'consolidation', if not a 
rejection of the concept, was becoming necessary. This latter group was 
that of those National Party politicians and experts who were working in 
the various committees concerned with consolidation. Most of them, 
after having started their work following the government guidelines about 
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the extension of the homelands beyond the 1936 limits and the 1975 
proposals if it were necessary, and having seen almost all their 
suggestions and recommendations being rejected, realised that the 
material and political obstacles to a proper consolidation were almost 
insurmountable. Therefore, they tried to find alternative approaches 
to the question of the viability of the homelands, approaches which 
would not require a great effort as far as consolidation was concerned 
and which at times appeared to suggest the relinquishment of some aspects 
of separate development: 
Land alone is not the answer. Economic development is the answer, 
and economic development that is not necessarily based on the 
policy of separate development, because one thing is as plain as 
pikestaff and that is that there cannot be nine or ten economies 
in Southern Africa.(121) 
No wonder that in such a situation the consolidation issue remained at 
a standstill and even the implementation of the 1975 proposals was still 
in its initial phase. 
The situation became a little clearer in 1982, after the split in 
the National Party and the formation of the Conservative Party. At 
least the continuous sniping of the verkrampte from within the govern-
ment every time the latter tried Jto do something in regard to 
consolidation had ceased, and the government could at least consider 
exceeding the 1936 limits without having to backtrack on its decisions 
for fear of causing a split in the party and Afrikanerdom. 
Despite the fact that in the three years after P.W. Botha became 
Prine Minister the government was not able to take a definite decision 
about consolidation and in which cases to exceed the 1936 limits, the 
pattern followed by the acquisition of land, both black and white, for 
the implementation of the 1975 proposals had unwittingly, or perhaps 
wittingly, created a situation in which de facto the 1936 limits were 
continuously exceeded. As a member of the Conservative Party complained: 
•.. the first guide-line ••• was that the 1975 proposals ..• had 
to be •.• implemented as quickly as possible. These proposals 
involved, inter alia, the declaration of certain poorly-situated 
Black areas to be White areas. It is now 1982 and I do not know 
of a single poorly-situated Black <}r~~ in my region which has 
finally been declared to be White.ll ) 
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Therefore, while in the government the verligte were trying to have an 
official endorsement to exceed the limits of the 1936 Land Act, and for 
one reason or the other could not succeed in their attempts, these 
limits had already been exceeded by 170 000 ha. in the Transvaal and by 
59 000 ha. in Natal (end 1982)~( 123 ) 
The reason for this was that the acquisition of land for the Blacks 
had continued to go on at the same speed as in the mid-1970s, the 
process of turning 'black spots' and 'badly situated Black areas' into 
white areas had been much slower. It is difficult to say if this was 
the result of a precise policy, or if it happened almost by chance, or 
if it was due to a newly acquired sensitivity on the part of the govern- · 
ment to the protests that the excision of each 'black spot' and the 
consequent resettlement of the people living therein aroused. 
At any rate, even the 1975 consolidation proposals were far from 
being implemented and the whole issue of consolidation was in such a 
fluid state that even the people who had suggested putting the stress 
on economic development rather than on consolidation were compelled to 
ask for a speedy implementation of the 1975 proposals in order to have 
some sort of basis to build on: 
We cannot undertake the planning and the development of the Black 
States properly if we do not know where the boundaries are. We 
must therefore complete consolidation ••• I ask .•. a specific 
fund so that we shall know we have R500 million or R600 million 
annually with which we can undertake this matter.(124) 
R500 million or more annually was a considerable amount, and the 
• government had to give its attention to more impel lent issues such as 
the split in the ranks of the National Party and the ~uestion of the 
constitutional reform, and the consolidation issue faded into the 
background of the political scene. Nevertheless it is difficult to 
avoid the sensation of confusion and lack of direction in examining the 
statements of the government side on this matter. 
The government was positive that "the geographic consolidation and 
the arrangement of borders is of course a priority to give each of the 
Black national states meaningful content with regard to their political 
future".( 125 ) It was less clear if this consolidation should be based 
on the 1975 proposals, which had already been considered partially 
inade~uate at the begi~ni.ng of the Botha Primeministership, or if ~nd 
in which measure these proposals should be exceeded. Even the man who 
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was most involved in trying to find a solution to this question, 
H.J.D. van der Walt,was at times unable to disentangle himself from 
the confusion: 
If we want to consolidate properly, we shall have to exceed the 
quota ••• At the end of 1982, the quota had already been exceeded 
••• The fact is that the land acquisition programme had been 
proceeding extremely rapidly since 1973, while the process of 
turning the Black spots or badly situated areas into White areas 
has not been proceedingat the same pace. Therefore the situation 
could not be rectified ••• We have decided that if we do not remove 
badly situated Black areas or Black spots, the compensatory land 
that has already been bought for them will have to be returned 
So the quota was only exceeded in the book entry. ( 126) 
It is true that the Commission for Co-operation and Development 
continued to work on the various aspects of consolidation and to make 
suggestions about the way to bring it about, but almost all its recommenda-
tions met the fate of those relating to Venda: ~the Cabinet ••• did not 
accept a single recommendation of the commission relating to Venda. 11 ( 127) 
Although it had been decided that if black areas earmarked for 
excision were not excised the compensatory land would be retained 
under white control, thus bringing everything again within the 1936 
limits, it appeared that the government was prepared to contradict 
itself if this could lead to some precise objective: 
Let me take KwaNdebele as an example. If we are going to exceed 
. the Transvaal quota in order to make KwaNdebele independent, then 
I say that we can exceed the quota to do that ••• If I say that 
we are going to exceed the quota for Bophuthatswana, then we shall 
exceed it for the purpose of promoting constitutional development 
in the form of our confederation idea. (128) 
The trickiness of the land question had bogged down Botha's aspira-
tions to innovation. After four years as Prime Minister he has been 
unable or unwilling to set clear directives to put into practice the 
innovations he implied when he said that the 1936 Land Act was a step 
in the right direction. In 1983 this step in the right direction had 
yet to be totally implemented and further steps were almost completely 
dismissed as impossible: 
The Government regards its obligations in terms of the 1936 
legislation as having been met as soon as the acquisition in terms 
tif the 1975 consolidation p~oposals have been made ••• I personally 
regard any additional land ••• as bonus land which is allocated to 
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the Blacks ••• I can guarantee· ••• that if the essence of my 
commission's ·proposals is accepted, more than 60% of all the 
Black people will be living in the Black States ••• None of us 
••• could bring about consolidation today in the way in which 
it was done in the past ••• we used the word 'consolidation' 
when we were working with the 1936 quota. Thenceforth we 
should rather talk about 'border adjustments' ••• (nobody) 
could bring about more geographical consolidation. It is 
simply no longer possible in South Africa.(129) 
Indeed, as far as territorial consolidation is concerned, the practical 
results of the first four years of the Botha government have been scarce 
and, from the point of view of the homelands, disappointing. The 1975 
consolidation proposals have still to be implemented in great part, 
and it means that part of the land promised to the Blacks in 1936 is 
still in white hands. The decision to opt for independence has given 
the TBVC countries only a slight advantage over the other homelands in 
this field. Also in their case not all the land earmarked for them in 
the 1975 proposals has been transferred. Most of the gains these 
countries obtained in negotiating independence regarded land earmarked 
for excision which they have been able to retain only by renouncing other 
land which would otherwise have been given to them. 
Of the three homelands which opted for independence before P.W. Botha 
became Prime Minister, Transkei and Venda were promised extra land 
beyond the limits of the 1975 proposals. Transkei·was promised the 
districts of Glen Grey and Herschel, and it duly received them a short 
time before independence. However, it is safe to say that the prompt 
fulfilment of the promise to Transkei was much facilitated by the fact 
that the land concerned was already black land, only belonging to Ciskei. 
Indeed; in the case of Venda, where the extra land promised was white 
land, the only step made towards the fulfilment of the promise is the 
insertion of that land in the schedule of the Borders of Particular States 
Extension Act (No. 2 of 1980) as land which the State President may 
determine by proclamation that shall "cease to be a part of the Republic 
of South Africa and become a part of the sovereign and independent 
state mentioned". In this regard, therefore, the Act is nothing but the 
insertion in the statute book of the independence agreement signed with 
Venda. 
In reality, this Act, which was the first move of Botha's government 
on the issue of cession of land to the independent states, in its 
original form was merely the unification in a single document inserted 
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in the statute book of the agreements entered into with the TBVC 
countries at the moment of their independence. The silver lining for 
the homelands is that this Act has been amended four times, and each 
time the amendment consisted of the addition of some land to the 
schedule without any excision therefrom. (l30) 
In relation to the amendments of this Act and its implementation, 
Transkei appears to be less favoured than the other black states. In 
the original Act, land was scheduled for transfer to Transkei in the 
districts of Mt.Currie, Elliot, Maclear, Indwe and Queenstown. This 
was the land that the 1975 proposals assigned to Transkei and had not 
yet transferred. Not one of the amendments provided for further land 
to be transferred to it. Of the land scheduled in the Act, all that 
situated in the district of Queenstown became part of Transkei on the 
1st November 1982,( 131 ) part of that situated in the district of Mt. 
Currie was transferred on the 1st October 1983( 132) and part of that 
in the districts of Maclear and Indwe on the 1st January 1984. (l33) 
(See Map 1) 
The land earmarked for Bophuthatswana was in the districts of Vryburg, 
Taung, Kuruman and Mafeking in the Cape, and in the districts of Warmbaths, 
Brits, Rustenburg, Swartruggens, Marico, Oelareyville, Thabazimbi and 
Mdutyana in the Transvaal. By the Laws on Co-operation and Development 
Second Amendment Act (No. 94 of 1980) the town of Mafeking with the 
surrounding land was added to this schedule, and further land was added 
to the districts of Taung and Brits by the Border of Particular States 
Extension Amendment Act (No. 25 of 1983). By the same Act, land in the 
districts of Bloemfontein was also added, and the Borders of Particular 
States Extension Second Amendment Act (No. 109 of 1983) added land in 
the district of Excelsior, including the town of Thaba 'Nchu. Of this 
land, the town of Mafeking with its surrounding land was transferred to 
Bophuthatswana on the 20th September 1980. (l34) Further land was 
added on the 18th December 1981, in the districts of Taung and 
Thabazimbi,( 135) and other land situated in the districts of Mafeking 
and Vryburg was transferred on the 1st January 1982.( 136 ) Towards the 
end of 1983 there was a new round of land transfers to Bophuthatswana. 
On the 1st October, the town of Thaba 'Nchu was given to it,( 137) and 
further land in the districts of Vryburg and Rustenburg was transferred 
on the 1st January 1984. (138) (See Map 6) 
As regards Venda, the original Act included in the schedule all the 
land promised to Venda in the independence agreements (land situated in 
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the districts of Messina and Soutpansberg). There has been an addition 
to this schedule by the (first) Amendment Act of 1983 (No. 25 of 1983), 
which added the area of Kutama and Senthimula situated to the west of 
Louis Trichardt. Also in the case of Venda, the implementation of 
this Act has been slow and is still far from being completed. By the 
beginning of 1984 it has affected little more than half the land 
scheduled. The land scheduled in the district of Messina, excluding 
one farm and parts of another, was transferred to·venda on the 
1st October 1982, and another addition came on the 1st January 1984 
when it received the area of Katima and Senthimula~ 139 ) (See Map 7) 
The original Act made, of course, no mention of Ciskei, but in 
1983 the {first) Amendment Act provided for the addition to its 
schedule of land to be ceded to Ciskei. This land is situated in the 
districts of East London, Queenstown, Stutterheim, Stockenstrom, 
Cathcart and Victoria East. These are mostly areas not included in 
the 1975 proposals and, therefore, are beyond the 1936 quota, Also in 
this case the implementation has not been particularly fast and by early 
1984 the only area which has been given to Ciskei is the area situated 
in the district of Victoria East, which was transferred on the 1st 
January 1984. (140) (See Map 8). 
Of the TBVC countries, Ciskei appears to be the one for which further 
addition of land, beyond that scheduled in the Borders of Particular 
States Extension Act as amended, is contemplated. It is the only 
independent state in regard of which the recommendations of the Commission 
for Co-operation and Development have been made public{l4l) and if these 
recommendations are accepted, further land will be given to it in a 
number of districts (See Map 5). However, the extension of these pro-
posed additions is limited, and also in this case it would be better to 
speak of 'border adjustments' rather than of 'consolidation'. 
8.2.3 Perspectives 
Despite the statements of good intentions which from time to time 
come from the government, it appears that with the 1975 consolidation 
proposals, the period of the comprehensive approach to consolidation 
has been concluded. These proposals were the last occasion in which 
large extensions of land had been considered for cession to the homelands, 
and also the last occasion in which the land thus ceded was to become 
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simply black land. All the later discussions and the following few 
concessions regarded limited extension of land and a specific homeland, 
mostly a homeland already independent or on the point of becoming 
independent. 
The will of the government to move in 'the right direction• which 
had been hinted at by P.W. Botha at the beginning of his Primeminister-
ship must therefore be qualified. There will be no more wholesale 
transfer of land to black ownership (or, to be more precise, no more 
statements of intention of wholesale transfer of land). In future, the 
cession of land will be discussed and implemented on an ad h~~ basis, 
and will regard limited extensions of land to be given to a particular 
homeland (they will be the 'border adjustments• mentioned by H.J.D. van 
der Walt). 
Two different sorts of land will be the subject of these discussions. 
One of them is the land which according to the l975 proposals is to be 
excised from the black areas ('black spots• and 'badly situated black 
' 
areas'). It appears that the government has definitely abandoned any 
hope of being able to implement the 1975 proposals in their original 
form. And indeed, the most important difference between these proposals 
and the present situation is given by the amount of black land which 
has not been excised. 
In this case, both independent states and non-independent homelands 
are concerned. The government has often stated that if badly situated 
black areas were not excised, the compensatory land for them wo_uld not 
be given to the homelands, and if it has already been bought by the SADT, 
it would be sold back to the Whites. It is possible that the South 
African government intends to use these particular areas as a form of 
pressure on the homeland governments, to nudge them towards independence 
and to reward them for their collaboration. At least in .the case of 
the Katima and Senthimula area of Venda this seems to have happened. 
This is a 'badly situated black area• due to be excised from the black 
quota, but it has been transferred under Venda sovereignty at the 
beginning of 1984. Although the government said that as a consequence 
of the fact that this area would remain black, "land would be excised 
from the Soekmekaar-Bande 1 i erk op area originally compensatory for 
Katima a~d Senthirnula'',( 142 ) when it was transferred to Venda, no 
excision'was made in the Schedule of the Borders of Particular States 
Extension Act relating to Venda. (143) 
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At any rate, it seems that at least the bigger blocks of the badly 
situated black areas will remain under black control, regardless of the 
fact that the homeland to which they belong is independent or not. 
The other sort of land which could be object of further discussions 
is white land adjoining the existing main block of the homelands. This 
land would be beyond the 1936 quota and would perhaps include some 
towns. In this case, only independent states and homelands which have 
opted for independence will be involved. Although the independent 
states have lost most of their leverage for obtaining extra land and, 
therefore, it seems unlikely that the South African government could 
give them more land out of sheer generosity, it cannot be excluded that 
they could benefit from some South African concession. The case of 
Bophuthatswana, which after independence has been given, extra quota, 
the towns of Mafeking and Thaba ;Nchu, indicates that this is a real 
poss i b i1 ity. 
It is possible that the South African government considers some 'ad 
hoc border adjustments' as a prize for good behaviour. In other cases, 
particularly when towns are concerned, the cession of land to these 
states is the result of the unsustainable situation in which the town, 
almost completely surrounded by the independent state, .finds itself, in 
particular because of the economic decline due to the development just 
across the border of a twin town which drains away from it its former 
customers. In this light, King William's Town appears to be the most 
likely candidate for a transfer to black sovereignty. It is possible 
that in order to enhance the attractiveness of the independent states, 
the government might take into consideration an enlargement of their 
territories on the lines of the recommendations .of the Van der Walt 
t· Commission or of the Select Committee on Co-operation and Development. 
In all these cases, however, the governments of the independent states 
are merely passive recipients of South African decisions. Their ability 
to influence these decisions is almost non-existent, and where it exists, 
it derives not from any kind of bargaining power they have, but from 
their skills as mendicants. 
As it has already been pointed out, the only time when the homeland 
leaders have a real bargaining power towards the South African government 
is when they have expressed their acceptance of independence, but are not 
yet firmly committed to it. This is the only time when the homeland 
leaders have a carrot of their own to dangle in front of South African 
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,leaders' eyes. This is the time when they can extract some concessions. 
· Even Transkei and Bophuthatswana were able to obtain territorial 
concessions in that period, although they negotiated with Vorster's 
team of hardliners. Venda, negotiating in the transition period from 
Vorster's to Botha's Primeministership obtained little more. In this 
regard, Ciskei has been the most favoured of the independent states, 
despite the fact that most of the original recommendations of the Van 
der Walt Commission were rejected. In its negotiations before indepen-
dence, it could obtain the South African commitment to cession of land 
beyond that earmarked for it in the 1975 proposals and the promise of 
further border adjustments (See Map 8). 
The KwaNdebele leaders are playing the same card, apparently more 
successfully than anybody else, In the 1975 proposals, the land ear-
marked for KwaNdebele covered an area of about 72 000 ha.( 144 ) By April 
1983, its size was 98 000 ha., which according to the proposals of the 
Commission, could be increased to 340 000 ha. (l 45 ) (See Map 9). 
Admittedly, the Commission's recommendations have not yet been approved,· 
and might not be approved in their totality. Furthermore, the influx 
of KwaNdebele of a great number of Ndebeles and other Blacks in the 
latest years has created a potentially explosive situation which could 
be improved only by addition of land. Nevertheless, a fourfold or, if 
the Commission's recommendations are accepted, an almost fivefold increase 
of the land area of the homeland as a result of the independence 
negotiations is not a mean achievement. In its negotiations with 
KwaNdebele, the South African government has shown that although it is 
reluctant to face the economic and political costs it would incur in 
adding to the homelands sizeable extensions of land, if this cession is 
necessary to achieve a determined objective, then it will be done. As 
H.J.D. van der Walt has explained: "If we are going to exceed the 
Transvaal quota in order to make KwaNdebele independent, then I say that 
we can exceed the quota to do that". (146 ) 
This attitude can be considered as a gauge which helps to assess the 
perspectives in the subject of territorial consolidation beyond the next 
two or three years. 
It is evident that the land question is a very sensitive topic. Many 
in the National Party and the government realise that if separate develop-
ment and the independent states are to be credible and successful, even 
with the more modest objectives that the present government has apparently 









However, for any government national territory is not something 
given away, and for a nationalist one it is something almost 
This is a first basic obstacle to the enlargement of the home-
To this inherent reluctance to relinquish national territory 
must be added the practical obstacles that such a move has to overcome. 
Up to now the economic cost of buying the white land before giving it 
to the homelands and the reluctance to budget the considerable amount 
of money necessary for a speedy fulfilment of the 1936 commitment, have 
been the major obstacle. However, it seems that the government has 
finally accepted the Commission's recommendations about the opportunity 
to give the land to the homelands without first buying it. Possibly 
this line will not be followed for the remaining quota land, but for 
most of the further 'border adjustments', in particular if they regard 
towns, it will. Indeed, it has already been adopted in the case of the 
cession to Bophuthatswana of Mafeking and Thaba 'Nchu. In reality, 
however, the financial problems were a useful screen for the lack of 
political will (although stubbornness is one of the characteristics of 
the South African government, it is not possible that it took almost 
twenty years to realise that it is not physically necessary to buy the 
land before it can be given to the homelands). 
The political dangers for the government of a policy of land cession 
are well known and have been only slightly diminished by the formation 
of the Conservative Party. The foreseeable evolution of South African 
politics points to a likely increase of the dissatisfaction among 
nationalist Afrikaners, due to the 'progressive' moves of the Botha 
government and their consequences. Land to the homelands is not at the 
moment a priority for the short term success of these moves. Therefore, 
it appears likely that the government in the next few years will move 
carefully on the land question to avoid swelling the ranks of those 
crying 'treason'. There will probably be enough of them without adding 
those who would be indignant for the 'selling of the forefathers' land'. 
It is also not likely that in the next few years the intensity of 
the homelands' claims will increase, nor that the South African government 
will be induced by moves of the homeland governments to change the order 
of priority of the land question. The South African government appears 
to have its hands full with the additions alrea~y scheduled in the 
Borders of Particular States Extension Act and with the Commission's 
proposals for Ciskei and KwaNdebele. Other homeland leaders do not seem 
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to have the intention, for the moment, of dangling the carrot of their 
independence in front of the government's eyes. And at least the 
Bophuthatswana government, whose country presents the most complicated 
consolidation problem amongst the independent states, has apparently 
found some virtue in a temporary acceptance of the present scattered 
form of its country. In fact, many economists reckon that the 
scattered blocks of some homelands facilitate their economic growth. 
The more scattered a homeland, the easier it is for it to be affected 
by the pull of the more developed economy of the white areas. In the 
light of this constatation, it would be worthwhile for the homelands 
to accept their division in many blocks. Also the South African 
government would find it easier to invest in order to develop growth 
points if these area situated in the white areas rather than in the 
homelands. At times, when the national territory is concerned, , 
economic considerations take the back seat, but it is possible that' 
for a few years a country like Bophuthatswana will put the stress on 
economic development rather than on territorial consolidation. 
This is not to say that territorial consolidation has been disposed 
of. If, and when, the South African government reckons that without it 
the progress of its policy is threatened, then territorial consolidation 
will again take first priority. In this case, the government is likely 
to find the will to fight its conservative adversaries on this field 
and to face and defy their resentment. However, until it is not 
considered to be really necessary for the success of a policy aimed at 
preserving Afrikaner rule over South Africa, the government will avoid 
taking important steps in this sensitive matter. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE BENEFICIARIES OF INDEPENDENCE 
The decision to opt for independence required an evaluation of the 
advantages such a choice would present to the people involved. These 
advantages could be found in the socio-political field as well as in 
the economic one.. It has a 1 ready been pointed out in Chapter 7 that 
those homelands which opted for independence have received an increased 
amount of financial aid from South Africa. It is therefore possible to 
say that oneof the most important advantages of independence had been 
the influx, under various forms, of more South African money than 
the TBVC countries would have received had they not opted for independence. 
In order to evaluate what independence has meant for the people of these 
countries it is necessary to see how the increased resources available 
to them have been allocated among their population. 
Independence also meant reduced South African presence and influence 
in every-day life. This decrease in South African presence, too, has 
affected in different ways different groups within the independent states, 
and some groups have been able to take advantage of this change more 
than others. 
Without any doubt, the group which was in the best position to take 
advantage of independence was the political elite. These people had 
the control of the new state and therefore were in the condition to 
decide how its resources would be allocated. The traditional elite of 
the black society, the chiefs, are included in this group. Indeed, 
thanks to the peculiar way in which the devolution of power from South 
Africa to the homelands has taken place, the chiefs are the largest 
component of the political elite. 
The traditional structure of the black society was not conducive 
to the emergence of a middle class, and in the South African situation 
there were limited possibilities for the establishment of a viable and 
active black bourgeoisie. The middle class in the homelands was made 
up of two main groups, the civil service - including the teachers - and 
the traders, plus a splattering of professionals. These groups, too, 
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have been affected by independence, and the way in which it has 
affected them may be one of the.most important factors for the medium 
term stability of the independent states. 
However, the viability of the independent states as a factor in the 
long term solution to the South African problems rests on the support 
they can enjoy amongst the majority of the population. Most of the 
people living in the homelands are peasant and lower class wage earners, 
many of the latter migrants. Although they had almost no influence 
on that choice, nor on the subsequent policy decisions taken by the 
leadership of the independent states, they too have been affected by 
independence. It is, however, doubtful that for the majority of the 
population independence has meant significant improvements in their 
everyday life. Despite this, something has changed also for them, and 
much depends on whether for them these changes have been positive or 
negative. 
9.1 The political a~d traditio~al filite 
This is certainly the group which has received the greatest 
advantages from independence. They are the people who hold the power 
and can decide in which way the resources of the country are allocated. 
Since the early 1950s, the Nationalist government has used the 
traditional tribal structure as the foundation of its policy of separate 
development. Chiefs and headmen had 'inherited the political kingdom' 
and have fared quite well. With independence they have strengthened 
their control on the resources of their countries, and have used them 
to their advantage. Although in most cases their salaries are not 
particularly high in absolute terms, those who are appointed to a position 
in the tribal hierarchy or have a seat in the National Assembly have a 
remuneration which few can enjoy in a society where jobs are scarce and 
salaries low. Furthermore, the increase in their salaries has been 
much higher than the increase in the average wages in their territories. 
For example, in Transkei in 1964 the salary of chiefs sitting ex officio 
in the TLA was £400 and the salary scale for headmen was R64-112; in 
1978 these were R3 300 and R340-540 respectively, this in a country where 
in 1978 the GDP per capita was Rl53. (l 47 ) Besides their salaries, chiefs 
receive an extra payment based on the number of taxpayers in the area of 
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their tribal authority, and chiefs.and headmen receive travelling and 
other allowances and ~ pension when they retire from their official 
position. This is not a iavish treatment, particularly when headmen 
and petty chiefs are concerned, but also in their case it is enough to 
free them from the necessity of migrating in search of a job. This allows 
them to follow more closely their local interests and to take advantage of 
the favourable occasions that present .themselves. 
Moreover, the influence they have because of their position of 
authority, and the administrative dominance they enjoy as a consequence 
of this, make it possible for them to increase their wealth through the 
unopposed and unchecked use of.corruption and coercion. Of course, the 
higher up in the hierarchy one is, the greater are the prizes. 
Headmen and petty chiefs can substantially increase their income 
thanks to the 'presents' their tribesmen give them for being assigned a 
plot of land o~ for having the precedence in the list of the local 
labour bureaux. 
The President, the ministers and their retinues can find themselves 
owner of a recently transferred white farm as 'a sign of the gratitude of 
their people' for their efforts in the 'struggle for national liberation' .( 148) 
Or they can receive a profitable sinecure as figurehead of some department, 
corporation or office. Furthermore, their high income, their position 
of power and their knowledge make them the greatest beneficiaries of 
almost all the economic enterprises which provide for the participation 
of private black shareholders.( 149 ) In addition, if everywhere corruption 
is .rife, at the higher levels the sums are bigge~, and it is possible to 
surmise that a not inconsiderable boost to the income of those who are 
in a decision-making position comes from the activity known as 'greasing 
the wheels'. 
There is also a brighter side to this situation. This is the fact 
that amongst the many headmen, chiefs, ministers, relatives thereof (and 
with the traditional Bantu extended family there are many of them) and 
friends thereof who simply enjoy the-power they have and the economic 
benefits which derive from a more or less unscrupulous use of it, there 
are also active and able people who constitute the bulk of the budding 
entrepreneurial class of these territories. 
Indeed, as the years pass and the effects of the increased availability 
of money and opportunities are more widely felt, there is a change in 
the social condition of the traditional elite. The most able amongst 
this elite are becoming more involved in the modern economy and are 
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drawing a greater proportion of their wealth from their activity in this 
field. For them we~lth, and therefore influence and power, are ceasing 
to be the result of their semi~feudal lordship over their tribe to 
become the resul.t 6f their membership of ari ~conomically active entre-
preneurial class in an almost modern context. 
This process, by which the most resourceful part of the traditional 
elite is changing from being a sort of nobility to being part of a 
growing bourgeoisie might have important repercussions on the future 
of these countries. For example, it is possible that if a sufficient 
number of chiefs becomes less dependent on their right to assign land 
to their tribesmen as a source of wealth and power, it might lessen 
their opposition to what is widely considered as a reform essential for 
improving the viability of these countries, i.e., the switch from the 
tribal land tenure to freehold tenure. At least a first step in this 
direction has already been taken. Also because of South African pressure 
(See 8.2.2), the land that has been transferred to the independent states 
since 1980 has not been given to the tribes but has been sold to private 
buyers or leased to farmers, including white farmers who are often the 
previous owners.(lSO) 
Although the political elite is formed mostly by members of the 
traditional elite, it has also a different component. Commoners can be 
members of the National Assembly and prominent members of the ruling 
party. And, of course, many commoners are in the retinues of the most 
important figures. These people, too, partake of the economic and 
social benefits accruing to the members of the political elite. Their 
number is not great, but usually they are amongst the most influential 
people of their own area. This co-option of commoners into the political 
elite has been more noticeable after independence, also because in 
occasion of independence the number of elected members of the National 
Assembly has been increased in each one of the TBVC countries. 
This co-option of commoners had not only the effect of enlarging the 
social basis of the political elite, but also the one of giving the 
ruling group the capacity to control more tightly the population or to 
manipulate more efficiently their opinion. In fact, these men - who 
are men of promin_ence in their area, having been co-opted into the ruling 
group and enjoying the economic benefits of this, are likely to use their 
position of influence among the local population to promote support for 
the independent states and to suppress eventual resistance to it. 
Conversely, the activists of the ruling parties in the independent states 
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view these parties as a channel by which they may gain access to the 
resources distributed by the state. 
9.2 The middle class 
The line of drawing the most influential, educated and active segment 
of the population into a form of economic dependence upon the apparatus 
of the independent states was not, of course, limited to the small number 
of prominent people co-opted in the ruling group. Indeed, the 
establishment and development of a stable middle class has been one of 
the main tactical objectives of the South African government and of the 
governments of the independent states. The successful establishment of 
such a class is an important factor for the success of the policy of 
separate development. 
First of all, a development along these lines would create a 
numerous group of people having a vested interest in the preservation 
of the system. In this way the proportion of people in support of the 
independent states would increase, and, at the same time, a preventive 
blow would be dealt at the opposing side by enlisting the support of 
the very people who, because of their higher education and/or initiative, 
could be the most effective leaders of a challenge to the ruling group. 
As important as the political role is the economic one which is 
anticipated for the middle class. Unless a stable and growing middle 
class is firmly established in the independent states, their economic 
development will always totter. It is impossible to develop a territory 
merely with intervention and influx of capital from outside~ In this 
way most of the income thus generated flows directly back without 
benefitting the territory in question where the only impact on the 
local situation is limited to the establishment of some low-pay employment 
opportunities. The only real chance of an autochthonous development lay 
in the creation of a thick network of small economic activities in the 
hands of the local people. Therefore, economic and political motives 
combine to make the development of the middle class one of the priorities 
of the independent states. 
However, the emergence of an entrepreneurial group is slow and 
difficult, particularly in the case of underdeveloped countries. Therefore, 
the bulk of the middle class in the independent states is formed by civil 
servants and people employed in various services, such as education, who 
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are all in the employment of the government. The former in particular 
have an important function as one of the main supports of the establishment. 
9.2.1 The civil s~tVice 
All the components of the civil service, as well as teachers and 
health workers, are on the government pay-roll. This, of course, 
facilitates the control of potential sources of dissent, since all the 
government employees know how easily they can lose their job if they 
show any propension to making trouble for their employer. This is 
particularly significant in the cases of Transkei and Venda where govern-
ment employment constitutes the majority of the jobs, as shown in Table 32. 
TABLE 32: Economically active population (excluding agriculture) 
and government employment in the independent states. 19~0. 
ECONOMICALLY GOVERNMENT 
COUNTRY . ACTIVE POPULATION EMPLOYMENT 
Transkei 133 541 66 700 
Bophuthatswana 176 142 28 500 
Venda 9 071 8 650( l) 
Ciskei 124 680 13 180 
(l) Particularly in Venda, government employment includes a 
number of agricultural projects. 
SOURCE: Elaboration from BENSO Data. BENSO, Statistical Survey 
1981, part I I. 
The threat of dismissal is the stick that keeps government employees 
toeing the line. However, there is also a carrot to induce them to 
identify with the fortunes of the independent states. The rapid 
extension of the civil service and other sectors of qualified government 
employment after independence has not only increased the number of 
people depending for their livelihood on the very existence of the 
independent states, but has also offered them particularly enticing 
career prospects. The civil service proper has particularly benefitted 
from this. 
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The expansion of the bureaucracy in the independent states has been 
one of the most significant and substantial aspects of independence. 
To give the example of,Transkei, in 1953 its civil service establishment 
was of 117, of whom only 43 were Blacks; in 1963 it was 2 446, of whom 
445 were Whites; and in 1979, it was 19 800, of whom 140 were Whites.( 151 ) 
The same increase is noticeable also in the other independent states 
(See Table 33). The increase is not all attributable to the creation of 
new posts: the greatest single yearly increase happened between the 
year before independence and the year of independence and reflects the 
takeover by the government of the independent states of a number of 
services formerly run by privates (such as hospitals) or by the South 
African government (such as postal services). Nonetheless, the real 
increase due to actual new jobs makes the public service the fastest 
growing source of employment in the independent states. 
It is these public servants who constitute the main core of the 
middle class of the independent states. They emerge from the mass of 
the local population and are differentiated from it by their education 
and by the level of their financial remuneration. The rapid expansion 
of the establishment has provided for fast and numerous promotions, with 
accompanying schemes for the improvement of the educational and 
technical qualifications of the people involved. 
The civil servants have emerged as the most influential pressure 
group in the independent states. Despite the ban on trade union activities 
in these territories, they have their own Public Servants' associations 
which articulate their request about their conditions of service, requests 
that are in general sympathetically considered by the holders of power. (152) 
They have been quite successful in fostering their interests and, in 
particular, their remuneration scale is very good if one considers the 
general conditions of these territories, and they have obtained numerous 
sa 1 ary increases by which they have kept far ahead of every other 
category of salaried people. (l53) All these improvements have been 
justified on the grounds of shortage of qualified personnel and on the 
basis of the policy that the civil servants of the independent states 
should have at least the same salary as South African black civil servants. 
The economic advantages enjoyed by the civil servants, however, are 
not the only reason for their identification with the independent states. 
It seems possible to say that the civil servants, particularly those in 
the higher echelons, have been recruited among that part of the Blacks 
which has been politically prepared to accept and support the notion of 
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from 1975 to 1982 (excluding teachers). 
FIXED SECONDED WHITE 
ESTABLISHMENT OFFICIALS.· 
TRANSKEI{l) 
10 291 258 
17 320 358 
17 300 314 
17 310 232 
19 800 140 
20 000 119 
20 505 94 










































{l) Transkei excluding Police and Prison Services. 
(2) Venda excluding Venda National Force. 
SOURCES: Republic of Transkei, Annual Report of the Public Service 
Commission; 
Republic of Bophuthatswana, Annual Report of the Bophuthatswana 
Public Service Commission; 
Republic of Venda, Department of Public Service Commission, 
Annual Reports, 
of the appropriate years. 
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separate devefopment first, and independence afterwards. The only 
circumstantial evidence of this is pointed out by Southall( 154) in 
regard to Transkeian civil servants. · No information in this regard is 
available for the other independent states, but it makes sense to pre-
sume that those who entered the civil service of the homelands (and now 
are in the higher echelons of the civil service of the independent 
states) came from that 10% to 30% of Blacks which is found by most 
surveys to support the idea of separate and independent ethnic states. 
Therefore, the economic benefits strengthen the opinions already held 
by these individuals~ but in general are not the cause of their 
conversion in favour of independence. The fact that most of the civil 
servants supported separate development even before they joined the 
civil service, coupled with the substantial economic benefits they enjoy 
in their present condition, makes them the most dependable support of 
the existence of the independent states. 
A particular category of government employees are the teachers. Like 
the civil servants, they depend on the state for their income and are 
subject to official control. In their case too, their number has increased 
noticeably since the homelands have taken over the control of education 
in their territories, and in the latest years (i.e., after independence, 
even if not as a consequence of it) the increase has been particularly 
noticeable in secondary education. Consequently, for them too, the years 
after independence have meant career advances and ~ay increases. However, 
they cannot, in general, be considered as dependable as the civil servants 
in their support for the system. Indeed, the teachers have been for years 
one of the main components of the 'old' A.N.C. and in their majority had 
strongly rejected separate development and the homelands. Jo break the 
teachers' opposition the stick has been used more often than the carrot, 
and, particularly.in the early years of separate development, a wide-
ranging operation of 'weeding out' the most open opponents to the govern-
ment policy was undertaken. The effects of this on the teachers as a 
category has been almost traumatic. Many of the most able among them 
lost their job and many others, in order to avoid the same fate, had to 
silence their inner convictions and work within and for a system which 
they rejected. This situation, which remains widespread also today, 
may be one of the reasons of a certain demoralization among the teachers, 
which is reflected. in "an excessively high rate of drinking and an 
''(155) allegedly low level of professional conduct". The teachers are not, 
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however, an homogeneous group and it would be mistaken to conclude that 
they are as a group at least potentially opposed to the independent 
states. This is not the case even in Transkei and Ciskei, where their 
dissatisfaction with the homelands policy and their opposition to it 
has been particularly lively. Indeed, not only the most hostile among 
them have left the independent states and other potential opponents are 
kept in check by repressive action, but also many of them have found in 
the increased opportunities now available in their field for personal 
advancement a good reason to reconcile themselves to the notion of 
independent states. Furthermore, in some of the TBVC countries, a form 
of active control of the teachers (on the lines of KwaZulu's require-
ment of teachers' membership of Inkatha) is in vigour, and many of them 
have been converted to supporters and fosterers of the homeland idea. 
Nevertheless, in particular in Transkei and Ciskei, there has been 
continuously a degree of antagonism towards the government which has 
at times flared into fairly open disaffection. At least in these two 
countries the teachers can be considered as a group of middle class which 
still has in great part to be won over to wholehearted acceptance of the 
existence of separate ethnic states. 
9.2.2 Traders and businessmen 
The fact that the most numerous component of the middle class is that 
of the qualified people employed by the government should not detract 
from the evaluation of the importance of traders and businessmen in the 
socio-economic context of the independent states. 
An integral aspect of the homelands policy has been the creation of 
conditions conducive to the establishment of a productive middle class 
based on trade and small service enterprises. The governments of the 
independent states have used their increased financial resources and 
wider discretion to support the expansion of this sector of the middle 
class. 
Originally, the only noteworthy component of business-orientated 
middle class were the traders. The expansion of black traders, however, 
has been severely hampered in the past by lack of capital and by a 
system of licensing which had the practical effect of establishing a 
virtual monopoly by Whites over trade in all the reserves~ This virtual 
monopoly was maintained also with the help of a provision that established 
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a five mile radius exclusivity zone around each trading station. The 
first relaxation of this measure cam~ in 1934, when the radius was 
reduced to two miles in respect of some kind of commercial undertaking. 
As a result of this, the number of black general dealers in the 'native 
areas' increased from 119 (9,1% of the total) in 1936 to 1 199 (45,5%) 
in 1952. (156) 
It was in the 1950s that the black traders started to have official 
encouragement from the government. Indeed, as the policy of separate 
development began to be implemented, the government provided black 
businessmen or prospective businessmen with various forms of assistance. 
The establishment of the Bantu Investment Corporation (now CED) in 1959, 
and later that of the various homelands' Development Corporation, 
represented an important step in this direction. These corporations 
. were empowered to make loans to Blacks without requiring security and 
thus eliminating one of the main stumbling blocks on the path of the 
expansion of a black middle class. 
Although the assistance rendered to black businessmen by the 
corporations has been criticised both in regard to its quantity and to 
its quality,(l57 ) it had, and still has, critical importance in promoting 
the development of a black middle class in the homelands. Certainly, the 
amount of money utilized to this end was limited: by 1975 the BIC had 
loaned a total of R13 million to black businessment and the XDC R9,5 
'11 . ( 158) Th. h h t . f 1 d . m1 ion. 1s, owever, was enoug o cause a man1 o increase 
in established blackowned businesses in the homelands. In 1952 there 
were 1 .199 of them (all general dealers), in 1973 they had increased to 
9 675 (86% general dealers). (159 ) 
During their early years of operation, however, the BIC and the home-
lands' Development Corporations were strongly criticised by many black 
businessmen and homeland politicians on the grounds that they were working 
with an eye to South African interests rather than to promote homeland 
development. Complaints were aired about the limited amount of loan 
capital they advanced to black businessmen, high interest rates, favouritism 
in the granting of trading licences, and, in particular, about the fact 
that the direction of these corporations was totally in white hands. 
With independence, all the assets of the development corporation of 
the homelands concerned were ceded to their governments, which by agreement 
were granted the power to nominate half of the board of directors of their 
own National- Development Corporation. Blacks nominated to the direction 
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boards were mainly drawn from the.local business community, which, 
therefore, has increased its influence on the activity of the corporations. 
If control over the major activities of the corporations is not in black 
hands (the South African government still hold, in one form oi another, 
the purse strings), nevertheless, after independence, the Blacks have 
gained a decisive voice in the issues which most directly affect black 
entrepreneurs, in particular the distribution of trading licences and 
the allocation of loans. 
The allocation of loans is perhaps the sector in which the effects 
of the increased power of the local business community are more evident. 
In the case of Ciskei, up to 1974 the then XDC had loaned an amount of 
Rl 420 950 to 160 businessmen;(l60) by 1980 the cumulative amount of 
loans to Ciskeian businessment by the CNDC had increased to R3 962 436 
for a total of 334 loans, and in 1983 the figures were R8 683 857 for 
a total of 517 loan~.( 161 ) The yearly figures given in Table 35 show 
that from 1981 the amount loaned by the CNDC was in each year almost 
double the amount it loaned in 1980. Unfortunately I have not been 
able to find data as detailed for the other independent states, but 
it seems possible to say that the same applies for them. For example, 
the total amount of loans to Transkeian businessmen up to 1976 was 
R6 519 700( 162 ) plus a negligible amount for housing loans; by 1981 
the total amount loaned by the TDC, including housing, was R29 million.( 163) 
This increase in loans has helped to establish firmly a growing 
number of trade concerns and small businessmen in the independent states. 
The political effect of this is that the productive middle class is as 
dependent on the contintied existence of the independent states as the 
burocrats are. There is no data available on the social origin of these 
businessmen. However, from various bits and pieces of information I 
gathered in interviews during a period of fieldwork in Ciskei and 
Transkei and from odd data found in different publications, I am 
inclined to say that a considerable number of them has family links with 
chiefs, headmen and prominent politicians. This can mean that a sizeable 
proportion of these people was already part of that minority of Blacks 
favourably predisposed towards independence. Nevertheless, the net 
result of the policy tending to support the expansion of local traders 
and businessmen has. been the enlargement of the number of people having 
a vested interest in the preservation of the independent states, and 
the enlistment of the budding business community amongst the supporters 
of independence. 
TABLE 35: Business and housing loans granted by the Ciskeian National Development Corporation 
HOUSING LOANS: 
SPECIAL SCHEME FOR 
BUSINESS LOANS HOUSING GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (100% BOND) LOANS (TOTAL) (included in HOUSING LOANS (TOTAL)) 
NUMBER AMOUNT (R). NUMBER AMOUNT (R) NUMBER AMOUNT (R) 
1975 36 330 436 17 70 330 
1979 22 505 176 477 1 195 040 
1980 48 831 750 538 1 719 930 
::0 
" 1981 60 1 520 150 708 3 470 000 149 1 396 000 N 
1982 51 1 414 232 637 4 698 680 219 2 862 910 
1983 61 1 688 769 387 3 299 885 148 2 090 000 




Another component of the middle class is that of the people in 
professional occupations. Their number in the independent states is 
sma 11 both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the economically 
active population (See Table 36 below). 
TABLE 36: Number of people in professional occupations in 
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SOURCE: Republic of South Africa, Population Census 1970, 
Report No. 02-05-06. 
Unfortunately, the data for the 1980 census are not yet available 
and therefore the information given by the table is outdated. Never-
theless, it is safe to presume that people in professional occupations 
still constitute a very small proportion of the population. {The report 
of the Commission of Inquiry into the Economic Development of Ciskei 
gives the number of professionals in 1975 as 3 059. Considering too the 
excision of Glen Grey and Herschel, this number indicates a minimal 
increase in those five years.)( 164) 
It is not possible to say how many of these professionals are in 
government employment, but if it is taken into consideration the fact 
that education, health and welfare services are under the control of the 
government, and that a number of professionals are employed by businesses 
and public corporations, the proportion of professionals depending, in 
one way or another, on the apparatus of the state is certainly high. 
The others, mainly church ministers, lawyers and medical doctors, are 
the elements of the middle class more peripheral to the state and, there-
fore, they have less interest in the existence of the independent states 
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than the other components of the middle class. Their independence from 
the economic lu~e of the system makes them potential candidates for an 
opposition role. Indeed, it is from this group that most of the 
opposition politicians came. Potentially, this group may have a leading 
role in challenging the legitimacy of the system. However, a number of 
factors contribute in making this role hypothetical. 
Although these people have generally widespread contacts with the 
mass of the population, they are powerless in helping to change the 
conditions of life. In a society where misery is widespread and 
employment scarce, patronage is the most powerful instrument for 
controlling and mobilising the population at local level, Therefore, 
potential opposers have few chances of building up followers. Even if 
they were able to do so, the repressive apparatus of the state would 
insure that they were stopped before they could become a threat to the 
ruling elite. Furthermore, another factor makes even less probable 
that from this group could come a challenge to the system. It is the 
fact that amongst the educated Blacks, those who are in principle 
opposed to the existence of independent ethnic states, and therefore 
could form the core of a potential opposition, are for this very reason 
most reluctant to settle in the homelands or the independent states. (l5S) 
The professionals who have settled in the independent states, therefore, 
are mostly those who accept, or are indifferent to their existence, and 
thus are unlikely to feel the urge of becoming politically involved on 
the side of the opposition. 
Jn conclusion, the expanding middle class has considerably benefitted 
from the establishment of the independent states and as a consequence 
has a strong interest in their preservation. The expansion of this 
middle class is one of the most important instruments for the entrenchment 
of the system, and up to now it has been reasonably successful. 
9.3 Pea~a~t~ and salati~d wotkers 
Despite the expansion of the middle class, the great majority of the 
population of the independent states is still obviously formed by peasants 
and lower class salaried workers. The support, or at least the 
neutrality, of these people is of vital importance for the long term 
stability of the independent states, and therefore, it is important that 
301 
they too cduld find advantages in independence. However, it is difficult 
to say that independence has a great effect on their conditions. 
As far as the peasants are concerned, the general situation has not 
changed much. Most of them have land rights in the tribal areas, where, 
however, the number of landiess people is inevitably on the increase. 
They eke out a living from subsistence farming, integrating it with spells 
of work in the white area when the products of their plots are 
insufficient to assure the survival of the family. Their present 
condition is, in general, similar to that of five or ten years ago. 
There have been some improvements, such as a limited increase in capital 
available under form of.loans and better opportunities to market the 
products of the larid. These improvements, however, have been not only 
limited in magnitude but also circumscribed to particular areas, and few 
people have benefitted from them. The areas where these improvements 
were mostly felt are those in which agricultural development projects 
have been undertaken, such as Tyefu in Ciskei, Taung,in Bophuthatswana 
and Ncora in Transkei. These development schemes have hot always been 
successful, but in the cases where they established themselves, and 
lately these cases appear to be more numerous than in the past, they had 
a considerable impact on local conditions. In most cases, they have 
also changed the conditions of land tenure, substituting the traditional 
tribal tenure with probatory leasehold, convertible to freehold, for a 
certain-number of economic plots (less numerous than the plots assigned 
to the households of the tribe in precedence) plus communal areas where 
the rest of the tribespeople are employed as seasonal labourers. In 
some cases (again Tyefu is an example), those who formerly had land 
rights but are unable or unwilling to become full-time farmers, are 
entitled to subsistence plots of 0,25 ha. under irrigation, from which 
they can produce enough to cover most of the elimentary needs of their 
families. The result of these agricultural schemes is that some peasants 
(who might be the most able, or the most lucky or those with better 
connections) have become small landowners, have noticeably increased 
their income and are becoming part of the middle class, while many others 
have become 'proletarianized', having lost all or most of their 
traditional rights to land and pasture. However, considering that in 
any case many tribal households are landless and that many of those who 
have land rights do not produce enough to maintain all the members of 
the household,( 166 ) it is possible that the standard of life of many, 
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if not all the households of the tribes involved in the scheme have 
actually improved. At least in the case of Tyefu, this is borne out 
by the claim ~f the management of that scheme( 167 ) that the number of 
migrants from the tribe-_has been drastically reduced in few years after 
the implementation of the project. 
Although most of the few improvements of the conditions of the rural 
people cannot be considered as a direct or indirect result of indepen-
dence (however, the establishment of the agricultural corporations such 
as TRACOR in Transkei, Agricor in Bophuthatswana and AgriVen in Venda 
happened after independence and as a result of political decisions 
taken by the leadership of the independent states), it is possible that 
they are perceived by those affected by them as a consequence of 
independence, since they happened after it. And certainly, the 
authorities of the independent states will not miss the occasion of 
making political capital out of this. 
Independence had even less practical effects for the lower class 
salaried workers. This group can be divided into two categories: those 
who are in paid employment wi1thin the independent states and those who 
work in the white area as commuters or as migrants. The workers and 
labourers in paid employment within the independent states are growing 
in number as a consequence of the economic growth of these countries. 
As far as a proportion of this economic growth can be attributed to the 
increase in the resources available to the independent states because 
of their having opted for independence (See Chapter 7), it is possible 
to say that independence has meant more local employment. Of course, 
most of this increase. in local employment would have happened even if 
. these countries had not chosen independence, and it is impossible to 
quantify the 'independence factor' in this regard. 
The conditions of employment are less favourable to the workers in 
the independent states than to the black workers in the metropolitan areas. 
Their wages are lower, sometimes much iower,( 168) than those in white 
South Africa. They have no rights to organise themselves, indeed trade 
unions are banned and actively repressed, and they have even less 
contractual power than their fellows in South Africa. On the other hand, 
it has to be said that workers in white South Africa are in a relatively 
privileged condition and the situation in the homelands is similar to 
that which prevails in the independent states.( 169 ) Furthermore, in the 
independent states a few fortunates among the mass of the workers have 
the chance of making a career out of their jobs in a way that would be 
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impossible in white South Africa. 
For the migrants too, little ha~ changed with independence. Their 
material conditions are similar to what they were previously, and where 
they have changed, they have changed for everybody regardless of their 
or1g1n. In the case.of Transkei, the number of migrant workers has . 
noticeably increased in the years after independence (from 311 100 in 
(170) . . 
1974 to 499 012 in 1979), but this was due to the contemporary 
decrease of migrant workers coming from the other African countries as 
a consequence of revolutionary changes (as in the case of Mozambique) or 
other political decisions (as in the case of Malawi). The number of migrant 
workers depends on the conditions of the South African economy and not on 
the fact that they come from an independent state or a homeland. It is 
possible that their place of provenience might become an important factor 
in the case of a deterioration of the South African economy and consequent 
drastic reduction of employment opportunities. In this case, it might 
be easier for the South African government to limit the number of 'foreign' 
migrants from the TBVC coutttries, and leave the authorities of the 
independent states to-face and solve the problems this situation would 
bring about, than to reduce the number of migrants from the homelands 
and having to use South African forces to maintain order. This is, 
however, only a speculation on what might happen, and at the moment there 
is no sign that the South African government is considering such a line 
of conduct. 
At any rate, the idea of letting the black authorities of the 
independent states manage the recruitment of the migrant workers and to 
involve them in the system of migrant labour and to bind them to it is 
being rapidly implemented. Excluding those who have 'call-in' cards, 
all the other migrants, or woul~-be migrants, have to go through the local 
labour bureaux which are under the control of the local authorities of the 
independent states. This gives the chiefs and, in general, the independent 
states' apparatus a further instrument for controlling the population, 
punishing opposition and rewarding collaboration. 
In general, for the bulk of the population of the TBVC countries 
independence has changed little. This makes the improvement of the 
conditions of life of the small, albeit somewhat growing, middle class 
more conspicuous and potentially dangerous. The difference between-the 
'haves' and the 'have-nots' is widening and becoming more rigid, and since 
the majority of the population is formed by 'have-nots' independence may 
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be seen by them as a cause of their relative impov~rishment in comparison 
with the middle class 'collaborationists'. This could ca.use the majority 
of the population to deny the legitimacy of their political leaders and 
to refuse independence for good. However, one result of independence 
has affected everybody in the independent states. This is the abrogation 
of the racial legislation which is in vigour in South Africa. The 
effects of the elimination of discriminatory legislation in these 
countries are not easy to gauge and are not economically quantifiable. 
However, it is possible to say that even if independence was not 
supported by the majority of the population of the independent states, 
and the ruling gt:oup has little legitimacy in their eyes, it is hardly 
believable that the opposition of the same majority to the present system 
goes as far as being prepared to fight for the reintroduction of that 
discriminatory legislation. As long as South Africa remains reasonably 
stable and the racial legislation in regard to the Blacks remains in 
force, it is likely that a large majority of the population of the 
independent states will accept, even if not support, the status quo. 
CHAPTER"lO 
. CONCLUSIONS 
Since the National Party has come to power, the South African 
government's policy towards the Blacks has developed along two ~ines. 
The first aimed at enforcing the separation between Blacks and Whites, 
with influx control as its main instrument. The second aimed at 
establishing an alternative outlet to the political aspirations of the 
Blacks. The political and economic development of the homelands has 
been the most important element in the latter aspect of the government's 
policy towards the Blacks in the last quarter of a century. It is a 
period sufficiently long to enable the evaluation of the effects such 
an effort has had on the South African body politic and its contribution, 
if any, to the solution of the problems of South Africa. 
Verwoerd's objective in launching the homelands policy and in setting 
the independence of these black ethnic states as its target was to buy 
11 for the white man the right to retain his domination in what is his 
country 11 • In his anticipation, independent homelands would gain 
international respectability for themselves and for South Africa, making 
South African again accepted and welcome in the international community. 
Furthermore, the homelands would be the instrument which all the Blacks 
would accept as the m~ans of fulfilment of their political aspirations. 
Last but not least, economic development in the homelands would attract 
therein a growing number of Blacks, causing, in the long run, a net 
: decrease of the number of Blacks living in the 'white area'. 
Twenty-five years after the enactment of the Promotion of Bantu Self-
Government Bill, it is possible to judge if Verwoerd's anticipation has 
become reality. There has been economic development in the homelands, 
and the number of Blacks in local employment there has increased manifold; 
and while in 1951 61,2% of the Blacks were living in the white area, in 
1980 only 48,3% of them were. However, how successful the homelands ·have 
been in attracting back the Blacks and decreasing their number in the 
'white area' is shown by the census results: in 1951 there were a little 
more than five mi 11 ion B 1 acks therein, in 1980 they were a 1 i ttl e more than 
ten mi 11 ion. 
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In these years a growing number of. Blacks had the opportunity to vote 
to send representatives to the l~gislative assemblies of the homelands. 
About five million of them have become resident citizens of independent 
ethnic states and a small but slowly growing proportion of them is 
finding independence remarkably to their benefito However, how success-
ful the homelands have been in becoming accepted by the Blacks as the 
centre of fulfilment of their political aspirations is shown by the 
results of all the surveys of black opinion made up to now: more than 
90% of them considers 'one man one vote' as the ideal solution, and 
only between a fifth and a quarter of them accepts the homelands as they 
are as their political home. 
Four homelands have been granted independence. Unofficial relations 
between them and at least the countries of the 'pariah' group are 
developing; scores of foreigners, if not hundreds, have invested in the 
TBVC countries; and certainly, if a letter is sent to other countries 
from any of them, it will arrive to destination. However, how successful 
the homelands have been in gaining international respectability and in 
making South Africa welcome again in the international .community is 
shown by the fact that they have not received diplomatic recognition from 
any country bar South Africa. South Africa is still the polecat of the 
international community, and the granting of independence to the TBVC 
countries not only has not alleviated international pressure on it and 
has not bought for the white man international acceptance of 11 his 
domination in what is his country", but has become a further cause of 
condemnation from every international organisation and every other 
country. No country in the world is prepared to consider openly as final 
any solution of the South African problems in which the Whites would 
maintain their domination. 
Therefore, it is possible to say that Verwoerd's anticipation was 
nothing but a dream. After twenty-five years of homelands policy not 
one of its main objectives has been achieved in its totality, and most 
of them appear as far as ever from their attainment. 
Despite this, the homelands policy is still the policy of the govern-
ment and considerable resources are every year devoted to its implementation. 
One of the most important reasons for the government to continue implementing 
this policy is the fact that its perception of the possible alternatives 
facing South Africa and of the role of South Africa in the world have 
changed. 
307 
The government has always considered and presented South Africa as 
the faithful watchdog of western interests in a strategically important 
area. As a consequence of this stance, it expected western sympathy for 
its attempts at solving, in its own way, the internal problems of the 
country and western support in case of danger. In this light, the 
homelands policy and homelands' independence were to be the answer 
to western criticism of the internal set~up of South Africa and the 
means by which, after the homelands become independent, white domination 
over the rest of South Africa would gain acceptance, guaranteeing in this 
way expanding economic relations and continuing military links. The 
events of the mid- and late-1970s provided the South African government 
with a few shocks and with the occasion to reassess the basic assumptions 
that it would always have the tacit understanding of the West and that, 
if the country were to be faced by an overwhelming threat, the West 
(meaning mostly the U.S.A. in this case) would come to the rescue. After 
that on a number of occasions, affecting South Africa directly (such as 
the Angolan adventure of 1975, the ignored or condemned independence of 
Transkei, the arms embargo) or by analogy (such as the solitary fall of 
the Shah of Iran), western attitudes and actions were almost the contrary 
to what the South African governmeht assumed they would be, it had to 
realise that most of its expectations regarding western support were 
groundless. 
It became clear to it that a white-ruled South Africa could never 
be accepted by the international community and that the West would not 
openly accept it either. Despite the presence in the West of important 
interest groups which are in favour of South Africa or of closer links 
with it, the support of the western countries for the present South 
African government is heavily qualified. The western countries have 
decided that their interest in South Africa lies in peaceful change that 
leads to an internationally accepted South Africa, and any internationally 
accepted solution of the South African situation would include the end 
of white rule. In the existing circumstances, the West would oppose as 
far as possible any move against South Africa that would hurt its interests 
therein and threaten the prospective of peaceful change, but would continue 
to exert pressure on the South African government to encourage it to 
change the internal set-up of the country. 
Not only would the West neither aid the South African government to 
entrench some form, however modified, of white rule nor come to its 
rescue in the case of a sudden deterioration of the situation, but even 
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its benevolent neutrality cannot be taken for granted forever. Even its 
participation in.eventual economic sanctions cannot be ruled out a priori. 
'Constructive engagement' can easily go out of fashion in Washington; 
and as far as the other western countries are concerned, if they can go 
out of step with the U.S.A. when they move towards South Africa, they 
most certainly will not do so if the U.S.A. adopt a hostile attitude 
towards it. American attitudes towards countries or governments situated 
in what are considered secondary theatres can easily change, also, if 
not mostly, as a result of internal events, and every new administration 
tends to modify them to a certain extent. There are very few places in 
the world in relation to which the attitudes and the policy of the U.S.A. 
can change so easily at the change of the administration as South Africa. 
The present Reagan administration is almost certainly the most favourable 
South Africa can hope for in the present circumstances. Therefore, 
every change of administration in the U.S.A. would be a change for the 
worse as far as the South African. government is concerned. 
Furthermore, even in the case of a favourably inclined administration 
in the U.S.A., the South African government can expect only a limited 
and qualified support. It has been demonstrated again and again that 
at least for controversial countries the U.S.A. are an unreliable ally. 
Therefore, the South African government can consider the U.S.A., and 
a fortiori the other western countries only as 'fair weather' friends, 
and cannot count on their help in case of danger. In this condition 
there is little point for the South African government to bend to external 
pressure: since no amount of change will ever be sufficient to make this 
government and its basic aim respectable to and acceptable by the inter-
national community, it can as well stop worrying about trying to obtain 
its approval, and exploit instead the condition of South Africa as 
'regional superpower' to compel the international community to accept it. 
Once such an assessment had been made, the South African government 
had only one path left to follow. This is to try and find an 'internal' 
solution supported or accepted by the majority of each racial group. 
Such an 'internal' solution has by necessity to include a separate 
constitutional framework for the Blacks, or at least for most of them. 
In this context the homelands maintain much of their original 
importance. They are the separate constitutional framework in which about 
half of the Blacks of Greater South Africa (i.e., the Republic of South 
Africa within its original borders) more or less willingly are accommodated. 
For the government it is of great importance to link politically also most 
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of the Blacks living in the white area to the homelands,- and. to have as 
many homelands as possible opt for independence. 
Although the four homelands that have opted for independence are 
still almost totally dependent on South Africa, particularly for employ-
ment opportunities for their resident population, and despite the fact 
that their independence is not recognised by any other country, from the 
point of view of the government they cannot be considered merely as an 
expensive failure. Indeed, in their regard one aspect of the homelands 
policy, and the most important one, has been successful: about 4,5 
million Blacks are now citizens of the independent states and not South 
African citizens. It does not matter if they still have to come to 
South Africa to find a job and if they have to use South African 
documents when they want to travel abroa·d (but not always). For the 
South African government and for South African law, they are foreigners; 
as far as their political rights are concerned, they are foreigners 
like the Greenlanders or the Fijians. This is what the South African 
government most wanted, and this is what it has obtained. 
The citizens of the TBVC countries have lost any claim to a direct 
share in the political affairs of the Republic of South Africa. Even if 
some form of confederal agreement is implemented, they would be barred 
from interfering with the internal affairs of the 'white homeland''• 
Since it is not likely that they could regain the possibility of 
participating directly in South African politics (barring the case of 
a total defeat of the government, which could only mean military defeat. 
And in this case, it would not matter any longer), the result of the 
granting of independence to the TBVC_ countries is that at least 4,5 
million Blacks (i.e., at least the de facto population of these countries) 
have been eliminated from the political and demographic balance of South 
Africa. This represents about one fifth of the total black population 
of Greater South Africa. 
In reality, this is not enough to make any important difference: 
according to the figures of the 1980 census the Blacks constituted around 
73% of the population of Greater South Africa and around 68% of the 
population of the Republic of South Africa. This is still far from what 
the government wants and from what it needs to make possible the long 
term survival of the 'white homeland'. Nevertheless, it means that one 
fifth of the Blacks has been put out of the political game. And it is 
the evidence that within determined limits it is possible to achieve some 
of the original objectives of the homelands policy. 
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It is difficult to foresee whether the South African government will 
be able to achieve its aim of a secure 'white homeland', and the odds, 
in particular the demographic odds, are certainly not in its favour. 
The attempt to achieve this aim would tax South African resources to 
the extreme. The implementation of the homelands policy has been 
expensive, and to continue implementing it would mean ever increasing 
expenses. South AfriCa is a wealthy country but its wealth has a limit. 
From the purely economic point of view, the homelands policy, and indeed, 
the whole political set-up in South Africa, have been mostly a waste of 
resources which could have been used more profitably in other ways. It 
is certainly not by chance that the most important representatives of 
the private capital are, and have consistently been for the last thirty 
years, opposed to the policy of the government. (Incidentally, this 
should induce an observer to question the validity of the theories 
that explain the homelands policy and apartheid in all its aspects as 
the adaptation of capitalistic exploitation to the peculiar donditions 
of South Africa.) The fact is that separate development is not directed 
at the maximisation of profits or at the most efficient utilisation of 
economic resources. Of course, it implies that those whose interest is 
paramount in the eyes of the government {the Afrikaners, and by extension, 
the Whites) enjoy, on average, a higher standard of life than other 
components of the population, but its main aim is the ethnic survival 
of a people which, rightly or wrongly, feels that in a unitary South 
Africa its identity would be threatened by the numerical superiority of 
the ''others 1 • 
In this context, the utilization of a sizeable portion of South 
African resources for the implementation of the homelands policy is not 
a waste of resources any longer. It constitutes part of the price, in 
reduced immediate wealth and profits, that the Whites are paying for 
maintaining their political supremacy (not only the Whites are paying 
this price, but the immediate economic benefits of a change of policy 
would go, in the short and medium term, mostly to the White). In this 
context, the independence of the TBVC countries has been a success for 
the government, a success big enough to justify the continuation of the 
efforts to induce other homelands to opt for independence, and the 
utilization of a sizeable proportion of the South African resources to 
the improvement of the conditions in the independent states so that a 
growing number of Blacks would find their interest in the preservation of 
independence. 
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The independent states are an important component of the 'internal' 
solution which the South African government is pursuing. However, even 
an 'internal' solution cannot be ~~cc~ssful. if it has not the support 
of the majority of the Blacks. At the moment, this support is 
conspicuous by its absence. As it has already been pointed out, between 
80% and 90% of the Blacks living in the white area considers 'one man 
one vote' as the best solution, and only around 10% of them supports the 
homelands per se. This is, of course, an uncomfortable fact for the 
government, since the Blacks living in the white area are the very group 
which constitutes the biggest problem for it. However, despite the 
higher visibility of the urban Blacks and despite the fact that they 
constitute the most sensitive political problem for the government, it 
should not be forgotten that half of the Blacks live in the homelands 
or the independent states. These Blacks have a better opinion about 
the usefulness of the homelands and see more positive aspects in the 
prospective of independence. Although those who support independence 
are still a minority, they are a sizeable minority: around 30% of the 
Blacks living in the homelands approve of it and this proportion 
increases in some particular categories (for example, in rural Ciskei 
it was over 40%). 
Furthermore, among both urban and rural Blacks the number of those 
prepared to accept independence, even if only considering it as the 
lesser of two evils, is noticeably higher than that of those who support 
independence per se. In the homelands for which elaborate opinion surveys 
exist (Ciskei and KwaZulu), those who support independence and those who 
accept it, constitute more than half of the population. It is reasonable 
to think that also in the other homelands the proportion is more or less 
the same. Therefore, the minimum requirements exist for the involvement 
of the majority of the Blacks living in the homelands and independent 
states in an 'internal' solution which would protect white interests. 
Of course, to achieve a willing involvement of the homeland Blacks 
in such a solution it is necessary that they can feel that they benefit 
from it. It is difficult to say whether independence can be positively 
judged from the point of view of the Blacks, excluding, of course, the 
small ruling group which has 'inherited the political kingdom' and for 
which the advantages of independence are great indeed. 
The Blacks living in the urban areas are opposed to independence and 
indeed to the whole homelands concept. For most of them the independent 
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states are irrelevant. Only for those who are related to them independence 
had some effects, mostly negative.· De jure they have lost their South 
African citizenship and therefore are potentially worse off than before 
independence. Despite the provisions concerning citizenship in the 
Status Acts, most of those Blacks who in terms of the Bantu Homelands 
Citizenship Act of 1970 were considered as citizens of the TBVC home-
lands although they lived in the white area, have not up to now been 
forced to take up formally the citizenship of their independent state. 
Nevertheless, their condition of 'potential foreigners' can easily 
change to one of 'actual foreigners' every time they enter into contact 
with South African authorities. Those Blacks have lost, if not for 
themselves, but for their children born after independence, Section 10 
rights to live in the urban areas; they can be more easily subject to 
resettlement than those Blacks who are not de jure foreigners; and, 
together with the people living in the independent states, they have 
been cut off from future constitutional developments in South Africa: 
as the slogan goes, their birthright as South Africans has been sold 
for a dish of lentils and their right to claim as South ~fricans a 
bigger share of the wealth of South African has been taken away from them. 
However, this is only a part of the picture. These Blacks have been 
indeed excluded from any future favourable political development in the 
Republic of South Africa, at least under the present government. But 
these developments are merely a possibility in the future and it is 
undisputable that it will take at least a bit longer before such a 
possibility becomes actual and the political conditions of the Blacks 
in South Africa undergoes a meaningful change. Therefore, the citizens 
of the independent states have not been cut off from a situation in which 
they could exert political power, or even foresee to be able to exert 
it in the medium term, and restricted instead to a condition of political 
irrelevance. They have been cut off from a situation of political 
powerlessness and from the apartheid legislation. At least in the short 
and medium term their situation has not worsened. Indeed, for those who 
live in the independent states, in some aspects it has improved: at least 
they are not constricted and oppressed in their everyday life by the 
racial legislation of South Africa. This does not mean that their space 
of liberty has greatly widened: most of the independent states are 
typical third world style tyrannies. However, in the case of Bophuthatswana 
a Bill of Rights has been included in the Constitution. Although 
stringent security legislation has been subsequently enacted, the citizens 
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of Bophuthatswana are more protected by law against abuses of power than 
the Blacks in South Africa. Also the establishment of an Ombudsman 
office at departmental level enhance this protection (besides allowing 
official or semi-official contacts between a Bophuthatswana department 
and similar institutions in other countries).( 171 ) 
Also as far as the prospects of a bigger share of the wealth of 
South Africa are concerned, it is doubtful that the citizens of the 
independent states are worse off now than they were before independence. 
In the independent states there are no trade union rights and no 
minimum wage regulations, therefore, for labourers and salaried workers 
there is less protection from exploitation than there is in the urban 
areas of South Africa. However, the same conditions applied before 
independence, as they apply to the other homelands. Furthermore, in.the 
urban areas the conditions of the citizens of the independent states are 
not different from those of the other Blacks. 
There is no doubt that the citizens of the independent states have 
lost the right to claim a bigger share of the wealth of South Africa 
through the eventual future application of political influence within 
the Republic, but again this is only a potential loss, not an actual one. 
And in reality, the desire of the South African government to see the 
independent states work has meant that since independence they have 
received a larger share of South African resources than they received 
before it. 
However, for the TBVC countries the benefits of independence have 
not been as great as one could expect. All of them have been promised 
more land than that earmarked for them in the 1975 consolidation proposals, 
but by mid-1984 only part of this land has been transferred to them. 
Furthermore, the amount of extra land to be given to them is small and 
far short of what their leaders hoped for. Land is certainly a thorny 
issue, but it is surprising that the South African government did not 
feel opportune to reward the choice of independence more generously in 
terms of land. Also in terms of economic benefits the advantages for 
the TBVC countries have been limited. As a consequence of independence 
they have received more money and aid than they did before it, and more 
than comparable homelands have received. However, this extra South 
African aid, which can be ascribed more or less directly to the decision 
of these states to opt for independence, has been concentrated in the 
years around and immediately following independence. Four years after 
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it, the rate of increase in South African transfers to the independent 
states was back at the average rate of increase of the transfers to all 
the homelands and independent states. Again, also in this regard, the 
independent states are better off than if they had not opted for inde-
pendence, but it is only a small improvement. 
Furthermore, this increase in the resources at the disposal of the 
independent states has not spread its benefits evenly to all the people. 
The greatest benefits have been for the ruling elite, the political 
'collaborationists', who have greatly increased both their power and 
their wealth. The fledgling bourgeoisie, composed of middle and high 
ranking civil servants, traders and businessmen and commercial farmers, 
is the other component of the population which has most benefitted from 
independence. ·However, it constitutes only a small, although slowly 
growing proportion of the population. Furthermore, most of its members 
are amongst those who originally supported the decision to opt for 
independence. Therefore, the most visible advantages of the first 
years of independence have not gone to that majority of the population 
which was opposed or passively accepted it and which must be won over 
if the independent states are to play a constructive role in the future 
of Greater South Africa. 
While the noticeable economic benefits which the small bourgeoisie 
is enjoying vindicate its decision to support independence and strengthen 
this support, the high visibility of its newly gained standards of life 
can be unsettling for the majority of the population.whose conditions 
have remained unchanged, and this could be the origin of many political 
troubles. The increase in the number of local job opportunities, however 
lowly paid they are, can have a stabilizing effect, but this increase 
has generally been too low to influence the outlook of many people. 
Therefore in the first· years of independence, the independent states have 
not been able to enlarge noticeably the degree of support they have among 
their own population. On the other hand, the abrogation of the 
discriminatory legislation has certainly had some impact on the daily 
life of the people. The fact that, despite a general improvement in the 
situation of the Blacks in the urban areas of the Republic, such a 
discriminatory legislation is still in force in South Africa and there 
are no signs that it can be modified in the medium term (at least as far 
as the Blacks are concerned), is a strong argument for inducing the 
majority of the people living in the independent states to conclude that 
independence is still the lesser of two evils. 
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It is possible to say that the decision of the TBVC leaders to opt 
for independence has strenghtened the position of the South African 
government and, therefore, has helped in perpetuating a system which is 
repugnant to most of the Blacks. However, it is also possible to say 
that the fact that some million Blacks have ceased to be South African 
citizens, and the prospective that some more will follow, has made the 
government more amenable to the idea of accepting the urban Blacks as 
. a different political entity and, therefore, of finding a way to acommodate 
their political aspirations outside the homelands framework. 
It can be argued that the changes in the conditions of the Blacks 
since the mid-1970s are due to the pressure for change on the South 
African government caused by the modification for the worse of both 
internal and external situation and by the failure of the homelands 
policy in its original form. From this point of view, the only way 
to transform the South African society according to the wishes of most 
of the Blacks is to maintain this pressure to compel the South African 
government to bring about meaningful change or face the active opposition 
of four fifths of the population. In this light, the decision to opt 
for independence has been detrimental to the long term interests of the 
Blacks and the work of a handful of traitors of the people. However, 
this view can be shared only by those who want a change not merely in 
race relations but in the very fabric of the South African society. 
To bring about a new society it is necessary to destroy the old one; 
therefore, the heavier the pressure on the South African government and 
the worse the situation in South Africa the better it is, since this 
brings closer the day of the 'triumph of the people'. 
It is possible that if the pressure on the South African government 
increases and it feels its position threatened it could make more 
concessions to the Blacks. But if the threat is too great it is possible 
and likely that the reaction of the Whites would be uncompromising: 
after all, if the result of peaceful change would be, in terms of loss 
of power and lower standard of living, similar to that of a military 
defeat, the alternative of a violent struggle which might be won could 
become attractive to many Whites. 
The present condition of the Blacks is not enviable, and some aspects 
of the homelands policy are distasteful. However, in the present situation, 
the South African government is fortunately not ruthless enough to implement 
methodically these most distasteful aspects of its policy. But if the 
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government, and the white community at large, feel that they are fighting 
with their backs to the wall they could be tempted to use every means 
at their disposal. The determination of the Whites, and in particular 
of the Afrikaners, to fight for what they consider their land cannot be 
underestimated. This is an important weapon in the hands of the govern-
ment, because nobody can afford the risk of considering merely as a bluff 
statements such as 
If all our efforts to ensure peace should fail, ••• if all our 
goodwill and methods of upliftment are set to nought, and people 
try to dictate to us by means of violence, something will happen 
to the West on this subcontinent which they cannot imagine at the 
moment ••• If people drive us until we have our backs to the wall, 
we shall strike and the consequences even the West cannot imagine 
today. We have not been sleeping. We have been preparing ourselves.(172) 
It is possible that the South African government would shrink from 
such a 'Gottersdammerung' solution, but even if it were so {and it is 
not certain), the destruction caused by a conventional fight to {almost?) 
the bitter end would be so great that the winner would find itself in 
possess of a heap of rubble. In this case, everybody would certainly 
be the loser. 
Of course, it is not merely a question of moralizing about the necessity 
to avoid violence, or of using in an opposite political environment the 
slogan of 'better red than dead' so dear to some currents of the pacifist 
movement, although obviously even a political observer cannot but wish 
that violence and suffering are reduced to a minimum. The point is that 
neither an open struggle for supremacy between the two main race groups, 
which would certainly be a long, bitter and destructive struggle, nor 
the eventual establishment of a People's Republic of Azania, which would 
be the almost certain outcome of a white defeat in such a struggle (a 
defeat which is not, however,. certain), would be in the interest of the 
greatest part of the South African population nor in the interest of 
the western countries. Both in the interest of the majority of the 
population of South Africa and the western countries the best solution 
would be an evolutionary, and therefore step by step, process of change 
which would improve the conditions of life of all the groups which 
compose the population of South Africa. 
The independent states are part of such a process. Their independence 
had the support of important sectors of their population, as important 
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dynamic forces among the population of the other homelands support 
independence, even if not mainly as a result of the benefits it has 
brought to the independent states but because they think that both the 
status quo and violent opposition to it would be a worse alternative. 
However, the majority of the population of the homelands does not 
support independence, even if many are prepared to accept it for dearth 
of more enticing alternatives. Therefore it is difficult to foresee 
whether after KwaNdebele, other homelands would opt for independence. 
This decision would depend on three factors. The first concerns the 
condition of independence. If the South African government is prepared 
to make more concessions in terms of land, economic development before 
independence and financial aid after it, then it is possible that other 
homelands could find worth their while to become independent. Such 
concessions would be expensive for the South African government and 
would require some time to be implemented. Thus the South African govern-
ment would have to concentrate its efforts on a single homeland for a 
longer period of time around its independence than it has done up to 
now. This would slow down the tempo of the independence process. This 
is already happening: after that Transkei and Bophuthatswana became 
independent in successive years, both Venda and Ciskei did so after two 
years had passed from the independence of their predecessor. Three 
years have passed since the independence of Ciskei, and KwaNdebele is 
in the process of following suit. It is possible that if in future 
other homelands will opt for independence this would happen at a five 
or six years' interval between one and the other. 
This introduces the second factor, which concerns the possible 
developments of the condition of the Blacks within the Republic of South 
Africa. It seems logical that if these conditions, particularly in the 
political field, appear to improve, or if the situation appears to 
deteriorate rapidly and deeply enough to make the fall of white rule a 
possible outcome in the short- or medium-term, the attractiveness of 
independence would decrease noticeably. 
As regards the latter eventuality, the government appears to be firmly 
in control of the situation. There are good prospects that the interna-
tional attitude towards South Africa could remain for some time as 
positive {as attitudes towards South Africa go) as it is now, or even 
improve if friendly governments in some western countries {and moderate 
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African countries, perhaps) remain in power. If nothing untoward 
happens, .it will be the end of this decade or the early 1990s before 
the situation could worsen again, even to the point of becoming dangerous. 
Therefore, there should be enough time for at least another homeland, 
besides KwaNdebele, to become independent. 
Also as far as the first eventuality is concerned, holding out should 
not bring great rewards in the short or medium term. The government has 
realised that the independent states will never attract the support of 
all the Blacks, and therefore it is tentatively searching for different 
solutions. However, two facts make this attitude of. scarce interest for 
the homeland governments and perhaps also for their population. The first 
is that it will take a long time before this tentative search could be 
translated into practical policy. Considering that from the first detailed 
enunciation of the plan for a tri-cameral assembly to its implementation 
seven years have passed, it is legitimate to think that it will be the 
1990s before a constitutional reform involving the Blacks could become 
reality. (Again bar unexpected happenings.) And, at any rate, such a 
constitutional reform could not bring the Blacks in on an equal footing 
with Whites, Coloureds and Indians (otherwise the 'white homeland' could 
not exist), and it would concern the urban Blacks only. For the 
population of the homelands, and particularly for their leaders, this 
would not change the present situation. 
The third factor concerns a possible evolution of the constellation 
of states concept. The South African government is establishing structures 
that allow a joint decision-making with the governments of the independent 
states and the homelands in many fields. In this framework, black leaders 
will enjoy considerable power, although the size of their countries and of 
their countries• economy will still leave the South African government 
with greater power. The fact that the homelands participate in this 
structure could make independence pointless. However, if the homelands 
remain part of South Africa, they will always be subject to the laws of 
South Africa and to the overall control of the South African government. 
This would put the homelands in a somewhat inferior condition than the 
independent states and increase the attractiveness of independence. 
The situation of South Africa is complex and a solution to its many 
problems difficult to find. However, if it is accepted that a violent 
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struggle would be detrimental for all the people involved and for the 
western interests, it must be remembered that a peaceful solution requires 
not only that the economic and political aspirations of the Blacks be 
.satisfied, but also.that the interests of the Whites be protected and 
their aspirations respected. In this light, the independent states have 
an important role to play. 
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NOTES TO PART I 
1 Even if one complied with these qualifications the franchise 
was not automatic. One had to petition the Governor-General 
for admission to the franchise and the petition had to be 
accompanied by a number of documents, comprising a certificate 
of good character signed by three white electors and endorsed 
by a Resident Magistrate or a Justice of the Peace. And of 
course, the Governor-General was not compelled to grant the 
application. 
2 The constituencies were: Victoria East, Fort Beaufort, 
Somerset East, Queenstown, Wodehouse, Aliwal North and 
Tembuland. 
3 South Africa Act, 1909; Section 24 (iii). 
4 Amongst those early discriminatory laws of the Union there 
were: 
The Native Labour Regulation Act (Act No 15 of 1911) which 
continued an already established tendency - both in the 
British Colonies and the Boer Republics - to make certain 
actions, when committed by Blacks, a criminal offence - in 
this case a breach of labour contract; and 
the Dutch Refonned Church Act (Act No 23 of 1911) whose 
clause 10 prohibited non-European members in the Cape from 
membership in the Transvaal or Free State. 
5 Walshe, P., The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa, 
London 1970, p.30. 
6 P. Seme, then member of the executive of the Congress. 
Quoted in Walshe, P., op.cit., p.37. 
7 General Smuts' famous speech at the Savoy Hotel, London, 
although pronounced a few years later (May 1917} is indicative 
that at the time there was a wide agreement on the opportunity 
of a total territorial and political segregation of the 
Blacks. In this speech he said that it was useless to attempt 
to govern Blacks and Whites in the same way, that its govern-
ment's policy was to keep the Blacks apart as much as possible 
in land ownership, in forms of government and in many other 
ways, and that in the long run large areas governed and 
cultivated by Blacks would exist side by side with White 
areas. 
Quoted in Walshe, P., op.cit., p.58. 
8 Hertzog's Native policy legislative programme consisted of 
four interdependent bills published in July 1926. The first 
of these was the Coloured Persons' Rights Bill which removed 
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the Blacks from the Cape common voters' roll. The 
Representation of Natives in Parliament Bill provided for 
seven White M.P.'s (two each for Cape, Transvaal and Natal, 
one for the Orange Free State), to be elected by chiefs, 
headmen and prominent Blacks nominated by the Governor-
General. These M.P.'s were to have a reduced status, being 
able to vote only on 'Native matters'. The Union Native 
Council Bill established an advisory council composed of fifty 
members, fifteen nominated by the Governor-General, the others 
elected in the same way as the seven M.P. 's. The fourth bil 1, 
the Native Land (Amendment) Bill was to be the solution of the 
land problem and proposed to give the Blacks the possibility 
of acquiring ownership rights in those areas suggested by the 
Beaumont Commission. 
9 Sections 12 to 15. 
10 Every district outside the Transkeian Territories, excluding 
the areas which were native reserves or for which a native 
advisory board was established, had an electoral committee 
composed of members elected by all the Black taxpayers of the 
district (which for this purpose was divided into wards). 
Section 5. 
11 Sections 8 to 11. 
12 Sections 20 to 29. The Council was to consist of twenty-two 
members, of whom were White officials, four were nominated 
Blacks and twelve elected Blacks. 
13 See Walshe, P., op.cit., ch. IV and VI. 
14 About the influence of the mining industry on the early 
elaboration of the pass-law system, see, among others: 
Smalberger, J.M., The Role of the Diamond-mining Industry in 
the Development of the Pass-law System in South Africa, in The 
International Journal of African Historical Studies, vol. IX, 
No 3 (1976), pp.419-434. 
15 Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, Census of the Cape of Good 
Hope 1904, Final Report, G.19-1905, para. 139. 
16 Ibidem, para. 228. 
17 Union of South Africa, Third census of the population of the 
Union of South Africa, Report, Part I, U.G. 15-'23. 
18 By Section 10. They were to consist of not less than three 
elected Blacks, resident in the area, and a chairman 'who may 
be a European'. 
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19 Sections 12 and 17. 
20 Native (Urban Area) Amendment Act of 1930 (No 25 of 1930). 
21 In this period there were some amendments to the 1 aws of 1923 
and 1936, but not of great importance. The Native Laws 
Amendment Act (No 43 of 1937) in addition to introducing the 
principle of the removal of 'redundant' Blacks from the urban 
areas, modified the previous laws in the general sense of 
toughening the measures of those laws, extending the 
restrictions of the right of Blacks to acquire land to the 
rural townships and further restricting the right of the Black 
to enter urban areas. The Native Laws Amendment Act (No 46 of 
1944) worked in the same direction, but also enlarged 
(slightly) the powers of the native advisory boards. 
22 Section 9. 
23 Sections 14, 28 and 29. 
24 See for instance Ballinger, M., From Union to Apartheid,, a 
Trek to Isolation, Cape Town 1969, ch. 10. 
25 The tenns of reference of the Fagan Commission were: (1) to 
enquire into: (a) the operation of the laws in force in the 
Union relating to Natives in or near urban areas and in areas 
where Natives are congregated for industrial purposes other 
than mining; (b) the operation of the Native Pass Laws and 
any laws requiring the production by Natives of documents of 
identification; (c) the employment in mines and other 
industries of migrant labour; its econ~nic and social effects 
upon the lives of the people concerned, and the future policy 
to be followed in regard thereto; and (2) to draft such 
legislation as might be necessary to give effect to its 
recommendation. 
Union of South Africa, Department of Native Affairs, Report 
of the Native Laws Commission 1946-49, U.G.28-1948. 
26 See Brookes, E.H., The History of Native Policy in South 
Africa from 1830 to the Present Day. Cape Town 1924, ch. XV. 
27 See Bundy, C., The Rise and Fall of the South African 
Peasantry. London 1979. 
28 South African Natives Affairs Commission 1903-5; Report of the 
Commission; Cape Town 1905, para. 193. 
29 Ibidem, para. 207. 
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30 For a discussion of this act, see Brookes, E.H., op.cit., 
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1976, ch. 3. 
32 Union of South Africa, Report of the Natives' Land 
Commission. (U.G. 19/1916) 
33 See Walshe, P., op.cit., chs. III and V. 
34 From 1918 to 1935 four acts regarding the land question were 
signed: 
- the Natives' Lands (Natal and Transvaal) Release Act (No 28 
of 1925); 
- the Natives' Lands Further Release and Acquisition Act (No 
34 of 1927); 
- the Natives' Lands Adjustment Act (No 36 of 1931); and 
- the Natives' Lands Further Release and Acquisition Act 
(No 27 of 1935). 
All of them were almost meaningless, regarding as they were 
only slight adjustments of borders or the cession of a few 
farms here and there. 
35 See for example the declaration of J.G. Strijdom - then an 
M.P. of the then official Opposition Party, Or. Malan's 
National Party - during the debates in the first session of 
1938, in which he emphatically attacked the Government for 
'squandering' the White man's money on buying land and some 
technical improvements for the Natives. 
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was within the Village Management Boards, set up by the 
Village Management Boards Act of 1881. The Boards in each 
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a completely Black Board. The Boards apparently did not 
function too well, and in 1921 the Cape Provincial 
Administration abolished all existing Native Village 
Management Boards. 
See Brookes, E.H., op.cit., pp.252-253. 
38 For a discussion of this law see: Hammond-Tooke, W.D., 
Command or Consensus, the Development of Transkeian Local 
Government. Cape Town 1975, chs. 5 and 10. 
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39 The last district to be added was Xalanga in 1925 (By 
Proclamation No 310 of 1924). 
40 By Proclamation No 169 of 1911 in the three districts of 
Western Pondoland, with a General Council (Pondoland General 
Council). The Council was extended to the four districts of 
Eastern Pondoland by Proclamation No 166 of 1927. The main 
difference between the district counci 1 s in Transkei and those 
in Pondoland was that in the latter only two members of the 
council were elected (instead of four), two being nominated by 
the Paramount Chief. The other two were appointed by the 
magistrate on behalf of the Governor-General. 
41 By Proclamation No 279 of 1930. 
42 For instance, the estimates of expenditure for the year 
1932-33 were of £150 238 (revenue £148 336). 
From Evans, I.L., Native Policy in Southern Africa. 
Cambridge 1934, ch. 7. 
43 Section 21. 
44 The Executive Committee was to consist of the Chief 
Magistrate, three other district magistrates and four Black 
members of the Council nominated by the Council itself for the 
appointment by the Governor-Genera 1. 
45 Sections 28 to 36, and Section 54. 
46 Sections 1 to 4. 
47 Sections 5 and 14. 
48 By Proclamation No 34 of 1934. 
49 This matter was regulated 
of 1926 (No 27 of 1926). 
by the Native Affairs Amendment Act 
50 For a detailed description of the structure and work of the 
Council System, see: Brookes, E.H., op.cit., ch. IV and XII; 
and Rogers, H., Native Administration in the Union of South 
Africa. Johannesburg 1933, ch. IV. 
51 See, for example, the discussion on the social composition of 
the Bunga and the various degrees of support it had from 
different groups of the Transkeian population in 
Hammond-Tooke, W.D., op.cit., pp.186-194. 
32 5 
52 Walshe, P., Black Nationalism in South Africa. 
Johannesburg 1973, p.31. 
53 Union of South Africa, Population census, 8th May 1951. 
U.G. 42/1955. 
54 See Gerhart, G.M., Black Power in South Africa; the 
Evolution of an Ideology. Berkeley 1978, ch. 3; and 
·Benson, M., The African Patriots, the Story of the African 
National Congress of South Africa. London 1963, chs. IX 
and X. 
55 See Walshe~ P., The Rise of African Nationalism in South 
Africa, op.cit., ch. XIV. 
56 See Benson, M., op.cit., ch. XIII. 
57 The most important of these measures were, in 1949: the 
Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (No 55 of 1949), the 
Natives Laws Amendment Act (No 56 of 1949); in 1950: the 
Immorality Amendment Act (No 21 of 1950), the Population 
Registration Act (No 30 of 1950), the Group Areas Act (No 40 
of 1950), the Suppression of Communism Act (No 44 of 1950); 
and in 1951: the Native Building Workers Act (No 27 of 1951), 
the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act (No 52 of 1951), the 
Bantu Authorities Act (No 68 of 1951). 
58 In particular in February 1950 on the Reef. See S.A.I.R.R., 
Survey of Race Relations 1949-1950, pp.19-20 and 71-72; and 
in October-November 1951 in the Eastern Cape and Johannesburg, 
see s.A.I.R.R., Survey of Race Relations 1951-1953, pp.27-34. 
59 From about 7 000 to about 100 000. See Walshe, P., op.cit., 
pp.402-403. 
60 For example, the Suppression of Communism Amendment Act 
(No 50 of 1951), the Public Safety Act (No 3 of 1953) and the 
Riotous Assemblies and Suppression of Communism Amendment Act 
(No 15 of 1954). 
61 During the war many emergency measures were proclaimed. To 
ensure the ~nooth working of the industrial machine measures 
providing for the settlement of labour disputes, prohibiting 
strikes, were introduced. (Proclamation 318 of 1942, War 
Measure No 145 of 1942; and following amendments of 1944.) 
This measure was continued after the war by Acts 18 and 48 of 
1948, and by Act 29 of 1950 (all called War Measures 
Continuation Act). 
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62 Section 77. To safeguard the 'economic welfare' of employees 
of any race, in any undertaking, industry or occupation, the 
Minister of Labour could begin a lengthy process of 
investigations and recommendations at the end of which it 
might be possible to reserve certain kinds of work for persons 
of a specific race. The undertaking, industry, trade or 
occupation concerned had to be defined determining the area or 
class of the premises involved, the type of work and whether 
it was to be reserved wholly or in part for members of the 
racial group specified. 
63 Benson, M., op.cit., ch. 5. 
64 Gerhart, G.M., op.cit., ch. 5. 
65 On the P.A.C., see Gerhart, G.M., op.cit., ch. 5. 
66 Only in the townships around Vereeniging and those of Cape 
Town the P.A.C. was able to mobilise a significant proportion 
of the Black population. See S.A.I.R.R., Survey of Race 
Relations 1959-1960, pp.55-60. 
67 See Soukosi, Z., African Opposition in South Africa from 
1948-1969; an Analysis of the African National Congress of 
South Africa's Non-violent and Violent Actions. Berlin 1975, 
pp.237-244. 
68 On Poqo and in particular on its activity in Transkei see: 
Lodge, T., Poqo and rural resistance in the Transkei 
1960-1965, in: University of London, Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies, Collected Seminar Papers No 24, 
. pp.137-147. 
69 Section 27 of the Native Laws Amendment Act (No 54 of 1952) 
extended the provisions and limits of Section 10 of the 
Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act (No 25 of 1945) to 
women. This extension was not immediately implemented.· 
However from 1954, it was applied in the Cape Peninsula and a 
few other areas mainly in the Western Cape. From 1956 it was 
applied gradually in the whole Union, beginning with small 
towns. This was a precautionary measure in consideration of 
the strong resentment the issue of these documents to the 
women caused amongst the Blacks. 
70 About the betterment schemes, see Yawitch, J., Betterment; 
the myth of homeland agriculture. Johannesburg 1982. 
71 S.A.I.R.R., Survey of Race Relations 1954-1955, p.90. 
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72 Union of South Africa; Summary of the Report of the 
Commission for Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas 
within the Union of South Africa. U.G. 61/1955, pp.45-46. 
73 H. Verwoerd, then Minister of Native Affairs. Hansard, 
vol. 18, col. 7548; 20 June 1955. 
74 Up to 1961 sixteen blatk spots measuring 15 252 morgen in the 
Transvaal, and sixteen measuring 4 398 morgen in the Cape had 
been cleared. 
11Acquisition of Land by the S.A. Native Trust and the 
Consolidation of Bantu Homelands" in Bantu, July 1961. 
75 From January 1959 to the end of 1961 more than 26 000 Blacks 
had been 'endorsed out• of the Western Cape, 14 272 frrnn the 
Cape Town municipal area. 
Hansard 10, col. 3542; 30 March 1962. 
76 The machinery for the gradual abolition of the labour tenant 
system was provided by the Bantu Laws Amendment Act (No 42 of 
1964). 
77 It is extremely difficult to quantify the number of people 
affected by the removals. From Mare, G., African Population 
Relocation in South Africa, Johannesburg 1980, it appears that 
up to 1970 well over one million Blacks had been relocated, 
about 97 000 due to black spots clearance and around a million 
due to the abolition of the labour tenant system and squatting 
on \'lhite-owned farms. pp.7 and 10. 
78 According to BENSO, op.cit., 1976, in terms of the 1975 
consolidation proposals about 175 000 Black families would 
have to be removed from the areas they were occupying and 
resettled elsewhere in their consolidated homeland. p.23 • 
. 
79 - Category I: clearance of black spots; - Category II: re-
location due to the abolition of the labour tenant system and 
•squatting• on white-owned farms; - Category III: relocation 
through the operation of influx control legislation; 
- Category IV: urban relocation; -Category V: relocations due 
to the institution of betterment schemes; - Category VI: re-
location for strategic or infrastructural schemes; 
- Category VII: relocation as resistance; - Category VIII: 
Homeland consolidation; - Category IX: other. 
Mare, G., op.cit., pp.2-43. 
80 Surplus People Project, Forced Removals in South Africa. 
Cape Town 1983, vol. 1. The categories are: 1) Farm 
removals; 2) The clearing of Black spots; 3) Removal of 
'badly situated' Black areas in terms of the territorial 
consolidation of the homelands; 4) Urban relocation from de-
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proclaimed Black townships to the homelands; 5) Removals of 
informal settlements in urban and peri-urban areas; 
6) Removals because of the operation of influx control 
legislation, including repatriation of foreign Blacks; 
7) Group areas removals; 8) Removals as result of imple-
mentation of infrastructural development schemes or 
agricultural projects; 9) Removals for strategic-military 
purposes; 10) Directly political removals (including 
banishment of individuals); and 11) Removals due to the 
institution of betterment schemes. The estimated number of 
people removed for all the reasons in the period 1960-1982 is 
put at 3 522 900 plus and the estimated number of people under 
threat of removal is 1 765 000 plus. 
81 Section 5(a). 
82 Only in 1963 the first Urban Bantu Councils were established, 
in Benoni and Welkom. Up to 1967 only three others were 
established: Vereeniging in 1965, Kroonstad in 1966 and Parys 
in 1967. Seven were established in 1968 and eleven in 1969. 
S.A.I.R.R., Survey of Race Relations 1968, p.180; id. 1971, 
p.151. 
83 By Section 8 of the Third Bantu Laws Amendment Act (No 49 of 
1970). 
84 For example the percentage poll of the elections of the Urban 
Bantu Council of Soweto in October 1974 was 14,3%. 
S.A.l.R.R., Survey of Race Relations 1974, p.170. 
85 See Gerhart, G., op.cit. ch. 8. 
86 Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe (National Cultural Liberation 
Movement) was first founded in 1928 by King So 1 omon Ka 
Oinizulu (Chief Buthelezi's grandfather). Under the 
leadership of Chief Buthelezi it was transfonned into a 
political movement open to all the Blacks. 
87 Republic of South Africa, Report of the Commission of Inquiry 
into the Riots of Soweto and elsewhere from the 16th of June 
1976 to the 28th of February 1977. RP 55/1980. Part E. 
88 Arguably the most important effect of the riots was to urge 
the Government to change its policy in regard to the 
Coloureds. It was the first time that a Black protest gained 
important Coloured support and that a great number of 
Coloureds joined the Blacks in rioting. Although the 
Nationalist Government did very little to endear the Coloureds 
to itself, the Coloureds had always been considered a 
potential ally of the Whites against the Blacks. The attitude 
of many Coloureds during the riots was thus unexpected and 
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traumatic for many Whites. The new constitutional 
dispensation, for Coloureds and Indians, can be considered as 
the most important r-esu 1 t of the 'Soweto' riots. 
89 Specified in Section 5, subsection (l)(a). 
90 According to S.A.I.R.R., Survey of Race Relations 1978, 
pp.341-342, the percentage poll in the Soweto wards varied 
from 4,4% to 6%; but in Meadowlands and Dobsonville which had 
separate community councils, it was 16% and 42% respectively. 
91 The Commission of Enquiry into Labour Legislation and Other 
Related Matters, chaired by Professor N. Wiehahn, was 
appointed in 1977. The investigations into the labour 
legislation were to be made with reference to: 
- the adjusting of the existing systan for the regulation of 
labour relations in South Africa with the object of making 
it provide more effectively for the needs of South Africa's 
changing times; 
- the adjustment, if necessary, of the existing machinery for 
the prevention and settlement of disputes which changing 
needs may require; 
- the elimination of bottle-necks and other problems which 
are at present being experienced within the entire sphere of 
labour; 
- the methods and means by which a foundation for the 
creation and expansion of sound labour relations may be laid 
for the future of South Africa. 
The Wiehahn Commission presented the first of its seven 
reports to the Government in 1979. Among the most important 
recommendations of the Commission were that legal recognition 
should be extended to African unions; that individuals should 
be free to join any trade union of their choice; that trade 
unions should be free to prescribe such membership 
qualifications as they saw fit; that regulations which 
governed the segregation of facilities should be repealed; 
and that the principle of statutory work reservation should be 
abolished. 
See S.A.I.R.R., Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 
1977, pp.301-304; 1979, pp.274-278. 
92 By the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act of 1979 (No 94 
of 1979). 
93 Republic of South Africa, Report of the Commission of Inquiry 
into Legislation affecting the Utilisation of Manpower 
(excluding the legislation administered by the Departments of 
Labour and Mines), RP 32/1979, ch. 4. 
94 Notwithstanding the improvement of the conditions of the 
urban Blacks, there was no place for them in the political 
dispensation in South Africa: the Minister of Plural 
Relations, C. Mulder, reaffirmed this: "If our policy is 
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taken to its full logical conclusion as far as the Black 
people are concerned, there will not be one Black man with 
South African citizenship". 
Hansard, 2/78, col. 579, 7 February 1978. 
95 Section 8 of the Black Local Authorities Act (No 102 of 1982). 
96 Section 23(1)(1). The Schedule mentions 29 matters, from the 
"promotion of the moral and social welfare of the residents" 
to the "allocation of bursaries for educational purposes", and 
from the "establishment, construction, maintenance ••• within 
or outside the area ••• of works for supplying power" to the 
"prevention or combating of the unlawful occupation of land 
and buildings". 
97 Section 23(1)(a) to (i). 
98 The lowest percentage polls were those of Evaton, in the Vaal 
Triangle (5,05%), and of the Grahamstown's township, Rini 
(5,87%). In the important area of Soweto the polls were: 
Soweto 10,7%, Diep Meadow 14,7%, Dobsonville 23,53%, while in 
Mamelodi it was 27,97%. The places with the highest 
percentage poll were Kagiso (Krugersdorp) with 36,05%, 
Seeisoville (Kroonstad) with 33,53% and Jouberton (Klerksdorp) 
with 31,72%. In most of the other places the percentage poll 
was between 22% and 29%. 
Financial Mail, 6 December 1983. 
99 See, for example, one of the earliest statements on 
separate development which can be found in the draft 
Republican constitution of 1942, declaring in Article IX, 
Section 2: "To each of such segregated race groups of 
Coloured subjects of the Republic, self-government will be 
granted within their own territory under the central 
management of the genera 1 Government of the country, in 
accordance with the fitness of the Group for the carrying out 
of such self-government for which they will have to be 
systematically trained". Quoted in Carter, G.M., et al,. 
South Africa's Transkei: the Politics of Domestic Colonialism. 
London 1967, p.34. 
100 For a discussion of the political climate in which those 
changes took place, and for their ideological background as it 
was presented during the debates in Parliament, see 
Carter, G.M., et al., op.cit., chs. 2 and 3. 
101 Although only at its lower level, that of the tribal 
authority, it was really reflecting (and not completely) the 
traditional Bantu power structure, the upper levels being an 
artificial elaboration on the theme. See Hammond-Tooke, W.O., 
op.cit., ch. 11. 
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102 Section 2. 
103 Sections 3, 4 and 9. 
104 Sections 3, 5, 6 and 10. 
105 Sections 3, 7 and 11. 
106 Section 8: On the political climate in which this law was 
enacted and the Black reaction to it, see: Carter, G., et al, 
op.cit., chs. 2 and 3 and Ballinger, M., op.cit., chs. 
107 At the 1955 session the General Council, having been asked 
whether or not it was prepared to accept this new system, 
decided to accept "the principles of the Bantu Authorities 
Act, but, in order to preserve the integrity of the Transkei, 
it requests the Chairman to appoint a Recess Committee to 
consider how best to integrate the Council system with the 
Bantu Authority policy". The main committee suggestion was to 
keep the district councils as a fourth tier between tribal and 
regional authorities, in order not to disrupt the by now 
consolidated administrative structure of Transkei. These 
proposals were unanimously and with little discussion approved 
by the Council at a special session held on 23rd and 
24th November 1955. 
See Hammond-Tooke, W.O., op.cit., pp.202-205. 
108 About the effects this sudden coming into the spotlight had 
on the institution of the chieftainship. and as its credibility 
amongst the tribesmen, see Hammond-Tooke, W.O., op.cit., 
ch. 12. 
For the reason of the 'recruiting' of the tribal chiefs as 
the backbone of the Bantu Authorities System, see amongst 
others, Hepple, A., Verwoerd. London 1967, pp.110 et seq.; 
and Mayer, P., The Tribal Elite and the Transkeian Elections 
of 1963, in The Elites of Tropical Africa, O.V.P., London 
1966, pp.286-308. 
109 The general terms of reference of the Tomlinson Commission 
were: 
"to conduct an exhaustive inquiry into and to report on a 
comprehensive scheme for the rehabilitation of the Native 
Areas with a view to developing within them a social structure 
in keeping with the culture of the Native and based on 
effective socio-economic planning." 
Uni on of Sou th Africa, Summary of the Re po rt of the 
Commission for Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas 
within the Union of South Africa. Pretoria 1955, p.xviii. 
110 Ibidem, ch. 50, para. XIV. 
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111 Ibidem, ch. 50, para. II. 
112 "Taking into account the cultural-historical background, the 
systematic expansion of seven blocks around historico-legal 
centres is recommended by the Commission, namely Tswanaland, 
Vendaland, Pediland, Swaziland, Zululand, Xhosaland and Sotholand, 
in each of which, on the basis of the Bantu Authorities Act, the 
Bantu themselves will exercise administrative functions to an ever-
increasing extent, suited to the normal process of development and 
according to the demands of the time." 
Ibidem, ch. 50, para. XIII, sec. iv. 
113 "Of the entire territory 30% is badly eroded and 44% moderately so." 
Ibidem, ch. 12, para. 62. But it is referred to the Transkei only 
and not to the whole of the black areas as many authors report. 
114 Ibidem, ch. 24, para. 16. 
115 Ibidem, ch. 28, paras. 20 to 23. 
116 Ibidem, ch. 47, para. 9. 
117 Ibidem, ch. 12, para. 29. 
118 Ibidem, ch. 36, paras. 21 to 27. This was not an unanimous 
recommendation. Two commissioners, Mr. C. W. Prinsloo and Mr. 
C. B. Young, recommended in a minority report that the black 
areas should not be open to white industrialists, and therefore 
they wanted that the development of industry in those areas be 
undertaken only by "Bantu" or "bodies controlled by the state". 
Ibidem, ch. 36, para. 29. ' 
119 Ibidem, ch. 36, paras. 4 to 20. 
120 Government Decisions on the Recommendations of the Commission for 
the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union 
of South Africa. 
White Paper F-1956. 
121 W.P. F-1956; decision 9(i) . 
. 122 Ibidem, decision 10. 
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123 Ibidem, decision 9 (vii). On this matter the Government will 
change its mind in 1959. 
124 Ibidem, decision 10. 
125 Ibidem, decision 20. 
126 · Ibidem. 
127 Some of the decisions taken in the White Paper, however, were 
changed. 
128 Section 15. 
129 Section 2. Those national units were North Sotho, South Sotho, 
Swazi, Tsonga, Tswana, Venda, Xhosa, and Zulu. 
130 Section 8 and Section 12, subsections (1) and (2). 
131 Section 12, subsection (6). 
132 Sections 4 and 5. 
133 Sections 2 and 3. At the beginning, commissioner-generals were 
appointed respectively to the North Sotho unit, the Tswana and 
South Sotho units, the Venda and Tsonga units, the Xhosa unit, 
and the Zulu and Swazi units. 
134 See for instance the words of the then Prime Minister, Dr. H. Verwoerd, 
during the debate of the second reading stage of the Bill: 
"I say that if it is within the powers of the Bantu and if the 
territories in which now lives can develop to full independence, it 
will develop in that way." 
Hansa'.d, vol. 101, col. 6221 (20th May 1959). 
135 Hansard, vol. 99, col. 63 (27th January 1959). 
136 For a discussion of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act and 
for the political debate it aroused, see: Carter, G.M., et al; op. 
cit., pp. 51-67. 
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137 Hansard, vol. 101, col. 6222 (20th May 1959). 
138 In the words of Dr. Verwoerd: 
"The policy of the National Party is to strive for a permanent 
White South Africa, whatever dangers are threatening it, whilst 
being prepared to develop the areas where the Bantu control may 
be extended under the leadership of the White man as a guardian 
and on the understanding that even if it should lead to Bantu 
independence, it would be ensured by wise statemanship that that 
development takes placed in such a spirit and in such a way that. 
friendship will remain possible although the White man will never 
be under any form of Bantu control. 11 
Hansard, vol. 101, col. 6241 (20th May 1959). 
139 Hansard, vol. 101, col. 6215 {20th May 1959). 
140 Hansard, vol. 101, col. 6032 (18th May 1959). 
141 Situation in May 1959. The nine regional authorities were established 
in the districts of Potgietersrust, Taung, Pilansberg, Herschel, 
Keiskamahoek, King William's Town, Middledrift, East London and 
Victoria East. 
142 To give a summary of the implementation of the Bantu Authorities 
System as modified by the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, 
the dates of the establishment of the territorial authorities are 
the following: 
Transkei: Transkei Territorial Authority and Executive Council -
1 1st September 1956. 
Ciskei: Ciskei Territorial Authority - 24th March 1961; 
Executive Council - 20th September 1968. 
Bophuthatswana: Tswana Territorial Authority - 21st April 1961; 
Executive Council - 14th October 1968. 
Lebowa: Lebowa Territorial Authority - 10th August 1962; 
Executive Council - 16th September 1969. 
Venda: Thohoyandou Territorial Authority and Executive Council -
· 9th November 1962. 
Gazankulu: Machangane Territorial Authority - 9th November 1962; 
Executive Council - 1st August 1969. 
QwaQwa: Basotho-Ba-Borwa Territorial Authority and Executive 
Council - 1st April 1969. 
KwaZulu: Zulu Territorial Authority - 22nd May 1970. 
Kangwane: Swazi Territorial Authority and Executive Council -
28th November 1975. 
KwaNdebele: South Ndebele Territorial Authority and Executive 
Council - 24th November 1977. 
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143 For example, the Buthelezi tribe consistently refused to accept the 
betterment schemes and the institution of any authority above the 
tribal level. Only in 1968 was it possible to establish the 
Mahlatabini Regional Authority, of which Gatsha Buthelezi became 
the chairman, and this only after the South African Government 
exerted heavy pressure on the tribes of the area, who made clear 
that they were not supporting the system but merely obeying the law. 
See Butler, I., et al: The Black Homelands of South Africa. 
Berkeley 1977, pp. 79-80. 
144 In the words of the then Prime Minister, Dr. H. Verwoerd: 
"The Bantu will be able to develop into separate states. That is 
not what we would have liked to see. It is a form of fragmentation 
that we would not have liked if we were able to avoid it. In the 
light of the pressure being exerted on South Africa, there is how-
ever no doubt that eventually this will have to be done, thereby 
buying for the White man the right to retain his domination in what 
is his country." 
Hansard, vol. 107, col. 4191 {10th April 1961). 
145 Transkei Territorial Authority, Proceedings and Reports of Select 
Committees at the Session of 1961. Umtata: Territorjal Printers, 
1961, p. 49. 
146 The decision of not allowing a multiracial electorate became very 
controversial (although it was really naive to think that the 
Government could ever consider such a thing), but at least this 
time Matanzima did not take the tune from the Government, and his 
decision to strive for a black government and a black electorate 
was clear long before the meeting with the Prime Minister, as is 
proved by his declaration at the end of the debate of the Transkei 
Territorial Authority during which the select committee was appointed, 
in which he said that the T.T.A. decision was an "unequivocal 
rejection of the policy of a multiracial society". Quoted in 
Carter, G.M., et al., op.cit., p. 114. 
147 "In the case of the Transkeian Authority the stage was reached 
where the body which speaks on behalf of their national group 
specifically asked to be given a form of self-government. The 
Government then declared its willingness to grant self-government 
to the Transkei. 11 
Hansard, vol. 2, col. 74 (23rd January 1962). 
At least a third of the Prime Minister's speech, on the no-
confidence motion, was dedicated to the decision of giving self-
government to Transkei and to the limits within which this autonomy 
would be exerted, and to the reasons for which the Government 
adopted a policy which could result (as it did) in the partition of 
South Africa. 
See Hansard, vol. 2, coll. 60-99 (23rd January 1962). 
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148 Again in the words of Dr. Verwoerd: 11 If the Opposition is 
correct and we are now dividing the country, then now I have 
to choose between dividing it (and thereby retaining control 
over the area settled by our White forefathers) or regarding 
the country as one governmental unit (and thereby turning it 
in a multi-racial state which •.• will be under Black domination). 
I choose division. If I have to choose between division with all 
the dangers that may be attached to it, and the so-called terri-
torial unity with its attendant White racial suicide, then I 
unhesitatingly choose division.u 
Hansard, vol. 2, col. 89 (23rd January 1962). 
149 See: Republic of South Africa, Department of Information, The· 
Transkei; Emancipation without Chaos. Pretoria 1963. 
150 About the drafting of the Transkeian constitution of 1963 see: 
Carter, G.M., et al., op.cit., pp.113-120; and Laurence, P., The 
Transkei; South Africa's Politics of Partition,. Johannesburg 1976, i:p.63-67. 
151 The main opposition was to the composition of the future Legislative 
Assembly which was to be composed by sixty-four ex-officio (chiefs) 
and forty-five elected members. Some members of the T.T.A. wanted 
a fully elected Legislative Assembly, and many wante'd at least a 
numerical parity between elected and ex-officio members. (An amend-
ment to change the membership of the Legislative Assembly to sixty-
four ex-officio and sixty-four elected members was defeated only by 
fo~rty-eight votes to forty-three.) The main opposition both in the 
T.T.A. and in the country came from the Thembu and their Paramount 
Chief, Sabata Dalindyebo. 
See Carter, G.M., et al., op.cit., pp.118-119. 
152 For a discussion of the debate for the introduction of the Transkei · 
Constitution Act, see: Carter, G.M., et al., op.cit., pp.67-69. 
153 Consti:tution Amendment Act (no. 9 of 1963). 
154 Sections 2, 59 and 60. 
155 Section 7. 
156 First Schedule, Part A. The government departments of Transkei 
were to be: Department of the Chief Minister and of Finance, 
Department of Justice, Department of Education, Department of 
Interior, Department of Agriculture and Forestry, Department of 
Roads and Works. Three other departments, namely the Department 
of Posts and Telegraphs, the Department of Transport and the 
Department of Information were added in 1966. 
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157 Part IV, Sections 9 to 22. 
158 Part IV, Sections 22 to 43. 
159 First Schedule, Part B. The subjects ranged from direct 
taxation of Transkeian citizens residing inside or outside the 
territory, Bantu education, agriculture, soil and water 
conservation, roads and bridges (excluding national roads),, 
labour matters and welfare services to intoxicating liquors, 
establishment of inferior courts, control of police personnel 
transferred to the Transkeian government, and in general to 
"all matters which •• ~ are of a merely local or private nature 
in Transkei". 
160 Section 39. 11 establishment, control, entry, movement or 
operation of any military unit ... or any other military matter 
of whatever nature"; 11 ••• the establishment and control of 
factories working for the armament industry or producing 
explosives", all the matters regarding foreign policy, use of 
police forces not expressly assigned to the Transkeian government, 
telecommunications, railways, harbours and civil aviation, "the 
entry of persons other than Transkeian citizens into Transkei 11 , 
currency, public loans, banking and control of financial institutions, 
customs matters and the amendment or repeal of this act, were all 
matters expressly excluded from the jurisdiction of the Legislative 
Assembly. 
161 Part VIII, Sections 51 to 58. 
162 See Carter, G.M., et al., op.cit. p.124. 
163 See the speech of Dr. Verwoerd at the no-confidence debate on 
23rd January 1962. 
Hansard, vol. 2 coll. 60-99. 
164 See note 142. 
165 Act no. 86 of 1965, Section 4. 
166 Act no. 46 of 1968, Section 5. 
167 Act no.46 of 1968, Section 4(1)(m). 
168 Act no. 46 of 1968, Section 10. 
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169 Speech of Mr. M.C. Botha, then Minister of Bantu Administration 
and Development, at the second reading of the Bill. 
Hansard, vol. 24, col. 1766 (7th March 1968). 
170 Section 23. 
171 S~ction 4(1)(j) and Section 4(1)(d). 
172 White Paper F-1956, Decision 9(i). See above p. 51, 
173 Hansard, vol. 24, col. 1772 (7th March 1968). 
174 For example the GDP of the homelands (i.e. excluding migrants and 
commuters), excluding the subsistence sector was, for the year 
1959/60, R98 668 000, and in the year 1965/66 R140 416 000 of which 
respectively R6 975 000 and RB 848 000 were the contribution of 
"manufacturing, electricity, gas, water, and construction". 
BENBO (1976), op.cit., table B.7.2. 
175 Hansard, vol. 24, col. 1773 (7th March 1968). 
176 Dugard, D.J.R., Political Options for South Africa and Implications 
for the West; in Rotberg, R., et Barratt, J. (eds.); Conflict and 
Compromise in South Africa, Cape Town 1980, p.19. 
177 Section 3 of this Act provided that: "every person falling within 
any of the undermentioned classes of persons shall be citizen of a 
particular territorial authority area, that is to say 
(a) every Bantu person born in that area, either before or after 
the commencement of this Act; 
(b) every Bantu person who is domiciled.in that area; 
(c) every Bantu person in the Republic speaking any Bantu language 
used by the Bantu population of that area, including every 
Bantu person belonging to any associated linguistic group which 
normally uses any dialect of any such language; 
(d) every other Bantu person in the Republic related to any member 
of the Bantu population of that area or who has identified him-
self with any part of such population or who is associated with 
any part of such population by virtue of his cultural or racial 
background." 
178 Republic of South Africa, Explanatory Memorandum on the Bantu 
Homelands Constitution Bill, 1971. W.P. 1-1971, Para. 1. 
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179 The preamble reads: "Whereas it is desirable that further 
provision be made for the development of Bantu nations to self-
government and independence " 
180 W.P. 1-1971, Para. 9. 
181 In the speech of the Minister of Bantu Administration and 
Development, Mr. M.C. Botha, at the second reading of the Bill. 
Hansard, vol. 32, col. 482 (8th February 1971). 
182 Some of these matters were also added to the jurisdiction of the 
Transkeian Legislative Assembly when the number of departments of 
Transkei was increased. 
183 Also added was "the registration and control of dogs". Schedule 1, 
item 29. But the political relevance of this addition can safely 
be considered not very hiigh. 
184 Not extraneous to this precautionary move was the remarkable 
independence showed in educational matters by the T.L.A. which, 
much displeasing the Government, abolished in Transkei the Bantu 
Education system. 
185 Section 4. 
186 Sections 6 to 10. 
187 The establishment of the legislative assemblies with Chapter 1 
rights was much swifter than the institution of the territorial 
authorities, and less than a year after the enactment of the 
Bantu Homelands Constitution Act, all the seven existing homelands 
had their legislative assemblies. Only in regard to the Swazi 
(whose national unit received the territorial authority in 1975) 
and the South Ndebele (who were recognized as a national unit in 
1977) the implementation of this act took longer. The dates of the 










Tswana Legislative Assembly 
Ciskei Legislative Assembly 
Venda Legislative Assembly 
Lebowa Legislative Assembly 
Machangane Legislative Assembly 
Basotho-QwaQwa Legislative Assembly 
KwaZulu Legislative Assembly 
Kangwane Legislative Assembly 
KwaNdebele Legislative Assembly 
1st May 1971 
1st June 1971 
1st June 1971 
1st July 1971 
1st July 1971 
1st October 1971 
30th March 1972 
1st October 1977 
1st October 1979 
188 The date of attainment of self-government (Chapter 2 rights) for 











30th May 1963 (by virtue of Act 48 of 1963) 
1st June 1972 
1st August 1972 
2nd October 1972 
1st February 1973 
1st February 1973 
1st November 1974 
1st February 1977 
1st April 1981 
Kangwane is not yet a self-governing territory, and it will not 
attain such a status until the question of its proposed cession 
to Swaziland is resolved. 
189 Babelegi in Bophuthatswana, Seshego in Lebowa, Witzieshoek in 
QwaQwa, Isithebe in KwaZulu, Butterworth and Umtata in Transkei. 
Republic of South Africa, White Paper on the Report by the Inter-
Departmental Committee on the Decentralization of Industries. 
Para. 53. 
190 It was announced by the Prime Minister, Mr. B.J. Vorster, in a 
speech before the S.A. Federated Chamber of Industries, in Pretoria 
on the 2nd October 1974: 
11 
••• time has now come for homeil and governments to decide for them-
selves the conditions under which they will be willing to allow the 
establishment of White enterprises in their areas. If, for example, 
a homeland government has no objections to White enterprises being 
established in the homeland without a restriction of term, it wou.ld 
be free to make such a decision~" 
191 Of them: 5 559 in Bophuthatswana, 2 287 in Transkei, 1 192 in 
Lebowa and 983 in KwaZulu. 
All the data are from BENBO (1976), op.cit., Annexure to ch. 9. 
192 "The ideal was of course, at its best, to obtain one single 
territory for every homeland. That is the ideal. We all strive 
after ideals, but it may not always be possible for us to attain 
them. The second best would then be to acquire as few scattered 
areas as possible ... I hope that we, having had regard to practical 
considerations, have accomplished this ..• " 
Hansard 17/1973, col. 8135 (4th June 1973). 
193 The members of the Committee were Messrs. M.C.Bothma, R.M.Cadman, 
H.J.Coetsee, P.Cronje, J.P.du Toit, M.S.F.Grobbler, Dr.F.Hartzenberg 
(elected as Chairman), Messrs. F.Herman, J~H.Hoon, Dr.G.de V.Morrison, 
Messrs. N.J.J.Olivier, W.J.C.Rossouw, Mrs.H.Suzman, Messrs. 
H.J.D.van der Walt and W.T.Webber (substituted by Mr. T.C.Huges before 
the beginning of the works of the Committee). 
194 The second report concerned the exchange of portions of two farms 
(respectively of ha.42,08 and ha.45,72) in the district of Umvoti 
in Natal; and in the third report, the Committee "having perused 
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the Proclamations and Government Notices issued by the 
Department of Bantu Administration and Development during 
the period 25th October 1974 to 9th May 1975 ... (begged) 
to report that it has no comment to offer thereon. 11 
195 The extension of the surface area of the black territories was 
not due to any extension of the area allocated in the 1936 
legislation, but to the failure to implement that legislation: 
in 1975 1 239 600 ha. of the quota land to be ceded to the Blacks 
were sti 11 outstanding. 
196 See for example a speech of Chief Gatsha Buthelezi at the KwaZulu 
Legislative Assembly in early 1975: 11 We do not and can never 
accept the map which resembles rags of a tattered quilt as a 
country for 4! million Zulu people ... We would not consider even 
less than ten pieces of territory as one country." 
197 
Quoted in Parliament by Mrs. H Suzman. Hansard, no. 14/1975; 
col. 5987 (14th May 1975). 
The total amount of land to be purchased was the fo 11 owing: 
1) Outstanding quota land (under Land Act, 1936) ha. 1 239 600 
2) Black spots ha. 157 100 
3) Badly situated Black areas ha. 788 700 
4) Compensatory land (for Black spots and 
badly situated areas) ha. 945 800 
Total planned takeover of White 1 and ha. 2 122 900(a) 
Total planned takeover of Black land ha. 157 lOO(b) 
(a) Given by 1 + 4 minus 62 500 ha. of land already purchased and 
kept as a reserve. 
(b) Black spots. The badly situated Black areas being property of 
the S.A.B.T. and thus not needing to be purchased. 
The total cost of this programme was estimated as follows: 
Land purchases R417 million 
Population movement R380 million 
Maintenance and development 
(essential services only) R 10 million 
TOTAL (at current money value) R807 million 
From BENBO (1976),op.cit., ch. 3. 
198 The participants to this summit meeting were Chief K. Matanzima of 
Transkei, Chief G. Buthelezi of KwaZulu, Chief L. Mangope of 
Bophuthatswana, Prof. H. Ntsanwisi of Gazankulu, Mr. L. Sebe of 
Ciskei, and Mr. C. Ramusi, Minister of the Interior of Lebowa, as 
representative of Dr. C. Phatudi, who was overseas. Absent were 
the leaders of Basotho QwaQwa and Venda or their representatives. 
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199 See S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1973, p. 164, and Butler, J., et al., 
The Black Homelands of South Africa, Berkeley 1977, p. 87. 
200 See Laurence, P., The Transkei: South Africa's Politics of 
Partition, Johannesburg 1976, pp. 100-101. 
201 See his declaration to the press in April 1966: 
freedom is a long one which has to be negotiated 
by step. 11 
Quoted in Laurence, P., op.cit., p. 91. 
11 The road to 
carefully, step 
202 The areas claimed were the districts of Elliot, Maclear, Mount 
Currie, Matatiele and Port St. Johns. 
203 Quoted in Laurence, P., op.cit., p. 95. 
204 Hansard 6/1974, coll. 415-419 (questions) (10th September 1974) .. · 
205 See S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1977, pp. 322-335. 
206 Clause 5, proposed sections 36B and 36C. 
207 Explanatory Memorandum on the Bantu Homelands Constitution 
Amendment Bill, 1977. White Paper 9-1977, Clause 5(c) (proposed 
section 360). 
208 As by Section 4 of the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act of 1971. 
209 Bantu Homelands Constitution Amendment Bill (B9-'77), Section 36E(l) 
and ( 2). 
210 Ibidem, Section 36E(3). 
211 For particulars of this bill, see: S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1977, 
pp. 318-320. 
212 Mr. P.T.C. du Plessis, M.P., Chairman of the Bantu Affairs 
Commission to the press. The Argus, 1st February 1977. 
213 The Argus, 26th t1arch 1977. 
214 The Argus, 29th March 1977. 
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215 See S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1977, pp. 319-320. 
216 The Argus, 29th March 1977. 
217 The Argus, 16th March 1978. 
218 See S • A. I. R. R. , Survey 1977' pp. 359-360. 
219 See S.A. I.R.R., Survey 1978, pp. 296-298. 
220 See S.A.l.R.R., Survey 1978, p. 289. 
221 For all the particulars of the terms of reference of the Ciskei 
Commission, see: The Quail Report. Feb. 8 80. Ciskei 
Commission Report, Silverton 1980, pp. 12-14. 
222 The political recommendation of the Quail Commission are given 
·in paras. 340-348 of the report (pp.126-127). Considerations 
about independence are in para. 347 which reads: 
"We consider independence as at present understood to be 
an unattractive option at this time. The following are the 
main reasons. 
(1) The terms on which separation is currently available 
(e.g. as in the case of Transkei, Bophuthatswana and 
Venda) are not favourable. 
(2) In terms of size and economic viability, the Ciskei 
would rank among the world's least endowed states. 
(3) An independent Ciskei would not be accorded recognition 
as a bona fide member of the international community of 
nations. 
(4) According to our attitude survey two out of 'three 
Ciskeians oppose separation on present terms. 
(5) Finally .•. South Africa is changing: this is not the 
time to risk cutting itself off from the prospects of 
gaining its rightful share of political and economic 
benefits within South Africa." 
223 Paragraph 348 of the Report of the Ciskei Commission reads: 
" ... we consider that the Ciskei should opt for independence 
only if the following conditions can first be satisfied. 
(1) That majorities of Ciskeians both in the Ciskei and in 
the South African common area vote in favour of 
independence in a carefully supervised referendum on 
this issue. 
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(2) That citizenship on satisfactory tenns is negotiated 
which gives non-resident Ciskeians the choice of either 
Ciskeian or South African status or both, and that the 
South African government relinquishes its rights to 
expel, deport or otherwise remove from the common area 
Ciskeians who have chosen South African status. 
(3) That on land, an enlargement of the Ciskei to an extent 
acceptable to the Ciskei government has been agreed 
with the South African government ..• 
(4) That the rights of Ciskeians to seek work and remain 
employed in South Africa are explicitly preserved. 
(5) That South Africa agrees to provide equitable financial 
support." 
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NOTES TO PART II 
1 The draft Republican constitution of 1942 provided for self-
government to be granted to the various non-l~hite groups 
"within their own territory under the central management of 
the general Government of the country". See note 99 in the 
Part I. 
2 Quoted in Lacour-Gayet, R., A History of South Africa. London 
1977. 
3 "Although the High Commission Territories were artificially 
excluded from the Union in 1910, these territories remain 
the 'heartlands' of Bantu inside the Territories as well as 
outside the Territories, in the Union. In 1913, and again in 
1936, the legislators of the Union very clearly set aside the 
Bantu Areas, taking into account the cultural-historical bonds 
of the Bantu including those of the three High Commission 
Terri tori es." 
Union of South Africa. Summary of the Report of the Commission 
for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the 
Union of South Africa. Chapter 46, para. 14. 
See also ibidem, para. 16, where the commission outlines the 
proposed consolidated blocks in this way: 
"A. The Tswana Block, with Bechuanaland as nucleus of a block 
to which is added complexes A(l), A(2) and A(3) situated in the 
Western areas. 
D. A Swazi Block, with Swaziland as nucleus and the addition 
thereto of adjacent areas of the Union inhabited by Swazi. 
G. A South Sotho Block, with Basutoland as its 'heartland' 
and with the addition of areas in the Union (Witzieshoek and 
Northern Transkei)." 
4 Government Decisions on the Recommendations of the Commission 
etc., White Paper F-1956, Decision 20. 
5 Ibidem. 
6 Dr. Verwoerd explained this during the debate for the Promotion 
of Bantu Self-Government Bill with the following words: 
"What we are trying to achieve under our apartheid policy is a 
South Africa which endeavours to build up reasonable opportunities 
for the Bantu in such a way and of such a nature that we can secure 
their permanent friendship and co-operation without giving them 
domination over the whole of our own area in addition to that." 
Hansard, vol. 101, col. 6228, (20th May 1959). 
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7 Hansard, vol. 99, col. 63, (27th January 1959). 
8 Hansard, vol. 101, col. 6221, (20th May 1959). 
9 The official announcement of this decision to Parliament was 
given during the no-confidence· debate at the opening of the 
1962 session: 
11 
... this announcement wil 1 prove that the pol icy of separate 
development is not just theory but practical politics ... The 
Government wi 11 therefore grant the Transkei self-government." 
Hansard, vol. 2, col. 75, (23rd January 1962). 
10 "It is hardly possible for us to change the international situation 
except by surrendering everything and doing everything they want us 
to do. If that is to be the price of international support, namely 
the suicide of a nation, we will not pay the price." 
Hansard, vol. 2, col . 97 (23rd January 1962). 
11 Hansard, vol. 2, col. 97, (23rd January 1962). 
12 See Carter, G., et al., South Africa's Transkei: the Politics 
of Domestic Colonialism. London 1967; and Stultz, N.M., 
"Creative Self-Withdrawal" in Transkei, in Africa Report, vol. 9, 
No 4, April 1964, pp.18-23. 
13 Ibidem, p.183. 
14 Hansard, vol. 5, col. 234, (25th January 1963). 
15 "The question has been asked here as to when the Transkei is 
going to become independent ... history has taught us that the 
road to independence in our case took more than a full century." 
Hansard, vol. 6, col. 3162, (21st March 1963). 
16 Hansard, vol. 5, col. 2240, (6th March 1963). 
17 Statement of the chairman of the commission to the press quoted 
in a House debate. 
Hansard, vol. 5, col. 2326, (7th March 1963). 
18 During the no-confidence debate at the opening of the 1965 
parliamentary session, Mr. G.H. van L. Froneman, Chairman of 
the Bantu Affairs Commission said: "When will they get independence? 
... if they are ready for it, it may be within five years, it may 
.... 
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happen within ten years, it can possibly be 20~or 30 years .... . 
It is not for us to determine. No, it is for them to ~etermine .. . 
when they have reached the stage where they can accept the 
responsibility of properly exercising independence, they will get 
it ... no time 1 imit has been 1 aid down." 
Hansard, vol. 13, col. 165, (27th January 1965). 
19 Hansard, vol. 16, col. 65, (25th January 1966). 
20 About the elections of 30th March 1966, see Worral, D., South 
Africa's "Partition Election", in Africa Report, vol. 11, 
May 1966, pp.25-26, from which this quotation has been taken. 
21 Vorster's message to the Nation on 14th September 1966, the day 
after his election as Prime Minister. 
22 "They {Transkei) will get it (independence) in due course." 
Mr. M.C. Botha, the new Minister of Bantu Administration and 
Development in the House. 
Hansard, vol. 18, col. 4144, {13th October 1966). 
23 Mr.M.C. Botha, during the debate of the vote of his Department. 
Hansard, vol. 18, col. 4129, {13th October 1966). 
24 Ibidem., col. 4131. 
25 Ibidem. 
26 Ibidem. 
27 Hansard, vol. 18, col. 4132, (13th October 1966). 
28 Ibidem. 
29 "We have always maintained ... that the policy of separate 
development in respect of every Bantu nation in South Africa 
can proceed as rapidly as the Bantu nation in question is able 
to absorb it ... When they have reached a stage where it is 
within their power to become independent, we accept;that they 
will become independent. We shall therefore help them along 
that road. But at the same time I want to say that we can give 
no guarantee that they will become independent because only 
Good Lord knows whether they have that ability in them". 
Handard, vol. 21, col. 6285, (18th May 1967). 
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30 See for example this statement of Mr. B. Coetzee, then Deputy 
Minister of Bantu Administration and Development: 
"If he (an Opposition M.P.) thinks that we shall permit capitalists 
to be turned 1 oose 1 i ke vultures in the Transkei and·. these areas, 
he is badly mistaken ... Because then Kaizer Matanzima will no 
longer have a country in two years' time ... we are not going to 
allow this economic colonialism which will cripple those areas 
to such an extent that they wi 11 never become independent." 
Hansard, vol. 18, coll. 4107-4108, (12th October 1966). 
31 The same Deputy Minister two years later. 
Hansard, vol. 22, col. 2228, (15th March 1968). 
32 "It is in their own interest that they do not become independent 
until they are economically viable. (It is not possible) to say 
... that by the year 2000 four, five or six of them would have 
attained independence." 
Hansard, vol. 23, col. 4022, (24th April 1968). 
33 Hansard, vol. 24, col. 6656, (6th June 1968). 
34 Hansard, vol. 24, coll. 6656-6661, (6th June 1968). 
35 Hansard, vol. 22, col. 2465, (19th March 1968). 
36 In Vorster's words: "We are prepar:ed to co-operate with all 
neighbouring states ... on a friendly basis, provided they 
respect our independence, provided they do not interfere in 
our affairs. 11 
Hansard, vol. 23, col. 4020, (24th April 1968). 
37 Hansard, vol. 27, col. 8165, (16th June 1969). 
38 Ibidem. 
39 See above, chapter 3. 
40 "We accept that the end of the political road for each 
Bantu nation is independence, if they are capable of that." 
Hansard, vol. 28, col. 202, (25th February 1970). 
41 Hansard, vol. 30, col. 4211, (15th September 1970). 
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42 For example, at the 30th June 1969, there were only 42 400 
Transkeians with paid jobs inside Transkei. 
43 Hansard, vol. 30, col. 5157, (28th September 1970). 
44 Hansard, vol. 33, col. 4869, (21st April 1971). 
45 Hansard, vol. 34, col. 9115, (14th June 1971). 
46 Hansard, vol. 38, col. 5280, (19th April 1972). 
47 A good example of this is given by the Malagasy Republic. It 
seemed for a while that the Malagasy Republic could follow the 
lead of Malawi and forge closer ties with South Africa. In 
1971 an eight-man Malagasy diplomatic and economic mission 
headed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, visited 
South Africa for talks on economic and trade links. As a result 
of this visit, among other things, a permanent commission was 
set up to explore fields for further co-operation. This 
commission started to meet at regular intervals, alternatively 
in Madagascar and South Africa. In May 1972, however, the 
government of President P. Tsiranana collapsed after a revolt. 
The new government of General G. Ramanantsoa complete repudiated 
dialogue with South Africa and broke all links with the Republic 
48 "If a homeland does not want to become independent as a 
result of the fact that I do not want to give it more land, 
then it is its affair. 11 
Hansard, vol. 38, col. 4995, (25th April 1972). 
49 Hansard, vol. 47, col. 1226, (19th February 1974). 
50 Hansard, vol. 51, coll414-419, (10th September 1974). 
51 Hansard (Senate), n. 9/74, col. 3340, (23rd October 1974). 
52 Zambia Daily Mail, 30.10.74. 
53 Hansard, vol. 55, coll •. 378-380, (7th February 1975). 
54 This conference was a follow-up of an earlier meeting which had 
been held in Addis Jl.baba in February, and at which there were 
differences of opinion over the issue of detente between OAU 
states and South Africa. (The main topic of both conferences 
was however the negotiations for a settlement in Rhodesia.) 
S.A.I.R.R., Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1975, p.295. 
350 
55 Hansard, vol. 56, col. 4380 (18th April 1975). 
56 S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1971, p.107. 
57 Hansard, vol. 55, col. 380 (7th February 1975). 
58 Senegal's President. L.S. Senghor, Africa, Middle East and 
South Africa, in Africa Report, vol. 20, No. 5 (Sept-Oct 1975), 
pp.18-20. 
59 It is my opinion that it was not the presence of South African 
troops in Angola in support of UNITA which alienated African 
trust in South Africa, but the failure of this intervention and 
what was widely considered the defeat of South African troops at 
the hands of t.he Cuban expeditionary force. It was only at the 
end of March 1976 that South Africa was singled out as the 
villain of the situation (U.N. Security Council resolution 
condemning South African aggression adopted with nine votes to 
nil and five abstentions (U.K., U.S.A., France, Italy, Japan); 
China did not participate in the voting.). Thus, only when the 
MPLA victory was certain, the African states could find enough 
common ground on the subject to put the blame on South Africa: 
at an O.A.U. meeting held in mid-January 1976 a motion urging 
recognition of the MPLA government and condemning South African 
intervention received 22 votes, another 22 votes going to a 
Senegalese motion calling for a ceasefire and denouncing all 
foreign intervention in Angola. 
60 This was well known by Vorster who said in Parliament: 
"We are saddled with problems, and I have no illusion about this 
•.. that the Transkei might not be recognised by certain Western 
·countries, except if it declares war against us on the eve of 
its independence! Then they may recognize it the following day. 
But to do so in a peaceful way will probably not entail 
recognition for it." 
Hansard, vol. 61, col. 5130 (21st April 1976). 
61 See, for example, Breytenbach, W.J., The Republic of Transkei's 
International Relations with the B.L.S. States. Paper delivered 
at a Conference of the South African Institute of International 
Affairs in llmtata (24th-27th November 1976) on "International 
Implications of the Independence of Transkei". 
62 The Legislative Assembly of an 'internally autonomous country' 
would have been empowered to make laws in respect of all matters 
not mentioned in Schedule 1 to the Act (Act 21 of 1971). This 
would have given it the possibility of scrapping most of the 
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55 Hansard, vol. 56, col. 4380, (18th April 1975). 
56 S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1971, p.107. 
57 Hansard, vol. 55, col. 380, (7th February 1975). 
58 Senegal 1 s President, L.S. Senghor, Africa, Middle East and 
South Africa, in Africa Report, vol, 20, No. 5 (Sept-Oct 1975), 
pp.18-20). 
59 It is my opinion that it was not the presence of South African 
troops in Angola in support of UNITA which alienated African 
trust of South Africa, but the failure of this intervention and 
what was widely considered the defeat of South African troops at 
the hands of the Cuban expeditionary force. It was only at the 
end of March 1976 that South Africa was singled out as the 
villain of the situation (U.N. Security Council resolution 
condemning South African aggression adopted with nine votes to 
nil and five abstentions[U.K., U.S.A., France, Italy, Japan]; 
China did not participate in the voting.). Thus, only when the 
MPLA victory was certain, the African states could find enough 
common ground on the subject to put the blame on South Africa: 
at an O.A.U. meeting held in mid-January 1976 a motion urging 
recognition of the MPLA government and condemning South African 
intervention received 22 votes, another 22 votes going to a 
Senegalese motion calling for a ceasefire and denouncing all 
foreign intervention in Angola. 
60 This was well known by Vorster who said in Parliament: 
11 We are saddled with problems, and I have no illusion about this 
... that the Transkei might not be recognised by certain Western 
countries, except if it declares war against us on the eve of 
its independence! Then they may recognize it the following day. 
But to do so in a peaceful way will probably not entail 
recognition for it. 11 
Hansard, vol. 61, col. 5130, (21st April 1976). 
61 See for example Breytenback, W.J., The Republic of Transkei 's 
International Relations with the B.L.S. States. Paper 
delivered at a Conference of the South African Institute of 
International Affairs in Umtata (24th-27th November 1976) on 
11 International Impl i cations of the Independence of Transkei 11 • 
62 The Legislative Assembly of an 'internally autonomous country' 
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in the homelands, see: Kotze, O.A., African Politics in South 
Africa 1964-1974, London, Pretoria 1975, pp.39-65. 
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NOTES TO PART III 
1 The number of agreements entered into between South Africa and 
Transkei when the latter became independent was 54 (although 
only 53 were published in the Government Gazette, one of them 
having been apparently forgotten); between South Africa and 
Bophuthatswana, 63; between South Africa and Venda, 67 (the 
Government Gazette published 68 agreements between South Africa 
and Venda, but two of them were duplicate, turning up under a 
different heading but under the same title a few pages after 
appearing for the first time. Perhaps in return for this, 
however, the Government Gazette did not publish the non-
aggression treaty which was signed in August 1979 together with 
all the other treaties and agreements. This adds up to the 
total of 67 agreements I mentioned - E.&.O.E.); and the number 
of agreements entered into between South Africa and Ciskei was 81. 
2 The agreements entered into between South Africa and Transkei 
have been published in the Government Gazette No! 5320 of the 
22nd October 1976; 
those between South Africa and Bophuthatswana in the Government 
Gazette No. 5823 of the 6th December 1977; 
those between South Africa and Venda in the Government Gazette 
No. 6652 of the 12th September 1979; 
those between South Africa and Ciskei in the Government Gazette 
No. 8204 of the 14th May 1982. 
3 Non-aggression Pact, Article 1. The treaties with the four 
independent black states have all the same wording. 
4 Non-aggression Pact, Article 2. 
5 The extradition agreement with Transkei has been published in 
the Government Gazette No. 5813 of the 25th November 1977. 
6 Article 1 of the agreement in regard to development co-operation. 
7 The relevant parts of the agreement are Article 3 and Annexure. 
8 Article 7. 
9 In particular in the Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the Annexure. 
10 Article 1. 
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11 A rt i cl e 2. 
12 Personal communication. The absence of tho~e agreements from 
the list is certainly due to a faulty channel of communication 
between government sectors, or to inattention and lack of checks. 
The non-aggression pact with Venda, for example, was regularly 
signed on the 13th August 1979, and being equal to the non-
aggression pacts with Transkei and Bophuthatswana, should have 
been published together with the other agreements in the 
Government Gazette No. 6652. 
13 Government Gazette No. 8204, 14th May 1982, pages 14-18. 
14 Article 1 of the agreement. As an example I quote from the 
"Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South 
Africa and the Government of the Republic of Bophuthatswana 
relating to the Economic Development of Bophuthatswana" which 
appeared in the Government Gazette No. 5823 of the 6th December 
1977, p. 10. The agreements entered into between South Africa 
and the other independent black states on this subject are 
equivalent. 
15 Ibidem, Art. 3. 
16 Ibidem, Art. 2. 
17 Section 3(1) of the Economic Co-operation Promotion Fund Act, 
1968 (Act No. 68 of 1968). 
18 See S.A.I.R.R., Survey of Race Relations 1981, p. 310. 
19 Ibidem. 
20 Preamble of the agreement. Again I give as an example the 
agreement signed with Bophuthatswana, which appeared in the 
Government Gazette No. 5823 of the 6th December 1977, p. 17. 
The agreements signed with the other independence black states 
are, rnutatis mutandis, a repetition of this one. 
21 Ibidem, Art. 4. 
22 Ibidem, Art. 5. 
23 For example, in the case of Bophuthatswana there are five 
projects to be completed after independence: namely, a 
military base, a road over rail bridge, a border post, another 
road over rail bridge, and a mass water supply. 
See Government Gazette No. 5823 of the 6th December 1977, p. 12. 
' ,) 
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24 These acts are: 
- Financial Arrangements with Transkei Act (Act No. 106 of 1976); 
- Financial Arrangements with Bophuthatswana Act (Act No. 93 of 
1977); 
- Financial Arrangements with Venda Act (Act No. 105 of 1979); 
- Financial Arrangements with Ciskei Act (Act No. 118 of 1981). 
25 Section 2(l)(a) of the Financial Arrangements acts. 
26 Ibidem, Section 2(1)(b). 
27 Ibidem, Section 2(l)(c). 
28 Ibidem, Section 2(1)(b)(i). 
29 Ibidem, Section 2(1)(b)(ii). 
30 Ibidem, Section 2(1)(b)(iii ). 
31 For variety's sake this time I quote as an example the agreement 
"relation to the development of certain areas and the undertaking 
of resettlement projects ... by the Government of the Republic of 
South Africa" signed with Venda. 
See Government Gazette No. 6652 of the 12th December 1979, pp. 145-148. 
32 Ibidem, Art. 3(2) and (3) and Art. 2(d) respectively. 
33 At least in the interest of South Africa as seen from the 
government's point of view. 
34 See S.A.I.R.R., Survey of Race Relations, 1979, p. 399. 
35 See S.A.I.R.R., Survey of Race Relations, 1980, p. 430, 
36 Hansard, 3/82 Questions, cols. 112-114. 
37 See S.A.I.R.R., Survey of Race Relations, 1981, p. 310. 
38 See R.S.A., Department of Foreign Affairs and Information; 
The Promotion of Industrial Development: an Element of a 
Co-ordinated Regional Development Strategy for Southern Africa, 
Pretoria 1982. 
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39 The plan identifies ei~ht national development regions to which 







the basis of an index of Relative Development Need. These regions 
are: 
- Region A: Western Cape, Relative Development Need: 6; 
- Region B: Western Transvaal/Northern Cape/Bophuthatswana, R.D.N.: 6; 
··Region C: O.F.S./QwaQwa/Bophuthatswana (Thaba Nchu), R.D.N.: 6; 
- Region D: Eastern Cape/Ciskei/Transkei (southern part), R.D.N.: 9; 
- Region E: Natal/KwaZulu/Transkei (northern part), R.D.N.: 8; 
- Region F: Eastern Transvaal/Kangwane/parts of Lebowa and 
Gazankulu, R.D.N.: 6; 
- Region G: Northern Transvaal/Venda/parts of Lebowa and 
Gazankulu, R.D.N.: 8; and, 
- Region H: the P.W.V. area, R.D.N.: 4. 
Ibidem. 
Ibidem, Appendix A. 
In this regard see the figures in BENSO, 1980, op.cit., 
tables 107 and 108. 
Bantu Homelands Constitution Act of 1971. 
Transkei Constitution Act of 1963. 
Bophuthatswana is in this regard an exception, since the 
proportion of SADT expenditure out of the total South African 
expenditure, which was 21,4% in 1975/76 and rose to 28% in the 
years of independence, in 1981/82 was still 16,8%. 
These figures are taken from BENSO, 1980, op.cit., but also in 
this regard BENSO's figures are questionable. See, for example, 
Abedjan, I., National Accounting Statistics for the Less 
Developed Economies (with Special Reference to Transkei). 
Unpub 1 i shed thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements 
for the Degree of Master of Arts (Economics), U.C.T., 1982, Passim. 
In particular, ibidem p. 108, table 27, gives the income of the 
Transkeian Government from transfers received from South Africa 







13 238 686 
3 166 333 
118 378 000 
The budgetary assistance in my figures is included in the direct 
South African expenditure: for the General Tax and the Rand 
Currency Circulation, BENSO's figures are R7 000 000 and Rl 000 000 
respectively for a total of RB million. The total for the same 
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headings in Abedjan (who obtained the data for his tables from 
the Auditor-General's Office, Income Section, Republic of Transkei) 
is R16 405 019, more than double the amount given by BENSO. 
46 BENSO 1980, op.cit., table 108, referring to the source of 
finance of the governments of the independent black states, 
gives the following figures for Bophuthatswana in the year 
1981/82: 
Self-generation Rll 7 052 000 General Tax RIO 390 000 
Customs Union R114 944 000 Statutory Grant R22 000 000 
Rand Monetary Area R 1 000 000 Project Aid R17 600 000 
Loans R 2 300 000 Opening Balance R53 315 000 
for a total of R338 601 000. The very high opening balance 
(15,7% of the total) suggests the existence of bottlenecks in 
the process of allocation of resources and indicates serious 
inefficiency. 
47 The figures for this diagram are the following: 
1976/77. 1977 /78 1978/79 1979/80' 1980/81 _1981/8~ 
Bophuthatswana 113, 7 160,1 210,2 244,2 309,8 327,8 
Ciskei 117 ,4 115 ,2 135,7 164,3 241,3 393,5 
Gazankulu 111,5 122,8 147,5 265,0 307,5 479,4 
KwaZulu 111,4 118,3 147,0 167,1 210,5 273,5 
Lebowa 120,2 129,0 159,2 194,0 265,5 322,4 
Transkei 150,4 188,6 208,0 230,6 255,5 272, 1 
Venda 116,2 130,9 231,2 295,5 405,2 498,9 
A 11 homelands and 
independent states 123,0 142,4 179,2 212,6 269,1 339,2 
48 The figures for Diagram 2 are the fo 11 owing: 
1976/77 1977 /78 . 1_978/79 '1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 
Bophuthatswana 92,4 112,4 117 ,5 114,9 115' 1 96,6 
Ciskei 95,4 80,9 75,7 77 ,2 89,6 116,0 
Gazankulu 90,6 86,2 82,3 124,6 114,2 141,3 
KwaZulu 90,5 83,0 82,0 78,6 78,2 80,6 
Lebow a 97,7 90,5 88,8 91,2 98,6 95,0 
Transkei 122,2 132,4 116,0 108,5 95,0 80,2 
Venda 94,5 91,9. . 129,0 .139,0 150,5 147,0 
.TJ..11 home 1 ands and 
independent states 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
49 That these figures are nothing more than educated guesses is 
demonstrated by the discrepancy existing between the mid-year 
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estimates for 1980 and the results of the census of the same year. 
50 Both the figures of the 1970 census and the population estimates 
51 
for the following years up to 1975 were made considering the 
borders existing at the time. The transfer in 1975 of the Herschel 
and Glen Grey districts from Ciskei to Transkei changed considerably 
the population of these two homelands. The modified figures have 
been elaborated by BENSO only for the year 1970. 
The figures for Diagram 4 are the fo 11 owing: 
1975 . 1976' 1977 1978 1979 
Bophuthatswana 60 55,5 74 93 111 
Ciskei 124 111,3 98 111 118 
Gazankulu 55 52 55 64,5 86 
KwaZulu 57 52,5 53,5 64,5 67 
Lebowa 39 39 40,5 48,5 52,5 
Transkei 48 60 74,5 80,5 87,5 
Venda 54 52,5 57,5 99 136 
52 About the unreliability of some of the figures published by BENSO 
on the economy of the homelands and the independent black states, 
see: Abedjan, I., op.cit., pp. 72-78; and Thomas, W.H., Research 
note on BENSO's Statistical Survey on the Independent States, in 
Development Studies Southern Africa, vol. 5, No, 4, July 1983, 
pp. 475-493; and for the other side of the coin~ the reply to 
Prof. Thomas' note by F.J. van Eeden, ibid., pp. 49J.-513. 
53 The only figures available regarding the number of baTswana 
employed in the mines in Bophuthatswana are from 1970. In that 
year there were 22 607 people working in the mining sector. Of 









54 Thomas, W.H., Unemployment and Job Creation, Transkei 's Perspective; 
in Development Studies Southern Africa, vol. 5, No. 2, January 1983, 
pp. 222-247. 
55 Republic of Bophuthatswana, Department of Economic Affairs, 
Statistical Report No. 5, 1978. 
56 BENSO, Statistical Survey of Black Development, 1981, Part II, 
Table. 7. 
57 Hansard 5/1981 (7th Parliament) col. 2367, 31.8.81. 
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58 Grobler, M.S.F., Hansard 13/1976, col. 5615; 28th April 1976. 
59 In Schedule B of the Status of the Transkei Act (No. 100 of 1976) 
the categories of persons who in terms of Section 6 are citizens 








Every person who was citizen of the Transkei in terms of any 
law at ttte commencement of this Act; · 
every person born in the Transkei of parents one or both of 
whom were citizens of the Transkei at the time of his birth; 
every person born outside the Transkei whose father was a 
citizen of the Transkei at the time of his birth; 
every person born out of wedlock (according to custom or 
otherwise) and outside the Transkei whose mother was a citizen 
of the Transkei at the time of his birth; 
every person who has been lawfully domiciled in the Transkei 
for a period of at least five years ... and on application 
in the prescribed manner has been granted citizenship of the 
Transkei by the competent authority in the Transkei; 
every South African citizen who is not a citizen of a territory 
within the Republic of South Africa, is not a citizen of the 
Transkei in terms of paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d) or (e), and 
speaks a language used by the Xhosa or Sotho speaking section 
of the population of the Transkei, including any dialect of 
any such language; 
every South African citizen who is not a citizen of a territory 
within the Republic of South Africa, is not citizen of the 
Transkei in terms of paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) or (f), 
and who is related to any member of the population ~ontemplated 
in paragraph (f) or has identified himself with any part of 
such population or is culturally or otherwise associated with 
any member or part of such population. 
60 Although section 6(3) of the Status of Bophuthatswana Act does not 
explicitly mention the fact that those who renounce the Bophuthatswana 
citizenship do so to regain the South African one, it is evident that 
it refers to this case: it would make no sense otherwise. 
61 At the end of 1982, 4 304 Blacks had recovered the South African 
citizenship in terms of Section 3(3) of the National States 
Citizenship Amendment Act. There were: Transkeian citizens 3 735, 
Bophuthatswana citizens 541, Venda citizens 14, Ciskeian citizens 
14, They took up the citizenship of the following homelands: 
Ciskei 2 104 (and they lost again the South African citizenship in 
1981), KwaZulu 1 097, QwaQwa 1 065, Gazankulu 23, Lebowa 15. 
Hansard 3/1983, Questions, col. 213; 18th February 1983. 
62 C.P. Mulder, Hansard 1/1978, col. 228; 1st February 1978, 
63 M.C. Botha, Hansard 13/1976, col. 5564; 28th April 1976. 
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64 See, for example, the text of the agreement with Transkei, in 
Government Gazette No. 5320 of 22nd October 1976, p. 59. The 
text of the equivalent agreements with the other states is 
identical. 
65 In February 1978 C.P. Mulder still said: "If our policy is taken 
to its full logical conclusions as far as the Black people are 
concerned, there will not be one Black man with South African 
citizenship." 
Hansard 2/1978, col. 579; 7th February 1978. 
66 'Star' of 20th February 1979 quoted in S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1979, 
p. 305. 
67 "We have taken the question of citizenship into account ... we 
admit ... that there are certain facets which prevent people from 
accepting other citizenship because they have certain benefits in 
terms of the South African citizenship they enjoy. 11 
P.W. Botha, Hansard, 1/1980, col. 260; 6th February 1980. 
68 Idem, ibidem. 
69 Idem, ibidem. 
70 Hansard, 1/1981 (7th Parliament), col. 149; 4th August 1981 . 
. 
71 A.E. Nothnagel, Hansard, 5/1981 (7th Parliament), col. 2392; 
31st August 1981. 
72 S.J. De Beer, Hansard, 5/1981 (7th Parliament), col. 2415; 
31st August 1981. 
73 L.L. Sebe, quoted in Hansard, 9/1981 (7th Parliament), col. 5293. 
74 C.J. van der Merwe, Hansard, 5/1981 (7th Parliament), col. 2482; 
31st August 1981. 
75 Idem, col. 2483. 
76 "The grossest example of this ... (ideological preconceptions) ... 
that I have ever heard is the description that the Black man in 
White areas is only here temporarily and on a causal basis, for 
as long as the White man tolerates his presence here, In the times 
and the century we are living in, there is no longer place for this 
kind of unscientific semantic day-dream." 
The Deputy Minister of Co-operation, G. Morrison; Hansard, 3/1983, 
col. 1332; 18th February 1983. 
(Not a bad performance for a deputy minister in a N.P. government ... ) 
373 
77 A.E. Nothnagel, Hansard, 11/1982, col. 4969; 21st April 1982. 
78 Idem, Hansard, 3/1983, col. 1312; 18th February 1983. 
79 Idem, ibidem, col. 1311. 
80 P. Koornhof, Hansard, 1/1983, cols. 160-164; 1st February 1983. 
81 P. Koornhof, Hansard, 1/1984, col. 133; 31st January 1984. 
82 Idem, ibidem, cols.138-9. 
83 M.C. Botha, Hansard, vol. 18, col. 4141, 13th October 1966. 
84 "Where is the land belonging to the Blacks, and where are the 
boundaries? The final reply ... was given in 1936 ... 
black land in South Africa1is that land which belonged to the Blacks in 1936, plus the 771 million morgen which the Whites 
have to purchase for them from the white land in South Africa 
... there will be a clearance of black spots, black spots will 
be exchanged in order to consolidate as far as consolidation is 
practicable." 
Vorster, Hansard, vol. 25, col. 363; 7th February 1969. 
85 Vorster, Hansard, vol. 30, col. 5485; 1st October 1970. 
86 ''The government will keep the word the White man gave by way of 
this act ... {the Land Act of 1936) ... ynd the process of 
purchasing ... will continue until the 7~ million morgen of land 
has been given. However, once that 7~ mlllion morgen of land h~s 
been given, then territorial demands,~as far as this government 
and I personally are concerned, will have disposed of." 
Vorster, Hansard, 11/1971, col. 4867; 21st April 1971. 
87 Vorster, Hansard, 11/1972, col. 5277; 19th April 1972. 
88 Those 61 100 ha. were thus subdivided: 22 000 ha. in Transvaal, 
21 000 ha. in Natal, 18 000 ha. in the Cape Province and 100 ha. 
in the Orange Free State. They were from the quota provided for 
in the 1936 Land Act and kept as a reserve for 'rounding off' the 
homelands if and when the necessity should arise. 
89 Vorster, Hansard, 1/1976, cols. 382-383. 
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90 S.Jl .. I.R.R., Survey 1972, p. 34. 
91 In particular, the Second Report of the Select Committee on 
Bantu Affairs, 1973, referring to consolidation in Natal and 
Transvaal (A. 2 -'73); the Third Report of that committee (S.C. 
12 -'73) referring to land consolidation in the Northern Cape 
and Transvaal in regard to Bophuthatswana; and the First Report 
of the Select Committee on Bantu Affairs of 1975 (S.C. 9 - 1 75) 
with additional proposals regarding all the homelands. 
92 Republic of South Africa, First Report of the Select Committee 
on Bantu Affairs (S.C. 9 -'75), Map C. 
93 In the Glen Grey district, where the people whose Paramount 
Chief is Matanzima live, the results were: 37 842 votes (83,7%) 
against the transfer to Transkei, 6 634 (14,7%) int:favour. 
From Kotze, D.A., op.cit., p. 162. 
94 S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1973, p. 155. 
95 Hansard, 17/1977, cols. 8645-8647; 27th May 1977. 
96 Interview with the Venda Ambassador in South Africa, 
S.R. Ramabulana. 
97 BENBO, Black Development in South Africa, op.cit., 1976, p.23. 
98 In regard to the Katima and Senthimula block of Venda, the 1973-75 
proposals are bizarre. While most of the block is considered as a 
'badly situated Black area' and therefore its excision is 
compensated, some farms at its extremities are considered as 'black 
spots' and therefore excised without compensation. Even stranger 
is the fact that the compensatory land for the block results to 
be land already included in the released areas and already under 
the jurisdiction of the Venda and Gazankulu ho~elands. 
See: Republic of South Africa, Second Report of the Select 
Committee on Bantu Affairs, 1973, A.2 -'73, p. 56 and map A. 
99 H.J.D. van der Walt, Hansard 7/1983, col. 3263; 16th March 1983. 
100 J.P. du Toit, Hansard 17/1977, col. 8454; 25th May 1977. 
101 Hansard, vol. 43, col. 4995; 25th April 1973. 
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102 Referring to the exchange of land between South Africa and the 
Homelands, Vorster said: "There is no one who would not like to 
see a contiguously consolidated homeland. I hope and trust that 
in the many years which lie ahead it will be possible for this 
to happen." 
Hansard 10/1978, col. 4511; 12th April 1978. 
103 C.P. Mulder, Hansard 13/ 1978, col. 6037; 1st May 1978. 
104 V.A. Volder, Hansard 18/1978, col. 8991; 9th June 1978. 
105 P.W. Botha, Hansard 1/1979, col. 242; 7th February 1979. 
106 S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1979, p. 303. 
107 Ibidem. 
108 Ibidem. 
109 J.C. Heunis, Hansard 13/1979, col. 6320; 11th May 1979. 
110 S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1979, p. 304, 
111 Republic of South Africa, Commission for Co-operation and 
Development, Annual Report for the Period 1st .January 1977 to , 
31st December 1980. 
R.P. 12/1982, p. 18. 
It is noteworthy that this report for the years 1977 to 1980 was 
released only in 1982. 
112 S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1979, p. 304. 
113 Hansard 3/1981, Questions col. 129. 
114 J.J.G. Wentzel, then Deputy Minister of Development and Land Affairs, 
made the point of the situation in regard to the consolidation of 
Ciskei durinq the debate on the Status of the Ciskei Bill: 
11 (the agreem~nt reached on this subject will be implemented in phases) 
... Phase 1 entails the areas which were declared to have been set 
aside in 1913 as well the areas which were proclaimed to be 
released areas in 1936 ... which (were) state land and which will 
be incorporated on 4 December. This is the territory which ... is 
to be incorporated under the jurisdiction of the Ciskei. Phase 2 
principally concerns those territories designated by Parliament 
since 1972-1975 for addition to the Ciskei. but which have not 
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all been bought out yet, but which will, in terms of our agreement, 
be bought out by the R.S.A. by 30 December 1982 ... There is Phase 3 
as well ... it concerns further additions which will be dealt with 
and discu~sed when finalizing the consolidation of Ciskei and which 
will eventually have to be passed by Parliament as well." 
Hansard 9/1981, cols. 5104-6, 29th September 1981. 
The following day he went back on the subject to give more details 
about Phase 1. "Phase 1 determines the territory defined in this 
status legislation. This consists of three groups of land. In 
the first place there is the 1913 land .•. in the second place, 
there is the land added in terms of the 1936 Act, i.e., prior to 
the proposals of 1973 and 1975. This gives us a total surface area 
of 533 000 ha. However, after the 1972 and 1975 proposals, we 
continued to buy up land ... This means an additional 100 000 ha. 
was included, and this gives us a total of approximately 630 000 ha. 
The rest of the territory ... is land still in the process of being 
bought up." 
Hansard 9/1981 (7th Parliament), col. 5229, 30th June 1981. 
115 According to H.J.D. van der Walt "in the framework of the 
constellation of states concept, the whole question of land might 
not be all that important." 
Quoted in S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1980, p. 391. 
116 Ciskei Commission Report, op.cit., paras. 333-339. 
117 S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1980, p. 392. 
118 Hansard 1/1981, cols. 241-3, 28th January 1981. 
119 H.J.D. van der Walt, Hansard 1/1981, col. 376, 29th January 1981. 
120 A.P. Treurnicht, Hansard 1/1981, col. 350, 29th January 1981. 
121 H.J.D. van der Walt, Hansard 1/1981, col. 377, 29th January 1981. 
122 W.J. Snyman, Hansard 11/1982, col. 4970, 21st April 1982. 
123 Hansard 5/1983, col. 2259, 3rd March 1983. 
124 H.J.D. van der Walt, Hansard 11/1982, cols. 5028-9, 21st April 1982. 
125 A. Fourie, Hansard 5/1983, col. 2237, 3rd March 1983. 
126 H.J.D. van der Walt, Hansard 5/1983, cols. 2259-60, 3rd March 1983. 
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r127 H.J.D. van der Walt, Hansard 7/1983, col. 3265, 16th March 1983. 
128 H.J.D. van der Walt, Hansard 18/1983, col. 8738, 6th June 1983. 
129 H.J.D. van der Walt, Hansard 18/1983, cols. 8826-32, 7th June 1983. 
130 The Borders of Particular States Extension Act (No. 2 of 1980) has 
been amended by: 
- the Laws on Co-operation and Development Second Amendment Act 
(No. 94 of 1980), 
the Borders of Particular States Extension Amendment Act (No. 77 
of 1981), 
the Borders of Particular States Extension Amendment Act (No. 25 
of 1983), and, 
the Borders of Particular States Extension Second Amendment 
Act (No. 109 of 1983). 
131 By Proclamation No. R. 211 of 29th October 1982. 
132 By Proclamation No. R. 141 of 30th September 1983. 
133 By Proclamation No. R. 214 and R. 213 of 30th December 1983 respectively. 
134 By Proclamation No. 180 of 19th September 1980. 
135 By Proclamation No. R. 258 of 18th December 1981. 
136 By Proclamation No. R. 259 of 31st December 1981. 
137 By Proclamation No. R. 142 of 30th September 1983. 
138 By Proclamation No. R. 212 of 30th December 1983. 
139 By Proclamation No. 187 of 24th September 1982 and No. 210 of 
30th December 1983 respectively. 
140 By Proclamation No. 211 of 30th December 1983. 
141 Republic of South Africa, First Report of the Select Committee on 
Co-operation and Development. (S.C. 7-'83) 
142 H.J.O. van der Walt, Hansard 7/1983, col. 3265, 16th March 1983. 
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143 The real situation regarding the Katima and Senthimula area 
appears to be confused. The facts are that the government stated 
that since this area was given to Venda, another area earmarked 
for cession to it would be sold back to the Whites. From what I 
could gather from the text of South African legislation and of the 
agreements with Venda, the only area~ offici~lly e~rrnarked for 
cession to Venda are those reported on·Map4prus Kati ma and 
Senthimula which was added to the schedule in 1983. When this 
area was given to Venda, no modification was made to the schedule, 
and none has been made to it up to mid-1984. Therefore, ft seems 
clear that no "compensatory land in the Soekmekaar-Bandelierkop 
area" earmarked for Venda has been returned to white ownership as 
a consequence of the cession of Katima and Senthimula. However, in 
the 1975 proposals, the compensatory land for Katima and Senthimula 
is not situated in the Soekmekaar-Bandelierkop area, nor in any 
other-area mentioned in the schedule of the Borders of Particular 
States Extension Act. As already pointed out in note 98, the question 
of the compensatory land for Katima and Senthimula appears to be 
bizarre, and I have not been able to find a satisfactory answer to 
it. The latest turn of events seems to have added new interrogatives 
to it. The answer to all this might be very simple, but since most 
of the proceedings of the various commissions and committees working 
on consolidation are confidential, I cannot find it. 
144 BENBO (1976), op.cit., p. 23. 
145 P. Koornhof, Hansard 12/1983, Q. col. 1120, 27th April 1983. 
146 Hansard 18/1983, col. 8738, 6th June 1983. 
147 Southall, R., South Africa's Transkei. The Political Economy of 
an 'independent' Bantustan. London 1982, p, 174. 
148 Ibidem, p. 196. 
149 Ibidem, p. 197, and Streek, B. and Wicksteed, R., Render unto 
Kaiser, op.cit., ch. 7. 
150 For example, according to the Bophuthatswana Land Act, 10% of the 
land incorporated under the consolidation process is reserved for 
the state, 20% is to be sold to private buyers and the remaining 
70% is to be leased to farmers, including Whites. No new land will 
be qiven to the tribes. 
S.A:I.R.R., Survey 1983, p. 329. 
151 Southall, R., op.cit., pp. 176-7. 
152 Ibidem, p. 180. 
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153 For example, in Transkei, from 1963 to 1980 salary increases were 
awarded to the publid service in 1964, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 
1971 (twice), 1973, 1974, 1976 and 1978. 
Southall, R., op.cit., p. 178. 
154 Ibidem, p. 180. 
155 Commission of Inquiry into the Standard of Education in Transkei. 
Quoted in Southall, R., op.cit., p. 184. 
156 Ibidem, p. 186. 
157 Ibidem, pp. 37-8 and 187-8. 
158 Ibidem, p. 38. 
159 BENBO (1976) op.cit., ch. 9. 
160 Ciskeian National Development Corporation, C.N.D.C. Annual 
Report. p. 12. 
161 C.N.D.C., Annual Reports 1980 to 1983. 
162 BENBO ( 1976), op.cit., ch. 9. 
163 Transkei Development Corporation, Annual Report 1981. 
164 Government of Ciskei, Office of the Presidency, Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry into the Economic Development of the 
Republic of Ciskei, p. 32. 
165 Southall says that "in a survey of students at Fort Hare ... it 
was found that only one-third of those interviewed were prepared 
to consider working in the Ciskei or Transkei, a major reason for 
rejection of such opportunity by the remaining two-thirds being 
that they rejected the homeland concept." 
Southall, R., op.cit., p. 180. 
166 See for example: Bekker, S.B., et al., A Socio-Economic Survey of 
the Amatola Basin. Interim Report. Rhodes University, Institute 
of Social and Economic Research, Working Paper No. 2, 
September 1981, Ch. IV. 
167 R.F. Loxton, Hunting & Associates, Notes on the Tyefu Irrigation 
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168 For example, the average pay in the manufacturing industry in 
Bophuthatswana in February 1979 was R109,50 (Republic of 
Bophuthatswana Statistics, compiled by the Department of Economic 
Affairs, 1981, table C 10); during the same year the average 
wage of a black worker in the manufacturing industry in white 
South Africa was in the range of R97-R201 per month. (S.A.I.R.R., 
Survey 1979, p. 228). 
169 It is difficult to find consistent data in this regard, 
as an example the case of Venda in 1978 can be quoted. 
year, the average wage in the manufacturing industry in 
(only 466 employees) was R468 per year. 




170 BENSO, Statistical Survey 1978 (for the 1974 figure), and 
S.A.I.R.R., Survey 1980, p. 115. 
171 About contacts between the Bophuthatswana Ombudsman and those of 
other countries, see: 
Republic of Bophuthatswana, Office of the Ombudsman, First Annual 
Report, 1982. 
172 P.W. ·Botha, Hansard, 1/1980, col. 253, 6th February 1980. 
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A study of the concept of stress in the literature immediately reveals a 
confusing lack of consistency in the use of the term. 
The concept of stress is elusive because it is poorly 
defined. There is no single agreed definition in 
existence. It is a concept which is fami 1 iar to both 
layman and professional alike; it is understood by 
all when used in a general context but by very few when 
a more precise account is required, and this seems to 
be the central problem. (1) 
According to C.B. Dobson (2) there are over 300 definitions of stress and 
words that. are semantically akin to it. This is perhaps partly the result 
of the upsurge of general interest in stress in recent years and the 
popularisation of the concept in the media. A further factor is its use 
in a variety of disciplines such as physiology, psychology, sociology, 
management, psychiatry and pharmacology. 
Derived from Latin (stringere, strictus, meaning 'to bind or draw tightly'), 
the word stress was used popularly in seventeenth century England to 
signify hardship and adversity. By the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries it was being used to denote a force acting on and tending to 
distort or strain a person's body or mental powers, causing ill-health. (3) 
The word 'stress' was also introduced into physics to refer to the internal 
force generated within a solid body by the action on it of an external force 
or 'load', the resulting distortion of the body being termed 'strain'. This 
led to the use of the expression 'being under stress', with resulting 
physiological strains. L. Levi referred xo stress as 'the rate of :wear and 
tear in the organism.' (4) 
Most references to stress in the literature are associated with negative 
and harmful consequences or symptoms. These fall into three categories, 
namely, psychological, behavioural and physiological manifestations. 
2 
The psychological ill-effects of stress are negatively-toned emotions such 
as anxiety, uneasiness, depression, frustration, tension, conflict, 
confusion, apathy, a feeling of not being able to cope, and a feeling of 
not being in control of oneself and the situation. 
The behavioural responses to stress include poor performance, loss of 
motivation, absenteeism from work, and the abuse of alcohol, tobacco and 
, 
and drugs. 
Physiological symptoms that are common are increased blood pressure and 
heart rate, headaches, muscular tension especially in the neck and back, 
fatigue, sweating, loss of appetite, dryness of the mouth and throat, 
skin rashes, over-secretion of hydrochloric acid in the stomach (possibly 
causing ulcers), and sexual dysfunctions. 
Stress is an inevitable part of human experience because all people face 
demands, threatening situations, challenges and adjustments which call for 
coping behaviour. When the coping response is appropriate and successful, 
the disequilibrium (stress) caused by the perceived discrepancy between 
the demand and the individual's capability of responding successfully, is 
removed. Stress in this case may be a positive force rathe~ than a negative 
one, a stimulus to achievement, motivation and satisfaction. 
W. Gmelch asserted that a moderate amount of stimulation and stress is 
necessary for optimum performance in life. Excessive stimulation (and 
stress) and insufficient stimulation (and stress) both lead to a drop in 
performance levels. 
Mild stress - or rather the desire to relieve it - is 
an energising not a debilitating fore~. (5) 
Gmelch illustrated the relationship between stress and performance 
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STRESS AND PERFORMANCE (GMELCH) (6) 
2. DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF STRESS 
2.1 Three main approaches have been adopted in the definition of stress. 
The first views stress as a person's response to a threatening or 
disturbing environment. It is treated as a dependent variable. 




external to the person, causing extraordinary demands and threatening him 
4 
in some way. It is seen as an independent variable 'out there' in 
a noxious environment, impinging on a person and stimulating unhealthy 
reactions. 
I The third approach, the interactional one, regards stress as reflecting 
a lack of 'fit' in the. interaction between a person and his environment. 
Stress is a state that occurs in the person when there is an imbalance 
between the environmental demand made upon him and his capacity for 
coping successfully. What is important in this interaction between 
the individual and his situation is his perception of the discrepancy 
i between the demand and his ability to cope, and not the actual, objective 
levels of these two variables. The person's cognitive appraisal of the 
situational demand and his personal capability makes stress an individual 
phenomenon. According to this approach, stress is an intervening 
variable between stimulus and response. 
Stress resides neither in the situation nor in the 
'/person, but de.pends _o~ t__11~ __ t r~~sact ion of the 
' individual.. in the situation. (7) --· .. - ~. ... .... '-·.~-···-~·~ . 
One outcome of the existence of three very different approaches to the 
definition of stress is confusion over terminology, particularly in the 
mushrooming popular literature on the subject and in everyday conversation. 
Thus, when using the word 'stress', it is possible to mean the events, 
f: forces and circumstances that tend to pressure and overwhelm one (a 
stimulus definition), or th~ physiological and psychological reactions 
. =' 
and changes that result from being exposed to extreme pressure (a response 
definition). Alternatively, the word 'stress' may denote a psychological 
·state resulting from the perception of threat and leading to successful or 
~--------------------~--~~~-~~_:-_~~-~~ 
unsuccessful coping responses (an interactional definition). 
A short account of the response-based and stimulus-based definitions of 
stress is provided, after which an attempt is made in this paper to 
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describe more fully the interactional models of stress favoured by the 
more recent writers in this field. 
2.2 RESPONSE-BASED DEFINITIONS 
---
IThis approach to stress focuses on the person's response pattern to 
disturbing elements in his environment. The response pattern is viewed 
i as stress, and people are refe·rred to as being 'under stress' or 
}'stressed'. The stress response manifests itself physiologically and 
psychologically. :The disturbing demands or threats in the environment 
I 
v' /are termed 1 stressors 1 • The simplest form of this stress model is a 
linear stimulus --- response one, but a response may act as a further 
stimulu~ to produce another stress response. 
ENVIRONMENT PERSON 
J St ressor ]1--------->~ .__s_t_r_e_s_s __ 
STIMULUS----..;;)) RESPONSE 






Probably the best-known response-based moel of stress is Hans Selye's 
biological model. He reversed the traditional view of stress as a 
stimulus or force upon a person, and instead regarded stress as the result 
or response produced within the organism by the presence of a demand or 
stimulus. 
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He defined physiological stress as 
the non-specific response of the body to 
any demand made upon it. (9) 
The response, or defence reaction, is non-specific because the body's 
initial pattern of adaptation is the same for healthy and pleasant demands 
or stressors as for unpleasant and noxious demands. 
Selye named the stress response the General Adaptation Syndrome. Briefly, 
the first stage of the G.A.S. is the alarm reaction', during which adrenalin 
is released into the bloodstream causing racing of the heart and shallower 
breathing. Hormonal secretions mobilize other parts of the body for action. 
Additional red blood cells carry oxygen and nourishment to other cells in 
the body, and the ability of the blood to clot is increased. Muscular 
tension occurs, particularly in the lower back and neck. Hydrochloric 
acid is released in the stomach. Having been prepared to meet the stressor, 
assuming that the demand is still present, the person enters the 'resistance 
stage' during which the body actively combats the stressor. If the demand 
is particularly severe or prolonged, bodily resources may be so depleted that 
the third phase, the 1 exhaustion stage 1 , may be reached. At this point 
stress-related diseases begin to set in. 
Selye's ideas have had great influence on and been transferred to the 
psychological field, but there is growing evidence that the notion of the 
1 non-specificity 1 of the stress response has been overstated. (10) 
Kagan and Levi in Sweden developed Selye's response-based model by stating 
that psychosocial stimuli elicit physiological responses that prepare the 
person for the physical activity of coping. If these responses are intense 
and prolonged, they may produce 'wear and tear' and disease. (11) 
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2.3 STrMULUS~BASED DEFINITIONS OF STRESS 
According to R.D. Allen et al., 
Stress may be defined as a force that creates 
physiological or psychological strain. (12). 
This type of definition emphasizes the stimulus characteristics of the 
environment that give rise to strain within the person. Stress is seen 
as an independent variable, something external to the person, impinging on 
him and acting as a disruptive force .. The following simple linear model 
represents this approach. 
ENVIRONMENT PERSON 
STI MULLIS--------.:----• RESPONSE 
STIMULUS-BASED MODEL OF STRESS (13) 
This use of the term 'stress' to represent an external force causing strain, 
originated in engineering. For instance, Hooke's Law of Elasticity 
describes how a load (stress) placed upon a metal produces internal strain 
and deformation. The metal returns to its original condition when the 
load is removed, providing the strain falls within the elastic limit of the 
mater i a 1. Permanent damage is caused if the strain exceeds this limit. 
In accordance with the engineering analogy, just as metals have different 
elastic limits and tolerances to stress, so individual people vary in their 
resistance to stress. As with metals subjected to stress, people are able 
to tolerate a certain amount of stress, but suffer harm when that level is 
exceeded. 
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In terms of the stimulus-based definition, stress is viewed in terms of 
demand and focuses attention on the conditions that can be accepted as 
stressful. In the literature there are references to many of these 
conditions, but this highlights one of the problems of this model. 
Some of the conditions or situations that are stressful to some people are 
by no means stressful to other people. It is sometimes said, 'One man's 
stress is another man's challenge.' The highly individual nature of 
people's responses to circumstances poses problems for this model. In 
addition the mechanistic approach in which people are passive recipients 
of stress, places further limits on its usefulness. 
2.4 INTERACTIONAL DEFINITIONS OF STRESS 
2.4.1 lnteractional approach~s to the definition of stress emphasise the 
importance of the individual person's perceptions of demands (stimuli) 
and his capability of coping successfully with those demands. 
Accordingly, stress is viewed as an internal perceptual state inter-
vening between stimuli (stressors) and responses (psychological, 
physiological or behavioural strain). This differs from the response-
based and stimultis-based definitions which are represented as stimulus-
response models. Strumpfer represented the simple interactional model 
as fo 1 lows: 
STIMULUS------~ ORGAN I SM-----~ RESPONSE 
EXPERIENCE 
STRESSOR------7 OF STRESS-----~ STRAIN 
\ 
S - 0 - R MODEL OF REACTION TO STRESSORS (14) 
According to interactional !definitions, stress is the result of a 
particular relationship between an individual and his environment. 
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There is no predictable pattern of reaction to demands (stressors) both 
environmental and internal. By means of the psychological processes 
of perception and cognitive appr~isal, each person defines for himself 
those situations that he finds to be stressful. Unlike the stimulus and 
response approaches, the person has an active, and not a passive, role 
in the occurrence of stress. McGrath expressed this perceptual, inter-
actional definition of stress as follows: 
There is a potential for stress when an environmental 
situation is perceived as presenting a demand which 
threatens to exceed the person's capabilities and 
resources for meeting it, under conditions where he 
expects a substantial differential in the rewards and 
costs from meeting the demand versus·not meeting it. (15) 
In accordance with this formulation, environmental demands are neutral, \ 
but may become stressful for a particular person when they are perceived 
to constitute a threat. When the consequences of not coping are 
minimal, stress is insignificant, but when they are serious, stress is 
likely to be great. 
When demands and resources are well balanced, there is minimal stress. 
When this balance is destroyed, stress develops, causing the person to 
take coping action to restore the balance and remedy the situation. 
Usually this imbalance is in the form of an excess of demand in relation 
to resources, but Cherniss (16) pointed out that the reverse can also be 
the case when resources exceed demands (quantitatively or qualitatively). 
This also produces stress manifested by boredom, lack of stimulation, and 
frustration in one's job, for instance, and a suitable coping response to 
restore the balance is necessary in order to reduce the stress. 
2.4.2 The concept of demand is an important one in the context of stress. 
According to Cox (17) the term demand denotes a request or requirement 
for physical or mental action, usually with the implication of a perceived 
time constraint. If demands are not met by means of successful adjustment 
-------------------------------------
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or coping behaviour, they have harmful consequences for a person. 
Lazarus (18) referred to external or environmehtal demands, which are 
largely social and interpersonal, and internal demands, which are - - ---~ . - -~ 
' biological or arise from personal moral values and needs. 
--~-·---
2.4.3 Lazarus (19) defined threat, another key psychological element of stress, 
as anticipation of harm of some kind. The harm, or undesirable con-
sequences, may be physiological or psychological. The greater the 
anticipated harm, the greater will be the threat and the more intense 
the accompanying emotion and the efforts to adjust. People experiencing 
threat try to eliminate the danger of harm to themselves, or at least 
lessen it. The anticipation of possible harm is based on the person's 
appraisal of the situation but may equally be distorted by a lack of 
information or objectivity on the part of the person feeling threatened. 
Thus, the anticipated danger or harm may be more imaginary than real. 
Perception of threat is the key psychological process referred to in the· 
definitions of most recent writers on stress. 
The p~r~~:m - environment fit model outlined by Marshall and Cooper brings 
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A PERSON - ENVIROtlMENT FIT MODEL (MARSHALL AND COOPER) (20) 
2.4.4 Of prime importance in all interactional models of stress are the 
processes of perception and cognitive appraisal; The individual 
ultimately defines stress himself by his perceptions of the demands of 
the situation, his ability to cope, and the importance of coping. 
Stres·sors are 11 there11 
psychologically there. (21) 
only if they are 
For example, it is not only the ill-equipped examination candidate who 
experiences stress before the examination, but also those highly capable 
candidates who perceive their preparation to be inadequate to meet the 
demands of the examination. Furthermore, a person of limited ability 
placed in a very demanding work situation, may not experience stress 
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if his interpretation of the situation is based on faulty perceptions 
of his ability or of the degree of difficulty of the work, or of the 
importance of succeeding. Once he tackles the work and realises his 
limitations or the demanding nature of the work or the importance of 
success, he may well start feeling threatened and experience stress. 
Cognitive appraisal goes beyond the perception of the individual elements 
of the situation, and involves a judgement or interpretation of the 
significance of a potentially threatening situation. .The appraisal 
is cognitive, and not emotional, because it is a function of the person's 
accumulated knowledge, experience and understanding. it may be seen as 
an individual's evaluation of his interaction with his environment, includ-
ing its perceived demands, limitations, resources and opportunities. 
Lazarus defined two kinds of appraisal, namely primary and secondary. (22) 
During primary appraisal of a situation or demand, a person judges whether 
it is potentially beneficial or harmful, important or unimportant, challeng-
ing or threatening. This initial appraisal is greatly influenced by the 
person's estimation of the adequacy of his coping resources, his values, 
goals, and personality. It is also affected by past experiences of success 
or failure in similar situations. 
Once the person starts to deal with the situation or demand, successfully 
or unsuccessfully, secondary appraisals take place. In these he re-
evaluates his initial perceptions of the demand and his resources for 
meeting the demand. The extent to which the coping action meets the demand 
may alter the person's coghitive appraisal of the situation. 
Differences in people's perceptions of themselves and of environmental 
conditions, as well as in their cognitive appraisal of the situations in 
which they find themselves, help to explain the highly individual and 
personal nature of the stress phenomenon. With some truth it has been 
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said that stress is in the eye of the beholder. A person does not 
simply react to a situation, but to the situation as he perceives and 
evaluates it, especially with regard to his ability to cope. 
2.5 SOME FACTORS INFLUENCING COGNITIVE APPRAISAL 
A person's appraisal of a situation is influenced by a highly complex set 
of factors, both environmental and internal. In order to illustrate this, 
some examples of such factors, mentioned by writers in this field (23), 
are listed. 
2.5.1. Personal values and goals. A person judges the importance of meeting 
demands upon him by reference to his value system which places constraints 
upon him. Situations that endanger the achievement of important personal 
goals are judged to be threatening. A problem inevitably arises, for 
example, when a person sets unrealistic goals for achievement, advance-
ment, and status and is reluctant to modify them. 
2.5.2 Importance of outcome. If the outcome of the event is perceived by the 
individual to be unimportant, it will influence his cognitive appraisal 
in the direction of evaluating the situation as safe and non-threatening. 
2.5.3 Severity of the demand. The demand may pose performance requirements 
which exceed or severely tax the individual's capabilities. The severity 
of the demand may also be related to the conflict, frustration or anxiety 
inherent in the situation. By conflict, in this context, is meant the 
simultaneous presence of two or more incompatible goals or demands, where 
actions designed to satisfy one goal necessarily threaten the other. 
Frustration arises from the thwarting or delaying of the satisfaction of 
a need or desire. Anxiety is an emotional state which involves general-
ized feelings of fear or dread. The degree of difficulty of the demand 
may also be increased by its prolonged duration and its multiple nature. 
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Demands that are ambiguous, in that what is required is not clear, and 
those that are novel, having never been experienced before, tend to be. 
perceived as being more threatening than others. 
2.5.4 The imminence of harm. If the potential harm is distant in time, there 
will tend to be less threat to the individual than if it is near at hand. 
The prospect of death, for example, seems to be remote from a young 
person, who tends to give 1t relatively little thought until he is caught 
up in a highly dangerous situation. 
2.5.5 Experience and information. Successful past experience increases a 
person•s competence and confidence in handling situations, and encourages 
favourable cognitive appraisal5. Likewise, the possession of sufficient 
information about a situation reduces unpredictability and enables the 
individual to make an accurate assessment of the demand and the coping 
possibilities. 
2.5.6 Available resources. The individual's perceptions of the personal and 
environmental resources available to him clearly influence his evaluation 
of his adequacy in the face of a particular demand. Included among these 
resources are technical and interpersonal skills, specific training, time, 
authority and status, and supportive and trustworthy helpers. 
, 2.5.7 Personality factors. Threat appraisal is affected by a wide range of 
personality characteristics. Some people have a cheerful and optimistic 
I 
disposition, while others are excessively introspective and readily 
indulge in self-condemnation which magnifies perceived inadequacy and 
inhibits motivation. Some individuals are very competitive and experience 
anxiety as a result of comparing themselves with others. They may react 
badly in evaluation situations, such as speech-making, in which they feel 
they are being judged. Some people do not find it easy to relate to 
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others and worry about failing in their dealings with them. There are 
those who are 'perfectionists', setting unreasonably high standards and 
constantly facin~ the possibility of personal defeat and a consequent 
lowering of self-esteem. 
Two cardiologists, Rosenman and Friedman(24), studied the personality 
ltypes associated with coronary heart disease and arrived at a twofold 
classification~ designated Type A and Type B. 
According to their research, nearly all people fall into these two broad 
personality and behavioural categories. Type A people are competitive 
and achievement-oriented, have a marked sense of time-urgency, are 
extremely involved in their work, often feel under pressure, are self-
critical and easily become annoyed and frustr~ted. They tend to over-
extend themselves in terms of the relationship between demands and 
cap ab i 1 it i es. Type B behaviour is characterised by the converse of these 
traits. Rosenman and Friedman's ten-year research programme, involving 
35 000 men, showed that people exhibiting Type A behaviour were three 
times more prone to coronary heart disease than others. They estimated 
that 10 percent of urban employed men in the U.S.A. are Type A, while 
76 percent of managers exhibit this type of behaviour. 
While this classification may be felt to be rather simplistic, since 
Type A's and B's are probably at opposite ends of a continuum with many 
people falling in between , it doe~ point to important personality 
differences which affect the way in which people react to demands and 
and situations. 
Kobasa et al. (25) studied the stress and general health of a sample of 
670 managers in an attempt to identify a 'hardiness factor' that enabled 
some to be more resistant to stress and stress-related illnesses than 
others. It was found that those with high scores for three variables 
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were more likely to be able to cope with stress. Th~ three components 
of the so-called 1 hardiness factor' are: (1) challenge, the tendency 
to face up to problems in a positive way, to regard threatening situations 
as challenges to be met, and to view changes a~ opportunities; 
(2) commitment, the willingness to become fully involved and actively 
interested in those aspects of life identified as important; and (3) 
control, the belief that one can influence one's environment, that one 
can take control through various actions and not be a helpless victim of 
circumstances which threaten to overwhelm one. Some people have an 
internal locus of control, believing that they can exert control over 
their environment, while others, with an external locus of control, feel 
that they are unable to influence events and situations, largely being 
victims of circumstances. People who do not see themselves as effective 
capers are more likely to appraise demands as being personally threatening. 
In a study of 130 secondary school teachers, Kyriacou and Sutcliffe (26) 
obtained a significant correlation between self-reported teacher stress 
and externality on Rotter 1 s Internal-External locus of control scale. 
3. COPING 
Coping is a key concept in stress theory. When a person perceives an 
imbalance between demand and resources, he experiences discomfort and stress, 
and he is motivated to take steps to remedy the situation. He employs 
problem-solving or adjustment responses, called coping, to remove or alleviate 
the anticipated harm. Effective coping removes the stress experienced by 
the person, because the person 1 s cognitive appraisal of the situation changes 
to a favourable one. Ineffective coping serves to reinforce the stress, 
because the secondary cognitive appraisal confirms the person 1 s inadequacy 
in meeting the demand or threat. 
A detailed account of the coping processes is given in a separate paper on 
the management of stress. 
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The final section of this paper is devoted to a brief description of three 
recent stress models. 
4. COX AND MACKAY'S TRANSACTIONAL MODEL OF STRESS (27) 
Stress is defined as a perceptual phenomenon arising from an imbalance ~etween 
a person 1 s perception of the demand made upon him and his ability to cope, 
when coping is regarded as important. The experience of stress gives rise 
to responses which represent efforts to cope with the source of stress. 
If coping is ineffective, stress is prolonged, and abnormal responses and 
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TRANSACTIONAL MODEL OF STRESS (COX AND MACKAY) (28) 
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An important aspect of this model is that it is not linear, but cyclical, 
with feedback components at various points among the five stages. 
The first stage consists of the actual, objective internal and environmental 
demands and the person's actual capability of meeting the demands. During 
the second stage there is a cognitive appraisal of the perceived demand and 
the person's~ perceived capability of meeting that demand. If there is an 
imbalance, it gives rise to the emotional experience of stress. Cox and 
Mackay illustrated the main components of the transaction between a person 
and his environment, through the process of cognitive appraisal, diagrammati-
cally as follows: 
Extern a 1 
environmental 

















THE BASIC COMPONENTS OF THE TRANSACTIONAL MODEL (29) 
The stress response is the third stage. This is both physiological, in 
the form of bodily changes, and psychological, in the form of behavioural 
and cognitive attempts to cope with the stress. The fourth stage represents 
the consequences, both perceived and actual, of the coping responses. 
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The fifth stage consists of feedback to the cognitive appraisal process of 
\ 
' the successful or unsuccessful consequences of coping. Successfu I 
coping leads to a favourable secondary cognitive appraisal and the consequent 
reduction or elimination of stress. The reverse is the case with ~nsuccessful 
coping. Feedback also occurs when a phy·si.ological response, such as the 
release of adrenalin, affects the person's perception of the demand, or when 
a behav ioura 1 response changes the actua. 1 demand. 
This model has the advantage of representing a dynamic, cyclical process of 
transacti.on between an individual and his environment, unlike those linear 
models that do not provide for feedback mechani.sms. 
5. McGRATH'S STRESS CYCLE (30) 


















... c. Response , Selection 
McGrath's four-stage, four-link stress cycle also represents an interactional 
approach. 
This model is simpler than Cox and Mackay 1 s, but is very similar except that 
it is represented as a closed loop. Emphasis is also placed on the 
importance of the cognitive appraisal process in subjectively interpreting 
( 
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a situation as stressful. On the basis of his appraisal and past experience, 
the person decides on an appropriate coping response. This leads to 
particular coping behaviours, the outcomes of which may .either have the 
desired effects in dealing with the stressor, or alternatively may be in-
effective and even generate new stresses. 
6. McLEAN'S MODEL OF STRESS (31) 
This model was devised with work stress in Mind, and focused particularly 
on the conditions under which certain stressors tend to produce a stress 
response. An unfavourable context and internal vulnerability of the person 
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McLEAN'S WORK STRESS FACTORS (32) 
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The first factor that helps to determine whether a stressor will produce 
stress symptoms is the context in which the interaction takes place. 
The social and work context covers a wide range of elements and norms, such 
as the nature of the social relations and expectations, the work ethic, and 
the economic conditions. For example, in times of mounting unemployment, 
the possibility of losing one 1 s job is much more likely to produce stress 
than when there is full employment and it is easy to obtain another job. 
Strtimpfer (33) in his ·interactional model of organizational stress, included 
a variable which he called •cultural antecedents.•, emphasizing that no 
individual can be viewed out of his cultural context. 
Individual vulnerability to stressors varies widely and is influenced by 
personality factors, moods, stage of development, self-concept, past 
experiences, and skills. McLean underlined the importance of the person 1 s 
perceptions of his personality and capabilities in determining his vulnera-
bility to stressors. He also drew attention to particular vulnerabilities 
of each life stage, drawing on Levinson et al. 1 s conceptualization of the 
seasons of a man•s life, e.g. the 1 mid-life crisis.' (34) 
Stressors form the third set of variables in McLean 1 s model. Li tera 1 ly 
anything can be a stressor if the individual is vulnerable and the context 
unsupportive or unfavourable in relation to the particular str.essor. McLean 
maintained that the common denominator among stressors is that they involve 
some form of change. Individuals have a built-in resistance to change. 
Consequently, they find events that demand change stressful. This is 
consistent with Holmes and Rahe's (35) research on stressful life events. 
They produced a schedule of forty-three critical life events, necessitating 
personal and social adjustment, and gave a value (life change units) to 
each one on the basis of the amount of adjustment each required, e.g. death 





. I pro .uce a tgher' L.C.U. score, which indicated a danger to a person's 
health. 
The final feature of McLean's .model is that the three circles, representing 
the three sets of variables, move and sometimes overlap. A stress 








Here, there is the probability 
that the stressor will produce 
stress because the interaction 
between the stressor and the 
vulnerable person takes place 
in an unfavourable context. 
Although the person is vulnerable 
within an unfavourable context, 
there is no stress because no 












This stressor is less likely 
to produce a stress response 
because the interaction between 
the stressor and the vulnerable 
individual does not take place 
in an unfavourable context. 
The environment may be suppor-
tive and help the person to 
withstand the destructive 
effects of the stressor. 
The stressor operates within 
an unfavourable context, but 
this will not lead to stress 
because this particular person 
is not vulnerable in this 
situation. 
McLEAN'S WORK STRESS SITUATIONS (ADAPTED) (36) 
McLean's model can be developed further by varying the size of each circle 
to reflect symbolically the relative importance or magnitude of the three 
variables at a particular time. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
Simple, linear stimulus-response models of stress, which give insufficient 
recognition to the part played by the individual's subjective perceptions 
intervening between stimulus and response, have given way to interactional 
models. In these, there is a dynamic interplay between the individual and 
his environment. During this interaction, the person's cognitive appraisal 
of his ability to cope, based on his perceptions of his personal resources, 
the demands made upon him, and the importance of the outcome, defines his 
stress. His coping responses either reduce or remove the stress or, if 
they are ineffective, reinforce it in terms of harmful physiological, 
emotional and behavioural responses. Since these are cyclical models, by 
feedback, the coping response re-defines other elements in the system, such 
as the demand (stimulus) or perceived resources. 
The interactional models are more satisfactory representations of the stress 
phenomenon because they account more fully for individual differences in 
reacting to situations than the rather mechanistic earlier stimulus-response 
models. They direct attention to the importance of the person's thought 
processes and this has implications for stress management, as is explored 
more fully in a separate paper. The interactional models also represent 
a dynamic, rather than a static situation, and make greater allowance for the 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The approach to stress on which this study is based is an 
interactional one such as that formulated by Joseph McGrath. 
Stress .involves an interaction of person 
and environment •••• there is a potential 
for stress when an environmental situation 
is perceived as presenting a demand which 
threatens to exceed the· person's capabilities 
and resources for meeting it, under conditions 
where he expects a substantial differential in 
the rewards and costs from meeting the demand 
versus not meeting it. (1) 
This type of stress model emphasizes the key part played 
by the person's perceptions of demands placed upon him and 
his resources for coping, as well as his cognitive appraisal 
of the extent to which the situation poses a threat to him. 
This conceptualization of stress underlines the highly 
individualistic nature of the stress phenomenon in terms of 
which a situation is not stressful unless it is perceived by 
a person to be stressful. People's perceptions are strongly 
influenced by personality factors, self-concept, and past 
experiences of coping or failing to cope with threatening 
demands. As a result, it cannot be assumed that particular 
dimensions of a job are intrinsically stressful. Almost 
every aspect of working life, in fact, is a source of stress 
to some person at some time. In some cases directly opposite 
conditions are both sources of stress for different people, 
for example; work overload and underload, overpromotion and 
underpromotion. (2) 
Although it is inappropriate to categorize certain situations 
as stressful per se, some aspects of managerial work have 
been identified as common potential stressors on the basis 
of numerous research studies and observations. In this 
study brief reference is made to some of this research, after 
which one of the classifications of sources of managerial 
work stress, that of Cooper and Marshall, is described more 
fully and related to the school principalship. 
/ 
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2. SURVEY OF RESEARCH STUDIES 
2.1 A survey of the literature on sources of stress yielded 
reference to only two research studies specifically concerned 
with school administrators. One was carried out by Tung 
and Koch (3) in America in 1978, and attempted to identify 
the different sources of work stress experienced by 1156 
administrators of educational institutions. A 35-item 
Administrative Stress Index questionnaire was compiled using 
the Index of Job Related Strain of Indik et al. (4), with 
other items added from the occupational literature and 
suggested by 40 school administrators. Analysis of the 
responses (62,3% response rate) revealed that the median 
percentage of total life stress attributed to work was 75%. 
Over 60% of the administrators perceived that more than 
three-quarters of their life stress resulted from their work. 
Tung and Koch found that the Administrative Stress Index 
clustered around four dimensions or factors. The first 
factor concerned the school administrator's role-based 
stress and had to do with his beliefs and attitudes about 
his role in the organization, e.g. lack of clarity about 
the scope and responsibilities of the job, insufficient 
authority to match the responsibilities, no knowledge of 
superiors' evaluation of administrator's performance, 
insufficient information to perform work satisfactorily. 
The second factor, task-based stress, arose from the day-to-
day performance of administrative duties, e.g. supervising 
the work of a large number of people, frequent interruptions, 
excessive work load in the time available, time-consuming 
meetings, high self-expectations. The third factor 
represented conflict-mediating stress, e.g. student discipline, 
problems between students, solving parent-school issues. 
The fourth factor reflected boundary-spanning stress in 
those situations in which the external environment 
impinged on the school. 
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2.2 Swent and Gmelch (5) compiled a Managerial Stress Index 
which was applied to over 1200 school administrators in 
Oregon, U.S.A., in 1977. This revealed five main categories 
of managerial stressors. Managerial constraints included 
interruptions, abnormal work· load, 'compliance with employer's 
policies and rules, and over-lengthy meetings. Managerial 
responsibility related to tasks characteristic of all 
managerial work, such as supervision, evaluation, planning, 
and speaking in front of groups. Interpersonal relations 
included resolving differences with superiors and between 
members of staff, and the feeling of the administrator 
that staff members did not understand his goals and 
expectations. Intrapersonal conflicts involved conflicts 
between performance and internal beliefs and expectations, 
e.g. not feeling qualified to cope with the job, having 
unrealistically high expectations, and feeling frustrated 
about lack of career progress. Role expectations concerned 
differences in expectations of the administrator and the 
various people serviced, for example, not being clear about 
the scope and responsibilities of the job. 
Swent and Gmelch's survey, using the Managerial Stress Index 
outlined above, pointed to the following ten main managerial 
stressors in rank order : 
1. Complying with state, federal, and organizational rules 
and policies. 
2. Feeling that meetings take up too much time. 
3. 'Trying to complete reports and other paperwork on time. 
4. Trying to gain financial support for programmes. 
5. Trying to resolve personnel conflicts. 
o. Evaluating staff members' performance. 
7. Having to make decisions that affect the lives of 
individuals that I know, e.g. colleagues. 
8. Feeling that I have too heavy a work load, one that I 
cannot possibly finish during the normal work day. 
9. Imposing excessively high expectations on myself. 
10. Being interrupted frequently by telephone calls. 
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2.3 Gorton and Mcintyre (6), while surveying characteristics of 
sixty 'effective' senior high school principals in the United 
States in the National Association of Secondary School 
Principals' National Survey in 1978, reported that only 
one-sixth of the principals felt that stress was not a 
problem in their work •. 
2.4 Although not specifically concerned with work stress, 
Cawood's analysis of the school principalship in the Cape 
Province, Orange Free State and South-West Africa in 1976 
(7) included the 312 principals' perceptions of their biggest 
problems. These were as follows: 
Quoted by 
1. Overloading with administrative matters 54% 
2. Finding staff 35% 
3. Control over teaching 31% 
4. Problems with teachers 21% 
5. Need to do too much teaching 19% 
6. Problems that stem from Department and inspectors 13% 
7. Problems with parents and other social problems 12% 
8. Shortage of time for principals' tasks 9% 
9. Problems with pupils 8% 
10. Inadequate preparation for the principalship 7% 
11. Problems to do with the cirriculum 7% 
Other problems reported by some of the principals included: 
the unmanageable scope of the principal's work; 
problems to do with rising or falling enrolment; 
the diminishing authority of the principals; 
the ~aintenance of healthy human relationships; 
co-operation and problems with the school committee; 
insufficient private time and time for family life; · 
the loss of teachers from the profession; 
restrictions such as those on the married woman teacher; 
too much emphasis on examination results. 
2.5 Numerous studies of sources of stress among teachers have 
been reported in the literature (8). These have confirmed 
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that occupational stress represents a serious and growing 
problem among teachers, for example in Western Europe and 
North America. Cox et al. (9) matched 100 teachers and 100 
semi-professionals in England for age, sex and marital status, 
and asked them to comment on the main sources of stress in 
their lives. Seventy-nine percent of the teachers pointed to 
work compared with 38 percent of the non-teachers. The 
International Labour Organization estimated that almost 25 
percent of the teachers in Britain, America and Sweden are 
experiencing sufficient stress to cause significant health 
problems. ( 10) 
2.6 In a study of sources of stress by Kyriacou and Sutcliffe (11),. 
257 secondary school teachers in England were asked to rate 
51 stressors on a five~point scale (from 'no stress' to 
•extreme stress', scored 0 to 4). Although not directly 
concerned with the principalship, the findings are of interest. 
Four factors predominated, namely, Eupil misbeh~viour 
(e.g. difficult classes, difficult behaviour problems), 
poor working conditions (e.g. poor promotion opportunities, 
inadequate salary, shortage of equipment), time pressures 
(e.g. too much work in the available time, administrative 
work), and poor school ethos (e.g. inadequate disciplinary 
policy of school, lack of consensus on minimum standards, 
attitudes and behaviour of headmaster). The most highly 
rated single stressors were, in descending order of means, 
•pupils' poor attitudes to work', 'trying to uphold values 
and standards', 'poorly motivated pupils', 'covering lessons 
for absent teachers', 'too much work to do', 'lack of time 
to spend with individual pupils', and 'individual pupils 
who continually misbehave.' 
2.7 Much research has been carried out into the sources of 
occupational stress in general, and managerial stress in 
particular. 
For example, Kiev and Kohn (12) undertook a survey of 
executive stress on behalf of the American Management 
Association in 1979 involving 1375 top management and 1197 
6 
middle management executives. The five major.sources of 
stress (in rank order) were perceived as follows: 
1. Heavy work load, time pressures, and unrealistic deadlines 
2. Disparity between what I have to do on the job and what I 
would like to accomplish 
3. The general 'political' climate of the organization 
4. Lack of feedback on job performance 
5. Long working hours 
2.8 A useful overview of this research was compiled by Cooper 
and Marshall (13) and over forty interacting factors were 
identified. On the basis of this analysis, a conceptual model 
of sources of managerial stress was devised, and this was used 
in a survey research project involving 208 senior managers. 
Among the conclusions drawn, were the importance of work 
overload, lack of autonomy, and concern about career 
development as stressors, and of ambitiousness and anxiety-
proneness as personality characteristics contributing to 
stress vulnerability. 
3. COOPER AND MARSHALL'S CLASSIFICATION OF MANAGERIAL STRESSORS 
Of more importance, in the context of this review, is Cooper 
and Marshall's sevenfold classification of sources of 
managerial stress, because this provides the framework for the 
discussion of sources of stress in the school principalship in 
the remainder of the study. 
According to this model, work stress is individually defined 
by the interaction between environmental sources of stress 
(numbered 1 to 6 in the diagram) and the characteristics of 
the individual at a particular time. (number 7). Potential 
sources of stress evoke different reactions from different 
people, because a person's perception of threat is strongly 
influenced by personal characteristics such as emotional 
stability, tolerance of uncertainty, security, competitiveness, 
flexibility, interpersonal competence, and stability of 
self-concept. 
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SOURCES OF MANAGERIAL STRESS IN A PERSON-ENVIRONMENT 
FIT FRAMEWORK (after Cooper and Marshall) (14) 
Some personality types appear to be psychologically predisposed 
to stress in that they are _less able to cope with or adapt to 
stress-provoking situations. Examples of personal characteristics 
that tend to increase vulnerability to stress are neurotic 
tendencies, insecurity, rigidity, impatience, and perfectionism. 
Sources of stress clearly cannot be analysed and classified by 
reference to environmental factors alone, and for this reason 
Cooper and Marshall included a seventh category, 'characteristics 
of the individual,' in their classification. 
It should also be emphasized that each of the environmental 
demands in this model may be either a stimulus to development 
and achievement or a source of stress, depending on how it is 
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perceived and coped with. The person's perceptions are strongly 
influenced by his self-concept, past experiences and personality, 
that is, those factors that are intrinsic to the individual. 
There is thus a close association between stress and satisfaction. 
For example, demands such as work overload, time pressure, and 
change may bring satisfaction to one person and stress to 
another. To the same person, these environmental demands may 
cause stress in the short-term and satisfaction in the long-
term, or vice versa. Cooper and Marshall allowed for this 
association in their research design by providing rating scales 
for both 'satisfaction' and 'pressure' opposite each 
environmental demand in their Job Characteristics Questionnaire. 
3.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE JOB 
3.1.1 According to the research conducted by Kiev and Kohn for the 
American Management Association (15), heavy work load, with 
associated time pressures and unrealistic deadlines, was the 
most commonly perceived source of stress among managers. 
French and Caplan (16) distinguished between quantitative 
overload and qualitative overload, having too much to do as opposed 
to having work that is too difficult with regard to the skills, 
abilities and knowledge required. In research carried out at 
NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center and NASA headquarters they 
produced strong evidence that work overload, both quantitative 
and qualitative, causes various symptoms of stress, such as 
job dissatisfaction, job tension, lower self-esteem, threat, 
embarrassment, high cholesterol levels, increased heart rate, 
skin resistance, and more smoking. McGrath (17) suggested 
that it is not work overload per se that causes stress, but 
rather overload that leads to a reduction in the quality of 
performance or to the inability to perform all the role demands. 
He also cautioned that apparent overload can readily be used 
to legitimize non-performance Of especially difficult or 
unenjoyable other demands of the job on the grounds that there 
is no time for them. 
J 
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Research studies of business executives by Caplan et al. (18) · 
and Weiman (19) showed that under certain circumstances 
quantitative and qualitative work underload is a source of 
job dissatisfaction and stress as a result of boredom, 
stagnation, and the absence of challenge. 
The surveys carried out by Swent and Gmelch in America and 
Cawood in South Africa (quoted earlier in this paper) both 
indicated that a significant proportion of school principals 
regarded work overload as one of their main problems and 
pressures. The 1131 high school principals, who took part 
in the NASSP's survey in America, reported an average working 
week of 56,5 hours. Cawood's sample of 151 high school 
principals in South Africa claimed to be working 10,8 hours 
per day in a six-day working week. It is suggested that the 
scope of the principalship is elastic and ill-defined and 
that, as in other human service organizations, there is a 
real sense in which 'the job is never done•. Personality 
factors, such as idealism, motivation, ambitiousness and 
conscientiousness influence the principal's workload, as 
does his leadership style as it affects such matters as the 
/ 
amount of consultation with colleagues, counselling and 
training staff, and the extent and manner of delegation. 
Clearly, too, the principal's workload is affected by his 
attitude towards the extent to which he should become involved 
with individual pupils and parents. 
Qualitative overload refers to the complexity of the work. 
In this respect the principal is charged with an exceptionally 
wide variety of responsibilities, including the supervision 
of the teaching programme, staff development, pupil discipline, 
interaction with parents, community and Departmental officials, 
the management of facilities and finance, and public relations 
work. A correspondingly wide range of technical, human and 
conceptual skills is needed by a principal in the execution 
of these varied tasks. Teachers who do not have the opportunity 
to acquire these skills before assuming their first 
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principalship are faced with a serious skills deficit and a 
qualitative overload problem which leads to job strain~ 
3.1.2 Related to work overload, with its attendant time pressures, 
are the frequent interruptions (reported in Tun~ and Koch's 
survey), the fragmented nature of the work, and the 
immediacy of many of the tasks, e.g. disciplinary crises. 
3.1.3 
3.1.4 
Another characteristic of the principal's work that is a 
potential source of stress is ambiguity concerning the 
outcomes of his work. Edelwich and Brodsky (20) in their 
analysis of 'burn-out' in the helping professions identified 
as a built-in source of frustration the lack of objective 
criteria for measuring accomplishment, in situations where 
there are so many influences at work and where many results 
are long term. Lortie (21) referred to this -as the problem 
of •authorship', of lacking objective feedback about the 
results of one's work so that one does not know what one is 
achieving. In Kiev and Kahn's survey of managerial stressors 
(22) 'lack of feedback on job. performance' was ranked as 
one of the main sources of stress. 
Staffing the school constituted a major problem for 35~ of 
the principals in Cawood's survey in South Africa. Although 
not specifically stated, this probably referred mainly to 
the difficulty of finding teachers of 'scarce• subjects 
such as mathematics and the sciences, and also the problems 
and frustrations associated with the employment of married 
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women teachers and attempts· to retain their services. 
Changes in service regulations would remove this latter 
pressure. 
Another potential source of stress associated with staff is 
the difficulty experienced in terminating the services of an 
unsuitable teacher. The investigation carried out into 
'the effective principal' by Brumberg and Greenfield (23) 
revealed this particular difficulty to be one of the three 
most frustrating and emotionally threatening problems in 
their work. It· is probable that South African principals 
experience similar frustrations in this regard. 
A further aspect of the principal's work, related to his 
staff, tha~ is a potential stressor, is his responsibility 
for evaluating his teachers. In Swent and Gmelch's survey 
in America, •evaluating staff members' performance' was 
quoted as one of the main sources of stress. In South Africa, 
evaluation is linked with the granting of achievement awards 
(leading to salary increases) and enhanced promotion prospects. 
Although similar functions are also carried out by managers 
in other organizations, it is suggested that the evaluation 
of teachers is more complex and demanding because of the 
subtleties of the teaching-learning interaction, the 
values-intensive nature of the situation, and the consequent 
problems inherent in agreeing on objective performance 
criteria. Formal evaluation procedures in the context of a 
tightly-knit group of .fellow-professionals may well be more 
problematical than in the industrial and commercial context 
in their effect on relationships within the group. This is 
3.1.6 
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particularly the case when evaluation is perceived as deciding 
on a person's worth in general rather than indicating their 
effectiveness in terms of the quality of their work. 
' 
The principal's responsibility for_ pupil discipline can 
weigh heavily, depending on the size of the school, the type 
of community, and the competence of the staff. In Tung 
I 
and Koch's survey, 'handling student discipline problems' 
featured prominently among sources of stress perceived by 
principals. Similarly, discipline headed the list of 
stressors experienced by teachers in Phillips and Lee's 
survey of the research in America (24), while in Kyriacou 
and Sutcliffe's (25) research in England, problems with 
pupil discipline, negative attitudes, and lack of motivation 
were found to be prime causes of teacher strain. The 
evidence points to heavier demands being made upon principals 
in discharging their disciplinary function within an 
environment experiencing significant changes in social norms 
and attitudes towards authority. Serious disciplinary 
problems, including those involving the possibility of 
expulsion, tax a principal's resources to the full. 
The final characteristic of the job selected for this analysis 
of stressors is change. Growth and development, and the 
accompanying changes, are inevitable and indispensable 
elements of life, calling for appropriate adjustment. 
What are referred to here are changes that are perceived as 
producing extraordinary pressure on the manager. Those 
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innovations that produce uncertainty, threaten the existing 
power structure, disrupt established role relationships 
and daily work patterns, and which are seen to be imposed 
from above on an unconvinced and uncommitted manager, were 
regarded by Moss (26) as extraordinary pressures. 
In the Cape Province, a number of innovations have been 
introduced in the schools in the, past decade. While these 
have been stimulating professionally, they have brought with 
them new demands, because in each case the principal has been 
responsible for introducing and sustaining the innovation 
at the level of the individual school. Inevitably this 
involves, in varying degrees, overcoming suspicion, apathy 
and resistance, apart from the technical and conceptual skills 
needed. 
3.2 ROLE IN THE ORGANIZATION 
Various research studies (27) have shown that a person's role 
at work is another major source of stress. 
3.2.1 Role ambiguity exists when a person does not have sufficient 
information about his work role, including its scope, 
responsibilities, authority, success criteria, and the 
expectations of co-workers. Lack of feed-back about how 
performance is assessed by others may also generate 
ambiguity, uncertainty, self-doubt, a lowering of 
self-esteem, and a consequent perception of threat. 
Kahn et al, found in their study in 1964 that 35 percent 
of all employees experienced role ambiguity resulting 
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in such symptoms as lower job satisfaction, high job-
related tension, low self-confidence, and increased blood 
pressure. French and Caplan obtained similar results at 
the Goddard Space Flight Center, as did Margolis, Kroes 
and Quinn with a representative national sample. Role 
ambiguity has a more marked effect on people with a high 
need for structure and a low tolerance for ambiguity. It 
arises more frequently because 'of the greater size and 
complexity of organizations, as well as changes in 
technology, social structure, and personnel. 
Tung and Koch's Administrative Stress Index contained 
several items referring to role ambiguity, notably 'Being 
unclear on just what the scope and responsibilities of my 
·job are•, 'Not knowing what my supervisor thinks of me, 
?r how he/she evaluates my performance•, 'Knowing I can't 
get information to carry out my job properly.• 
School principals may also find themselves asking such 
questions as, 'To what extent should I be involved in 
fund-raising activities?', 'Where should I draw the line 
with social work-type activities in helping pupils and 
their families?', 'How far should I concern myself with 
my pupils' out-of-school misdemeanours in exercising 
discipline?' All of these relate to the ambiguities in 
the principal's role. 
3.2.2 Role conflict exists when a person in a particular work 
role is torn by conflicting work demands or by doing things 
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he does not really want to do or does not think are part 
of the job. Forty-eight percent of the employees in the 
Kahn et al. study reported being caught in the middle 
between two groups of people demanding different kinds 
of job behaviour, while 67 percent in the Goddard survey 
reported some role conflict, resulting in physiological 
symptoms, lowered job satisfaction, and tension. Greater 
role conflict tends to be experienced in boundary roles, 
for example, between departments or between the organization 
and the outside world. 
McGrath (28) referred to four different forms of role conflict. 
The first is the •man-in-the-middle' situation, where 
superordinates and subordinates hold conflicting expectations 
for the focal person's role behaviour, so that satisfying 
the one automatically means dissatisfying the other. In the 
second form of role conflict, the role demands contain 
internally contradictory expectations, for example, love 
and discipline in the parent's role. In the third form, 
role expectations conflict with some attribute of the focal 
person, e.g. trait, preference, value, or moral principle. 
Finally, there is inter-role conflict, 'wearing many hats•, 
when certain roles held simultaneously may conflict, e.g. 
the demands of job and family. 
A principal is liable to experience all these forms of role 
conflict. He may find himself under pressure to assist 
certain subordinates in attaining their personal goalB, 
which may conflict with his superordinates' requirements 
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for his role. 
By virtue of being closest to the 
teachers, the principal may be placed 
in a situation of role conflict which can 
be dysfunctional as well as personally 
painful, if the teachers expect the 
principal to express their norms, 
sentiments, and needs, even when they are 
not congruent with organizational 
purposes • { 2 9) 
He will certainly experience some of the emotional 'pain' 
involved -in taking strict disciplinary action for the sake 
of the pupil as well as in the long term interests of all 
the pupils. Conflict also arises when the principal's 
personal values are violated by certain policies or job 
requirements, {'having to do things against my better 
judgement•). Time pressure brings about conflicts 
over the allocation of time to job and family, working 
life and 'private' life. 
3.2.3 Boundary roles are associated with high levels of stress, 
largely be.cause it is the person at the interface 
between departments, or between the organization and 
'head office' and the community, who is in the firing line 
when there are conflicts of interest. This is precisely 
the position in which the principal finds himself as he 
mediates between different departments of the school, 
between the school and the parents and community, and 
between the school and the education authorities. 
3.2.4 One aspect of the managerial role that has been identified 
in the literature as a potential stressor is responsibilitl 
for people. French and Caplan {30), in their Goddard 
study, found that responsibility for other people's work 
and wellbeing constituted a significantly greater source 
of stress than responsibility for 'things', the impersonal 
aspects of the organization. McLean (31)-referred to the 
significantly higher incidence of suicide, alcoholism 
and drug abuse among doctors in America, and ~elt that the 
burden of responsibility for other people's welfare was 
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the key variable accounting for this. Cherniss (32) 
considered anyone in a human service organization (including 
teachers, social workers, and medical service personnel) 
to be particularly vulnerable to stress because the sense 
of responsibility for the wellbeing of others makes the 
demand for effective performance particularly strong. 
Doubts, on the part of the worker, about possessing 
sufficient resources to meet this powerful performance 
demand would be especially threatening and conducive to 
stress. An analysis of the school principal's responsibilit-
ies and work activities makes it clear that he is exposed 
to this stressor. 
3.3 RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE ORGANIZATION 
Managerial positions, including the school principalship, 
are 'human-intensive• and involve numerous encounters with 
a variety of people. A number of behavioural scientists 
have identified good relationships between people at work 
as a central factor in individual and organizational 
health. 
Morris (33) represented this aspect of managerial work in 
a model called the 'cross of relationships', in which the 
manager is the 'man-in-the-middle' of a set of relation-
ships with, and between, seniors, colleagues, juniors and 
outsiders (users). There is much potential for stress in 
this focal position unless harmonious relationships are 
maintained and the interests of the various groups and 
individuals are balanced. Inevitably this involves 
mediating and resolving conflicts between individuals and 
groups. 
In Cawood's (34) survey of the problems perceived by 
principals, 'problems with teachers' was quoted by 21% of 
the principals. Supervision of the work of others is not 
easy and calls for a high level of interpersonal skill. 
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Participatory leadership styles have good potential for 
developing strong team spirit and commitment, but require 
skilled and sensitive handling. 
Relationships with parents sometimes produce difficult situations, 
as is the case with some misunderstandings and complaints. 
These may be complicated by fundamental differences in values 
between the people concerned. The principal who makes praise-
worthy efforts to be readily accessible to parents, is likely 
to find himself involved in far more time-consuming counselling 
work as well as related follow-up actions resulting from 
interviews. Apart from the heavier work load, frequent 
involvement with parents is also likely to increase work 
strain as problems are shared and possibly agonized over. 
In their survey of •effective principals' in America, Blumberg 
and Greenfield (35) found that the principals perceived 
themselves to be isolated from their fellow-principals. Apart 
from relationships based on personal friendships, there was 
very little helping, supporting, collaborating, or sharing of 
expertise. The principals expressed the desire for interaction 
and opportunities to share problems and frustrations with 
fellow-principals, and saw this as a critical factor 
influencing their motivation and psychological health. 
3.4 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND CLIMATE 
Cooper and Marshall also referred to those aspects of an 
organization that can make a person's working life either 
satisfactory or stressful. They included such matters as 
little or no participation in decision making, no sense of 1 v 
belonging, lack of effective consultation, poor communicatio~s, 
restrictions on behaviour, and organizational politics. 
3.4.1 Numerous studies have pointed to a link between greater 
participation and consultation and employee satisfaction, 
morale, and productivity. Margolis, Kroes and Quinn (36) 
found that non-participation at work was a significant 
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indicator or predictor of stress. Delegation, which is an 
important aspect of greater participation by subordinates 
in the management of an organization, is not without its 
problems. Delegated authority may be misused, ana 
responsibilities may be neglected or mishandled, thus 
producing situations that pose a threat to the manager who 
delegated. In addition, by delegating many of the more 
routine, structured, predictable responsibilities, the 
manager may be left with a high proportion of complex 
functions and intractable problems, with a high potential 
for stress. On the other hand, Donaldson and Gowler (37) 
pointed out that a common cause of anxiety and stress 
among managers to whom responsibilities are delegated is that 
there is a mismatch between formal and actual powers. 
In Tung and Koch's Administrative Stress Index this was 
expressed as, 'Feeling that I have too little authority 
to carry out responsibilities assigned to me.• The principals 
in Blumberg and Greenfield's (38) survey stated that one of 
their three major problems was the powerlessness they felt 
relative to their prerogatives inside and outside the 
school. They considered themselves to be 'under-powered' 
for the role they had to assume. 
This sense of powerlessness, in certain circumstances, is 
part of organizational life in a bureaucracy, such as a 
school system, particularly if the organization is of the 
•tall' variety with many status levels. Giammatteo and 
Giammatteo (39) in their Stress Awareness questionnaire, 
had this in mind with the item, 'I am restricted in my use 
of my own ideas and professional behaviours due to numerous 
laws, rules, and policies.• According to Blumberg and 
Greenfield, a. school system's emphasis in its organizational 
value system on smooth running and keeping the peace, 
places serious constraints on initiative and innovation, 
with consequent potential for stress manifested in 
frustration. Innovativeness carries with it a greater risk 
of mistakes occurring. If, in accordance with the 
___________________________________________ __JI 
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bureaucracy's value system, such mistakes count against 
the principal, he will tend to refrain from using his 
initiative, but will also experience frustration. 
3.4.2 Professionals working in bureaucratic organizations face 
restrictions on their autonomy that may result in stress, 
since bureaucracies emphasize supervision, conformity to 
laid down procedures, particular success criteria, and a 
considerable amount of uniformity. 
3.4.3 Another possible frustration of middle management in a 
bureaucracy is an inadequate flow of information from 'above•, 
or the delay in this information reaching them. For the 
purpose of this argument, principals occupy middle manage-
ment positions in a school system, while the head office 
personnel represent senior management. There may also be 
frustrations over inordinate delays in receiving decisions 
or responses to correspondence because of the procedures 
that are typical of a large bureaucracy. These particular 
weaknesses in bureaucratic organizations may weaken the 
sense of 'oelonging' and commitment felt by middle managers, 
especially when they are also members of a profession. 
The internal politics of the school as an organization may 
also be a source of stress to the principal. Within 
organizations the distribution of power and influence is 
not always as rational as the organization chart may seem to 
indicate. People lower in the hierarchy often develop 
informal power bases which principals have to take into 
account in decision making. Unfortunately, such groups may 
tend to further their own sectional interests with self-
serving behaviour at the expense of other groups or the 
organization as a whole. Power struggles may take place 
between subject departments, different extra-mural 
so~ieties, the •young turks' and the 'old guard' etc. Such 
struggles may even spill over into the parent body. 
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Hoyle very aptly described this as the 
dark side of organizational life which 
provides the source of much staff 
gossip. { 40) 
Handling it successfully calls for rare insight and human 
relations skills, and may be the cause of anxiety and stress. 
3.5 EXTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL SOURCES OF STRESS 
A person functions as a totality, and his behaviour at work 
and in other parts of his life are interdependent. There are 
a number of interfaces between working life inside the 
organization and life outside which may give rise to 
managerial stress. 
3.5.1 An important extra-organizational source of stress is the 
home-work interface. Work overload, time pressures, and 
the overflowing of duties related to work into home life 
may conflict with family demands. Such conflicts may place 
a strain upon the manager's relationship with his wife 
unless they have reached a satisfactory accommodation. 
Gowler and Legge (41) called this 'the hidden contract' by 
which the wife consents to adopt a supportive role to her 
husband so that he can further his demanding managerial 
career. Such a career requires a level of commitment that 
leaves reduced time and energy for home life. In return 
.for her supportive role the wife expects the sharing of 
certain leisure time, including weekends and holidays, as 
well as sharing in the material rewards and prestige of 
the husband's managerial career. Problems arise when the 
organization starts claiming additional time, or when the 
wife becomes dissatisfied with her role, perhaps because 
she wishes to pursue or re-commence her own career or 
because domestic help becomes too expensive and she becomes 
more disenchanted with household chores. Gowler and Legge 
made the point that the organization employing the executive 
tends to take the existence of the 'hidden contract' for 
granted, enabling it to lay claim freely to the executive's 
time and full commitment. 
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It is suggested that the school principalship, with its 
emphasis on service to the community and its 'elastic' 
hours of work, tends to make inroads into home life, 
requiring special understanding on the part of the wife. 
When the intrusion of the job into home life becomes 
excessive, or the wife becomes dissatisfied with the 
situation, stress will result. 
3.5.2 Business transfers involving moves to other towns, as a 
result of promotion up the management ladder, also 
contain potential for family problems and stress. Wives, 
in particular, may find it difficult to adjust to the new 
environment, and the whole family may be affected by 
insecurity caused by a feeling of mobility and 
temporariness. School principals and their wives are as 
prone to stress from. this source as any other type of 
manager. 
3.5.3 The interface between the school and the community-at-large 
also brings its pressures in the form of expectations, 
which the principal may feel to be unrealistic, 
misunderstandings based on misinformation, and changing 
social and moral norms which conflict with the values 
propagated by the school. In some cases the pressures are 
valid and constructive, forcing the principal to 
re-evaluate situations and policies, and possibly bringing 
about development. In other instances, the pressures 
merely exert a negative influence. 
3.5.4 An important aspect of the school-community interface is 
the school's reputation. It is suggested that principals 
are sensitive to this because of its effect on their 
professional pride and standing, their job satisfaction 
and self-esteem, and their career prospects. They may 
also be in a competitive area, in which the reputation of 
the school has a marked effect on its pupil enrolment and 
its ability to attract and retain a good teaching staff. 
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The public may adopt very superficial criteria when 
judging the relative merits of schools, and those 
principals who feel that their school suffer as a result 
of this superficiality are likely to experience frustration. 
Often a single damaging event or situation, given 
adverse press publicity, affects the reputation of an 
institution out of all proportion to its seriousness. 
In circumstances where the school's reputation in the 
community is a sensitive issue, anxiety about unfortunate 
situations and harmful publicity is likely to be a source 
of stress for the principal. 
3.6 CAREER DEVELOPMENT 
Fears that managers may have of demotion (perhaps as a 
result of their company being taken over by another company), 
redundancy or obsolescence (through changes in the economy 
or in technology), or losing their position on flimsy, 
personal grounds, hardly apply to school principals who 
enjoy exceptional security. What a principal may suffer 
from is status incongruity in the form of under-promotion 
or over-promotion. 
3.6.1 A blocked career, resulting in what the principal perceives 
as under-promotion, may be a powerful stressor particularly 
if the principal believes that less worthy candidates for 
promotion are being preferred to him. The blows to his 
pride and the negative effect on his self-concept, are 
likely to be more serious consequences of a blocked career 
than the prospect of continuing in a position that has 
become routine and predictable. 
3.6.2 Over-promotion, resulting in inadequacy in meeting the 
demands of the position, is an obvious 
unless the principal is unaware of his 
indifferent to its consequences. (42) 
source of stress, 
inadequacy or 
It should be borne 
in mind, too, that a principal who is capable of meeting 
the demands of the position at the start of his career as 
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a principal, may become inadequate at a later stage. One 
of the reasons for this could be changes in the nature of 
the job, such as a larger schoolp the necessity of a 
participatory style of leadership involving greater use 
of interpersonal skills, more involvement with parents and 
the community, and changes in attitudes towards authority 
and discipline. Principals who fail to adjust and to 
develop the necessary skills, become progressively less 
suited to the position, and more threatened by the demands 
of the job. 
3.6.3 Another reason for growing inadequacy is changes in the 
person himself. At the age of thirty-eight a principal 
may feel comfortable dealing with teenagers, whereas at the 
age of fifty-eight the same principal may feel out of 
touch with his pupils and also possibly many of his 
teachers. He ~ay also grow weary of and dissatisfied with 
the disciplinary role that he has to play in the school. 
He may find it very hard to maintain the enthusiasm and 
vitality that teenagers and teachers respond to so well. 
At this stage in his career he may feel that he is stagnating 
and is not the right person for his school, but is trapped 
in the position until retirement. Such a situation is 
conducive to depression, anxiety and other symptoms of 
stress. 
3.7 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
J.7.1 Individual people vary greatly in their vulnerability 
to specific stressors, some being able to cope 
better than others.· Gmelch suggested that we view 
stressors through personal filters which influence 
our response to stressors. 
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3.7.2 Numerous personal characteristics affect threat appraisal, 
including one's pattern of motivation, one's perceptions 
of the expectations of others, one's perceived capacity 
for controlling or altering situations, inner conflicts, 
self-concept (concerning competence and problem solving 
ability, for example), state of health, past experience, 
and levels of competence. In this account, a limited 
number of personal characteristics have been selected for 
treatment. 
3.7.3 Rosenman et al. (44) showed that people exhibiting certain 
behavioural characteristics were significantly more at risk 
to stress and coronary heart disease. Such behaviour was 
called Type A, as opposed to Type B (low risk of CHD). 
Type A behaviour is characterised by competitiveness, 
extreme achievement-orientation, aggressiveness, impatience, 
haste, feelings of being under pressure of time and the 
challenge of responsibility, hyper-alertness, explosiveness 
of speech, and tenseness of facial and other musculature. 
26 
3.7.4 A person's self-concept plays a major part in his evaluation 
of the demands made on him. According to Argyris 
••• the self influences what the 
individual is able to see in the 
environment, how he evaluates it, 
and how he deals with it. If what 
he is experiencing "out there" is 
consonant with his self-concept, 
then he will tend to "see" it in an 
undistorted manner. If what he is 
experiencing is antagonistic to his 
self, it is a threat. The greater 
the discrepancy between the self and 
what it is experiencing, the greater 
the threat. (45) · 
3.7.5 An important facet of a person's self-concept is his 
expectations of his performance. If his expectations are 
excessively high and there is a significant gap between 
his aspirations and his accomplishments, the resulting 
sense of failure has a negative effect on his self-concept. 
It is likely that school principals, because of the idealism 
and sense of calling that is associated with human service 
professions, are particularly vulnerable to excessive 
self-expectations. Cherniss (46) believed this to be a 
potential stressor because the threat of failure has more 
serious personal consequences for people who regard their 
work as a calling rather than a job. For those who view 
their work as a calling, their identity and self-esteem are 
related to a considerable extent to the successful 
accomplishment of their work. Dobson (47) pointed to the 
dangers of achievement anxiety, manifested as a pervasive 
fear of failure, for 'perfectionists• who set unreasonably 
high standards which are beyond their capabilities. 
Levinson (48) regarded intense self-criticism and internal 
dissatisfaction as part of the make-up of dynamic, motivated 
business executives, making them exceptionally vulnerable 
to feelings of failure. 
3.7.6 Writing about the problem of burn-out in the helping 
professions, notably social work, Edelwich and Brodsky 
referred to over-identification with clients as a dangerous 
tendency, because it causes the helper's emotional wellbeing 
3.7.8 
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to be too dependent on clients living up to. what may be 
unrealistic expectations. 
It is difficult, but necessary, to 
decide how much is too much ••••••• 
If a person is to succeed - or just 
survive - in the human services 
field, over-identification must 
give way to a degree of detachment. (49) 
A particular form that over-identification may take in 
a principal, is for the principal to associate himself so 
closely with the school (•my• school) that any setbacks or 
defects are taken so personally that they hurt very deeply. 
Such a principal is vulnerable to stress because a very 
wide range of demands or situations are likely to be 
perceived as personally threatening. 
Tolerance of uncertainty and ambiguitl, which was found by 
Bray et al. (50) to be the fifth most effective trait 
predictor of managerial advancement, is an important 
personal characteristic having a direct bearing on threat 
perception and stress. Related to this is the person's 
locus of control, the amount of control which he perceives 
he has over his environment. People with an external locus 
of control believe that they have little control over 
events that affect them and are subject to greater 
uncertainty than people with an internal locus of control. 
A person's values play an important part in determining 
the degree of importance he attaches to meeting or failing 
to meet a demand which has an important bearing on stress. 
In addition, situations or demands which conflict seriously 
with his values would cause stress. 
4. CONCLUSION 
The first step in this (stress) 
management is to become aware of the 
things that cause stress ••••• 
Identified stressors allow us to choose 
how much or how little weight we will 
grant to each. (51) 
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This review has ranged very widely in identifying potential 
sources of stress, and this is in keeping with the 
multidimensionality of the concept. The causes of stress are 
highly individual because they are to be found not only in the 
environment and in the person, but in the interaction between 
the person and the environment. The key role of the person's 
perceptions of demand, personal resources, and the degree of 
importance attached to meeting the demand, further complicates 
the identification of stressors, because perception is a 
highly individual process. Cooper and Marshall's classification 
of managerial stressors provides a useful framework for 
attempting to analyse and isolate particular sources of stress. 
It must, however, be remembered that a person is subject to 
a number of stimuli at any one time, and it is often the 
cumulative effect of a number of stressors from various sources 
acting together than produces stress. Identifying the causes of 
a person's stress may, therefore, be a more complex matter than 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Very few people would dispute the key position of the school principal within 
the education system. The opinion expressed by the Inspectorate in England 
in their publication, "Ten Good Schools", that the quality of the principal's 
leadership is the main single factor influencing the success of a school, is 
one with which anyone with a good insight into schools would readily agree. 
It is also common knowledge, certainly among experienced principals, that 
the scope and complexity of the principal's work have increased greatly in 
recent years, and that the demands of the position are indeed heavy. 
The sum of all the responsibilities adds up to an enormous 
job for school principals. (1) 
The pressures on principals should not be under-estimated, either by the 
principals themselves, or by their staffs and the education authorities. 
Being aware of the special demands of the position is a necessary first step 
towards coping successfully with those demands. In this paper an attempt 
is made to present certain characteristics of the principal's work that give 
greater insight into the demands made upon him. The last section of the 
paper examines various recent trends that have added to the complexity and 
pressures of the principal's work. Throughout the paper the writer has in 
mind the principalship of large urban high schools of the Cape Education 
Department. 
2. TEN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SCHOOL PRINCIPAL'S WO~.K 
It must be acknowledged that principals, like any other leaders, vary in 
such matters as their perceptions of the scope of their work, their priori-
ties, and the amount of time they are prepared to devote to their work as 
opposed to their leisure time and family lives. Some aim at efficiency and 
stability, a smooth-running school, while others are restlessly innovative. 
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Leadership styles also vary considerably according to the personality, 
philosophy, training and experience of the individual principals. 
Circumstances.at a particular time, such as an extensive building programme, 
the integration of an unusually l~rge number of new teachers into the staff, 
or a major innovation or reorganization, may distort the principal's work 
temporarily in a particular direction. But, even allowing for these 
individual differences, it is possible to identify a number of characteristics 
common to the work of all principals. 
2.1 The principal's work is exceptionally varied. 
Viewed as an educationist, a school principal is a specialist, but when 
regarded as the leader and manager of an organiz.ation he is a generalist 
performing a variety of functions. It was with th.is in mind that Knezevich 
(2) referred to the school principalship as a constellation of positions. 
Schools are staffed for their primary function of teaching and other aspects 
of their educational work, such as extra-mural activities, yet there are 
numerous other functions that have to be attended to. Work that would be 
performed by a personnel manager, a public relations officer, a company 
secretary, an accountant, or a social worker in other organizations, has to 
be handled by the principal in the case of a school. Certain duties of 
this type may be delegated to teachers, but this does not alter the fact 
that the principal is involved in an exceptionally wide variety of work tasks. 
Richard Gorton (3) drew up a classification of the principal's task areas 
which demonstrated the degree of variety present in his work. Although 
this classification referred to the work of principals in the United States, 
it corresponds closely with the concerns of a typical high school principal 
in the Cape Province. Gorton identified seven main task areas as follows: 
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2.1.1 Staff, e.g. selection, allocation of duties, briefing,· observing, 
evaluating, helping, co-ordinating work, fostering team-work, stimulating 
development. 
2.1.2 Pupils, e.g. enrolment, orientation, attendance, safety, guidance, 
discipline, extra-curricular programme, assessment, reporting on progress. 
2.1.3 School-community interaction, e.g. arrangements for parental and community 
involvement, conferring with parents, handling complaints, P.T.A., co-
operation with community organizations. 
2.1.4 Instruction and curriculumdevelopment, e.g. planning curriculum,. 
allocating resources of personnel/time/space/materials, providing for 
supervision of teaching, providing for in-service staff development. 
2.1.5 School busi.ness management, e.g. budget, accounting, controlling 
expenditure, accounting for school property, smooth running of office. 
2.1~6 School plant, e.g. planning for growth and improvement of school facili-
ti es, imp 1 ement i ng pl ans for improvements,. maintenance of facilities. 
2.1.7 General tasks, e.g. public relations work, handling delicate interpersonal 
problems, evaluating the school's programme, attending school and other 
related functions, correspondence, reports, record-keeping, attendin.g 
meetings and conferences. 
Bearing in mind also that many principals try to continue with a limited 
amount of teaching, which requires preparation and keeping up to date with 
developments in the teaching of the subjects concerned, it will be 
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appreciated that a principal 1 s work is exceptionally varied. 
Another factor which contributes to the wide scope of the principal 1 s 
activities and responsibilities is his involvement with the full range of 
school subjects, most of which were of little concern to him before his 
elevation to the principalship. This is particularly true of the high 
school principal. Some of the decisions he needs to take concerning the 
curriculum require a deep insight into school subjects outside of his own 
area of specialization. This type of problem is not unique to school 
principals and is experienced by leaders and managers in other fields, but 
it is suggested that the breadth of the principal's involvement goes far 
beyong that of most other organizational leaders. The need for an unusually 
wide range of knowledge poses many problems for a newly-appointed or 
inexperienc'd principal, unless he has been fortunate enough during his 
deputy-headship to have worked under a principal whose practice was to 
involve him, in the whole spectrum of issues and problems. Such in-service 
training or coaching is of great value in the preparation of future princi-
pals, although clearly further training after assuming duties is also 
essential in order to cope successfully with the greatly increased variety 
of work. 
2.2 The principal fulfils many roles. 
Given the wide range of duties of a principal, it is understandable that he 
finds himself fulfilling a number of differnent role~. Some of these 
roles are implicit in the brief summary of the principal's functions 
contained in the Cape Education Department 1 s Handbook for Principals. 
Besides his primary duty as an educator, the principal 
is in the first place a professional leader •... He 
is responsible for determining policy, planning, 
organization, effective management, and supervision and 
control of all facets of school life •.•.• (4) 
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The prime roles indicated in this short job description are those of 
educationist, professional leader, manager, supervisor, and politician 
(pol icy maker}. 
Richard Gorton (5} summ.a.rised the major roles of a. school principal as 
fo 1 lows. 
* Manager, the person who~ by careful planning and organization ensures 
that the school is aclministered smoothly and efficiently. 
~~ Leader, particularly with regard to the school~s educationa.l programme, 
ensuring tha.t objectives are set, and progress and d.evelopment achieved. 
* Discfpfi~arian, maintaining order and dealing with misbehaviour, and 
fostering a positive attitude to self-discipline. 
1: Facilitiator of human relations, developing co-operative and harmonious 
relationships among the staff and in the school as a whole. 
Change agent, assessing needs, developing and implementing solutions, 
orienting staff, and evaluating results. 
~·· Conflict mediator, a growing role in view of the conflicts associated 
with changed attitudes towards authority and less agreement among 
people over values. 
Among the other important roles played by a principal are those of~ 
ordinator (harmonising the activities of the different groups and 
individuals}, resource allocator (allocating time, space and money, among 
other resources, according to the priorities established for the school), 
monitor (seeking and receiving information about the actual functioning 
of the school for the purpose of future policy-making), censor, (the lonely, 
usually controversial, high-risk role of preventing or stopping what he is 
convinc~d are harmful or dysfunctional situations, according to his value 
system), disturbance handler (solving organizational problems, ''putting 
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out fires 11 ), figurehead (the highly influential role of being, saying and 
doing the kind of things that inspire the confidence and pride of pupils, 
parents and teachers in the school; symbolising what the school stands 
for). 
A particularly important role of any principal is tha.t of maintaining a 
balance between elements within a school which sometimes come into 
conflict. This is not an easy role because the choices are often not 
at all clear-cut, being between two or more good things, rather than between 
good and bad. Examples of this are the balancing of innovation with 
stability; an examination-success orientation with broader personal 
development goals; the academic programme with extended extra-mural 
activities; sport with cultural activities; initiative (with the 
accompanying risk of ~istakes) with efficiency. A princlpal's broader 
perspective of the school, and his tendency to think longer-term than the 
average teacher or school committee member, help M'm to exercise this 
balancing role. 
Enough reference has been·made to the principal's roles to show what a 
wide range of knowledge, insight and ski 1 ls is need.ed. to occupy these roles 
success fu 11 y. There are times when a principal finds hi.mself in a role 
overload situation where he is called upon to perform a variety of roles 
simultaneously or in bewilderingly rapid succession. 
With so many roles to fulfil, the principal is especially exposed to the 
pressures of role conflict. J. Upham and J. Hoeh (6) I identified four 
main types of role conflict. 
11Wearing many hats. 11 Some of the roles held simultaneously by the 
principal may conflict. Often the pressures of the admi~_t..r~ve role 
interfere with the teaching role. -----..::. . Out-of-school roles, such as family 
man, church member, and Rotarian, may on occasion conflict with work roles. 
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There is always the problem of the conflicting claims on the principal 1 s 
time of job and family. 
11Man-i n-the-mi dd 1e. 11 The principal holds an intermediate position between 
!various reference groups, such as the Department teaching staff, the teachers and the pupils, the of Education and the parents and the teachers, 
the members of one subject department and another, the sports coaches and 
the producers of the annual play, etc. Being the 11man-in-the-middle11 
holds much potential for conflict. An example of this is the uncomfortable 
postion in which the principal finds himself when mediating between the 
parent, with a justifiable complaint, and the teacher concerned, who needs 
to be upheld in the eyes of his pupils. 
11Caught in group crossfire. 11 This involves different expectations held 
by teach~rs for the role of the principal, resulting in conflict. Some 
expect strong uniform disciplinary action from the top, while others expect 
discretion to be allowed to individual teachers. Some expect the main-
tenance of the smooth-running status quo, while others feel that the 
principal should be an innovator. 
uThe man versus the job. 11 This type of role conflict a.rises from discrep-
ancies between the demands of the job and the personality characteristics 
and needs of the principal, As a person, he may thoroughly dislike 
public speaking and disciplining others, for instance, whereas as a principal 
he is inevitably called upon regularly to do both of these things. 
2.3 The principal uses many skills. 
Apart from the wide range of tasks performed and roles occupied, another 
heavy demand placed upon a school principal is the acquisition and use of 
a formidable repertoire of skills required for the tasks and roles. 
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According to Katz's analysis (7) these skills fall into three main 
categories: techn i ca 1 , human, and conceptual. 
~Technical skills are behavioural competences, specific techniques, 
knowledge of procedures, and the lpossession of information necessary for 
the work. Examples of some of the technical skills needed by principals 
are: public speaking, interviewing, letter writing, timetabling, 
conducting meetings, budgeting, analysing a colleague's teaching skills, 
planning, decision making, and co-ordinating. 
I Human skills used by principals include couselling, motivating,. negotiating, 
resolving conflict, team-building, encouraging, inspiring confidence and 
developing a climate that encourages initiative. 
~onceptual skills include comprehensive understanding, the ability to 
integrate all the elements involved in a situation, and the ability to 
perceive possibilities and to relate events to principles. These are 
manifested in such activities as setting goals, weighing alternative choices 
against priorities, evaluating effectiveness, assessing the needs of the 
community and the schools, and balanced judgement. 
The array of skills required of the effective princi.pal is i.ndeed formidable. 
The situation is complicated by the fact that a number of these skills are 
not exercised by teachers and that some of them, particularly in the concep-
tual and human categories, are not easily acquired. This points to the 
need for staff development policies within schools that provide scope for 
the acquisition of these skills by senior teachers, some of whom are likely 
to be promoted to principalships. Much of this professional growth should 
result from on-the-job coaching and experiential learning, but seminars, 
shor~ courses, informal reading programmes, and formal studies can all make 
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valuable contributions towards preventing a demoralizing.skills-deficit when 
a teacher commences his first principalship. Naturally, the acquisition 
and refining of skills should continue throughout a principal's career to 
meet his particular needs, for example, time management and stress management. 
I 








The dominant mode of the principal's work is through personal contacts. 
He spends much of his time interacting with a wide variety of people in 
carrying out the whole range of tasks and occupying the multiplicity of 
roles m~~tione~-~arll~r. In accordance with their differing personalities, 
priorities and leadership styles, principals vary in the extent to which they 
involve themselves with pupils, parents and teachers, respectively. Some 
seek to maximise contact with the teachers by limiting their involvement 
with pupils, while others feel strongly that they should keep in touch with 
the pupils at all costs. Some are prepared to have an open-door policy, 
with the risks of time-wasting and interaction overload. Others prefer a 
1:t If 
more formal system of scheduled interviews. The wise principal, of course, 
tries to maintain a balanced approach by ensuring that he remains in touch 
with all sections of the school community, for he cannot afford to drift 
away from any of them. It is this fact that makes his work human-intensive 
..---~~----·----- -~--
and very demanding as a consequence. 
John Morris (8) of the Manchester Business School in England provided a simple 
human relationships model of any managerial situation, and this can also be 
applied to the school principalship. 
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Seniors 
Colleaguesi--~~~~~~--1 Manageri--~~~~~~-t Users ___ _, 
Juniors 
MORRIS'S CROSS OF RELATIONSHIPS MODEL 
[), 
Morris viewed the work of a manger from the point of view of the relation-
/I 
ships and influences that he has to deal with. These come in from four 
directions: from his seniors, his juniors, his working colleagues, and a 
variety of people outside the organization. Morris cal led this the "cross 
of relationships.'' It has a very different appearance from the usual 
organization chart, which takes the form of a pyramid divided into status 
levels. The advantage of the "cross of relationships" is that it can be 
applied to any management position, because every manager, whether senior or 
junior, sees himself as !being at the centre of a cross. Influences, 
expectations, and activities reach the manager along all four arms, and he in 
turn affects others along the four arms by his expectations and actions. 
The manager is the "man-in-the-middle" and day by day he must find ways of 
balancing the respective claims of the four complex and changing sets of 
relationships. 
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This simple model fits the situation in which the principal finds himself 
and may be adapted as follows. 
Department of Education 
Inspectorate 
Teachers I I Parents 
Non-teaching staff._, ___ ..,,, Principa1 1i------c Community agencies 
School Committee Higher educ. institutions 
Other schools 
I Pupils I 
A RELATIONSHIPS OR INTERACTIONAL MODEL OF THE SCHOOL 
PRINCIPALSHIP 
In this model there is a constant flow of. expectation, influence and activity 
in both directions along each arm representing the main working relationships. 
Being in the pivotal position, the principal finds himself interacting 
frequently with.many reference groups. The trend towards participative 
management and leadership styles involving more consultation, the prolif-
eration of people with specialist functions (e.g. teacher-psychologist, 
teacher-librarian, co-ordinator.of programmes for the gifted), and the rapid 
increase in external links, have increas~d the principal 1 s working relation-
~ -. ..... 
~ ....... -·-----1~ ........ - .-...................... ,,,,.., ... 
ships and the demanding human-intensive character of his work. 
~----~--~~----------------·-·------·-_,__..__,,.,.__.....__£~U--M--U-IH-·---····-~· 
A further implication of his man-in-the-middle position in the cross of 
working relationships is that he is often faced with the exacting and some-
times stressful task of mediating between parents and teachers, teachers and 
pupils, one teacher and another, and the Department of Education and the 
teachers. 
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Frequent human interaction places a heavy premium on communication skills, 
particularly oral communication which predominates in a principal's work. 
The spoken word is, in fact, his main tool, and accurate and effective 
speech, accompanied by appropriate body language, is an important require-
ment. Written communication is also important; ambiguous statements in 
newsletters to parents or in correspondence may cause misunderstanding 
and problems. 
Successful interaction with other people also calls for empathy, sensitivity, 
:-"'._..____.,.~---~~~~~~:=----:-·-~~f-~~-:-~--~~-.. -_ - --~....,........-_;:-:-::':-~·---..:---~-:·~~ ..... ~~- --~-~':; 
tact, and persuasiveness. Other requirements are a willingness to 'listen 
____ .... _____ , __ ,.,,. ___ ..,,"''""~~~ ...,,_~.,----..-:-~-·~··, ... .,,~~- ·,- __ "·----:- ~ -· . 
properly t5others, flexibility and a willingness to abandon preconceived 
:..~J.- ·r ._ ~"..,:: .• ,:-._ . .::: - . --.- .. ,., 
ideas in the face of convincing arguments, and sufficient self-confidence 
to interact with others on the basis of seeking what is right, and not who 
==-:c-cjCO-:.o-:,=c,.::;;,c;·.cC:.--'-,.,,_.o·c· ., .,.·' 
is right. 
2.5 The principal's work is values-intensive. 
Unlike industry and commerce, schools are not involved in producing and 
selling material objects, but with the intensely human activity of providing 
for the personal development of young people. While it is not suggested 
that the activities of industry and commerce are value-free, it is clear 
that a human service organization, like a school, is more intensely concern-
ed with moral values. ConsequeQtly, many of the decisions made in schools 
need to be based on carefully considered values rather than on expediency. 
The basis on which decisions are made is, "What is right?" What is for 
the good of the child? What is best for the school?" rather than 11What 
wi 11 work? What will be easiest? What do they want? What w i 11 m.ake us 
more popular?" 
Arriving at broad agreement on basic values that affect many aspects of 
school life is obviously essential, but is not easy because teachers, 
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with their extended academic training, are probably more accustomed to 





Examples of the issues that arise are: the aims of school 
the extent to which authority should be exercised and freedom 
the extent of a teacher's responsibilities to and for his 
the notion of a balanced curriculum; the place of competition 
in the school; the meaning and importance of good school spirit; 
loyalty to the school as opposed to following one's own interests; 
conformity as opposed to individuality; the relative importance, in 
taking disciplinary action, of the interests of the individual and those 
of the group (the school); the role of the parents in the affairs of a 
school; the relative importance of sport and cultural acitivities in the 
school; the importance of success in sport; the extent to which 
teachers have a right to be consulted about matters that affect them; 
the importance of neat appearance (of teachers as well as pupils); the 
importance of,developing the skills of learning relative to memorising a 
substantial body of useful knowledge. 
These examples should be sufficient to demonstrate that those who work in 
schools are involved in value judgements.at almost every turn. As 
professional leader and chief executive, the principal finds himself 
having to think through his own values more frequently tha.n anyone else on 
the staff. There are also occasions when lack of consensus concerning 
certain values may undermine the effectiveness and unity of a staff., Lt 
cannot be taken for granted, by any means, that all teachers subscribe to 
the same set of basic values as the principal. The writer recalls an 
occasion when, as principal, he called upon all teachers to support a drive 
to eliminate the carving of graffiti on the pupils' desks, only to find a 
reluctance on the part of one teacher on the grounds that graffiti developed 
a sense of tradition. 
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It is suggested that the values-intensive nature of the principal's 
decision making and work contributes greatly to the complexity and 
demands of the position. The fact that he knows that he is dealing with 
people's most precious possession, their children for whom they want the 
best, adds to this particular pressure. 
2.6 Much of the principal's work is fragmented and immediate. 
A principal's work, because it is so varied and people-oriented, contains 
many brief encounters concerning the whole spectrum of. the school's 
activities. Interruptions are caused by immediate, non-scheduled events, 
such as telephone calls, and important events are interspersed with routine 
and even trivial ones, calling for rapid shifts in moods. P. Webb and 
G. Lyons (9), who conducted empirical research into the managerial be-
haviour of senior staff in schools in England, found that the duration of 
individual activities fell mostly within the range of 5 - 25 minutes. 
The frequency and fragmented nature of the principa1 1s interactions with 
others, apart from causing work pressure, creates the danger of a pre-
occupation with relatively superficial activities. If he spends much of 
his time reacting to situations and people, the principal may find himself 
doing too little creative planning and reflective thinking. Many 
principals find that the only solution to this problem is to engage in this 
type of activity after everyone else has gone home! 
2.7 The principal bears responsibility for all facets of school life, 
According to the Cape Education Department's Handbook for Principals (10), 
the principal "is responsible for •.• the supervision and control of all 
facets of school life." This is indeed a heavy responsibility, and one 
that is deeply felt by principals, because it includes the physical safety 
of the pupils and their moral well-being, as well as their educational 
progress. Bearing responsibility for people weighs far more heavily 
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than responsibility for things, such as money and equipment. The 
consequences of an error of judgement in permitting an inexperienced and 
rather immature teacher to lead an outdoor club mountain climbing expedi-
tion, or of allowing a film that is highly controversial on moral grounds 
to be shown to the whole school, are likely to be far more serious than an 
error of judgement that leads to damage to an item of equipment. The 
human element makes all the difference. 
What adds to the burden of responsibility is the particularly broad span 
of control of the principal of a large school. To supervi. se the work of 
forty-five, or more, teachers i.s a demanding responsibility, even allowing 
for the authority and supervisory functions delegated to other members of 
staff. 
2.8 The principal's-mistakes and controversial decisions are subject to high 
visibility. 
The public expects especially high standards of school principals, as 
is also the case with doctors and ministers of religion •. Teachers and 
pupils, too, hold high expectations of their principals. When a principal 
makes a significant mistake or fails to deal effectively with a serious 
disciplinary situation, for example, he knows that news of his failure 
will spread rapidly throughout the school, thus undermining his credibility 
and authority. If this type of negative information spreads too often, 
the principal will steadily forfeit the respect, trust and confidence of 
pupils, teachers and parents, and he will be unable to exercise effective 
leadership. 
A principal has to accept his high visibility as one of the challenges of 
his position, and do al 1 in his pow.er to avoid costly mistakes which would 
tarnish his reputation. Controversial decisions and actions that could 
easily be misunderstood need to be explained to the individuals or groups 
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concerned, as far as possible, in order to minimise the difficulties that 
tend to arise. Press publicity can cause problems and needs to be 
handled with care. 
2.9 There is ambiguity over the outcomes of the principal's work. 
It is impossible to obtain accurate objective measurements of the success-
fulness of the school in the way that other organizations can measure 
their effectiveness in terms of sales, profits, production output, and 
production costs. Many of the school's achievements are not measurable 
in such precise terms. Even a seemingly objective measure of success, 
such as the Senior Certificate examination results, needs to be interpreted 
with caution. In addition some of the most important effects of school 
education are long-term and consequently not know to the schools. 
This ambiguity affects teachers as well as principals, but in the case of 
principals there is the additional factor that in many respects they exert 
their influence through others. Th i.s a.dds to the uncertainty experienced 
by principals as to how important and efficacious their contributions are 
towards the success of the school. 
2.10 The principal works in relative isolation. 
The principal works in relative isolation from principals in other schools 
an.d the Department of Education. He has an 11 inside focus 11 ; over-
whelmingly he interacts with subordinates (teachers an~ pupils) within his 
own school. There is a real danger of receiving virtually no feeback 
from oth.ers concerning his performance and effectiveness, and his own 
development needs. At times, when he needs the supportiveness and 
encouragement of other principals, he may remain isolated. Fortunately, 
there has been a tendency for this isolation to be broken down as 
principals interact more with other principals and the inspectorate. 
The activities of the teachers' associations, and the in-service seminars 
organized by the Department of Education and the teachers' entres, have 
played an important part in this regard. 
3. RECENT TRENDS CAUSING INCREASED PRESSURE ON PRINCIPALS 
3.1 There has been a far greater emphasis on the need for the principal to be 
a leader, particularly an instructional leader, than in the past. It 
has been realised anew that high quality performance in the schools cannot 
be brought about by the actions of Head Office planners ~nd administrators 
alone, but requires the good leadership of the principal at the individual 
school level. 
Leadership.involves more than the efficient administration of an organi-
zation. 
Although it is critically important for organizations 
to be kept in motion, merely to do so is. not to be 
equated with the exercise of leadership. The process 
of leading involves attempting to influence the 
behaviour of others to do things differently. (11} 
Leadership involves a proactive approach rather than a reactive one; 
leaders shape ideas rather than respond to them: It has to do with 
determining future directions and obtaining the commitment of others to 
them. This is obviously more difficult than keeping a school running 
smoothly through sound administration, and for this reason the Department 
of Education (through its in-service courses), the faculties of education 
of several of the universities in the Cape, and the South African Teachers' 
A.ssociati.on (through its PROGRO programme), have emphasized leadership 
d.eve lopment. 
The precise nature of the principal 1 s instructional leadership role varies 
accordi.ng to the circumstances and the principal's resources. The fact 
3.2 
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that he i~ not a specialist in all subject areas obviously imposes certain 
limitations. W.L. Nell (12) argued that the principal's instructional 
leadership should be exercised largely through his subject heads, and 
should also include providing the necessary resources and motivation. 
J. Cawood (13) went further than this and stated that ideally a principal 
should devote 50% of his time to the supervision of teaching, including 
regular class visits and follow-up discussions. 
Surveys and experience have consistently shown that principals of large 
schools struggle to do justice to their instructional leadership role. 
For instance, J. Cawood's survey of 151 principals of high schools in the 
. Cape Province, Orange Free State and South-West Africa in 1976 revealed 
that as little as 14% of the ~rincipal's time was being devoted to 
instructional leadership, whereas 42% was being spent on administrative 
and routine clerical work. (14) ~lumberg and Greenfield, commenting on 
the same problem in the United States, suggested that the main cause was 
that 
·I\ (t \ ~ .. ~v l-·1 · 
most principals find themselves besieged on a daily basis I 
with.the nitty.gritty administrative tasks involved in 
1 
.• w '-: (J 
keeping the ship on an even keel.... (15) --t-" ~ '1~ I· 
noteworthy development has been the greater awareness of priicipals:J..\ Another 
of the need for managerial competence in the administration of the school. '-.....), 
This has arisen because the school has become a more complex organization 
which demands greater managerial expertise of its principal. Staffs are 
larger, authority is delegated more widely, subject teachers form depart-
ments of the school, numerous acti.vities need co-ordinating, careful 
planning and organizing are essential, consultation is a necessary part 
of the decision-making process, there is more potential in a more complex 
organization for interpersonal or intergroup conflicts which need resolution, 
and commun.i.cation is an essential and basic managerial function. The 
material and financial resources of the schools have increased greatly and 
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require efficient management. 
Teachers and parents expect schools to be well managed. Disorganization 
and amateurish administration are not readily tolerated, with the result 
that there is pressure on principals to learn and apply management 
techniques. 
3.3 Much emphasis in recent years has been placed on the professional status 
of teachers. On the strength of their training and their membership of 
a profession with its own code of ethics, teachers expect greater autonomy 
and the right to use their own discretion and judgement in their work. 
Yet they work within a bureaucratic system which imposes controls and rules 
through superiors in the hierarchy. E. Litwak (16) suggested that the 
conflicts between these two orientations could best be solved by distinguish-
ing clearly between administrative duties (subject to bureaucratic control} 
and professional tasks (allowing professional autonomy}. This may work 
well In highly developed and well established professions such a medicine 
and law, but in teaching it has not been possible to separate administrative 
and professional functions Jn such a clear-cut way. 
M.G. Hughes. (17) viewed the principal as a professional-as-administrator 
with two major roles, namely that of chief executive of a sub-system of the 
larger bureaucratic system, and that of leading professional of a group of 
professional teachers. It is his responsibility to achieve an accommodation 
between the organization's emphasis on superordinate control and the 
professional's desire for accountability only to fellow professionals. 
Inevitably there are times of role strain for the principal when certain 
teachers claim professional autonomy in situations where bureaucratic control 
has to be imposed. 
As part of their evolving professional status, teachers expect to be 
consulted, not only on the level of the profession as a whole, but also 
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wrthin their individual schools. They also expect greater participation 
in the leadership of the school. Today's principal needs to be skilled 
in the techniques of participative management, and must also be sensitive 
to the kind of situations that call for consultation and those that do not. 
A further consequence of the professionalization of teaching is the 
responsibility that this places on teachers themselves to develop their own 
expertise and keep up to date, as do doctors and other professionals, with-
out this being imposed by the employer. A professional derives his 
authority from his acknowledged expertise, in contrast to authority in a 
bureaucracy which is based on the office or position held in the organi-
zation. It has, therefore, been pleasing to note the professional growth 
activities of a teachers' professional body such as the South African 
Teachers' Association. Within each school the principal, as leading 
professional, has an important staff development function, and many prin-
cipals are currently trying to come to grips with this particular.role. 
3.4 Recent years have witnessed a number of innovations in the high schools of 
the Cape Education Department. These have included differentiated education, 
evaluation of teachers for promotability and achievement awards, teacher-
psychologists, Youth Preparedness, media centres and media-oriented learning, 
the Gifted Child Project, Family Guidance, and the internal Senior Certifi-
cate examination project. Each of these innovations has been of the 11 top-
down'' type, being planned outside the schools and disseminated through 
in-service meetings and printed materials. The principal has in each case 
been given responsibility for implementing the innovation. This has been 
a major challenge because it has involved mastering the ideas behind the 
innovation so as to be able to communicate them accurately and effectively 
to the teachers concerned. Other problems have been motivating teachers 
who may be unenthusiastic because they do not share the vision of the 
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planners and are very conscious of the ever-increasing demands of their work, 
and mobilising the necessary resources of time, space, manpower and materials. 
Apart from the change agent role described above, more principals are aware 
that the rapidly changing times demand that they be innovators in their own 
schools. This is not easy because as Crowson and Porter-Gehrie showed, 
the overwhelming pressure in the daily work of a principal is towards 
managing for stability and maintenance. (18) 
3.5 Another mounting demand upon the schools and their principals is the expan-
sion of the community's expectations of the schools. This may be inter-
preted partly as an expression of faith in the effectiveness of the school's 
work and influence, or as a tendency for the community to shift too many 
responsibilities on to the schools. 
Numerous requests for the school to participate in projects are made by a 
wide variety of.enthusiasts in the community, each one quite naturally 
feeling that his particular area of concern should enjoy the highest priority. 
These projects cover the whole range of social welfare activities as well 
as an increasing number emanating from the business coll1!'1unity. At times 
the principal may gain the impression that the community is relying largely 
on the school to deal with most of society's ailments, such as the rising 
divorce rate., vanda 1 ism, de 1 i nquency, road ace i dents, and the unwise use 
of money." That the school has an important contribution to make is un-
deniable, but a problem arises when schools are expected to add too many 
special projects to their already exceptionally demanding educational 
programmes. In these circumstances, the principal sometimes has the 
unpleasant task of declining well intentioned requests for co-operation. 
3.6 Social problems have proliferated as a result of rapidly changing values 
and the weakening of family life generally. This affects schools because 
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many of the problems that appear in schools are an expression of problems 
that lie beyond it, for example marital problems and parental alcohol 
abuse problems. 
Keith Blackburn (19) distinguished between pupils with problems and problem 
pup i ls. There have always been problem pupils, such as those who are 
problems to the school because of their disruptive behaviour, and schools 
have always accepted responsibility for doing something about these problem 
pupils. Pupils with problems do not jeopardize the smooth running of 
the school in terms of unacceptable behaviour, and consequently they may be 
over looked. Frequently social and personal problems, as well as academic 
underachievement, arise as a result of unresolved home problems. 
Many principals have responded to the needs of pupils with p~oblems, 
personally and through a pastoral care system in which the teacher-psycho-
logist and heads of standards are key members, but they have found this 
aspect of their work to be both demanding and exceedingly time-consuming. 
The number of pupils in need of help in a typical large urban high school is 
often so great that the principal may feel swamped and agonise over where he 
should. draw the 1 lne as far as the school• s i.nvo lvement is concerned. The 
principal tends to find this aspect of his work emotionally draining, for so 
often satisfactory solutions lie beyond his grasp. D. Hargreaves, writing 
about the situation in England, expressed these pressures as follows: 
There has been a broadening of educational objectives 
in which teachers stand in for parents, policemen, 
priests and social workers Other professionals 
get ti red, teachers become exhausted. (20) 
3.7 In keeping with the trend in society, authority is questioned and challenged 
more frequently in schools. Parental authority has weakened in an increas-
-~~~i;;.~~~~~.\1i~.rt'·~~"t'...t¥;J.,,,~rJP!~~:;.~~;~~!f."'-""~~~~'!)· 
ing number of homes, with the result that it has become more difficult to 
. -~~~~:,,,,:.""'~~~Cl~~"'-";1 __,. ,.._ . .h.'!b"'-..... ..:~.~-........ ,.._!t.'""-"''",..,. .. ,~~y~~&'·~'Ji,..,,.:rt-*';"~!:~,~-t.'J~~~llt$1~~~~-':.1.~P''? 
~~~·.~"'--''1:·--· ~ ....... _.,,.,.,.,. ....... l('l.,O""" 
ma.intain sound discipline at school. Under pressure and provocation, . 
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teachers sometimes commit indiscretions which may cause acute problems for 
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the principals concerned. Principals also grapple with the delicate 
~.....-..-----.~~~~~i..,..~,1'4~'l~'1'~~~(1$~~¢-,'l~rNc-:J!ifCi.:.~~!'~-'3~~(fW~~~l!Y~:»l~~~}1 
problem of how far the school's jurisdiction extends off the school premises. 
~~""m:t:lllii.~,,,._~~M~~a.~1a:t,~.:sw,r~1,M';'.b.~J;1,.;;'~4jJ'~l"'~StJ.~~(!~~.!C"'":°i;o.tf~~<;'.:',fr.tl~.~i'i,tt~--4'~~!~"l'::'-..~~f.l:;;..~!(.\\1'~j;}~~~f:$i~f.;!l(!f~.f,";',t:qo:m;~r;~~!;.l.f.):(C,~:ll:.tr..~5":<;t'°:':r.r,. 
Many within the school and in the community at large expect decis.iy~ .•. , 
-r--------•..,.lQ:::."'°~'IVAW,cno~A!~1rf~'~'~?!\~-.lt~.~~""'1\'.~~!&1ilo~..Qi!l'~Ni<iJ~;"l'.~':~P..N1•,~~~~1~'-,':",'Y<",.~.,:;.'!{.~~~~l,'iQ!tf1\>\;;ll 
disciplinary action from the principal in situations in which he has no 
~~~~~~1~~~~~.,,~~·.~;;~~·;;-~:;?'t~P'n;t..~-~,,..-~~iil~~~..:{*~~1,~~~~!.1~~~-t•kr"~~'1.l'~1~~~$.~~~:l'~SSt'.if~;.·~.,,~~~'t:)'!l'i· 
legal authority, but must rely on the co-operation of the parents of the 
~~~~"*'a."~i<>P.~'JJi,.,~!!!.li'.t'~ .. )W~~~a:!Jr..ljJ"'.(frtti~~m"l~!!1£:~~m,.,~~::~1~~~~~~~~~~:-:~~.~~~~~:-~~.,.~~·!lnt· 
offending pupils. When this co-operation is not forthcoming, extremely 
~~~~tll#~~~{,;lt~~~LJll)oi~.l'\o~~~Q,~~'(1!.;1.\~~.".ZW"!1t~{~1/fi,,..t:.'f~J;fA~.;:;::!'j~..;(,;~'-/jo'.l,,'\',:'t"-¥~~(l_'l~f'.Ji~'.1~~,..:~..;i.j:~';):O'>"J~'lll~*<~~/,\:~~':·j~~~~';;~f.~~\;l!~~.·~~~1 
difficul.t and stress-inducing circumstances arise for th~ ~rincigal~~ 
~~-~~~ .. 51~~;.·w~~t$~t>:~:~l~::~'ffi9tt~'f}J~~:~~tl!.;;~&.~s~~-~st"N~n~3,l~"'.:.rj'P~s,~·~r-;lJl~.w~-:;;f).¥.~.t:;i~'?f!~~ -~ ' 
3.8 Principals today realise that their schools are subjected to public scrutiny 
to a greater extent than before, and that they are held accountable. The 
publication of the Senior Certificate results, for instance, tends to be an 
anxious time for the principals of many schools~ Parents and members of 
the public are more prone to voice their disapproval if they are dissatis-
fied, or at least to seek clarification. Unfortunate and embarrassing 
events in schools are more likely to be publicised in the press. 
A different type of accountability is involved in the evaluation of teachers, 
which makes heavy demands- on principals, particularly when the evaluation 
is linked with nomination for achievement awards or promotion. Depending 
on the relationships that exist within the staff, ~ principal may encounter 
pressures affecting his objeitivity, or find himself in the midst of cross-
currents and resentments among his staff. 
3.9 Problems·of staffing the school occupy much of the principal 1 s time and 
attention, and produce strain. Finding teachers of "scarce subjects 11 , 
such as mathematics and the sciences, causes anxiety. The absence of 
teachers on military service or at in-service courses, while being under-
standable and necessary, disrupts the school and poses problems. The 
high staff turnover, which is now common, militates against building a 
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team and necessitates measures designed to maintain continuity. 
This is an age-old problem. As early as 66 A.O. Gaius Petronius, the 
the Roman author, complained, 
We trained hard .••• but it seemed every time we 
were beginning to form up into teams we were 
re-organized. (21) 
3.10 The political environment in which schools function is sensitive. 
Divisions exist and these are reflected in the parent body and the pupils. 
In these circumstances there is scope for misunderstanding and friction 
over a variety of matters as diverse as racially-mixed sporting events, 
Youth Preparedness, the teaching of certain aspects of History, the choice 
of dramatic productions or debating topics or magazine items, the choice 
of prize-giving speakers and the attitudes of certain teachers. It is 
the principal who bears the brunt of complaints and is expected to deal 
suitably with the problem. 
Another dimension to the pressure on the principal arising from political 
circumstances is the heavy responsibility for doing everything possible 
to ensure the safety of the pupils and security of the school. 
4. COPING WITH THE PRESSURES OF THE PRINCIPALSHIP 
4.1 Anyone in a leadership position must expect to have to contend with pressure 
and strain, and the principal is no exception. Indeed, many of the pressures 
described in this paper constitute the challenges in the work, and meeting 
these special demands results in job satisfaction, personal development, and 
a sense of fulfilment. When, however, a principal experiences what he 
perceives to be excessive~demands upon himself, the pressure may have negative, 
rather than positive, effects on his performance. This is especially the 
case when he is subjected to prolonged, frequent, or excessive pressures, 
which he finds particularly difficult to cope with. 
--- ----------------------------------------------
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4.2 One of the implications of the specially demandfng nature of the school 
principalship is the importance of an effective system of selecting 
suitable teachers as principals. Wise selection must be based on a 
thorough understanding of the nature of the pr inc i pa 11 s work and the 
pressures involved. The Cape Education Department's selection system, 
whereby the promotabi 1 ity evaluation of teachers is carried out periodically 
by the principals and inspectors, goes a long way towards meeting this need, 
providing both sets of evaluators constantly bear in mind the criteria 
against which they are evaluating the teacher concerned. 
It is not within the scope of this paper to explore in any detail the coping 
strategies a principal may employ, but three broad categories are suggested. 
4.3 Training and personal development give ~principals more skills and greater 
insight with' which to
1
tackle their work successfully. This increases 
principals' confidence and ability to cope with pressure. Ronald Rebore 
(22) identified six major areas as appropriate for development programmes 
for principals. These were 1) instructiona1 skills, including the 
evaluati.on, supervision and improvement of teaching; 2) management skills; 
3) human relations abilities; 4) political and cultural awareness; 
5) leadership skills; and 6) self-understanding. Development in these 
areas should result in increased competence in handling the work, as well as 
greater self-assurance and resilience in contending with the emotional and 
moral demands of the principalship. 
4.4 Some·principals fail to utilize all the resources at their disposal, and 
this con.tributes towards pressure and frustration. This applies particu-
larly to the human resources of the staff. Modern approaches to leadership 
emphasize team-work and the delegation of responsibilities, with commensurate 
26 
authority. When principals share their leadership with o~hers, they not only 
share the burden of the work, but also harness the particular talents and 
energies of the members of their leadership team. This strengthens the 
leadership of the school and frees the principal from feeling that the school 
is totally dependent upon him for its leadership. 
Other resources, such as the computerization of certain aspects of admin-
istration, may also be used fruitfully to reduce some of the pressure of 
work. 
4.5 Social support is the third form of coping strategy that can help sustain a 
principal through difficult times. According to Leonard Moss {23), people 
are said to have social support if they have a relationship with one or 
more persons that is characterized by relatively frequent interactions, by 
strong positive feelings, and by an ability and a willingness to give and 
take emotional and practical assistance in times of need. Research has 
shown clearly that in the work setting, supportive social relationships 
reduce various occupational stresses. {24) Social support augments the 
individual's strengths and facilitates his adaptive coping behaviour. 
Applied to the principalship, this underlines the importance to the principal 
of supportive relationships with his senior staff, particularly his deputy, 
and also with the school committee and the Inspector of Education. The 
principal under pressure may also draw support and encouragement from fellow-
principals, with whom, under threat-free conditions, he may feel able to 
share his problems. The supporting role of the principal's spouse should 
also not be underestimated. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
Any consideration of the administration ofi large urban high schools, and 
in particular of the role of the principals of these schools, must take into 
account the exceptionally demanding nature of th~ present-day· principal~ 
ship. The pressure on school principals is increasing, and harmful work 
stress must be recognised as a potential hazard confronting principals. A 
careful analysis of the sources of pressure and strain is a prerequisite for 
--~~~-.:.~~--~~~--__:~----------~~__.;-----------
devising effective ways of coping with the pressure. 
----------------------
Note. For the sake of brevity and convenience, reference has been made 
to male principals throughout the paper. 
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Stress is an inevitable part of life. The success with 
,which people cope with stress determines whether it is a 
---------=......,...,---=-~~~~ .-~~~= --~~~~~~~-~~~"~ 
stimulus to new levels of achievement, creativity and 
personal development, or whether it is the cause of anxiety, 
----------~~-~ .. ~~ . . ·-~.~--~~~~.~~-~~~ ... ~··~~~~~~--
depression, self-destructive behaviour, and illne~.s~ 
-~-.co-·-=.~~~~·~·.~~-.,,,.· - -~- ---- ---=-~.......---= ........ ~ _ .. 
People are characterised not so much by whether they 
experience stress as by how they cope with it. 
A most significant characteristic of stress is the highly 
individual nature of the phenomenon. People vary greatly 
in what they perceive to be stressors, as well as in the 
nature of their stress reactions. This applies also to 
the coping processes that people employ and the strategies 
they find useful in managing, controlling, alleviating and 
preventing stress. 
People use a wide variety of coping processes, 
depending on their personal characteristics, 
the nature of the environmental demands and 
contingencies, and how these are appraised. (1) 
In this paper, an attempt is made to analyse the normal stress 
coping responses, to describe an approach to stress management 
based on a transactional model, to present the findings of 
several re'cent research surveys, and to summarise the 
strategies commonly advocated for stress management. 
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2. HOW PEOPLE RESPOND TO STRESS : THE CONCEPT OF COPING 
2~1 When people are placed in demanding situations which they 
perceive to be stressful, they are motivated to do 
something about it by employing problem-solving behaviour 
to try to remove the source of the stress or alleviate 
the discomfort experienced. This psychological response 
to stress is called coping. Successful coping either 
eliminates the stress experienced by the person or, if this 
is not posstble, reduces the discomfort and makes tolerance 
of the demanding situation easier. Unsuccessful coping 
leads to the continuation of the stress symptoms, and 
possibly to their intensification as a result of the 
anxiety produced by the failure to cope satisfactorily. 
Sometimes, the attempted coping response takes the form of 
dysfunctional types of behaviour such as alcohol or drug 
abuse, and further problems are created. 
Coping takes two forms. A person may use direct action 
to deal with the actual problem, the source of the stress. 
Alternatively, particularly if little can be done about 
the source of the stress, he may use indirect action 
(Ealliation) to deal with the experience of stress by 
reducing emotional distress. These two forms of coping are 
examined in more detail. 
2.2 DIRECT ACTION FORMS OF COPING 
Direct action involves all types of behaviour designed 
to deal with the stressor. Drawing on the work of Lazarus, 
Cox (2) referred to four different forms that direct action 
3 
coping may take. 
2.2.1 Fighting the stressor 
This involves identifying the source of stress, confronting 
it and taking steps to deal with it. An appropriate 
coping response to a threatening, anxiety-inducing 
situation at work could well be. to work harder to ensure 
success, to seek advice from others, or to call in the 
assistance of fellow workers to master the threatening 
situation successfully. Often a direct confrontation is 
the most appropriate and effective_ way of coping with a 
stressor. 
In adversary situations, such as conflict between 
individuals or groups, the source of stress may be 
perceived as a particular person, a group of people, or 
an organization. In such circumstances, a display of 
aggression and anger towards the source of stress is a 
common coping response, and in the short term this may 
have the effect of reducing the stress. Circumstances 
may prevent the person from showing aggression towards 
the source of stress, and displaced aggression may be 
expressed towards an accessible innocent person. In this 
way a·man may vent his hostility on his wife when the real 
source of his stress i~ his supervisor at work. Unless 
he perceives his wife to be part of his problem, such 
displaced aggression may give rise to feelings of guilt ~ 
and add to his experience of stress. 
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2.2.2 Learning and preparing against future threats 
This goes beyond responding to present sources of stress 
and is preventive rather than adaptive as a form of 
coping. As a person strengthens his resources for 
meeting future demands, he reduces the actual danger 
of not being able to meet those demands as well as the 
perceived threat to himself. A good example of this 
form of direct coping action is the thorough preparation 
put in by a student ·before an examination. 
Learning, as a process of acquiring the 
ability to control the outcomes in anxiety-
producing situations, is therefore clearly 
an effective and constructive way of coping 
with stress that leaves the person better 
able to cope with situations that confront 
him. ( 3) 
2.2.3 Fleeing from the stressor 
Instead of confronting or fighting the stressor, people 
sometimes respond to stressful situations by fleeing 
from or avoiding them. This may involve physical·· 
withdrawal, for example the soldier who runs from the 
battlefield or the person who resigns from a job which 
he finds too taxing to be able to tolerate any further. 
This type of response may also entail procrastination 
in tackling unpleasant aspects of the work, excessive 
sick leave and staff turnover, unfinished projects, and 
over-delegation of work. 
Although these avoidance or escape tactics may be 
functional in certain circumstances when a person simply 
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cannot handle the situation or when temporary relief is 
essential, they are generally inappropriate because they do not 
solve the problem or strengthen the person's resistance .in 
the future. 
2.2.4 Ignoring the demand 
This may be a long-term response to chronic stress. 
Complete inaction in the face of demands made upon a 
person may represent a learned helplessness or hopelessness 
in the face of circumstances over which he is convinced he 
has no control. In this case apathy may be viewed either 
as a lack of coping or as a form of coping with a 
situation which the person is incapable of changing. 
The modes of coping described above are used by everyone 
to varying degress. Some direct action responses are 
functional and deal with ~he problem on a long-term basis, 
some have short-term value, while others are dysfunctional 
and leave the problem unsolved. What is needed are coping 
responses which equip people to cope effectively on a 
long-term basis. 
2.3 INDIRECT ACTION, OR PALLIATION 1 AS A FORM OF COPING 
' 
When a person feels that he cannot immediately change or 
avoid the situation causing stress, he may use palliative 
ways of coping which reduce the discomfort and moderate 
the distress. 
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Lazarus (4) referred to two modes of palliation,· namely, 
symptom-directed palliation and intrapsychic palliation. 
2.3.1 Symptom-directed palliation methods moderate the 
psychological symptoms of stress, for example anxiety 
and frustration, and the physiological effects, such as 
muscular tension, increased blood pressure and fatigue, 
without actually dealing with the sources of stress. 
Included among the palliatives are relaxation techniques, 
exercise and various forms of recreation, all of which are 
functional ways of reducing the effects of stress. They 
are particularly valuable when stress is inevitable. 
Of more dubious value are the use of tranquillizers, 
sedatives and other drugs, and alcohol and smoking, as a 
means of obtaining relief from the symptoms of stress. 
When used in moderation, these palliatives may have the 
desired effect, but when used excessively they become 
dysfunctional and cause such serious problems as alcohol 
abuse, drug dependence and a break-down in health. 
2.3.2 Intrapsychic palliation involves the use of cognitive 
defence mechanisms by which a person helps himself to cope 
with stress by distorting reality and deceiving himself 
about the dangers he faces. The actual threats persist 
but the ways they are perceived by the individual are 
modified in order to reduce discomfort. 
.. 
According to Burgoyne (5) cognitive defence mechanisms 
operate to some degree in all· people. They can result in 
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inappropriate behaviour which may increase stress. In 
addition they tend to leave people less able to cope with 
stress in the long term. They may, however, be functional 
if they buy time necessary for survival or for the learning 
of effective forms of coping. 
Denial, intellectualisati~n and rationalization are three 
examples of defence mechanisms. In denial, anxiety is reduced 
for a while by the person simply denying that the problem or 
threat exists. Often denial is accompanied by the discrediting 
of other people involved in the situation {e.g. the doctor 
giving the bad news about an illness) or by the distortion of 
information. Denial is usually regarded as an ineffective 
coping response because it leaves the cause of the stress 
unattended to. Under certain circumstances, when a person 
needs time in which to be able to adjust to a stressor, 
denial may be a constructive coping response. 
By means of intellectualisation an individual gains emotional 
detachment from a threatening situation by treating it in 
abstract, intellectual terms. This makes it more remote and 
less emotionally taxing. For example, a physician may treat 
his heart attack patient as emotionally neutral and avoid 
identifying_ too closely with the patient or his suffering. The 
danger of intellectualisation is that it may become so ingrained 
that it interferes with normal emotf.onal attachments and 
experiences. 
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According to Dobson, rationalization involves 
••••• finding a suitable excuse for doing 
something which will be repudiated by the 
superego. It also means replacing a motive 
which would receive social disapprobation 
by one which is logically and socially 
acceptable. Rationalization gives the 
appearance of havin~ acted rationally 
or sensibly ••••• (6) 
Thus, by rationalization, a person may deceive himself that 
failure to succeed in a particular demanding situation does 
not really matter, when in fact it does matter. Such a 
rationalization would be an effective stress palliative if the 
person were not conscious of rationalizing. Once he became 
aware of the fact that he was deceiving himself, the defence 
mechanism would cease to be a palliative. 
3• FACTORS INFLUENCING THE COPING PROCESS 
Meichenbaum (7) identified three key factors that play a 
particularly important role in the coping process. 
3.1 A sense of personal control 
According to Meichenbaum, a number of studies have shown 
that people who do not perceive themselves to have the 
ability to influence a threatening situation significantly, 
are liable to experience much greater stress reactions 
than those who feel they have some control over the 
situation. The level of stress is reduced by the mere 
belief in one's ability to exercise some control. An 
·example of this, quoted by Meichenbaum, is the person 
who says, 'If I could stop the roller-coaster, I wouldn't 
want to get off !' 
- ------- ---------------------------
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For some, a sense of personal control in trying circumstances 
comes from their personal belief system or religious faith 
which provides a potential means of coping with stress. 
People vary in their degree of perceived personal control. 
Some are pessimistic about their ability to exercise control 
over situations, believing themselves to have little influence 
over their circumstances. At the other end of the scale are 
confident, optimistic people, with an internal locus of control 
and the belief that they can generally exert control over 
their invironment. In their study of 2300 people in Chicago, 
Irearlin and Schooler (8) ident'.ified 'good copers' and 'poor 
copers•. The good copers were generally able to meet 
threatening events successfully, while the poor copers were 
frequently thro\'Vll off balance even by minor demands made on 
them because of their lack of confidence in their control 
over the circumstances. 
People with low expectations of their ability to cope or 
exercise control may develop what has been called learned 
helplessness, the belief that nothing they do will make any 
difference to the outcome of events or off set the stressful 
situation. (9) 
3.2 The availability of information 
Generally, the more information one has about the nature, 
duration, consequences and warning signs of a stressfuk · 
event, the more likely one is to be able to find ways of 
'preventing, reducing or cop~ng with stress associated 
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with that event. Knowing what to expect usually aids the 
coping process. This was shown by Johnson and Leventhal (10) 
who compared the stress reactions and coping responses of 
patients undergoing uncomfortable and difficult medical 
procedures. Those who were prepared beforehand by being 
given information about what they would experience were able 
to cope better than those lacking preparatory information. 
Likewise, information about possible crises that may occur, 
and contingency plans for meeting emergencies, assist a person 
to cope with stressful events when they occur. For example, 
astronauts who have trained to meet every conceivable 
emergency, are able to cope calmly with an emergency and treat it 
almost as a routine situation. 
3.3 Social support 
The supportiveness of other people can help a person to 
cope with stress. Meichenbaum (11) quoted a study in which 
-- -
it was found that women who had a close relationship with 
a husband or friend were 90% less likely to suffer 
depression than women lacking such a relationship. 
On the whole, we manifest less fear and 
stress and greater courage in the presence 
of others than alone. Somehow, the 
presence of others acts as a buffer to 
stress responses. (12) 
The quality of these social contacts is an important factor 
~-------- -~ 
influencin& the coping process. According to Moss (13), 
.,. _ __,,.~-~~....-_,,,.~ =. - - . ·- -- ~-}. 
people are said to have social support if they have a 
··-relationship with one or more persons that is characterised 
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by relatively frequent interactions, by strong positive feelings, 
and by an ability and a willingness to give and take 
emotional and practical assistance in time of need. 
The extent of the social support available to the individual 
person is also a major factor affecting coping. People with 
a variety of support systems tend to be best off because they 
---·-=--- --~-~,.,---::·~-_............- "'-- ,,, __ ::.__o o.'"~ • _- __ -_;;-_:~--~-·-·- _ .. ~--
are able to draw from the appropriate support system, strength 
to cope with diff~ren~ ty_pes of stressors. Examples of these 
support systems are the immediate family, colleagues at 
-------~- --~~~---=~----~~ - -
work, the church group, long-standing personal friends, 
. --o.~~~~ ~~------:--"-.-: _-_,_-:__•_ ···-::- - ·::_-_• - --::__ ·--:=~<-= ~~--~~..,..--_ ~· 
relatives, neighbours, the sports club, and the service club. 
In times of crisis people who are able to share their feelings 
with others, gain a truer perspective of the demands made 
upon them and tend to augment their personal coping resources. 
In particular, identification with others in a group can 
play an important part in reducing or coping with stress. 
4. A TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH TO Th'IANAGING STRESS 
According to Cox (14) the chain of events leading to stress 
may be broken in various ways. The key elements in the 
transactional model of stress are the person's cognitive 
appraisal of the demands made upon him, his resources 
for coping with those demands, and the consequences of 
not coping. When these can be altered from negative to 
positive appraisals, the stress is alleviated. Such ~ 
12 
modifications may be brought about by the alteration 
of the actual demand; the alteration of the actual 
ability to cope; supporting the existing ability to.cope; 
the alteration of the actual importance of coping; and 
the alteration of the perceptions of demand, capability, 
and the importance of coping. 
4 .• 1 Alteration of actual demand 
If, for example, stress is caused by too much work or 
too little work, work that is too demanding or work that 
is too simple, an alteration in the-nature of the person's 
duties and the demands made upon him could alleviate 
his stress. If the source of his stress, is poor working 
conditions, the improvement of those conditions would tend 
to reduce the stress. 
4.2 Alteration of the actual ability to cope 
This may be brought about by training and the development of 
relevant skills. If, for instance, difficulties, and 
consequent stress, arise from weaknesses in decision making 
and resolving interpersonal conflicts, training in these 
skills would enable the person to cope better and reduce 
the stress. Innovation and change make new demands and 
may call for additional knowledge and new skills on the 
part of the worker, if he is to cope. Likewise, someone 
moving into a new type of work usually experiences a need 
... 
for additional skills. A teacher making the transition to 
his first principalship needs to acquire a greater mastery --
/ 
13 
of such skills as planning, communicating, delegating, 
:~-.~·-T~:~ .,,.-c.;: ~·-:.--:;-_·-=-"=;'"~".'..7_~~~-~·--~=-_:--:;-:---~----::-'- "O 
time ma~;gement~·-and ,-i~te~vi~v;ing~,""--i"f he is to meet the 
new demands made upon him. ~bility to cope may also be 
enhanced by the deepening of spiritual resources and by 
improving one's physical resources through exercise, good 
-- .. -- -~.··· . -- --- - -- . -~.-::~-~:.-o:·~_-;-~;-'.·;:'"_~-·~_;::o 
nutrition, and relaxation. 
4.3 Supporting existing ability to cope 
,./1 This may involve deriving practical and emotional support 
from others who are close to one and can be trusted. 
In this way, a hard-pressed principal may be strengthened 
by the encouragement and moral support obtained from his 
deputy, the school committee, the inspector, and his wife 
and familyo It may help him to maximise and draw upon 
his existing resources in meeting the demands made 
upon him. 
4.4 Alteration of the actual importance of coping 
If the failure to cope satisfactorily with a particular 
demand becomes unimportant (or much less important), the 
situation will cease to be a source of stress. Thus, a 
change of priorities or standards of performance expected, 
may have this effect. Changing certain school rules 
whicl:l- have proved exceptionally difficult to enforce 
and a source of conflict and friction, would alleviate 
stress emanating from the situation concerned. 
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4.5 Alteration of perceptions of demand, capability and 
importance of coping 
~.5.1 The experience of stress is related to a J2_erceived imbalance 
between demand and capability in a situation in which 
coping is perceived to be important. The alteration of 
perceptions, consequently, is an important stress management 
techniqueo It may be the case that one is overestimating 
the severity of the demand or underestimating the adequacy 
of one's capability of coping successfully with the 
demand. One's perception of the importance of coping may 
be exaggerated. 
What is needed in these cases is an intervention which 
puts demand, capability ~nd importance of coping in truer 
perspective and results in more realistic perceptions. 
What, at first sight, may appear to be a mountain, may 
turn out to be a molehill. What seemed to be far too 
difficult to handle, may prove to be well within one's 
capabilities. What appeared to be a weakness unique to 
one's own school, may in fact be an unsolved problem 
shared by all other schools in the area. 
Discussion with others, informally or in a counselling 
situation, helps an individual to achieve more realistic 
appraisals and perceptions of situations. It may also 
help a person to establish goals and priorities in life, 
and to achieve greater self-understanding of his personal 
resources. This may have the effect of developing ... 
more positive attitudes and greater self~confidence. 
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There are other ways of altering perceptions, through the 
use of drugs such as nicotine, alcohol and tranquillizers, 
but thes.e carry with them the dangers of psychological and 
physical dependence and are not te be recom~::ended. 
' 
4.5.2 Burbach (15) referred to a number of cognitive 
distortions which affect people's appraisals of the 
situations in which they find themselves. People who 
manage to deal with these distortions and 'straighten 
out'vt~! _ _!~k;~~~~~i;-;rceptions, w:t; the) 
result that stress is either reduced or coped with 
'-/~ - . -- .....___ -··--- '----" - ·-- . 
more effectively. 
-
The following are examples of cognitive distortions 
mentioned by Burbach. 






whi te; regarding yourself as a total failure if your 
performance is not perfect. 
Over-generalisation - seeing a single negative event 
as a pattern of failure. 
Mental filter - allowing a single negative detail to 
colour the thinking about all other reality. 
Disqualifying the positive - rejecting positive 
experiences that do not match up with a generally 
pessimistic outlook. 
Jumping to conclusions - making negative interpretations 
even though there is no definite supporting evidence. 
Magnification (catastrophizing) or minimization -
exaggerating the importance of some things (such as 
your mistakes or the achievements of others), and 
inappropriately minimizing such things as your own 
good qualities or other people's imperfections. 
.. 
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• Emotional reasoning - assuming that negative feelings 
necessarily reflect reality. 'I feel it, therefore it 
must be true'. 
0 Personalization - seeing yourself as responsible. for a 
negative event which you were in fact not primarily 
responsible for. 
406 Cox emphasised the very individual and personal nature of 
stress and its causes. It is the result of a transaction 
between a person and his situation. (16) It follows that 
ways of preventing or alleviating stress need to be 
tailored to fit the individual. It is possible that 
certain measures designed to combat stress could actually 
increase it in some people. For example, taking away a 
particular element in the work may reduce stress for some 
workers who find the task concerned threatening. Other 
workers may react entirely differently to the removal of 
the task which they find challenging, stimulating and 
fulfilling, and perceive the change as a source of stress. 
Cooper and Marshall (17) emphasised the desirability of the 
individual himself taking the initiative in the management 
of stress because only he has full information about his 
stress. Under these circumstances loss of self~esteem is 
also less likely than if other people initiate the 
intervention. 
5. COPING WITH STRESS . . RESEARCH SURVEYS x 
5.1 In their survey of 1207 school administrators in the 
United States, Tung and Koch (18) asked the administrators 
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to enumerate the ways they personally found ·useful in 
handling the tensions and pressures of the job. The 
responses were analysed in three categories and there was 
a significant preponderance of palliation over direct 
action methods of coping. 
5.1.1 Physiological activities 
More than 50% of the respondents used physiological 
techniques as palliatives for coping with stress. These 
techniques could be divided into three categories. 
Firstly, there were those activities involving physical 
work or exercise. ~xamples were jogging, sport, walking, 
gardening, and general exercise programmes. Secondly, 
there were activities in which the respondents purposely 
isolated themselves from their work environment, in their 
. homes, at week-end retreats away from home, and by 
establishing social friendships outside of their working 
environment. Thirdly, there were relaxation mechanisms 
such as meditation and yoga. 
5.1.2 Cognitive activities 
These were used by .approximately 40% of the respondents, 
(and referred to the positive attitudes and philosophies 
I of life which helped the individual to cope with the 
tensions of the job. These. included cultivating an 
optimistic attitude; establishing realistic goals and 
recognizing one's limitations; sharing problems with 
colleagues, spouses and other members of the family; 
.. -
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maintaining a sense of humour; and applying one's 
religious faith and using prayer to overcome adversity. 
5.1.3 Acquisition of interpersonal and management skills 
Although less than 10% of the administrators quoted the 
acquisition of skills as useful in coping with stress, 
it is likely that the exercise of these skills could 
assist significantly in preventing certain forms of work 
stress. Time management skills, for instance, are of 
value in dealing with those stressors related to control 
over time (too heavy a work load, interruptions, many 
meetings). A principal's role involves many inter-
personal contacts, which are potentially stressful, and 
the improvement of communication, conflict resolution 
and other interpersonal skills could contribute 
substantially to stress management. 
5.2 The National Association of Secondary School Principals' 
survey of the Senior High School Principalship in 1978 
(19) referred to the techniques used by a group of 
'effective principals' in handling stress. 
The most frequently used approach was to get away from 
the'stressful environment, at school itself by leaving 
~~-~ 
the office and walking around the buildings or grounds, 
'---------------~--~--~-~~~~ -~~-~--~ 
and after school by becoming involved in some form of 
"--.,._ .. -.._o·-"- ...,,,=.,~--------~- - . -- --- - - ~-~c-. 
recreational activity. The second important approach 
..:. ___ .,~ <--'-'-,.~-._,___..,._,_,,~~-=-·~~- ~..,. .......... ~ - - ~---
used by principals was to develop a sense of perspect~ve 
19 
about the problem of stress. This perspective included 
an acceptance of the inevitability of some stress, 
a realistic appraisal of what it was pos~ible to accomplish 
on the job, and a sense of humour and optimism. 
A third approach used by a minority of principals was 
to discuss the stress with others, including pr,ofessional 
colleagues or their spouses. It was surmised that this 
method of relieving stress was not turned to by the 
principals more often because admitting to stress would 
possibly reflect poorly on them. It was noted in the 
Survey that this tendency not to share problems with 
others emphasised the isolation of the principal's 
position. 
5.3 Kiev and Kohn's survey of executive stress on behalf 
of the American Management Association in 1979 (20) 
called for responses to 17 ways in which a manager 
could cope with work-related stress. These techniques 
were grouped into four categories self-awareness, 
on-the-job techniques, away-from-the-job techniques, 
and programmes/books. 1338 respondents from top 
management were asked to indicate whether or not they 
used each technique in dealing with stress and to 
name the three methods they found to be most effective. 
The results were as follows: 
20 
AMACOM EXECUTIVE STRESS SURVEY STRESS COPING TECHNIQUES 
Extent Used 
SELF-AWARENESS 
• Develop sensitivity to my 
physical and emotional responses. 
Become aware of what are stress-
produc ing situations for me. 
• Analyse stress-producing 
situation and decide what is 
worth worrying about and 
what isn't. 
ON THE JOB 
• Establish daily goals and 
set priorities to accomplish 
the most important objectives. 
• Delegate responsibil.i ty instead 
of carrying entire load myself. 
• Withdraw physically from 
situation temporarily/take 
a break. 
• Work harder. 
• Talk with colleagues or 
others on the job. 









• Engage in engrossing non-work 8 
activities. Separate work from 
home life • 
• Allot time for rest and 12 
relaxation each day. 
• Engage in physical exercise. 7 
• Build regular sleeping 9 
and eating habits. 
• Take a number of short vacations. 13 
• Talk with spouse or friend. 6 
PROGRAMME/BOOKS 
• Transcendental meditation/ 
relaxation exercises. 
• Psychiatric treatment/ 
psychotherapy•' 
• Seminars on "stress management". 
• Books on "how to relax" how / " 





























































It is significant that the most extensively used and effective 
methods quoted by the managers were those that improved or 
...... ~---~0---~·~ ,,.,,,~~R-_- .:-"7• -- •. • 
supported their abiiTty ··to cope and those that altered their 
~-apjYraisar·ar the demands made upon them. 
Falling into the first category of improving the ability to 
cope with the work were such actions as delegating responsibility, 
instead of retaining the entire burden, and learning to establish 
daily goals and priorities in order to achieve the most 
important objectives. 
A number of the other effective coping techniques involved 
actions which positively influence the cognitive appraisal 
of demands. Examples of these are analysing diffiqult 
situations realistically so as to keep the threat to one in 
its true perspective, talking with friends or spouse in order 
to obtain a more objective assessment of a situation, and 
using self-analysis to establish clearly what situations are 
potentially threatening. 
6. PRACTICAL GUIDELINES FOR COPING WITH STRESS 
There is no single formula for managing stress. It is 
more effective to possess and use a variety of coping 
methods to suit the particular circumstances. Numerous 
writers have suggested general guidelines for managing 
stress, and some of the most commonly expressed ideas 
22 
6.1 Gm~lch emphasized the importance of identifying stressors 
and distinguishing those that are inhere.nt in the job 
~-2 
and must be tolerated, from those that can be controlled 
and resolved. He quoted the well known prayer to 
illustrate the point : 
' 2 Grant us the courage to change the 
~ things we can, 
The serenity to accept those we cannot, 
And the wisdom to know the difference. (21) 
With regard to the stressors which can be controlled, 
what is needed is tackling the stressors with a view 
to preventing or eliminating the stress. The following 
are examples of steps . that may-be taken : 
• 
• 
Anticipate potentially stressful periods and plan 
for them. 
Engage in training and self-development in order to 
acquire or increase the skills necessary for success. 
Apart from the specifically educational skills and 
knowledge associated with the position, school 
principals need to develop the following types of 
skills, each of which has a bearing on stress 
I 
management : 







• conflict management 
• interpersonal and group leadership skills 
... 
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• Develop realistic expectations so as to avoid 
unnecessary feelings of failure and frustration. 
• Prevent feelings of isolation. Communicate freely 
with others, sharing your feelings and tal.king out 
your problems. Develop and be involved with social 
support groups. 
• Avoid procrastination which tends to intensify a 
problem and increase anxiety. Tackle the demanding 
situation without delay and gain encouragement and 
motivation.from the progress made. 
• Do not be too future-orientated. Focus on the present 
and achieve a balance between reasonable concern for 





Develop your SEiritual resources as a particularly 
meaningful source of inner strength. 
Learn to say no. The alternative may be to be 
swamped with work and responsibilities that may 
become unmanageable and a source of stress. 
Learn to tolerate and forgive others. Intolerance 
of others leads to frustration and stress. Develop 
understanding and acceptance of other people. 
IdentifX stress management techniques that work for 
you and use them. 
6.3 When the actual causes of stress cannot be dealt with, 
steps can be taken to alleviate the symptoms of stress. 
In this regard people need to accept that a certain 
amount of stress i.s inevitable, normal, and even a 
stimulus to greater effort. Full recognition needs to 
be given to personal achievements in order to keep a 
sense of proportion concerning un9olved problems and 
failures. Some people find it helpful to take short ... 
- -- ---- -------------------------
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short breaks from work that they experience as stressful. 
Cultivating outside interests in order to avoid dwelling 
on work problems is another way of alleviating stress. 
Most writers offering guidance on the management of 
stress give prominence to physical fitness, relaxation 
and proper nutrition as means of equipping body and 
mind to withstand the effects of stress. 
6.3.1 Physical fitness 
The holistic approach to health emphasizes the 
necessity of harmony between the body, mind and 
spirit, which should be regarded as a single unit 
rather than separate entities. The Ancient Greeks 
understood this well and referred to 'a healthy 
mind in a healthy body'. Illness or stress may 
result when these parts of the whole body are out of 
balance. There are implications for handling stress. 
For example, exercise can help to relieve tension 
and absorb some of the effects of stress. 
6.3.2 Relaxation 
Relaxation is another way of relieving tension and 
reducing the level of physiological arousal and stress. 
For this reason it is an important element in most 
stress control programmes. The objective is to be 
able to relax deeply and quickly in order to cope 
with stress as soon as it is perceived. Many· people 
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use drugs, such as tranquillizers, to relieve the 
physiological and mental tensions of the stress 
reaction, but this carries with it the danger of 
side effects. Many self-activated relaxation 
techniques have been devised in order to help people 
to develop the skill of relaxing as a means of deai'ing 
effectively with muscular tension and other stress 
responses. 
Mental relaxation is an important part of most relaxation 
techniques, and it is practised and achieved in a 
-
variety of ways, including pleasant mental imagery, 
meditation, and recreational activities away from 
the job. 
Good nutrition 
Proper nutrition is important for good health, which 
in turn gives the body the best possible chance of 
coping with stress. 
Much has been written on the subject of healthy eating 
habits, but it appears that common threads running 
through this literature are : 
0 
• 
Maintain your recom~ended weight 
Eat a balanced, varied diet • 
• Limit the· amount of caffeine, salt, sugar and saturated 
fats, and cholesterol taken in. 




There is no simple recipe for coping with stress because 
of its very individual and personal nature. Stress is 
caused by many factors, and its management must therefore 
be approached simultaneously on various fronts. The 
strategies employed should include direct action forms> 
of coping, which attempt to confront and deal with the 
sources of stress, and palliative coping actions which 
reduce the discomfort experienced during times of stress. 
Recent perceptual models of stress lay emphasis on the 
alteration of perceptions as a powerful means of coping with 
stress. Any methods, such as social support or counselling, 
which help a person to alter his negative cognitive 
appraisal of his ability to cope with the demands made 
upon him, will have a significant effect on eliminating 
or reducing his stress. 
Successful coping with stress has a positive influence 
on a person because it not only stimulates personal 
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